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
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
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THE
A N C I E N T H I S T O R Y

OF THE

**EGYPTIANS,
CARTHAGINIANS,
ASSYRIANS,
BABYLONIANS,**

|| **MEDES & PERSIANS,
MACEDONIANS,
AND
GRECIANS.**

BY CHARLES ROLLIN,
LATE PRINCIPAL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF PARIS, &c.

IN FOUR VOLUMES.
ILLUSTRATED WITH PLATES.

VOL. II.

HARTFORD :

PUBLISHED BY SILAS ANDRUS.

HART & LINDOLN, PRINT. MIDDLETOWN.

.....

1815.

KF 19120



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BOOK SIXTH CONTINUED.

THE
HISTORY
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PERSIANS AND GRECIANS.

CHAPTER II.

THE HISTORY OF XERXES, INTERMIXED WITH THAT OF THE GREEKS.

XERXES' reign lasted but 12 years, but abounds with great events:

SECTION I.

XERXES REDUCES EGYPT, &c. &c.

XERXES * having ascended the throne, employed the first year of his reign in carrying on the preparations begun by his father for the reduction of Egypt. He also confirmed to the Jews at Jerusalem all the privileges granted them by his father, and particularly that which assigned them the tribute of Samaria, for the supplying of them with victims for the temple of God.

† In the second year of his reign he marched against the Egyptians, and having reduced and subdued those rebels, he made the yoke of their subjection more heavy; then giving the government of that province to his brother Achemenes, he returned about the latter end of the year to Susa.

‡ Herodotus, the famous historian, was born this same year at Halicarnassus in Caria; for he was 53 years old when the Peloponnesian war first began.

§ Xerxes, puffed up with his success against the Egyptians, determined to make war against the Grecians. He ¶ did not intend, he said, to buy the figs of Attica which were very excellent, any longer, because he would eat no more of them till he was master of the country. But before he engaged in an enterprise of that importance, he thought proper to assemble his council, and take the advice of all the greatest and most illustrious persons of his court. He laid before them the design he had of making war against Greece, and acquainted them with his motives, which were, the de-

* A. M. 3519. Ant. J. C. 485. Her. l. vii. c. 5. Jos. Antiq. l. xi. c. 5.

† Her. l. vii. c. 7. A. M. 3520. Ant. J. C. 484.

‡ Aul. Gel. l. 15. c. 23.

§ Her. l. vii. c. 8—19.

¶ Plut. in Apophth. p. 179.

sire of imitating the example of his predecessors, who had all of them distinguished their names and reigns by noble enterprises; the obligation he was under to revenge the insolence of the Athenians, who had presumed to fall upon Sardis, and reduce it to ashes; the necessity he was under to avenge the disgrace his country had received at the battle of Marathon; and the prospect of the great advantages that might be reaped from this war, which would be attended with the conquest of Europe, the most rich and fertile country in the universe. He added further, that this war had been resolved on by his father Darius, and he meant only to follow and execute his intentions. He concluded with promising ample rewards to those who should distinguish themselves by their valour in the expedition.

Mardonius, the same person that had been so unsuccessful in Darius' reign, grown neither wiser nor less ambitious by his ill success, and extremely affecting the command of the army, was the first who gave his opinion. He began by extolling Xerxes above all the kings that had gone before or should succeed him. He endeavoured to show the indispensable necessity of avenging the dishonour done to the Persian name; he disparaged the Grecians, and represented them as a cowardly, timorous people, without courage, without forces, or experience in war. For a proof of what he said, he mentioned his own conquest of Macedonia, which he exaggerated in a very vain and ostentatious manner, as if that people had submitted to him without any resistance. He presumed even to affirm, that not any of the Grecian nations would venture to come out against Xerxes, who would march with all the forces of Asia; and if they had the temerity to present themselves before him, they would learn to their cost that the Persians were the bravest and most warlike nation in the world.

The rest of the council, perceiving that this flattering discourse extremely pleased the king, were afraid to contradict it, and all kept silence. This was almost an unavoidable consequence of Xerxes' manner of proceeding. A wise prince, when he proposes an affair in council, and really desires that every one should speak his true sentiments, is extremely careful to conceal his own opinion, that he may put no constraint upon that of others, but leave them entirely at liberty. Xerxes, on the contrary, had openly discovered his own inclination, or rather resolution to undertake the war. When a prince acts in this manner, he will always find artful flatterers, who being eager to insinuate themselves and to please, and ever ready to comply with his passions, will not fail to second his opinion with specious and plausible reasons; whilst those that would be capable of giving good council are restrained by fear; there being very few courtiers who love their prince well enough, and have sufficient courage to venture to displease him, by disputing what they know to be his taste or opinion.

The excessive praises given by Mardonius to Xerxes, which are the usual language of flatterers, ought to have rendered him suspicious to the king and made him apprehend, that under an appearance of zeal for his glory, that nobleman endeavoured to cloak his own ambition, and the violent desire he had to command the army. But these sweet and flattering words, which glide like a serpent under flowers, are so far from displeasing princes, that they captivate and charm them. They do not consider that men flatter and praise them, because they believe them weak and vain enough to suffer themselves to be deceived by commendations that bear no proportion to their merits and actions.

This behaviour of the king made the whole council mute. In this general silence, Artabanus, the king's uncle, a prince very venerable for his age and prudence, made the following speech: "Permit me, great Prince,"

says he, addressing himself to Xerxes, " to deliver my sentiments to you
 " on this occasion, with a liberty suitable to my age and to your interest.
 " When Darius, your father and my brother, first thought of making war
 " against the Scythians, I used all my endeavours to divert him from it.
 " I need not tell you what that enterprise cost, or what was the success of
 " it. The people you are going to attack are infinitely more formidable
 " than the Scythians. The Grecians are esteemed the very best troops in
 " the world, either by land or sea. If the Athenians alone could defeat
 " the numerous army commanded by Datis and Artaphernes, what ought
 " we to expect from all the states of Greece united together? You design
 " to pass from Asia into Europe, by laying a bridge over the sea; and
 " what will become of us, if the Athenians, proving victorious, should ad-
 " vance to this bridge with their fleet, and break it down? I still tremble
 " when I consider, that, in the Scythian expedition, the life of the king
 " your father, and the safety of all his army, were reduced to depend upon
 " the fidelity of one single man; and that if Hystiæus the Milesian had, in
 " compliance with the strong instances made to him, consented to break
 " down the bridge which had been laid over the Danube, the Persian em-
 " pire had been entirely ruined. Do not expose yourself, Sir, to the like
 " danger, especially since you are not obliged to do it. Take time at least
 " to reflect upon it. When we have maturely deliberated upon an affair,
 " whatever happens to be the success of it, we have nothing to impute to
 " ourselves. Precipitation, besides its being imprudent, is almost always
 " unfortunate, and attended with fatal consequences. Above all, do not
 " suffer yourself, great prince, to be dazzled with the vain splendor of im-
 " aginary glory, or with the pompous appearance of your troops. The
 " highest and most lofty trees have the most reason to dread the thunder.
 " As God alone is truly great, he is an enemy to * pride, and takes pleas-
 " ure in humbling every thing that exalteth itself: and very often the most
 " numerous armies fly before an handful of men, because he inspires these
 " with courage, and scatters terror among the others."

Artabanes, after having spoken thus to the king, turned himself towards Mardonius, and reproached him with his want of sincerity or judgement, in giving the king a notion of the Grecians so directly contrary to truth; and showed how extremely he was to blame for desiring rashly to engage the nation in a war, which nothing but his own views of interest and ambition could tempt him to advise. " If a war be resolved upon," added he, " let the king, whose life is dear to us all, remain in Persia; and do you, since you so ardently desire it, march at the head of the most numerous army that can be assembled. In the mean time, let your children and mine be given up as a pledge, to answer for the success of the war. If the issue of it be favourable, I consent that mine be put to death; † but, if it proves otherwise, as I well foresee it will, then I desire that your children and you yourself, on your return, may be treated in such a manner as you deserve, for the rash counsel you have given your master."

Xerxes, who was not accustomed to have his sentiments contradicted in this manner, fell into a rage; " Thank the gods," says he to Artabanes, " that you are my father's brother; were it not for that, you should this moment suffer the just reward of your audacious behaviour. But I will

* Φίλει ο Θεος τα υπερηχόντα πάντα καλύψει, κ γαρ εις φρονεσει αλλοις μεγα ο Θεος, η εαυτου.

† Why should the children be punished for their father's faults?

“punish you for it in another manner, by leaving you here among the women, whom you too much resemble in your cowardice and fear, whilst I march at the head of my troops, where my duty and glory call me.”

Artabanus had expressed his sentiments in very respectful and inoffensive terms: Xerxes nevertheless was extremely offended. It is * the misfortune of princes, spoiled by flattery, to look upon every thing as dry and austere, that is sincere and ingenuous; and to regard all counsel, delivered with a generous and disinterested freedom, as a seditious presumption. They do not consider, that even a good man never dares to tell them all he thinks, or discover the whole truth; especially in things that may be disagreeable to their humour: and that what they stand most in need of, is a sincere and faithful friend, that will conceal nothing from them. A prince ought to think himself very happy, if in his whole reign he finds but one man born with that degree of generosity, who certainly ought to be considered as the most valuable treasure of the state; as he is (if the expression may be admitted) both the most necessary, and at the same time, the most rare instrument † of government.

Xerxes himself acknowledged this upon the occasion we are speaking of. When the first emotions of his anger were over, and he had time to reflect on his pillow upon the different counsels that were given him, he confessed he had been to blame to give his uncle such harsh language, and was not ashamed to confess his fault the next day in open council, ingenuously owning, that the heat of his youth, and his want of experience, had made him negligent in paying the regard due to a prince so worthy of respect as Artabanus, both for his age and wisdom; and declaring at the same time, that he was come over to his opinion, notwithstanding a dream he had had in the night, wherein a vision had appeared to him, and warmly exhorted him to undertake that war. All the lords who composed the council, were ravished to hear the king speak in this manner; and to testify their joy, they fell prostrate before him, striving who should most extol the glory of such a proceeding. Nor could their praises on such an occasion be at all suspected; † for it is no hard matter to discern, whether the praises given to princes proceed from the heart, and are founded upon truth, or whether they drop from the lips only, as an effect of mere flattery and deceit. That sincere and humble declaration of the king's, far from appearing as a weakness in him, was looked upon by them as the effort of a great soul, which rises above its faults, in bravely confessing them, by way of reparation and atonement. They admired the nobleness of this procedure the more, as they knew that princes educated, like Xerxes, in a vain haughtiness and false glory, are never disposed to own themselves in the wrong, and generally make use of their authority to justify, with pride and obstinacy, whatever faults they have committed through ignorance or imprudence. We may venture, I think, to say, that it is more glorious to rise in this manner, than it would be never to have fallen. Certainly there is nothing greater, and at the same time more rare and uncommon, than to see a mighty and powerful prince, and that in the time of his greatest prosperity, acknowledge his faults, when he happens to commit any, without seeking

* Ita formatis principum auribus ut aspera quæ utilia, nec quicquam nisi jucundum et lætum accipiant. Tacit. Hist. l. ii. c. 56.

† Nullum majus boni imperii instrumentum quam bonus amicus. Tacit. Hist. l. iv. c. 7.

‡ Nec occultum est quando ex veritate, quando adumbrata lætitia facta imperatorum celebrantur. Tacit. Annal. l. iv. c. 31.

pretexts or excuses to cover them; pay homage to truth, even when it is against him, and condemns him; and leave other princes, who have a false delicacy concerning their grandeur, the shame of always abounding with errors and defects, and of never owning that they have any.

The night following, the same phantom, if we may believe Herodotus, appeared again to the king, and repeated the same solicitations with new menaces and threatenings. Xerxes communicated what passed to his uncle; and, in order to find out whether this vision was divine or not, entreated him earnestly to put on the royal robes, to ascend the throne, and afterwards to take his place in his bed for the night. Artabanes hereupon discoursed very sensibly and rationally with the king upon the vanity of dreams: and then coming to what personally regarded him, * "I look upon it," says he, "almost equally commendable to think well one's self, or to hearken with docility to the good counsels of others. You have both these qualities, great prince; and if you follow the natural bent of your own temper, it would lead you entirely to sentiments of wisdom and moderation. You never take any violent measures or resolutions, but when the arts of evil counsellors draw you into them, or the poison of flattery misleads you; in the same manner as the ocean, which of itself is calm and serene, and never disturbed but by the extraneous impulse of other bodies. What afflicted me in the answer you made me the other day, when I delivered my sentiments freely in council, was not the personal affront to me, but the injury you did yourself, by making so wrong a choice between the different counsels that were offered; rejecting that which led you to sentiments of moderation and equity; and embracing the other, which, on the contrary, tended only to nourish pride, and to inflame ambition."

Artabanes, through complaisance, passed the night in the king's bed, and had the same vision which Xerxes had before; that is, in his sleep he saw a man, who made him severe reproaches, and threatened him with the greatest misfortunes, if he continued to oppose the king's intentions. This so much affected him that he came over to the king's first opinion, believing that there was something divine in these repeated visions; and the war against the Grecians was resolved upon. These circumstances I relate, as I find them in Herodotus.

Xerxes, in the sequel, did but ill support this character of moderation. We shall find that he had but very short intervals of wisdom and reason, which shone out only for a moment, and then gave way to the most culpable and extravagant excesses. We may judge, however, even from thence, that he had very good natural parts and inclinations. But the most excellent qualities are soon spoiled and corrupted by the poison of flattery, and the possession of absolute and unlimited power: † *Vi dominationis convulsus*.

It is a fine sentiment in a minister of state, to be less affected with an affront to himself, than with the wrong done his master by giving him evil and pernicious counsel.

Mardonius' counsel was pernicious; because, as Artabanes observes, it tended only to nourish and increase that spirit of haughtiness and violence

* This thought is in Hesiod, *Opera et Dies*, v. 293. Cic. *pro Cluent.* n. 84. et *Tit. Liv.* l. xxii. n. 19. *Sæpe ego audivi, milites, cum primum esse virum, qui ipse consulat quid in rem sit; secundum eum, qui bene monenti obediat; qui nec ipse consulere, nec alteri parere sciat, cum extremi ingenii esse.*

† Tacit.

in the prince, which was but too prevalent in him already, *ὄρεται αὐτόν;* and * in that it disposed and accustomed his mind still to carry his views and desires beyond his present fortune, still to be aiming at something farther, and to set no bounds to his ambition. † This is the predominate passion of those men whom we usually call conquerors; and whom according to the language of the holy scripture, we might call, with greater propriety † “robbers of nations.” If you consider and examine the whole succession of Persian kings, says Seneca, will you find any one of them that ever stopped his career of his own accord? that was ever satisfied with his past conquests; or that was not forming some new project or enterprise, when death surprised him? Nor ought we to be astonished at such a disposition, adds the same author, for ambition is a gulph and a bottomless abyss, wherein every thing is lost that is thrown in, and where, though you were to heap province upon province, and kingdom upon kingdom, you would never be able to fill up the mighty void.

SECTION II.

XERXES BEGINS HIS MARCH, AND PASSES FROM ASIA INTO EUROPE, BY CROSSING THE STRAITS OF THE HELLESPONT UPON A BRIDGE OF BOATS.

THE war being resolved upon, || Xerxes, that he might omit nothing which might contribute to the success of his undertaking, entered into a confederacy with the Carthaginians, who were at that time the most potent people of the west, and made an agreement with them, that whilst the Persian forces should attack Greece, the Carthaginians should fall upon the Grecian colonies that were settled in Sicily and Italy, in order to hinder them from coming to the aid of the other Grecians. The Carthaginians made Amilcar their general, who did not content himself with raising as many troops as he could in Africa, but, with the money that Xerxes had sent him, engaged a great number of soldiers out of Spain, Gaul, and Italy in his service; so that he collected an army of 300,000 men, and a proportionate number of ships, in order to execute the projects and stipulations of the league.

Thus Xerxes, agreeably to the prophet δ Daniel's prediction, “having, through his great power and his great riches, stirred up all the nations of the then known world against the realm of Greece;” that is to say, of all the west, under the command of Amilcar, and of all the east, that was under his own banner, ¶ set out from Susa, in order to enter upon this war, in the fifth year of his reign, which was the tenth after the battle of Marathon, and marched towards Sardis, the place of rendezvous for the whole land army, whilst the fleet advanced along the coasts of Asia Minor towards the Hellespont.

** Xerxes had given orders to have a passage cut through mount Athos. This is a mountain in Macedonia, now a province of Turkey in Europe,

* *ὡς κελόν ἐπὶ διδασκείν τὴν ψυχὴν πλέον τι διζήσθαι αὐτὸν εἶναι τὰ κεραιότες.*

† Nec hoc Alexandri tantum vitium fuit, quem per Liberi Herculisque vestigia felix temeritas egit; sed omnium, quos fortuna irritavit implendo. Totum regni Persici stemma percense: quem invenies, cui modum imperii satietas fecerit? qui non vitam in aliqua titerius procedendi cogitatione sinierit? Nec id mirum est. Quicquid cupiditati contigit, penitus hauritur et conditur; nec interest quantum eo, quod inexplabile est, congeras. Senec. l. vii. de benef. c. 3.

‡ Jer. iv. 7.

|| A. M. 3523. Ant. J. C. 431.

δ Dan. xi. 2.

¶ Herod. l. vii. c. 26. A. M. 3524. Ant. J. C. 430.

** Herod. l. vii. c. 21, 24.

which extends a great way into the Archipelago, in the form of a Peninsula. It is joined to the land only by an isthmus of about half a league over. We have already taken notice, that the sea in this place was very tempestuous, and occasioned frequent shipwrecks. Xerxes made this his pretext for the orders he gave for cutting through the mountain; but the true reason was the vanity of signalizing himself by an extraordinary enterprize, and by doing a thing that was extremely difficult: as Tacitus says of Nero, *Erat incredibulum cupitor*. Accordingly, Herodotus observes, that this undertaking was more vain-glorious than useful, since he might, with less trouble and expence, have had his vessels carried over the isthmus, as was the practice in those days. The passage he caused to be cut through the mountain was broad enough to let two galleys with three banks of oars each pass through it abreast. * This prince who was extravagant enough to believe, that all nature, and the very elements, were under his command, in consequence of that opinion, writ a letter to mount Athos, in the following terms: "Athos, thou proud and aspiring mountain, that liftest up thy head unto the heavens, I advise thee not to be so audacious, as to put rocks and stones, which cannot be cut, in the way of my workmen. If thou givest them that opposition, I shall cut thee entirely down, and throw thee headlong into the sea." † At the same time, he ordered his labourers to be whipped, in order to make them carry on the work the faster.

‡ A traveller, who lived in the time of Francis the First, and who wrote a book in Latin concerning the singular and remarkable things he had seen in his travels, doubts the truth of this fact, and takes notice, that as he passed near mount Athos, he could perceive no traces or footsteps of the work we have been speaking of.

§ Xerxes, as we have already related, advanced towards Sardis. Having left Cappadocia, and passed the river Halys, he came to Cylene, a city of Phrygia, near which is the source of the Mæander. Pythius, a Lydian, had his residence in this city, and next to Xerxes was the most opulent prince of those times. He entertained Xerxes and his whole army with an incredible magnificence, and made him an offer of all his wealth towards defraying the expences of his expedition. Xerxes, surprised and charmed at so generous an offer, had the curiosity to enquire to what sum his riches amounted. Pythius made answer, that having the design of offering them to his service, he had taken an exact account of them, and that the silver he had by him amounted to 2000 ¶ talents, which make 6,000,000 French money; and the gold to 4,000,000 of darics, ¶ wanting 7000, (that is to say, to 40,000,000 of livres, wanting 70,000, reckoning ten livres French money to the daric.) All this money he offered him, telling him, that his revenues were sufficient for the support of his household. Xerxes made him very hearty acknowledgements, entered into a particular friendship with him, and that he might not be outdone in generosity, instead of accepting his offers, obliged him to accept of a present of the 7000 darics, which were wanting to make up his gold to a round sum of 4,000,000.

After such a conduct as this, who would not think that Pythius' ** peculiar character and particular virtue had been generosity and a noble contempt of riches? And yet he was one of the most penurious princes in the

* Plut. de ira cohib. p. 455.

† Plut. de anim. tranq. p. 470.

‡ Herod. l. vii. c. 26—29.

¶ About L. 1,700,000 Sterling.

** Plutarch calls him Pythius. Plut. de virt. mulier. p. 262.

† Bellon. singul. rer. observ. p. 78.

§ About L. 255,000 Sterling.

world, and who, besides his sordid avarice with regard to himself, was extremely cruel and inhuman to his subjects, whom he kept continually employed in hard and fruitless labour, always digging in the gold and silver mines which he had in his territories. When he was absent from home, all his subjects went with tears in their eyes to the princess his wife, laid their complaints before her, and implored her assistance. Commiserating their condition, she made use of a very extraordinary method to work upon her husband, and to give him a clear sense and a kind of palpable demonstration of the folly and injustice of his conduct. On his return home, she ordered an entertainment to be prepared for him, very magnificent in appearance, but which, in reality, was no entertainment. All the courses and services were of gold and silver, and the prince, in the midst of all these rich dishes and splendid rarities, could not satisfy his hunger. He easily divined the meaning of this engima, and began to consider, that the end of gold and silver was not merely to be looked upon, but to be employed and made use of; and that to neglect, as he had done, the business of husbandry and the tilling of lands, by employing all his people in digging and working of mines, was the direct way to bring a famine both upon himself and his country. For the future, therefore, he only reserved a fifth part of his people for the business of mining. Plutarch has preserved this fact in a treatise, wherein he has collected a great many others, to prove the ability and industry of ladies. We have the same disposition of mind designed in fabulous story, in the example of a *prince who reigned in this very country, for whom every thing that he touched was immediately turned into gold, according to the request which he himself had made to the gods, and who by that means was in danger of perishing with hunger.

† The same prince, who had made such obliging offers to Xerxes, having desired as a favour of him some time afterwards, that out of his five sons who served in his army, he would be pleased to leave him the eldest, in order to be a support and comfort to him in his old age; the king was so enraged at the proposal, though so reasonable in itself, that he caused the eldest son to be killed before the eyes of his father; giving the latter to understand, that it was a favour he spared him and the rest of his children; and then causing the dead body to be cut in two, and one part to be placed on the right, and the other on the left, he made the whole army pass between them, as if he meant to purge and purify it by such a sacrifice. What a monster in nature is a prince of this kind? How is it possible to have any dependence upon the friendship of the great, or to rely upon their warmest professions and protestations of gratitude and service?

‡ From Phrygia Xerxes marched, and arrived at Sardis, where he spent the winter. From hence he sent heralds to all the cities of Greece, except Athens and Lacedæmon, to require them to give him earth and water, which, as we have taken notice before, was the way of exacting and acknowledging submission.

As soon as the spring of the year came on, he left Sardis, and directed his march towards the Hellespont. ¶ Being arrived there, he was desirous to see a naval engagement for his curiosity and diversion. To this end, a throne was erected for him upon an eminence, and, in that situation, seeing all the sea crowded with his vessels, and the land covered with his troops, he at first felt a secret joy diffuse itself through his soul, in surveying with

* Midas, king of Phrygia.

† Herod. l. viii. c. 58, 59. Sen. de ira. l. iii. c. 17.

‡ Herod. l. vii. c. 30—32.

¶ Ibid. c/ 44 et 46.

his own eyes the vast extent of his power, and considering himself as the most happy of mortals; but reflecting soon afterwards, that of so many thousands, in an hundred years time there would not be one living soul remaining, his joy was turned into grief, and he could not forbear weeping at the uncertainty and instability of human things. He might have found another subject of reflection, which would have more justly merited his tears and affliction, had he turned his thoughts upon himself, and considered the reproaches he deserved for being the instrument of shortening that fatal term to millions of people, whom his cruel ambition was going to sacrifice in an unjust and unnecessary war.

Artabanus, who neglected no opportunity of making himself useful to the young prince, and of instilling into him sentiments of goodness for his people, laid hold of this moment, in which he found him touched with a sense of tenderness and humanity, and led him into further reflections upon the miseries with which the lives of most men are attended, and which render them so painful and unhappy, endeavouring at the same time, to make him sensible of the duty and obligation of princes, who, not being able to prolong the natural life of their subjects, ought at least to do all that lies in their power to alleviate the pains and allay the bitterness of it.

In the same conversation, Xerxes asked his uncle, if he still persisted in his first opinion, and if he would still advise him not to make war against Greece, supposing he had not seen the vision, which occasioned him to change his sentiments. Artabanus owned he still had his fears; and that he was very uneasy concerning two things. What are those two things? replied Xerxes. The land and the sea, says Artabanus: the land, because there is no country that can feed and maintain so numerous an army; the sea, because there are no ports capable of receiving such a multitude of vessels. The king was very sensible of the strength of this reasoning; but, as it was now too late to go back, he made answer, that in great undertakings men ought not so narrowly to examine all the inconveniences that may attend them; that if they did, no signal enterprises would ever be attempted; and that if his predecessors had observed so scrupulous and timorous a rule of policy, the Persian empire would never have attained its present height of greatness and glory.

Artabanus gave the king another piece of very prudent advice, which he thought fit to follow no more than he had done the former. This advice was, not to employ the Ionians in his service against the Grecians, from whom they were originally descended, and on which account he ought to suspect their fidelity. Xerxes, however, after these conversations with his uncle, treated him with great friendship, paid him the highest marks of honour and respect, sent him back to Susa to take the care and administration of the empire upon him during his own absence, and to that end vested him with his whole authority.

* Xerxes, at a vast expence, had caused a bridge of boats to be built upon the sea, for the passage of his forces from Asia into Europe. The space that separates the two continents, formerly called the Hellespont, and now called the Strait of the Dardanelles, or of Gallipoli, is seven stadia in breadth, which is near an English mile. A violent storm rising on a sudden, soon after broke down the bridge. Xerxes hearing this news on his arrival, fell into a transport of passion; and in order to avenge himself of so cruel an affront, commanded two pair of chains to be thrown into the sea, as if he meant to shackle and confine it, and that his men should give

* Herod. l. vii. c. 35—56.

it three hundred strokes of a whip, and speak to it in this manner: "Thou troublesome and unhappy element, thus does thy master chastise thee for having affronted him without reason. Know, that Xerxes will easily find means to pass over thy waters in spite of all thy billows and resistance." The extravagance of this prince did not stop here: but making the undertakers of the work answerable for events, which do not in the least depend upon the power of man, he ordered all the persons to have their heads struck off that had been charged with the direction and management of that undertaking.

* Xerxes commanded two other bridges to be built, one for the army to pass over, and the other for the baggage and beasts of burden. He appointed workmen more able and expert than the former, who went about it in this manner: they placed 360 vessels across, some of them having three banks of oars, and others 50 oars each, with their sides turned towards the Euxine sea; and on the side that faced the Ægean sea, they put 314. They then cast large anchors into the water on both sides, in order to fix and secure all these vessels against the violence of the winds, and against the current † of the water. On the east side they left three passages or vacant spaces between the vessels, that there might be room for small boats to go and come easily, as there was occasion, to and from the Euxine sea. After this, upon the land on both sides, they drove large piles into the earth, with huge rings fastened to them, to which were tied six vast cables, which went over each of the two bridges; two of which cables were made of hemp, and four of a sort of reeds called βελαϑ, which were made use of in those times for the making of cordage. Those that were made of hemp must have been of an extraordinary strength and thickness, since every cubit of those cables weighed a talent. ‡ The cables, laid over the whole extent of the vessels lengthways, reached from one side to the other of the sea. When this part of the work was finished, quite over the vessels lengthways, and over the cables we have been speaking of, they laid the trunks of trees, cut purposely for that use, and flat boats again over them, fastened and joined together, to serve as a kind of floor or solid bottom: all which they covered over with earth, and added rails or battlements on each side, that the horses and cattle might not be frightened with seeing the sea in their passage. This was the form of those famous bridges built by Xerxes.

When the whole work was completed, a day was appointed for their passing over; and as soon as the first rays of the sun began to appear, sweet odours of all kinds were abundantly spread over both the bridges, and the way was strewed with myrtle. At the same time, Xerxes poured out libations into the sea, and turning his face towards the sun (the principal object of the Persian worship,) he implored the assistance of that god in the enterprise he had undertaken, and desired the continuance of his protection till he had made the entire conquest of Europe, and had brought it into subjection to his power. This done, he threw the vessel which he used in making his libations, together with a golden cup, and a Persian scymitar, into the sea. The army was seven days and seven nights in

* Herod. l. vii. c. 55—56.

† Polybius remarks, that there is a current of water from the lake Mæotis and the Euxine sea into the Ægean sea, occasioned by the rivers which empty themselves into those two seas. Pol. i. iv. p. 307, 308.

‡ A talent in weight consisted of 80 minæ, that is to say, of 42 pounds of our weight; and the mina consisted of 100 drachms.

passing over these straits; those who were appointed to conduct the march, lashing the poor soldiers all the while with whips, in order to quicken their speed, according to the custom of that nation, which, properly speaking, was only an huge assemblage of slaves.

SECTION III.

THE NUMBER OF XERXES' FORCES, &c. &c.

XERXES, * directing his march across the Thracian Chersonesus, arrived at Dor, a city standing at the mouth of the Hebrus in Thrace, where, having encamped his army, and given orders for his fleet to follow him along the shore, he reviewed them both.

He found the land army, which he had brought out of Asia, consisted of 1,700,000 foot, and of 80,000 horse, which, with 20,000 men that were absolutely necessary at least for conducting and taking care of the carriages and camels, made in all 1,800,000 men. When he had passed the Hellespont, the other nations that submitted to him, made an addition to his army of 300,000 men, which made all his land forces together amount to 2,100,000 men.

His fleet, as it was when it set out from Asia, consisted of 1207 vessels or galleys, all of three banks of oars, and intended for fighting. Each vessel carried 200 men, natives of the country that fitted them out, besides 30 more, that were either Persians or Medes, or of the Sæpe, which made in all 277,610 men. The European nations augmented his fleet with 120 vessels, each of which carried 200 men, in all 24,000; these added to the other, amount together to 301,610 men.

Besides this fleet, which consisted all of large vessels, the small galleys of 35 oars, the transport ships, the vessels that carried the provisions, and that were employed in other uses, amounted to 3000. If we reckon but 80 men in each of these vessels, one with another, that made in the whole 240,000 men.

Thus, when Xerxes arrived at Thermopylæ, his land and sea forces together made up the number of 2,641,610 men, without including servants, eunuchs, women, sutlers, and other people of that sort, who usually follow an army, and of which the number at this time was equal to that of the forces; so that the whole number of souls that followed Xerxes in this expedition, amounted to 5,283,220. This is the computation which Herodotus makes of them, and in which Plutarch and Isocrates agree with him. † Diodorus Siculus, Pliny, Ælian, and others, fall very short of this number in their calculation; but their accounts of the matter appear to be less authentic than that of Herodotus, who lived in the same age this expedition was made, and who repeats the inscription, engraved by the order of the Amphycions upon the monument of those Grecians who were killed at Thermopylæ, which expressed that they fought against 3,000,000 of men.

‡ For the sustenance of all these persons, there must be every day consumed, according to Herodotus' computation, above 110,340 medimni of flour (the medimnus was a measure, which according to Budæus, was equivalent to six of our bushels,) allowing for every head the quantity of a chœnix, which was the daily portion or allowance that masters gave their slaves among the Grecians. We have no account in history of any other

* Herod. l. vii. c. 56—99, et 184—187.

† Diod. l. xi. p. 3. Plin. l. xxxiii. c. 10. Ælian. l. xiii. c. 3.

‡ Herod. l. vii. c. 187.

army so numerous as this; and amongst all these millions of men, there was not one that could vie with Xerxes in point of beauty, either for the comeliness of his face or the tallness of his person. But this is a poor merit or pre-eminence for a prince, when attended with no other. Accordingly Justin, after he has mentioned the number of these troops, adds, that this vast body of forces wanted a chief: *Huic tanto agmini dux defuit.*

We should be hardly able to conceive how it was possible to find a sufficient quantity of provisions for such an immense number of persons, if the * historian had not informed us, that Xerxes had employed four whole years in making preparations for this expedition. We have seen already how many vessels of burden there were, that coasted along continually to attend upon and supply the land army; and doubtless there were fresh ones arriving every day, that furnished the camp with a sufficient plenty of all things necessary.

† Herodotus acquaints us with the method they made use of to calculate their forces, which were almost innumerable. They assembled 10,000 men in a particular place, and ranked them as close together as was possible; after which they described a circle quite round them, and erected a little wall upon that circle about half the height of a man's body; when this was done, they made the whole army successively pass through this space, and thereby knew to what number it amounted.

Herodotus gives us also a particular account of the different armour of all the nations this army consisted of. Besides the generals of every nation, who each of them commanded the troops of their respective country, the land army was under the command of six Persian generals, viz. Mardonius, the son of Gobryas; Tirintatechimus, the son of Artabanes, and Smerdonus, son to Otanes, both near relations to the king; Masistus, son of Darius and Atossa; Gergis, son of Ariazers; and Megabysus, son of Zopyrus. The 10,000 Persians, who were called the Immortal Band, were commanded by Hydarnes. The cavalry had its particular commanders.

There were likewise four Persian generals who commanded the fleet. In † Herodotus we have a particular account of all the nations by which it was fitted out. Artemisa, queen of Halicarnassus, who, from the death of her husband, governed the kingdom for her son, who was still a minor, brought but five vessels along with her; but they were the best equipped, and the lightest ships in the whole fleet, next to those of the Sidonians. This princess distinguished herself in this war, by her singular courage, and still more by her prudence and conduct. Herodotus observes, that among all the commanders in the army, there was not one who gave Xerxes so good advice and such wise counsel as this queen; but he was not prudent enough to apply it to his advantage.

When Xerxes had numbered his whole forces by land and sea, he asked Demaratus, if he thought the Grecians would dare to expect him. I have already taken notice, that this Demaratus was one of the two kings of Sparta, who, being exiled by the faction of his enemies, had taken refuge at the Persian court, where he was entertained with the greatest marks of honour and beneficence. ¶ As the courtiers were one day expressing their surprize that a king should suffer himself to be banished, and desired him to acquaint them with the reason of it: "It is," says he, "because the

* Herod. l. vii. c. 20.

† Ibid. c. 60.

‡ Ibid. l. vii. c. 89, 90.

¶ Plut. in Apophth. Lacon. p. 220.

law is more powerful than the kings at Sparta." This prince was very much considered in Persia: but neither the injustice of the Spartan citizens, nor the kind treatment of the Persian king, could make him forget his country.* As soon as he knew that Xerxes was making preparations for the war, he found means to give the Grecians secret intelligence of it: and now, being obliged on this occasion to speak his sentiments to the king, he did it with such a noble freedom and dignity, as became a Spartan, and a king of Sparta.

† Demaratus, before he answered the king's question desired to know whether it was his pleasure that he should flatter him, or that he should speak his thoughts to him freely and truly. Xerxes having declared that he desired him to act with entire sincerity, he spoke in the following terms: "Great prince," says Demaratus, "since it is agreeable to your pleasure and commands, I shall deliver my sentiments to you with the utmost truth and sincerity. It must be confessed, that, from the beginning of time, Greece has been trained up, and accustomed to poverty: but then she has introduced and established virtue within her territories, which wisdom cultivates, and the rigour of her laws maintains. And it is by the use which Greece knows how to make of this virtue that she equally defends herself against the inconveniences of poverty, and the yoke of servitude. But, to speak only of the Lacedæmonians, my particular countrymen, you may assure yourself, that as they are born and bred up in liberty, they will never hearken to any proposals that tend to slavery. Though they were deserted and abandoned by all the other Grecians, and reduced to a band of 1000 men, or even to a more inconsiderable number, they will still come out to meet you, and not refuse to give you battle." Xerxes, upon hearing this discourse, fell a laughing; and as he could not comprehend how men in such a state of liberty and independence, as the Lacedæmonians were described to enjoy, who had no master to force and compel them to it, could be capable of exposing themselves in such a manner to danger and death; Demaratus replied, † "The Spartans indeed are free, and under no subjection to the will of any man; but at the same time they have laws, to which they are subject, and of which they stand in greater awe than your subjects do of your majesty. Now, by these laws they are forbid ever to fly in battle, let the number of their enemies be ever so superior; and are commanded, by abiding firm in their post, either to conquer or to die."

Xerxes was not offended at the liberty wherewith Demaratus spoke to him, and continued his march.

SECTION IV.

THE LACEDÆMONIANS AND ATHENIANS SEND TO THEIR ALLIES IN VAIN TO REQUIRE SUCCOURS FROM THEM.—THE COMMAND OF THE FLEET IS GIVEN TO THE LACEDÆMONIANS.

LACEDÆMON † and Athens, which were the two most powerful cities of Greece, and the cities against which Xerxes was most exasperated, were not indolent or asleep, whilst so formidable an enemy was approaching. Having received intelligence long before, of the designs of this prince they had sent spies to Sardis, in order to have a more exact information of

* *Amicior patriæ post fugam, quam regi post beneficia.* Justin.

† Herod. l. vii. c. 101—105.

‡ Herod. l. vii. c. 145, 146.

¶ *Ibid.*

the number and quality of his forces. These spies were seized, and as they were just going to be put to death, Xerxes countermanded it, and gave orders that they should be conducted through his army, and then sent back without any harm being done to them. At their return, the Grecians understood what they had to apprehend from so potent an enemy.

They sent deputies at the same time to Argos, into Sicily to Gelon tyrant of Syracuse, to the isles of Corcyra and Crete, to desire succour from them, and to form a league against the common enemy.

* The people of Argos offered a very considerable succour, on condition that they should have an equal share of the authority and command with the Lacedæmonians. The latter consented, that the king of Argos should have the same authority as either of the two kings of Sparta. This was granting them a great deal; but into what errors and mischiefs are not men led by a mistaken point of honour, and a foolish jealousy of command! The Argives were not contented with this offer, and refused to enter into the league with the Grecians, without considering, that if they suffered them to be destroyed, their own ruin must inevitably follow.

† The deputies proceeded from Argos to Sicily, and addressed themselves to Gelon, who was the most potent prince of the Greeks at that time. He promised to assist them with 200 vessels of three benches of oars, with an army of 20,000 foot and 2000 horse, 2000 light armed soldiers, and the same number of bowmen and slingers, and to supply the Grecian army with provisions during the whole war, on condition they would make him generalissimo of all the forces both by land and sea. The Lacedæmonians were highly offended at such a proposal. Gelon then abated somewhat in his demands, and promised the same, provided he had at least the command either of the fleet or of the army. This proposal was strenuously opposed by the Athenians, who made answer that they alone had a right to command the fleet in case the Lacedæmonians were willing to give it up. Gelon had a more substantial reason for not leaving Sicily unprovided of troops, which was the approach of the formidable army of the Carthaginians, commanded by Amilcar, which consisted of 300,000 men.

‡ The inhabitants of Corcyra, now called Corfu, gave the envoys a more favourable answer, and immediately put to sea with a fleet of 60 vessels: but they advanced no farther than to the coasts of Laconia, pretending they were hindered by contrary winds, but in reality waiting to see the success of an engagement, that they might afterwards range themselves on the side of the conqueror.

§ The people of Crete, having consulted the Delphic oracle, to know what resolutions they were to take on this occasion, absolutely refused to enter into the league.

¶ Thus were the Lacedæmonians and Athenians left almost to themselves, all the rest of the cities and nations having submitted to the heralds that Xerxes had sent to require earth and water of them, excepting the people of Thespia and of Plataea. ¶ In so pressing a danger, their first care was to put an end to all discord and division among themselves; for which reason the Athenians made peace with the people of Ægina, with whom they were actually at war.

** Their next care was to appoint a general: for there never was any occa-

* Herod. l. vii. c. 148—152.

† Ibid. c. 153—162.

‡ Ibid. c. 169—171.

** Plut. in Themist. p. 111.

† Ibid. c. 168.

§ Ibid. c. 162.

¶ Ibid. c. 145.

sion wherein it was more necessary to choose one capable of so important a trust, than in the present conjuncture when Greece was upon the point of being attacked by the whole force of Asia. The most able and experienced captains, terrified at the greatness of the danger, had taken the resolution of not presenting themselves as candidates. There was a certain citizen at Athens, whose name was Epicycles, who had some eloquence, but in other respects was a person of no merit, was in disreputation for his want of courage, and notorious for his avarice; notwithstanding all which, it was apprehended that in the assembly of the people, the votes would run in his favour. Themistocles, who was sensible,* that in calm weather almost any mariner may be capable of conducting a vessel, but that in storms and tempests the most able pilots are at a loss, was convinced that the commonwealth was ruined, if Epicycles was chosen general, whose venal and mercenary soul gave them the justest reason to fear that he was not prof against the Persian gold. There are occasions when in order to act wisely, I had almost said regularly, it is necessary to dispense with and rise above all rule. Themistocles, who knew very well that in the present state of affairs he was the only person capable of commanding, did for that reason make no scruple of employing bribes and presents to remove his competitor: † and having found means to make the ambition of Epicycles amends, by gratifying his avarice, he got himself elected general in his stead. We may here, I think, very justly apply to Themistocles what Titus Livius says of Fabius on a like occasion. This great commander finding, when Hannibal was in the heart of Italy, that the people were going to make a man of no merit consul, employed all his own credit, as well as that of his friends, to be continued in the consulship, without being concerned at the clamour that might be raised against him; and he succeeded in the attempt. The historian adds; “ † The conjuncture of affairs, and the “ extreme danger the commonwealth was exposed to, were arguments of “ such weight, that they prevented any one from being offended at a conduct “ which might appear to be contrary to rules, and removed all suspicion of “ Fabius’ having acted upon any motive of interest or ambition. On the “ contrary the public admired his generosity and greatness of soul, in that “ as he knew the commonwealth had occasion for an accomplished general, and could not be ignorant or doubtful of his own singular merit in “ that respect, he had chosen rather in some sort to hazard his own reputation, and perhaps expose his character to the reproaches of envious “ tongues, than to be wanting in any service he could render his country.”

‡ The Athenians also passed a decree to recal home all their people that were in banishment. They were afraid lest Aristides should join their enemies, and lest his credit should carry over a great many others to the side of the barbarians. But they had a very false notion of their citizen, who was infinitely remote from such sentiments. Be that as it would, on this extraordinary juncture they thought fit to recal him; and Themistocles

* Quilibet nantarum vectorumque tranquillo mari gubernare potest: ubi orta sæva tempestas est, ac turbato mari rapitur vento navis tum viro et gubernatore opus est. Liv. l. xxiv. n. 8.

† Χρημασι τῆ φιλοτιμιᾶν ἐξηγοῦσθαι τῆ Ἐπικυδῆ.

‡ Tempus ac necessitas belli, ac discrimen summæ rerum, faciebant ne quis aut in exemplum exquireret, aut suspectum cupiditatis imperii consulem haberet. Quin laudabant potius magnitudinem animi, quod, cum summo imperatore esse opus reip. sciret, seque eum haud dubie esse, minoris invidiam suam, si qua ex re orietur, quam utilitatem reip. fecisset. Liv. l. xxiv. n. 9.

‡ Plut. in Arist. p. 322, 323.

was so far from opposing the decree for that purpose, that he promoted it with all his credit and authority. The hatred and division of these great men had nothing in them of that implacable, bitter, and outrageous spirit, which prevailed among the Romans in the latter times of the republic. The danger of the state was the means of their reconciliation, and when their service was necessary to the preservation of the republic, they laid aside all their jealousy and rancour: and we shall see, by the sequel, that Aristides was so far from secretly thwarting his ancient rival, that he zealously contributed to the success of his enterprises, and to the advancement of his glory.

The alarm increased in Greece in proportion as they received advice that the Persian army advanced. If the Athenians and Lacedæmonians had been able to make no other resistance than with their land forces, Greece had been utterly ruined and reduced to slavery. This exigence taught them how to set a right value upon the prudent foresight of Themistocles, who, upon some other pretext, had caused 100 galleys to be built. Instead of judging like the rest of the Athenians, who looked upon the victory of Marathon as the end of the war, he, on the contrary, considered it rather as the beginning, or as the signal of still greater battles, for which it was necessary to prepare the Athenian people: and from that very time he began to think of raising Athens to a superiority over Sparta, which for a long time had been the mistress of all Greece. With this view he judged it expedient to make the Athenian power entirely maritime, perceiving very plainly, that, as she was so weak by land, she had no other way to render herself necessary to her allies, or formidable to her enemies. His opinion herein prevailed among the people in spite of the opposition of Miltiades, whose difference of opinion undoubtedly arose from the little probability there was, that a people entirely unacquainted with fighting at sea, and that were only capable of fitting out and arming very small vessels, should be able to withstand so formidable a power as that of the Persians, who had both a numerous land army, and a fleet of above 1000 ships.

* The Athenians had some silver mines in a part of Attica called Laurium, the whole revenues and products of which used to be distributed amongst them. Themistocles had the courage to propose to the people, that they should abolish these distributions, and employ that money in building vessels with three benches of oars, in order to make war upon the people of Ægina, against whom he endeavoured to inflame their ancient jealousy. No people are ever willing to sacrifice their private interests to the general utility of the public: for they seldom have so much generosity or public spirit, as to purchase the welfare or preservation of the state at their own expence. The Athenian people, however, did it upon this occasion: moved by the lively remonstrances of Themistocles, they consented that the money which arose from the product of the mines, should be employed in the building of 100 galleys. Against the arrival of Xerxes they doubled the number, and to that fleet Greece owed its preservation.

† When they came to the point of naming a general for the command of the navy, the Athenians, who alone had furnished the two thirds of it, laid claim to that honour, as appertaining to them, and their pretensions were certainly just and well grounded. It happened, however, that the suffrages of the allies all concurred in favour of Eurybiades, a Lacedæmonian. Themistocles, though very aspiring after glory, thought it incumbent upon him on this occasion to neglect his own interests for the common good of

* Plut. in Themist. p. 113.

† Herod. l. viii. c. 213.

the nation ; and giving the Athenians to understand, that, provided they behaved themselves with courage and conduct, all the Grecians would quickly desire to confer the command upon them of their own accord, he persuaded them to consent, as he would do himself, to give up that point at present to the Spartans. It may justly be said, that this prudent moderation in Themistocles was another means of saving the state ; for the allies threatened to separate themselves from them if they refused to comply ; and if that had happened, Greece must have been inevitably ruined.

SECTION V.

THE BATTLE OF THERMOPYLÆ.—THE DEATH OF LEONIDAS.

THE only thing that now remained to be discussed, * was to know in what place they should resolve to meet the Persians, in order to dispute their entrance into Greece. The people of Thessaly represented, that as they were the most exposed, and likely to be first attacked by the enemy, it was but reasonable that their defence and security on which the safety of all Greece so much depended, should first be provided for, without which they should be obliged to take other measures, that would be contrary to their inclinations, but yet absolutely necessary, in case their country was left unprotected and defenceless. It was hereupon resolved, that 10,000 men should be sent to guard the passage which separates Macedonia from Thessaly, near the river Peneus, between the mountains of Olympus and Ossa. But Alexander, the son of Amyntas, king of Macedonia, having given them to understand, that if they waited for the Persians in that place, they must inevitably be overpowered by their numbers, they retired to Thermopylæ. The Thessalians, finding themselves thus abandoned, without any farther deliberation submitted to the Persians.

† Thermopylæ is a strait or narrow pass of mount Cæta, between Thessaly and Phocis, but 25 feet broad, which therefore might be defended by a small number of forces, and which was the only way through which the Persian land army could enter Achaia, and advance to besiege Athens. This was the place where the Grecian army thought fit to wait for the enemy : the person who commanded it was Leonidas, one of the two kings of Sparta.

‡ Xerxes in the mean time was upon his march : he had given orders for his fleet to follow him along the coast, and to regulate their motions according to those of the land army. Wherever he came, he found provisions and refreshments prepared beforehand, pursuant to the orders he had sent ; and every city he arrived at gave him a magnificent entertainment, which cost immense sums of money. The vast expence of these treats gave occasion to a witty saying of a certain citizen of Abdera in Thrace, who, when the king was gone, said, they ought to thank the gods, that he ate but one meal a-day.

§ In the same country of Thrace, there was a prince who showed an extraordinary greatness of soul on this occasion : it was the king of the Bisaltæ. Whilst all the other princes ran into servitude, and basely submitted to Xerxes, he bravely refused to receive his yoke, or to obey him. Not being in a condition to resist him with open force, he retired to the top of the mountain Rhodope, into an inaccessible place, and forbade all his sons,

* A. M. 524. Ant. J. C. 480. Herod. l. vii. c. 172, 173.

† Herod. l. vii. c. 175, 177.

‡ Herod. l. vii. c. 108, 152.

§ Ibid. l. viii. c. 110.

who were six in number, to carry arms against Greece. But they, either out of fear of Xerxes, or out of a curiosity to see so important a war, followed the Persians, in contradiction to their father's injunction. On their return home, their father, to punish so direct a disobedience, condemned all his sons to have their eyes put out. Xerxes continued his march through Thrace, Macedonia, and Thessaly, every thing giving way before him till he came to the Strait of Thermopylæ.

* One cannot see, without the utmost astonishment, with what an handful of troops the Grecians opposed the innumerable army of Xerxes. We find a particular account of their number in Pausanias. All their forces joined together, amounted only to 11,200 men, of which number 4000 only were employed at Thermopylæ to defend the pass. But these soldiers, adds the historian, were all determined to a man either to conquer or die. And what is it that an army of such resolution is not able to effect ?

† When Xerxes advanced near the Straits of Thermopylæ, he was strangely surprised to find that they were prepared to dispute his passage. He had always flattered himself, that on the first hearing of his arrival, the Grecians would betake themselves to flight: nor could he ever be persuaded to believe, what Demaratus had told him from the beginning of his project, that at the first pass he came to, he would find his whole army stopped by an handful of men. He sent out a spy before him to take a view of the enemy. The spy brought him word, that he found the Lacedæmonians out of their intrenchments, and that they were diverting themselves with military exercises, and combing their hair: this was the Spartan manner of preparing themselves for battle.

Xerxes, still entertaining some hopes of their flight, waited four days on purpose to give them time to retreat; † and in this interval of time he used his utmost endeavours to gain Leonidas, by making him magnificent promises, and assuring him, that he would make him master of all Greece if he would come over to his party. Leonidas rejected his proposal with scorn and indignation. Xerxes, having afterwards wrote to him to deliver up his arms, Leonidas, in a style and spirit truly laconical, answered him in these words, “ † Come and take them.” Nothing remained but to prepare themselves to engage the Lacedæmonians. Xerxes first commanded his Median forces to march against them, with orders to take them all alive, and bring them to him. These Medes were not able to stand the charge of the Grecians; and being shamefully put to flight, they showed, says Herodotus, † that Xerxes had a great many men, and but few soldiers. The next that were sent to face the Spartans, were those Persians called the Immortal Band, which consisted of 10,000 men, and were the best troops in the whole army. But these had no better success than the former.

Xerxes, out of all hopes of being able to force his way through troops so determined to conquer or die, was extremely perplexed, and could not tell what resolution to take, when an inhabitant of the country came to him, and discovered a secret † path to the top of an eminence, which over-

* Paus. l. x. p. 645.

† Herod. l. vii. c. 207—231. Diod. l. xi. p. 5—10.

† Plut. in Lacon. Apoph. p. 225.

† ἄντραψι, μάλιν λαβῆ.

† ὅτι πολλοὶ μὲν ἀνθρώποι εἰναι, ὀλιγοὶ δὲ ἄνδρες.

Quod multi homines essent, pauci autem viri.

† When the Gauls 200 years after this, came to invade Greece, they possessed themselves of the Straits of Thermopylæ by means of the same by-path, which the Grecians had still neglected to secure. Pausan. l. i. p. 7. et 8.

looked and commanded the Spartan forces. He quickly dispatched a detachment thither; which, marching all night, arrived there at the break of day, and possessed themselves of that advantageous post.

The Greeks were soon apprized of this misfortune; and Leonidas, seeing that it was now impossible to repulse the enemy, obliged the rest of the allies to retire, but staid himself with his 300 Lacedæmonians, all resolved to die with their leader; who being told by the oracle, that either Lacedæmon or her king must necessarily perish, determined, without the least difficulty or hesitation, to sacrifice himself for his country. The Spartans lost all hopes either of conquering or escaping, and looked upon Thermopylæ as their burying-place. The king, exhorting his men to take some nourishment, and telling them at the same time, that they should sup together with Pluto, they set up a shout of joy as if they had been invited to a banquet, and full of ardour advanced with their king to battle. The shock was exceedingly violent and bloody. Leonidas himself was one of the first that fell. The endeavours of the Lacedæmonians to defend his dead body were incredible. At length, not vanquished, but oppressed by numbers, they all fell except one man, who escaped to Sparta, where he was treated as a coward and traitor to his country, and nobody would keep company or converse with him. But soon afterwards he made a glorious amend for his fault at the battle of Platæa, where he distinguished himself in an extraordinary manner. * Xerxes, enraged to the last degree against Leonidas for daring to make head against him, caused his dead body to be hung up on a gallows, and made his intended dishonour of his enemy his own immortal shame.

Some time after these transactions, by order of the Amphictyons, a magnificent monument was erected at Thermopylæ to the honour of these brave defenders of Greece; and upon the monument were two inscriptions; one of which was general, and related to all those that died at Thermopylæ, importing, that the Greeks of Peloponnesus, to the number only of 4000, had made head against the Persian army, which consisted of 3,000,000 men: the other related to the Spartans in particular. It was composed by the poet Simonides, and is very remarkable for its simplicity. It is as follows:

† 'Ω ξειν', ἀγγελλον Λακεδαιμονιοις, οτι τη δε
 Κελευθα, τοις κειν αν πειθεμενοι νομοις.

That is to say, "Go, passenger, and tell at Lacedæmon, that we died here "in obedience to her sacred laws." Forty years afterwards, Pausanias, who obtained the victory of Platæa, caused the bones of Leonidas to be carried from Thermopylæ to Sparta, and erected a magnificent monument to his memory; near which was likewise another erected for Pausanias. Every year at these tombs was a funeral oration pronounced to the honour of these heroes, and a public game, wherein none but Lacedæmonians had a right to partake, in order to show, that they alone were concerned in the glory obtained at Thermopylæ.

‡ Xerxes in that affair lost above 20,000 men, among whom were two of the king's brothers. He was very sensible, that so great a loss, which was

* Herod. l. vii. c. 538.

† *Pari animo Lacedæmonii in Thermopylis occiderunt, in quos Simonides. Dic, hospes, Spartzæ, nos te hic vidisse jacentes, Dum sanctis patriæ legibus obsequimur.*

Cic. Tusc. QUEST. I. i n. 101.

‡ Herod. l. viii. c. 24, 25.

a manifest proof of the courage of their enemies, was capable of alarming and discouraging his soldiers. In order, therefore, to conceal the knowledge of it from them, he caused all his men that were killed in that action, except 1000, whose bodies he ordered to be left upon the field, to be thrown together into large holes, which were secretly made, and covered over afterwards with earth and herbs. This stratagem succeeded very ill; for when the soldiers in his fleet, being curious to see the field of battle, obtained leave to come thither for that purpose, it served rather to discover his own littleness of soul, than to conceal the number of the slain.

* Dismayed with a victory that had cost him so dear, he asked Demartus, if the Lacedæmonians had many such soldiers. That prince told him, that the Spartan republic had a great many cities belonging to it, of which all the inhabitants were exceeding brave; but that the inhabitants of Lacedæmon, who were properly called Spartans, and who were about 8000 in number, surpassed all the rest in valour, and were all of them such as those who had fought under Leonidas.

I return a little to the battle of Thermopylæ, the issue of which, fatal in appearance, might make an impression upon the minds of the readers to the disadvantage of the Lacedæmonians, and occasion their courage to be looked upon as the effect of a presumptuous temerity, or a desperate resolution.

That action of Leonidas, with his 300 Spartans, was not the effect of rashness or despair, but was a wise and noble conduct, as † Diodorus Siculus has taken care to observe, in the magnificent encomium upon that famous engagement, to which he ascribes the success of all the ensuing victories and campaigns. Leonidas, knowing that Xerxes marched at the head of all the forces of the east, in order to overwhelm and crush a little country by the dint of his numbers, rightly conceived, from the superiority of his genius and understanding, that if they pretended to make the success of that war consist in opposing force to force, and numbers to numbers, all the Grecian nations together would never be able to equal the Persians, or to dispute the victory with them; that it was therefore necessary to point out to Greece another means of safety and preservation, whilst she was under these alarms; and that they ought to show the whole universe, who had all their eyes upon them, what glorious things may be done, when greatness of mind is opposed to force of body, true courage and bravery against blind impetuosity, the love of liberty against tyrannical oppression, and a few disciplined veteran troops against a confused multitude, though ever so numerous. These brave Lacedæmonians thought it became them, who were the choicest soldiers of the chief people of Greece, to devote themselves to certain death, in order to make the Persians sensible how difficult it is to reduce free men to slavery, and to teach the rest of Greece, by their example, either to vanquish or to perish.

I do not copy these sentiments from my own invention, or ascribe them to Leonidas without foundation: they are plainly comprised in that short answer which that worthy king of Sparta made a certain Lacedæmonian; who being astonished at the generous resolution the king had taken, spoke to him in this manner: † “Is it possible then, Sir, that you can think of marching with an handful of men against such a mighty and innumerable army?” “If we are to reckon upon numbers,” replied Leonidas, “all the people of Greece together would not be sufficient, since a small part

* Ibid. l. vii. c. 134—137.

† Lib. xi. p. 9.

Plut. in Laced. Apoph. p. 225.

* of the Persian army is equal to all her inhabitants ; but if we are to reckon upon valour, my little troop is more than sufficient."

The event showed the justness of this prince's sentiments. That illustrious example of courage astonished the Persians, and gave new spirit and vigour to the Greeks. The lives then of this heroic leader and his brave troop were not thrown away, but usefully employed ; and their death was attended with a double effect, more great and lasting than they themselves had imagined. On one hand, it was in a manner the seed of their ensuing victories, which made the Persians for ever after lay aside all thoughts of attacking Greece ; so that, during the seven or eight succeeding reigns, there was neither any prince who durst entertain such a design, nor any flatterer in his court who durst propose the thing to him. On the other hand, such a signal and exemplary instance of intrepidity made an indelible impression upon all the rest of the Grecians, and left a persuasion deeply rooted in their hearts, that they were able to subdue the Persians, and subvert their vast empire. Cimon was the man who made the first attempt of that kind with success. Agesilaus afterwards pushed that design so far, that he made the great monarch tremble in his palace at Susa. Alexander at last accomplished it with incredible facility. He never had the least doubt, no more than the Macedonians who followed him, or the whole country of Greece that chose him general in that expedition, but that with 30,000 men he could reduce the Persian empire, as 300 Spartans had been sufficient to check the united forces of the whole east.

SECTION VI.

NAVAL BATTLE NEAR ARTEMISA.

THE very same day * on which passed the glorious action at Thermopylae, there was also an engagement at sea between the two fleets. That of the Grecians, exclusive of the little galleys and small boats, consisted of 271 vessels. This fleet had lain by near Artemisa, a promontory of Eubœa upon the northern coast towards the straits. That of the enemy, which was much more numerous, was near the same place, but had lately suffered in a violent tempest, which had destroyed above 400 of their vessels. Notwithstanding this loss, as it was still vastly superior in number to that of the Grecians, which they were preparing to fall upon, they detached 200 of their vessels, with orders to wait about Eubœa, to the end that none of the enemy's vessels might be able to escape them. The Grecians having got intelligence of that separation, immediately set sail in the night, in order to attack that detachment at day-break the next morning. But not meeting with it, they went, towards the evening, and fell upon the bulk of the enemy's fleet, which they treated very roughly. Night coming on, they were obliged to separate, and both parties retired to their post. But the very night that parted them, proved more pernicious to the Persians than the engagement which had preceded, from a violent storm of wind, accompanied with rain and thunder, which distressed and harassed their vessels till break of day ; and the 200 ships also, that had been detached from their fleet, as we mentioned before, were almost all cast away upon the coasts of Eubœa : it being the will of the gods, says Herodotus, that the two fleets should become very near equal.

The Athenians having the same day received a reinforcement of 53 ves-

* Herod. l. vii. c. 1—13. Diod. l. xi. p. 11. et 12.

sels, the Grecians who were apprized of the wreck that had befallen part of the enemy's fleet, fell upon the ships of the Cilicians at the same hour they had attacked the fleet the day before, and sunk a great number of them. The Persians being ashamed to see themselves thus insulted by an enemy that was so much inferior in number, thought fit the next day to appear first in a disposition to engage. The battle was very obstinate this time, and the success pretty near equal on both sides, excepting that the Persians, who were incommoded by the largeness and number of their vessels, sustained much the greater loss. Both parties however retired in good order.

* All these actions, which passed near Artemisa, did not bring matters to an absolute decision, but contributed very much to animate the Athenians, as they were convinced, by their own experience, that there is nothing really formidable, either in the number and magnificent ornaments of vessels, or in the barbarians' insolent shouts and songs of victory, to men that know how to come to close engagement, and that have the courage to fight with steadiness and resolution; and that the best way of dealing with such an enemy, is to despise all that vain appearance, to advance boldly up to them, and to charge them briskly and vigorously without ever giving ground.

The Grecian fleet having at this time had intelligence of what had passed at Thermopylæ, resolved upon the course they were to take without any further deliberation. They immediately sailed away from Artemisa, and advancing toward the heart of Greece, they stopped at Salamin, a little isle very near and over against Attica. Whilst the fleet was retreating, Themistocles passed through all the places where it was necessary for the enemy to come to land, in order to take in fresh water or other provisions, and in large characters engraved upon the rocks and the stones the following words, which he addressed to the Ionians: "Be of our side, ye people of Ionia: come over to the party of your fathers, who exposed their own lives for no other end than to maintain your liberty: or, if you cannot possibly do that, at least do the Persians all the mischief you can, when we are engaged with them, and put their army into disorder and confusion." By † this means Themistocles hoped either to bring the Ionians really over to their party, or at least to render them suspected to the barbarians. We see this general had his thoughts always intent upon his business, and neglected nothing that could contribute to the success of his designs.

SECTION VII.

THE ATHENIANS ABANDON THEIR CITY, WHICH IS TAKEN AND BURNT BY XERXES.

XERXES in the mean time was entered into the country of Phocis by the upper part of Doris, and was burning and plundering the cities of the Phocians. The inhabitants of Peloponnesus, having no thoughts but to save their own country, resolved to abandon all the rest, and to bring all the Grecian forces together within the isthmus, over which they intended to build a strong wall from one sea to the other, a space of near five miles English. The Athenians were highly provoked at so base a desertion, seeing themselves ready to fall into the hands of the Persians, and likely

* Plut. in Themist. p. 115, 117. Herod. l. viii. c. 21, 22.

† Herod. l. viii. c. 40, 41.

to bear the whole weight of their fury and vengeance. Some time before they had consulted the oracle of Delphos, which had given them for answer, “* That there would be no way of saving the city but by walls of “wood.” The sentiments of the people were much divided about this ambiguous expression: some thought it was to be understood to mean the citadel, because heretofore it had been surrounded with wooden palisades. But Themistocles gave another sense to the words, which was much more natural, understanding it to intend shipping; and demonstrated, that the only measures they had to take were to leave the city empty and to embark all the inhabitants. But this was a resolution the people would not at all give ear to, as thinking themselves inevitably lost, and not even caring to conquer, when once they had abandoned the temples of their gods and the tombs of their ancestors. Here Themistocles had occasion for all his address and all his eloquence to work upon the people. After he had represented to them, that Athens did not consist either of its walls, or its houses, but of its citizens, and that the saving of these was the preservation of the city, he endeavoured to persuade them by the argument most capable of making an impression upon them in the unhappy, afflicted, and dangerous condition they were then in, I mean the argument and motive of divine authority; giving them to understand by the very words of the oracle, and by the prodigies which had happened, that their removing for a time from Athens was manifestly the will of the gods.

† A decree was therefore passed, by which in order to soften what appeared so hard in the resolution of deserting the city, it was ordained, “That Athens should be given up in trust into the hands, and committed to the keeping and protection of Minerva, patroness of the Athenian people; that all such inhabitants as were able to bear arms, should go on shipboard; and that every citizen should provide, as well as he could, for the safety and security of his wife, children and slaves.”

‡ The extraordinary behaviour of Cimon, who was at this time very young, was of great weight on this singular occasion. Followed by his companions, with a gay and cheerful countenance, he went publicly along the streets of the Ceramicus to the Citadel, in order to consecrate a bit of a bridle, which he carried in his hand, in the temple of Minerva, designing to make the people understand by this religious and affecting ceremony, that they had no farther business with land forces, and that it behoved them now to take themselves entirely to the sea. After he had made an offering of this bit, he took one of the shields, that hung upon the wall of the temple, paid his devotions to the goddess, went down to the water side, and was the first who, by his example, inspired the greatest part of the people with confidence and resolution, and encouraged them to embark.

The major part of them sent their fathers and mothers, that were old, together with their wives and children, to the city of † Trezene, the inhabitants of which received them with great humanity and generosity: for they made an ordinance, that they should be maintained at the expence of the public, and assigned for each person's subsistence two oboli a day, which were worth about two pence English money. Besides this, they permitted the children to gather fruit wherever they pleased, or wherever they came,

* Herod. l. vii. 139—143. † Herod. l. viii. c. 51—54. Plut. in Themist. p. 117.

‡ Plut. in Cim. p. 481.

¶ This was a small city situated upon the sea-side, in that part of the Peloponnesus called Argolis.

and settled a fund for the payment of the masters who had the care of their education. What a beautiful thing it is to see a city, exposed as this was to the greatest dangers and calamities, extend her care and generosity in the very midst of such alarms, even to the education of other people's children!

When the whole city came to embark, so moving and melancholy a spectacle drew tears from the eyes of all that were present and at the same time occasioned great admiration with regard to the steadiness and courage of those men, who sent their fathers and mothers another way and to other places, and who, without being moved either at their grief and lamentations, or at the tender embraces of their wives and children, passed over with so much firmness and resolution to Salamin. But that which extremely raised and augmented the general compassion, was the great number of old men that they were forced to leave in the city on account of their age and infirmities, and of which many voluntarily remained there, on a motive of religion, believing the citadel to be the thing meant by the oracle in the forementioned ambiguous expression of wooden walls. There was no creature (for history has judged this circumstance worthy of being remembered); there was no creature, I say, even to the very domestic animals, but what took part in this public mourning; nor was it possible for a man to see those poor creatures run howling and crying after their masters who were going a ship-board, without being touched and affected. Among all the rest of these animals, particular notice is taken of a dog belonging to Xanthippus, the father of Pericles, which, not being able to endure to see himself abandoned by his master, jumped into the sea after him, and continued swimming as near as he could to the vessel his master was on board of, till he landed quite spent at Salamin, and died the moment after upon the shore. In the same place, even in Plutarch's time, they used to shew the spot wherein this faithful animal was said to be buried, which was called the "dog's burying place."

* Whilst Xerxes was continuing his march, some deserters from Arcadia came and joined his army. The King having asked them what the Grecians were then doing, was extremely surprised when he was told that they were employed in seeing the games and combats then celebrating at Olympia; and his surprise was still increased, when he understood that the victor's reward in those engagements was only a crown of olive. What men must they be, cried one of the Persian nobles, with great wonder and astonishment, that are affected only with honour, and not with money!

† Xerxes had sent off a considerable detachment of his army to plunder the temple at Delphos, in which he knew there were immense treasures, being resolved to treat Apollo with no more favour than the other gods, whose temples he had pillaged. If we may believe what Herodotus and Diodorus Siculus say of this matter, as soon as ever this detachment advanced near the temple of Minerva, surnamed the Provident, the air grew dark on a sudden, and a violent tempest arose, accompanied with impetuous winds, thunder and lightning; and two huge rocks having severed themselves from the mountain, fell upon the Persian troops, and crushed the greatest part of them.

‡ The other part of the army marched towards the city of Athens, which was deserted by all its inhabitants, except a small number of citizens who had retired into the citadel, where they defended themselves with incredi-

* Herod. l. viii. c. 18.

† Herod. l. ii. c. 50—54.

‡ Ibid. l. viii. c. 95—99. Diod. l. xi. p. 12.

his bravery, till they were all killed, and would hearken to no terms of accommodation whatsoever. Xerxes having stormed the citadel, reduced it to ashes. He immediately dispatched a courier to Susa, to carry the agreeable news of his success to Artabanes, his uncle; and at the same time sent him a great number of pictures and statues. * Those of Harmodius and Aristogiton, the ancient deliverers of Athens, were sent with the rest. One of the Antiochus', king of Syria, (I do not know which of them, nor at what time it was,) returned them to the Athenians, being persuaded he could not possibly make them a more acceptable present.

SECTION VIII.

THE BATTLE OF SALAMIN, &c. &c.

AT this time a division arose among the commanders† of the Grecian fleet; and the confederates, in a council of war which was held for that purpose, were of very different sentiments concerning the place for engaging the enemy. Some of them, and indeed the major part, at the head of whom was Eurybiades, the generalissimo of the fleet, were for having them advance near the isthmus of Corinth, that they might be nearer the land army, which was posted there to guard that pass, under the command of Cleombrotus, Leonidas' brother, and more ready for the defence of Peloponnesus. Others, at the head of whom was Themistocles, alledged that it would be betraying of their country to abandon so advantageous a post as that of Salamin; and as he supported his opinion with abundance of warmth, Eurybiades lifted up his cane, over him in a menacing manner. "Strike," says the Athenian, unmoved at the insult, "but hear me;" and continuing his discourse, proceeded to show of what importance it was for the fleet of the Grecians, whose vessels were lighter and much fewer in number than those of the Persians, to engage in such a strait as that of Salamin, which would render the enemy incapable of using a great part of their forces. Eurybiades, who could not help being surprised at this moderation in Themistocles, submitted to his reasons, or at least complied with his opinion, for fear the Athenians, whose ships made up above one half of the fleet, should separate themselves from the allies, as their general had taken occasion to insinuate.

‡ A council of war was also held on the side of the Persians, in order to determine whether they should hazard a naval engagement. Xerxes himself was come to the fleet to take the advice of his captains and officers who were all unanimous for the battle, because they knew it was agreeable to the king's inclination. Queen Artemisa was the only person who opposed that resolution. She represented the dangerous consequences of coming to blows with people much more conversant and more expert in maritime affairs than the Persians; alledging, that the loss of a battle at sea would be attended with the ruin of their land army; whereas, by protracting the war, and approaching Peloponnesus, they would create jealousies and divisions among their enemies, or rather augment the division, already very great amongst them; that the confederates in that case would not fail to separate from one another, to return and defend their respective countries; and that then the king, without difficulty, and almost

* Pausan. l. i. p. 14.

† Herod. l. viii. c. 56, & 66. Plut. in Themist. p. 117.

‡ Herod. l. viii. c. 67—70.

without striking a blow, might make himself master of all Greece. This wise advice was not followed, and a battle was resolved upon.

Xerxes imputing the ill success of all his former engagements at sea to his own absence, was resolved to be witness of this from the top of an eminence, where he caused a throne to be erected for that purpose. This might have contributed in some measure to animate his forces; but there is another much more sure and effectual means of doing it, I mean by the prince's real presence and example, when he himself shares in the danger, and thereby shows himself worthy of being the soul and head of a brave and numerous body of men ready to die for his service. A prince that has not this sort of fortitude, which nothing can shake, and which even takes new vigour from danger, may nevertheless be endued with other excellent qualities, but then he is by no means proper to command an army. No qualification whatsoever can supply the want of courage in a general; and the * more he labours to show the appearance of it, when he has not the reality, the more he discovers his cowardice and fear. There is, it must be owned, a vast difference between a general officer and a simple soldier. Xerxes ought not to have exposed his person otherwise than became a prince, that is to say, as the head, not as the hand; as he whose business it is to direct and give orders, not as those who are to put them in execution. But to keep himself entirely at a distance from danger, and to act no other part than that of a spectator, was really renouncing the quality and office of a general.

† Themistocles knowing that some of the commanders in the Grecian fleet still entertained thoughts of sailing towards the isthmus, contrived to have notice given underhand to Xerxes, that as the Grecian allies were now assembled together in one place, it would be an easy matter for him to subdue and destroy them altogether; whereas, if they once separated from one another, as they were going to do, he might never meet with another opportunity so favourable. The king gave into this opinion, and immediately commanded a great number of his vessels to surround Salamin by night, in order to make it impracticable for the Greeks to quit their post.

‡ Nobody among the Grecians perceived that their army was surrounded in this manner. Aristides came the same night from Ægina, where he had some forces under his command, and with very great danger passed through the whole fleet of the enemy. When he came up to Themistocles' tent, he took him aside, and spoke to him in the following manner: "If we are wise, Themistocles, we shall from henceforward lay aside that vain and childish dissention that has hitherto divided us, and strive with a more noble and useful emulation which of us shall render the best service to his country; you by commanding, and doing the duty of a wise and able captain, and I by obeying your orders, and by assisting you with my person and advice." He then informed him of the army's being surrounded with the ships of the Persians and warmly exhorted him to give them battle without delay. Themistocles, extremely astonished at such a greatness of soul, and such a noble and generous frankness, was somewhat ashamed that he had suffered himself to be so much excelled by his rival; but without being ashamed to own it, he promised Aristides that he would henceforward imitate his generosity, and even exceed it, if it

* *Quanto magis occultare ac abdere pavorem nitebantur, manifestius pavidi.*
Tacit. Hist.

† Herod. l. viii. c. 74—88.

‡ Plut. in Arist. p. 525. Herod. l. viii. c. 78—82.

were possible, in the whole of his future conduct. Then, after having imparted to him the stratagem he had contrived to deceive the barbarian, he desired him to go in person to Eurybiades, in order to convince him that there was no other means of safety for them than to engage the enemy by sea at Salamin; which commission Aristides executed with pleasure and success; for he was in great credit and esteem with the general.

* Both sides, therefore, prepared themselves for the battle. The Grecian fleet consisted of 380 sail of ships, which in every thing followed the direction and orders of Themistocles. As nothing escaped his vigilance, and as, like an able commander, he knew how to improve every circumstance and incident to advantage, before he would begin the engagement, he waited till a certain wind, which rose regularly every day at a certain hour, which was entirely contrary to the enemy, began to blow. As soon as this wind rose, the signal was given for battle. The Persians, who knew that their king had his eyes upon them, advanced with such a courage and impetuosity, as were capable of striking an enemy with terror. But the heat of the first attack quickly abated, when they came to be engaged. Every thing was contrary to, and disadvantageous for them; the wind, which blew directly in their faces; the height, and the heaviness of their vessels, which could not move and turn without great difficulty; and even the number of their ships, which was so far from being of use to them, that it only served to embarrass them in a place so strait and narrow, as that they fought in; whereas, on the side of the Grecians, every thing was done with good order, and without hurry or confusion; because every thing was directed by one commander. The Ionians, whom Themistocles had advised by characters engraven upon stones along the coasts of Eubœa, to remember from whom they derived their original, were the first that betook themselves to flight, and were quickly followed by the rest of the fleet. But queen Artemisa distinguished herself by incredible efforts of resolution and courage, so that Xerxes, who saw in what manner she had behaved herself, cried out, † that the men had behaved like women in this engagement, and that the women had showed the courage of men. The Athenians, being enraged that a woman had dared to appear in arms against them, had promised a reward of 10,000 drachms to any one that should be able to take her alive: but she had the good fortune to escape their pursuits. If they had taken her, she could have deserved nothing from them but the highest commendations, and the most honourable and generous treatment.

‡ The manner in which that || queen escaped, ought not to be omitted.

* Herod. l. viii. c. 84—86.

† *Οι μὲν ἀνδρῶν ὑποστάσι μὲν γυναικῶν, αἱ δὲ γυναικῶν ἀνδρῶν.*

Artemisa inter primos duces bellum acerrime ciebat. Quippe, ut in viro muliebrem timorem, ita in muliere virilem audaciam cerneret. Just. l. ii. c. 12.

‡ Herod. l. viii. c. 87, 88. Polyæn. l. viii. c. 58.

|| It appears that Artemisa valued herself no less upon stratagem than courage, and at the same time was not very delicate in the choice of the measure she used. It is said, that being desirous of seizing Latmus a small city of Caria, that lay very commodiously for her she laid her troops in ambush, and, under pretence of celebrating the feast of the mother of the gods, in a wood consecrated to her near that city, that she repaired thither with a great train of eunuchs, women, drums, and trumpets. The inhabitants ran in throngs to see that religious ceremony; and in the mean time Artemisa's troops took possession of the place. Polyæn. Stratag. l. viii. c. 58.

Seeing herself warmly pursued by an Athenian ship, from which it seemed impossible for her to escape, she hung out Grecian colours, and attacked one of the Persian vessels, on board of which was Damasithymus, king of * Calynda, with whom she had some difference, and sunk it: this made her pursuers believe that her ship was one of the Grecian fleet, and gave over the chase.

Such was the success of the battle at Salamin, one of the most memorable actions related in ancient history, and which has, and will render the name and courage of the Grecians famous for ever. A great number of the Persian ships were taken, and a much greater sunk upon this occasion. Many of their allies, who dreaded the king's cruelty no less than the enemy, made the best of their way into their own country.

Themistocles, in a secret conversation with Aristides, proposed to his consideration, in order to sound him and to learn his true sentiments, whether it would not be proper for them to send some vessels to break down the bridge which Xerxes had caused to be built, to the end, says he, that we may take Asia into Europe: but though he made this proposal, he was far from approving it. Aristides believing him to be in earnest argued very warmly and strenuously against any such project, and represented to him how dangerous it was to reduce so powerful an enemy to despair, from whom it was their business to deliver themselves as soon as possible. Themistocles seemed to acquiesce in his reasons; and, in order to hasten the king's departure, contrived to have him secretly informed, that the Grecians designed to break down the bridge. The point Themistocles seems to have had in view by his false confidence, was to strengthen himself with Aristides' opinion, which was of great weight against that of the other generals, in case they inclined to go and break down the bridge. Perhaps too he might aim at guarding himself by this means against the ill-will of his enemies, who might one day accuse him of treason before the people, if ever they came to know that he had been the author of that secret advice to Xerxes.

† This prince, being frightened on such news, made the best use he could of his time, and set out by night, leaving Mardonius behind him, with an army of 300,000 men, in order to reduce Greece, if he was able. The Grecians, who expected that Xerxes would have come to another engagement the next day, having learned that he was fled, pursued him as fast as they could, but to no purpose. † They had destroyed 300 of the enemy's ships, besides those which they had taken. The remainder of the Persian fleet, after having suffered extremely by the winds in their passage, retired towards the coast of Asia, and entered into the port of Cuma, a city in Æolia, where they passed the winter, without daring afterwards to return into Greece.

Xerxes took the rest of his army along with him, and marched by the way of the Hellespont. As no provisions had been prepared for them beforehand, they underwent great hardships during their whole march, which lasted 45 days. After having consumed all the fruits they could find, the soldiers were obliged to live upon herbs, and even upon the bark and leaves of trees. This occasioned a great sickness in the army, and great numbers died of fluxes and the plague.

The king, through eagerness and impatience to make his escape, left his army behind him, and travelled on before with a small retinue, in order to

* A city of Lycia,

† Ibid. c. 130.

† Herod. l. viii. c. 115—120.

reach the bridge with the greater expedition ; but when he arrived at the place, he found the bridge broken down by the violence of the waves, in a great tempest that had happened, and was reduced to the necessity of passing the strait in a cock-boat. This was a spectacle very proper to show mankind the mutability of all earthly things, and the instability of human greatness ; a prince, whose armies and fleets the land and sea were scarce able to contain a little while before, now stealing away in a little boat, almost without any servants or attendants ! Such was the event and success of Xerxes' expedition against Greece.

If we compare Xerxes with himself at different times and on different occasions, we shall hardly know him for the same man. When affairs were under consideration and debate, no person could show more courage and intrepidity than this prince : he is surprised, and even offended, if any one foresees the least difficulty in the execution of his projects, or shows any apprehension concerning events : but when he comes to the point of execution, and to the hour of danger, he flies like a coward, and thinks of nothing but saving his own life and person. Here we have a sensible and evident proof of the difference between true courage, which is never destitute of prudence, and temerity, always blind and presumptuous. A wise and great prince weighs every thing, and examines all circumstances, before he enters into a * war, of which he is not afraid, but at the same time does not desire ; and when the time of action is come, the sight of danger serves only to animate his courage. Presumption inverts this order. † When she has introduced assurance and boldness, where wisdom and circumspection ought to preside, she admits fear and despair, where courage and intrepidity ought to be exerted.

‡ The first thing the Grecians took care of after the battle of Salamina, was to send the first fruits of the rich spoil they had taken to Delphos. Cimon, who was then very young, signalized himself in a particular manner in that engagement, and performed actions of such distinguished valour as acquired him a great reputation, and made him be considered from henceforth as a citizen that would be capable of rendering the most important services to his country on future occasions.

§ But Themistocles carried off almost all the honour of this victory, which was the most signal that ever the Grecians obtained over the Persians. The force of truth obliged even those who envied his glory most to render him this testimony. It was a custom in Greece, that, after a battle, the commanding officers should declare who had distinguished themselves most, by writing in a paper the names of the man who had merited the first prize and of him who had merited the second.

On this occasion, by a judgment which shows the good opinion natural for every man to have of himself, each officer concerned adjudged the first rank to himself, and allowed the second to Themistocles, which was indeed giving him the preference to them all.

The Lacedæmonians having carried him to Sparta, in order to pay him the honours due to his merit, decreed to their general Eurybiades the prize of valour, and to Themistocles that of wisdom, which was a crown of olive for both of them. They also made a present to Themistocles of the

* Non times bella, non provocas. Plin. de Traj. Fortissimus in ipso discrimine, qui ante discrimen quietissimus. Tacit. Hist. l. i. c. 14.

† Ante discrimen feroces, in periculo pavidus. Tacit. Hist. l. i. c. 68.

‡ Herod. l. viii. c. 122, 125.

§ Plut. in Themist. p. 120.

finest chariot in the city ; and, on his departure, sent '300 young men of the most considerable families to wait upon him to the frontiers ; an honour they had never shown to any person whatsoever before.

But that which gave him a still more sensible pleasure were the public acclamations he received at the first Olympic games that were celebrated after the battle of Salamin, where all the people of Greece were met together. As soon as he appeared, the whole assembly rose up to do him honour ; nobody regarded either the games or the combats ; Themistocles was the only spectacle. The eyes of all the company were fixed upon him, and every body was eager to show him and point him out with the hand to strangers that did not know him. He acknowledged afterwards to his friends, that he looked upon that day as the happiest of his life ; that he had never tasted any joy so sensible and so transporting ; and that this reward, the genuine fruits of his labours, exceeded all his desires.

The reader has undoubtedly observed in Themistocles two or three principal strokes of his character, which entitle him to be ranked amongst the greatest men. The design which he formed and executed, of making the whole force of Athens maritime, showed him to have a superior genius capable of the highest view, penetrating into futurity, and judicious to seize the decisive point in great affairs. As the territory belonging to Athens was of a barren nature and small extent, he rightly conceived, that the only way that city had to enrich and aggrandize herself was by sea. And indeed that scheme may justly be looked upon as the source and cause of all those great events which raised the republic of Athens in the sequel to so flourishing a condition.

But, in my opinion, though this wisdom and foresight is a most excellent and valuable talent, yet it is infinitely less meritorious than that uncommon temper and moderation, which Themistocles shewed on two critical occasions, when Greece had been utterly undone, if he had listened to the dictates of an ill-judged ambition, and had piqued himself upon a false point of honour, as is usual among persons of his age and profession. The first of these occasions was, when notwithstanding the crying injustice that was committed, both in reference to the republic, of which he was a member, and to his own person, in appointing a Lacedæmonian generalissimo of the fleet, he exhorted and prevailed with the Athenians to desist from their pretension, though never so justly founded, in order to prevent the fatal effects with which division among the confederates must have been necessarily attended. And what an admirable instance did he give of his presence of mind and coolness of temper, when the same Eurybiades not only affronted him with harsh and offensive language, but lifted up his cane at him in a menacing posture ! Let it be remembered at the same time, that Themistocles was then but young ; that he was full of an ardent ambition for glory ; that he was commander of a numerous fleet ; and that he had right and reason on his side. How would our young officers behave on the like occasion ? Themistocles took all patiently, and the victory of Salamin was the fruit of his patience.

As to Aristides, I shall have occasion in the sequel to speak more extensively upon his care and merit. He was, properly speaking, the man of the commonwealth : provided that was well and faithfully served, he was very little concerned by whom it was done. The merit of others was far from offending him ; and instead of that became his own, by the approbation and encouragement he gave it. We have seen him make his way through the enemy's fleet, at the peril of his life, in order to give Themista-

clear some good intelligence and advice; and * Plutarch takes notice, that during all the time the latter had the command, Aristides assisted him on all occasions with his counsel and credit, notwithstanding he had reason to look upon him not only as his rival, but his enemy. Let us compare this nobleness and greatness of soul with the little spiritedness and meanness of those men, who are so nice, punctilious, and jealous in point of command; who are incompatible with their colleagues, using all their attention and industry to engross the glory of every thing to themselves; always ready to sacrifice the public to their private interests, or to suffer their rivals to commit blunders, that they themselves may reap advantage from them.

† On the very same day the action of Thermopylæ happened, the formidable army of the Carthaginians, which consisted of 300,000 men, was entirely defeated by Gelon, tyrant of Syracuse. Herodotus places this battle on the same day with that of Salamin. The circumstances of that victory in Sicily I have related in the history of the Carthaginians.

‡ After the battle of Salamin, the Grecians being returned from pursuing the Persians, Themistocles sailed to all the islands that had declared for them, to levy contributions, and exact money from them. The first he began with was that of Andros, from whose inhabitants he required a considerable sum, speaking to them in this manner; "I come to you accompanied with two powerful divinities, Persuasion and Force." The answer they made him was: "We have also two other divinities on our side, no less powerful than yours, and which do not permit us to give the money you demand of us, Poverty and Impotence." Upon this refusal he made a feint of besieging them, and threatened that he would entirely ruin their city. He dealt in the same manner with several other islands, which durst not resist him as Andros had done, and drew great sums of money from them without the privity of the other commanders; for he was esteemed a lover of money; and to be desirous of enriching himself.

SECTION IX.

THE BATTLE OF PLATEÆ.

MARDONIUS, || who staid in Greece with a body of 300,000 men, let his troops pass the winter in Thessaly, and in the spring following, led them into Bœotia. There was a very famous oracle in this country, the oracle I mean of Labadia, which he thought proper to consult, in order to know what would be the success of the war. The priest, in his enthusiastic fit, answered in a language which nobody that was present understood; as much as to insinuate, that the oracle would not deign to speak intelligibly to a barbarian. At the same time Mardonius sent Alexander, king of Macedonia, with several Persian noblemen, to Athens, and by them, in the name of his master, made very advantageous proposals to the Athenian people, to divide them from the rest of their allies. The offers he made them were, to rebuild their city, which had been burnt down, to give them a considerable sum of money, to suffer them to live according to their own

* Περὶ συνπραττῆς καὶ συνβολῆς, εὐδοκίματος ἐκὶ σωτηρίας καὶ ποιῆσαι τοὺς ἐχθρούς.

In vit. Arist. p. 823.

† Her. l. vii. c. 165. 167.

‡ Ibid. l. viii. c. 111, 112. Plut. in Them. p. 122.

|| A. M. 3525. Ant. J. C. 497. Herod. l. viii. c. 113—151. 136—140, 144. Plut. in Arist. p. 524. Diod. l. xi. p. 22, 23. Plut. de Orac. Defect. p. 412.

laws and customs, and to give them the government and command of all Greece. Alexander, as their ancient friend, exhorted them, in his own name, to lay hold on so favourable an opportunity for re-establishing their affairs, alledging, that they were not in a condition to withstand a power so formidable as that of the Persians, and so much superior to that of Greece. On the first intelligence of this embassy, the Spartans also on their side sent deputies to Athens, in order to hinder it from taking effect. These were present when the others had their audience, where, as soon as Alexander had finished his speech, they began in their turn to address themselves to the Athenians, and strongly exhorted them not to separate themselves from their allies, nor to desert the common interest of their country, representing to them at the same time, that their union in the present situation of their affairs was their whole strength, and would render Greece invincible. They added further, that the Spartan commonwealth was very sensibly moved with the melancholy state which the Athenians were in, who were destitute both of houses and retreat, and who for two years together had lost all their harvests; that, in consideration of that calamity, she would engage herself, during the continuance of the war, to maintain and support their wives, their children, and their old men, and to furnish a plentiful supply for all their wants. They concluded by observing, on the conduct of Alexander, whose discourse, they said, was such as might be expected from one tyrant who spoke in favour of another; but that he seemed to have forgot, that the people to whom he addressed himself, had shewed themselves, on all occasions, the most zealous defenders of the common liberty of their country.

Aristides was at this time in office, that is to say, principal of the Archons. As it was therefore his business to answer, he said, that as to the barbarians, who made silver and gold the chief objects of their esteem, he forgave them for thinking they could corrupt the fidelity of a nation, by large bounties and promises; but that he could not help being surprised and affected with some sort of indignation, to see that the Lacedæmonians, regarding only the present distress and necessity of the Athenians, and forgetting their courage and magnanimity, should come to persuade them to persist stedfastly in the defence of the common liberty of Greece, by arguments and motives of gain, and by proposing to give them victuals and provision: he desired them to acquaint their republic, that all the gold in the world was not capable of tempting the Athenians, or of making them desert the defence of the common liberty; that they had the grateful sense they ought to have, of the kind offers which Lacedæmon had made them; but that they would endeavour to manage their affairs so as not to be a burden to any of their allies. Then turning himself towards the ambassadors of Mardonius, and pointing with his hand to the sun: "Be assured," says he to them, "that as long as that planet shall continue his course, the Athenians will be mortal enemies to the Persians, and will not cease to take vengeance of them for ravaging their lands and burning their houses and temples." After which he desired the king of Macedonia, if he was inclined to be truly their friend, that he would not make himself any more the bearer of such proposals to them, which would only serve to reflect dishonour upon him, without ever producing any other effect.

Aristides, notwithstanding his having made this plain and peremptory declaration, did not stop there; but that he might still imprint the greater horror for such proposals, and for ever to prohibit all manner of commerce with the barbarians, by a principle of religion, he ordained that the Athenian priests should denounce anathemas and execrations upon any person

whatsoever, who should presume to propose the making of an alliance with the Persians, or the breaking of their alliance with the rest of the Grecians.

* When Mardonius had learned by the answer which the Athenians had sent him, † that they were to be prevailed upon, by no proposals or advantages whatsoever to sell their liberty, he marched with his whole army towards Attica, wasting and destroying whatever he found in his way. The Athenians, not being in a condition to withstand such a torrent, retired to Salamin, and for a second time abandoned their city. Mardonius, still entertaining hopes of bringing them to some terms of accommodation, sent another deputy to make the same proposals as before. A certain Athenian, called Lycidas, being of opinion, that they should hearken to what he had to offer, was immediately stoned; and the Athenian women running at the same time to his house, did the same execution upon his wife and children; so detestable a crime did they think it to propose any peace with the Persians. But notwithstanding this, they had a respect to the character wherewith the deputy was invested, and sent him back without offering him any indignity or ill treatment. Mardonius now found that there was no peace to be expected with them. He therefore entered Athens, burnt and demolished every thing that had escaped their fury the preceding year, and left nothing standing.

The Spartans, instead of conducting their troops into Attica, according to their engagements, thought only of keeping themselves shut up within the Peloponnesus for their own security, and with that view had begun to build a wall over the isthmus, in order to hinder the enemy from entering that way, by which means they reckoned they should be safe themselves, and should have no further occasion for the assistance of the Athenians. The latter hereupon sent deputies to Sparta, in order to complain of the slowness and neglect of their allies. But the Ephori did not seem to be much moved at their remonstrances; and as that day was the feast of ‡ Hyacinthus, they spent it in feasts and rejoicing, and deferred giving the deputies their answer till the next day. And still procrastinating the affair as much as they could on various pretexts, they gained ten days time, during which the building of the wall was completed.—They were on the point of dismissing the Athenian envoys in a scandalous manner, when a private citizen expostulated with them, and represented to them, how base it would be to treat the Athenians in such a manner, after all the calamities and voluntary losses they had so generously suffered for the common defence of liberty, and all the important services they had rendered Greece in general. This opened their eyes, and made them ashamed of their perfidious design. The very next night following, they sent off, unknown to the Athenian deputies, 5000 Spartans, who had each of them seven helots, or slaves, to attend them. In the morning afterwards the deputies renewed their complaints with great warmth and resentment, and were extremely surprised when they were told that the Spartan succours were on their march, and by this time were not far from Attica.

* Herod. l. ix. c. 1—11. Plut. in Arist.

† Posteaquam nullo pretio libertatem videt his venalem, &c. Justin. l. ii. c. 14.

‡ Amongst the Lacedæmonians the feast of Hyacinthus continued three days, the first and last of which were days of sorrow and mourning for the death of Hyacinthus, but the second was a day of rejoicing, which was spent in feasting, sports, and spectacles, and all kinds of diversions. This festival was celebrated every year in the month of August, in honour of Apollo and Hyacinthus.

* Mardonius had left Attica at this time, and was on his return into the country of Bœotia. As the latter was an open and flat country, he thought it would be more convenient for him to fight there than in Attica, which was uneven and rugged, full of hills and narrow passes, and which for that reason would not allow him space enough for drawing up his numerous army in battle array, nor leave room for his cavalry to act. When he came back into Bœotia, he encamped by the river Asopus. The Grecians followed him thither, under the command of Pausanias king of Sparta, and of Aristides general of the Athenians. The Persian army, according to the account of Herodotus, consisted of 300,000, or, according to that of Diodorus, of 500,000 men. That of the Grecians did not amount to 70,000 men, of whom there were but 5000 Spartans; but as these were accompanied with 35,000 of the helotæ, viz. seven for each Spartan, they made up together 40,000; the latter of these were light armed troops: the Athenian forces consisted but of 8000, and the troops of the allies made up the remainder. The right wing of the army was commanded by the Spartans, and the left by the Athenians, an honor which the people of Tégæa pretended to, and disputed with them, but in vain.

† Whilst all Greece was in suspense, expecting a battle that should determine their fate, a secret conspiracy, formed in the midst of the Athenian camp by some discontented citizens, who intended the subversion of their popular government, or to deliver up Greece into the hands of the Persians, gave Aristides a great deal of perplexity and trouble. On this emergency he had occasion for all his prudence. Not knowing exactly how many people might be concerned in this conspiracy, he contented himself with having eight of them taken up: and of those eight, the only two whom he caused to be accused, because they had the most laid to their charge, made their escape out of the camp, whilst their trial was preparing. There is no doubt but Aristides favoured their escape, lest he should be obliged to punish them, and their punishment might occasion some tumult and disorder. The others, who were in custody, he released, leaving them room to believe, that he had found nothing against them, and telling them that the battle with the enemy should be the tribunal, where they might fully justify their characters, and show the world how unlikely it was that they had ever entertained a thought of betraying their country. This well timed and wise dissimulation, which opened a door for repentance, and avoided driving the offenders to despair, appeased all the commotion, and quashed the whole affair.

Mardonius, in order to try the Grecians, sent out his cavalry, in which he was strongest, to skirmish with them. The Megarians, who were encamped upon a plain, suffered extremely by them; and, in spite of all the vigour and resolution with which they defended themselves, they were upon the point of giving way, when a detachment of 300 Athenians, with some troops armed with missive weapons, advanced to their succour, Masistius, the general of the Persian horse, and one of the most considerable noblemen of his country, seeing them advance towards him in good order, made his cavalry face about and attack them. The Athenians stood their ground, and waited to receive them. The shock was very fierce and violent, both sides endeavouring equally to show, by the issue of this encounter, what would be the success of the general engagement. The victory was a long time disputed: but at last Masistius' horse being wounded,

* Herod. l. ix. c. 12. 76. Plut. in Arist. p. 325—330. Diod. l. xi. p. 24, 26.

† Plut. in Arist. p. 326.

threw his master, who was quickly after killed: upon which the Persians immediately after fled. As soon as the news of his death reached the barbarians, their grief was excessive. They cut off the hair of their heads, as also the manes of their horses and mules, filling the camp with their cries and lamentations, having lost, in their opinion, the bravest man of their army.

After this encounter with the Persian cavalry, the two armies were a long time without coming to any action; because the soothsayers and diviners, upon their inspecting the entrails of their victims, equally foretold both parties that they should be victorious, provided they acted only upon the defensive; whereas, on the other hand, they threatened them equally with a total overthrow, if they acted offensively, or made the first attack.

They passed ten days in this manner in view of each other; but Mardonius, who was of a fiery impatient nature, grew very uneasy at so long a delay. Besides, he had only a few days provisions left for his army; and the Grecians grew stronger every day by the addition of new troops, that were continually coming to join them. He therefore called a council of war, in order to deliberate whether they should give battle. Artabazus, a nobleman of singular merit and great experience, was of opinion that they should not hazard a battle, but that they should retire under the walls of Thebes, where they would be in a condition to supply the army with provisions and forage. He alledged, that delays alone would be capable of diminishing the ardour of the allies; that they would thereby have time to tamper with them, and might be able to draw some of them off by gold and silver, which they would take care to distribute among the leaders, and among such as had the greatest sway and authority in their several cities; and that, in short, this would be both the easiest and surest method of subjecting Greece. This opinion was very wise, but was overruled by Mardonius, whom the rest had not courage to contradict. The result, therefore, of their deliberations was, that they should give battle next day. Alexander, king of Macedonia, who was on the side of the Grecians in his heart, came secretly about midnight to their camp, and informed Aristides of all that had passed.

Pausanias forthwith gave orders to the officers to prepare themselves for battle; and imparted to Aristides the design he had formed of changing his order of battle, by placing the Athenians in the right wing, instead of the left, in order to their opposing the Persians, with whom they had been accustomed to engage. Whether it was fear or prudence that induced Pausanias to propose this new disposition, the Athenians accepted it with pleasure. Nothing was heard among them but mutual exhortations, to acquit themselves bravely, bidding each other remember, that neither they nor their enemies were changed since the battle of Marathon, unless it were, that victory had increased the courage of the Athenians, and had dispirited the Persians. We do not fight, said they, as they do, for a country only, or a city, but for the trophies erected at Marathon and at Salamin, that they may not appear to be the work only of Miltiades, and of fortune, but the work of the Athenians. Encouraging one another in this manner; they went with all the alacrity imaginable to change their post. But Mardonius, upon the intelligence he received of this movement, having made the like change in his order of battle, both sides ranged their troops again according to their former disposition. The whole day passed in this manner without their coming to action.

In the evening the Grecians held a council of war, in which it was resolved, that they should decamp from the place they were in, and march

to another, more conveniently situated for water. Night being come on, and the officers endeavouring, at the head of their corps, to make more haste than ordinary to the camp marked out for them, great confusion happened among the troops, some going one way and some another, without observing any order or regularity in their march. At last they halted near the little city of Plataea.

On the first news of the Grecians being decamped, Mardonius drew his whole army into order of battle, and pursued them with the hideous shouting and howling of his barbarian forces, who thought they were marching, not so much in order to fight, as to strip and plunder a flying enemy : and their general likewise, making himself sure of victory, proudly insulted Artabazus, reproaching him with his fearful and cowardly prudence, and with the false notion he had conceived of the Lacedæmonians, who never fled, as he pretended, before an enemy ; whereas here was an instance of the contrary. But the general quickly found this was no false or ill-grounded notion. He happened to fall in with the Lacedæmonians, who were alone, and separated from the body of the Grecian army to the number of 50,000 men, together with 3000 of the Tegeats. The encounter was exceeding fierce and resolute ; on both sides the men fought with the courage of lions ; and the barbarians perceived that they had to do with soldiers who were determined to conquer or die in the field. The Athenian troops, to whom Pausanias sent an officer, were already upon their march to their aid : but the Greeks who had taken part with the Persians, to the number of 60,000 men, went out to meet them on their way, and hinder them from proceeding any farther. Aristides with his little body of men, bore up firmly against them, and withstood their attack, letting them see how insignificant a superiority of numbers is against true courage and bravery.

The battle being thus divided into two, and fought in two different places, the Spartans were the first who broke in upon the Persian forces, and put them into disorder. Mardonius, their general, falling dead of a wound he had received in the engagement, all his army betook themselves to flight ; and those Greeks who were engaged against Aristides, did the same thing, as soon as they understood the barbarians were defeated. The latter ran away to their former camp, which they had quitted, where they were sheltered and fortified with an inclosure of wood. The Lacedæmonians pursued them thither, and attacked them in their entrenchment, but this they did poorly and weakly, like people that were not much accustomed to sieges, and to attack walls. The Athenian troops, having advice of this, left off pursuing their Grecian adversaries, and marched to the camp of the Persians, which after several assaults they carried, and made a horrible slaughter of the enemy.

Artabazus, who, from Mardonius' imprudent management, had but too well foreseen the misfortune that befel them, after having distinguished himself in the engagement, and given all possible proofs of his courage and intrepidity, made a timely retreat with the 40,000 men he commanded ; and preventing his flight from being known by the expedition of his march, he arrived safe at Byzantium, and from thence returned into Asia. Of all the rest of the Persian army, not 4000 men escaped after that day's slaughter ; all were killed and cut to pieces by the Grecians ; who by that means delivered themselves at once from all further invasions from that nation : no Persian army having ever appeared after that time on this side of the Hellespont.

* This battle was fought on the fourth day of the month † Boedromion, according to the Athenian manner of reckoning. Soon after, the allies, as a testimony of their gratitude to heaven, caused a statue of Jupiter to be made at their joint and common expence, which they placed in his temple at Olympia. The names of the several nations of Greece, that were present in the engagement, were engraven on the right side of the pedestal of the statue; the Lacedæmonians first, the Athenians next, and all the rest in order.

‡ One of the principal citizens of Ægina came and addressed himself to Pausanias, desiring him to avenge the indignity that Mardonius and Xerxes had shown to Leonidas, whose dead body was hung upon a gallows by their order; and urging him to use Mardonius' body after the same manner. As a further motive for doing so, he added, that by thus satisfying the manes of those that were killed at Thermopylæ, he would be sure to immortalise his own name throughout all Greece, and make his memory precious to the latest posterity. "Carry thy base counsel elsewhere," replied Pausanias. "Thou must have a very wrong notion of true glory to imagine that the way for me to acquire it is to resemble the barbarians. If the esteem of the people of Ægina is not to be purchased but by such a proceeding, I shall be content with preserving that of the Lacedæmonians, only, amongst whom the base and ungenerous pleasure of revenge is never put in competition with that of showing clemency and moderation to their enemies, and especially after their death. As for the souls of my departed countrymen, they are sufficiently avenged by the death of the many thousand Persians slain upon the spot in the last engagement."

‡ A dispute, which arose between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians, about determining which of the two people should have the prize of valour adjudged to them, as also which of them should have the privilege of erecting a trophy, had like to have sullied all the glory, and embittered the joy of their late victory. They were just on the point of carrying things to the last extremity, and would certainly have decided the difference with their swords, had not Aristides prevailed upon them, by the wisdom of his counsel and reasonings, to refer the determination of the matter to the judgment of the Grecians in general. This proposition being accepted by both parties, and the Greeks being assembled upon the spot to decide the contest, Theogiton of Megara, speaking upon the question, gave it as his opinion, that the prize of valor ought to be adjudged neither to Athens nor to Sparta, but to some other city; unless they desired to kindle a civil war, of more fatal consequences than that they had just put an end to. After he had finished his speech, Cleocritus of Corinth rose up to speak his sentiments of the matter: and when he began, no body doubted but he was going to claim that honour for the city of which he was a member and a native; for Corinth was the chief city of Greece in power and dignity after those of Athens and Sparta. But every body was agreeably deceived when they found, that all his discourse tended to the praise of the Platæans, and that the conclusion he made from the whole was, that, in order to extinguish so dangerous a contention, they ought to adjudge the prize to them only, against whom neither of the contending parties could have any grounds of anger or jealousy. This discourse and proposal were received with a general applause by the

* A. M. 3523. Ant. J. C. 479. Paus. l. v. p. 532.

† This day answers to the eighth of our September.

‡ Herod. l. ix. c. 77, 78.

‡ Plut. in Arist. p. 451.

whole assembly. Aristides immediately assented to it on the part of the Athenians, and Pausanias on the part of the Lacedæmonians.

* All parties being thus agreed, before they began to divide the spoil of the enemy, they put four score talents † aside for the Platæans who laid them out in building a temple to Minerva, in erecting a statue to her honour, and in adorning the temple with curious and valuable paintings, which were still in being in Plutarch's time, that is to say, above 600 years afterwards, and which were then as fresh as if they had lately come out of the hands of the painters. As for the trophy, which had been another article of the dispute, the Lacedæmonians erected one for themselves in particular, and the Athenians another.

The spoil was immense; in Mardonius' camp they found prodigious sums of money in gold and silver, besides cups, vessels, beds, tables, necklaces, and bracelets of gold and silver, not to be valued or numbered. It is observed by a certain historian,‡ that these spoils proved fatal to Greece, by becoming the instruments of introducing avarice and luxury among her inhabitants. According to the religious customs of the Grecians before they divided the treasure, they appropriated the tithe, or tenth part of the whole, to the use of the gods: the rest was distributed equally among the cities and nations that had furnished troops; and the chief officers who had distinguished themselves in the field of battle were likewise distinguished in this distribution. They sent a present of a golden tripod to Delphos, in the inscription upon which Pausanias caused these words to be inserted: § "That he had defeated the barbarians at Platæa, and that in acknowledgment of that victory, he had made this present to Apollo."

This arrogant inscription, wherein he ascribes the honour both of the victory and of the offering to himself only, offended the Lacedæmonian people, who, in order to punish his pride in the very point and place where he thought to exalt himself, as also to do justice to their confederates, caused his name to be ras'd out, and that of the cities which had contributed to the victory to be put in the stead of it. Too ardent a thirst after glory on this occasion did not give him leave to consider that a man loses nothing by a discreet modesty, which forbears the setting too high a value upon one's own services, and which by screening a man from envy ¶, serves really to enhance his reputation.

Pausanias gave still a further specimen of his Spartan spirit and humour, in two entertainments which he ordered to be prepared a few days after the engagement; one of which was costly and magnificent, in which was served all the variety of delicacies and dainties that used to be served at Mardonius' table; the other was plain and frugal, after the manner of the Spartans. Then comparing the two entertainments together, and observing the difference of them to his officers, whom he had invited on purpose, "What a madness," says he, "was it in Mardonius, who was accustomed to such a luxurious diet, to come and attack a people like us, who know how to live without all dainties and superfluities, and want nothing of that kind!"

¶ All the Grecians sent to Delphos to consult the oracle concerning the

* Herod. l. ix. c. 79, 80.

† About L. 18,000 Sterling, or 80,000 crowns French.

‡ Victo Mardonio, castra referta regalis opulentie capta, unde primum Græcos, diviso inter se auro Persico, divitiarum luxuria cepit. Justin. l. ii. c. 14.

§ Cor. Nep. in Pausan. c. 1.

¶ Ipsa dissimulatione fame famam auxit. Tacit.

¶ Plut. in Arist. p. 331, 362.

sacrifice it was proper to offer. The answer they received from the god was, that they should erect an altar to Jupiter Liberator; but that they should take care not to offer any sacrifice upon it before they had extinguished all the fire in the country, because it had been polluted and profaned by the barbarians; and that they should come as far as Delphos to fetch pure fire which they were to take from the altar called the Common Altar.

This answer being brought to the Grecians from the oracle, the generals immediately dispersed themselves throughout the whole country, and caused all the fires to be extinguished: and Euehidæ, a citizen of Platæa, having taken upon himself to go and fetch the sacred fire with all possible expedition, made the best of his way to Delphos. On his arrival, he purified himself, sprinkled his body with consecrated water, put on a crown of laurel, and then approached the altar, from whence with great reverence, he took the holy fire, and carried it with him to Platæa, where he arrived before the setting of the sun, having travelled 1000 stadia, which make 125 miles English, in one day. As soon as he came back, he saluted his fellow-citizens, delivered the fire to them, fell down at their feet and died in a moment afterwards. His countrymen carried away his body, and buried it in the temple of Diana, surnamed Eucleia, which signifies, "of good renown;" and put the following epitaph upon his tomb in the compass of one verse: "Here lies Euehidæ, who went from hence to Delphos, and returned back the same day."

In the next general assembly of Greece, which was held not long after this occurrence, Aristides proposed the following decree that all the cities of Greece, should every year send their respective deputies to Platæa, in order to offer sacrifices to Jupiter Liberator, and to the gods of the city (this assembly was still regularly held in the time of Plutarch;) that every five years there should be games celebrated there, which should be called the Games of Liberty; that the several states of Greece together should raise a body of troops, consisting of 10,000 foot and 1000 horse, and should equip a fleet of 100 ships, which should be constantly maintained for making war against the barbarians: and that the inhabitants of Platæa, entirely devoted to the service of the gods, should be looked upon as sacred and inviolable, and be concerned in no other function than that of offering prayers and sacrifices for the general preservation and prosperity of Greece.

All these articles being approved of and passed into a law, the citizens of Platæa took upon them to solemnize every year the anniversary festival in honour of those persons that were slain in this battle. The order and manner of performing this sacrifice was as follows: * The 16th day of the month Maimacterion, which answers to our month of December, at the first appearance of day-break, they walked in a solemn procession, which was preceded by a trumpet that sounded to battle. Next to the trumpet marched several chariots, filled with crowns and branches of myrtle. After these chariots was led a black bull, behind which marched a company of young persons, carrying pitchers in their hands full of wine and milk, the ordinary effusions offered to the dead, and vials of oil and essence. All these young persons were freemen; for no slave was allowed to have any part in this ceremony, which was instituted for men who had lost their lives for liberty. In the rear of this pomp followed the archon, or chief magis-

* Three months after the battle of Platæa was fought. Probably these funeral rites were not at first performed till after the enemy were entirely gone, and the country was free.

trate of the Plateans, for whom it was unlawful at any other time even so much as to touch iron, or to wear any other garment but a white one. But upon this occasion, being clad in purple raiment, having a sword by his side, and holding an urn in his hands, which he took from the place where they kept their public records, he marched quite through the city to the place where the tombs of his memorable countrymen were erected. As soon as he came there, he drew out water with his urn from the fountain, washed with his own hands the little columns that stood by the tombs, rubbed them afterwards with essence, and then killed the bull upon a pile of wood prepared for that purpose. After having offered up certain prayers to the terrestrial * Jupiter and Mercury, he invited those valiant souls deceased to come to their feast, and to partake of their funeral effusions; then taking a cup in his hand, and having filled it with wine, he poured it out on the ground, and said with a loud voice, "I present this cup to those " valiant men who died for the liberty of the Grecians." These ceremonies were annually performed even in the time of Plutarch.

† Diodorus adds, that the Athenians in particular embellished the monuments of their citizens who died in the war with the Persians with magnificent ornaments, instituted funeral games to their honour, and appointed a solemn panegyric to be pronounced to the same intent, which in all probability was repeated every year.

The reader will be sensible, without my observing it, how much these solemn testimonies and perpetual demonstrations of honour, esteem, and gratitude for soldiers who had sacrificed their lives in the defence of liberty, conduced to enhance the merit of valor, and of the services they rendered their country and to inspire the spectators with emulation and courage; and how exceeding proper all this was for cultivating and perpetuating a spirit of bravery in the people, and for making their troops victorious and invincible.

The reader, no doubt, will be as much surpris'd, on the other hand, to see how wonderfully careful and exact these people were in acquitting themselves on all occasions of the duties of religion. The great event which I have just been relating, viz. the battle of Platæa, affords us very remarkable proofs of this particular, in the annual and perpetual sacrifice they instituted to Jupiter Liberator, which was still continued in the time of Plutarch; in the care they took to consecrate the tenth part of all their spoil to the gods; and in the decree proposed by Aristides to establish a solemn festival for ever, as an anniversary commemoration of that success. It is a delightful thing, methinks, to see pagan and idolatrous nations thus publicly confessing and declaring, that all their expectations centre in the Supreme Being; that they think themselves obliged to ascribe the success of all their undertakings to him; that they look upon him as the author of all their victories and prosperities, as the sovereign ruler and disposer of states and empires, as the source from whence all salutary counsels, wisdom and courage are derived, and as entitled, on all these accounts, to the first and best part of their spoils, and to their perpetual acknowledgements and thanksgiving for such distinguished favours and benefits.

* The terrestrial Jupiter is no other than Pluto: and the same epithet of terrestrial was also given to Mercury, because it was believed to be his office to conduct departed souls to the infernal regions.

† Lib. xi. p. 26.

SECTION X.

THE BATTLE NEAR MYCALE.—THE DEFEAT OF THE PERSIANS.

On* the same day the Greeks fought the battle of Plataea, their naval forces obtained a memorable victory in Asia over the remainder of the Persian fleet. For whilst that of the Greeks lay at Ægina, under the command of Leotychides, one of the kings of Sparta, and of Xanthippus the Athenian, ambassadors came to those generals from the Ionians, to invite them into Asia to deliver the Grecian cities from their subjection to the barbarians. On this invitation they immediately set sail from Asia, and steered their course by Delos; where, when they arrived, other ambassadors arrived from Samos, and brought them intelligence, that the Persian fleet, which had passed the winter at Cumæ, was then at Samos, where it would be an easy matter to defeat and destroy it, earnestly pressing them at the same time not to neglect so favourable an opportunity. The Greeks hereupon sailed away directly for Samos. But the Persians receiving intelligence of their approach, retired to Mycale, a promontory of the continent of Asia, where their land army, consisting of 100,000 men, who were the remainder of those that Xerxes had carried back from Greece the year before, was encamped. Here they drew their vessels ashore, which was a common practice among the ancients, and encompassed them round with a strong rampart. The Grecians followed them to the very place, and with the help of the Ionians, defeated their land army, forced their rampart, and burnt all their vessels.

The battle of Plataea was fought in the morning, and that of Mycale in the afternoon of the same day; and yet all the Greek writers pretend that the victory of Plataea was known at Mycale before the latter engagement was begun, though the whole Ægean sea, which requires several days sailing to cross it, was between those two places. But Diodorus, the Sicilian, explains us this mystery. He tells us, that Leotychides, observing his soldiers to be much dejected for fear their countrymen at Plataea should sink under the numbers of Mardonius' army, contrived a stratagem to reanimate them; and that, therefore, when he was just upon the point of making the first attack, he caused a rumour to be † spread among his troops, that the Persians were defeated at Plataea, though at that time he had no manner of knowledge of the matter.

‡ Xerxes, hearing the news of these two overthrows, left Sardis with as much haste and hurry as he had done Athens before, after the battle of Salamin, and retired with great precipitation into Persia, in order to put himself, as far as he possibly could, out of the reach of his victorious enemies. § But before he set out, he gave orders that his people should burn and demolish all the temples belonging to the Grecian cities in Asia: which order was so far executed, that not one escaped, except the temple of Diana at Ephesus. ¶ He acted in this manner at the instigation of the Magi, who were professed enemies to temples and images. The second Zoroaster had thoroughly instructed him in their religion, and made him a zealous defender of it. † Pliny informs us, that Otanes, the head of the Magi, and

* Herod. l. ix. c. 89—105. Diod. l. xi. p. 26—28.

† What we are told of Paulus Æmilius' victory over the Macedonians, which was known at Rome the very day it was obtained, without doubt happened in the same manner.

‡ Diod. l. xi. p. 28.

§ Strab. l. i. p. 634.

¶ Cic. l. ii. de Leg. n. 29.

† Plin. l. xxx. c. 1.

the patriarch of that sect, who maintained its maxims and interests with the greatest violence, attended Xerxes upon his expedition against Greece.* This prince, as he passed through Babylon on his return to Susa, destroyed also the temples of that city, as he had done those of Greece and Asia Minor; doubtless through the same principle, and out of hatred to the sect of the Sabæans, who made use of images in their divine worship, which was a thing extremely detested by the Magi. Perhaps also, the desire of making himself amends for the charges of his Grecian expedition by the spoil and plunder of those temples, might be another motive that induced him to destroy them: for it is certain he found immense riches and treasure in them, which had been amassed together through the superstition of princes and people during a long series of ages.

The Grecian fleet, after the battle of Mycale, set sail toward the Hellespont, in order to possess themselves of the bridges which Xerxes had caused to be laid over that narrow passage, and which they supposed were still entire. But finding them broken by tempestuous weather, Leotychides and his Peloponnesian forces returned towards their own country. As for Xanthippus, he staid with the Athenians and their Ionian confederates, and they made themselves masters of Sestus and the Thracian Chersonesus: in which places they found great booty, and took a vast number of prisoners. After which, before winter came on, they returned to their own cities.

From this time all the cities of Ionia revolted from the Persians; and having entered into confederacy with the Grecians, most of them preserved their liberty during the time that empire subsisted.

SECTION XI.

THE BARBAROUS AND INHUMAN REVENGE OF AMESTRIS, THE WIFE OF XERXES.

DURING the residence of Xerxes at Sardis, he conceived a violent passion for the wife of his brother Masistus, who was a prince of extraordinary merit, had always served the king with great zeal and fidelity, and had never done any thing to disoblige him. The virtue of this lady, her great affection and fidelity to her husband, made her inexorable to all the king's solicitations. However, he still flattered himself, that by a profusion of favours and liberalities he might possibly gain upon her; and among other kind things he did to oblige her, he married his eldest son Darius, whom he intended for his successor, to Artainta, this princess' daughter, and ordered that the marriage should be consummated as soon as he arrived at Susa. But Xerxes finding the lady still no less impregnable, in spite of all his temptations and attacks, immediately changed his object and fell passionately in love with her daughter, who did not imitate the glorious example of her mother's constancy and virtue. Whilst this intrigue was carrying on, Amestris, wife of Xerxes, made him a present of a rich and magnificent robe of her own making. Xerxes being extremely pleased with this robe, thought fit to put it on upon the first visit he afterwards made to Artainta; and in the conversation he had with her, he mightily pressed her to let him know what she desired he should do for her; assuring her, at the same time, with an oath, that he would grant her whatever she asked of him. Artainta, upon this, desired him to give

* Arrian. l. vii.

† A. M. 3525. Ant. J. C. 479. Herod. l. ix. c. 107—112.

her the robe he had on. Xerxes, foreseeing the ill consequences that would necessarily ensue upon his making her this present, did all that he could to dissuade her from insisting upon it, and offered her any thing in the world in lieu of it. But not being able to prevail upon her, and thinking himself bound by the imprudent promise and oath he had made to her, he gave her the robe. The lady no sooner received it, but she put it on, and wore it publicly by way of trophy.

Amestris being confirmed in the suspicions she had entertained, by this action, was enraged to the last degree. But, instead of letting her vengeance fall upon the daughter, who was the only offender, she resolved to wreak it upon the mother, whom she looked upon as the author of the whole intrigue, though she was entirely innocent of the matter. For the better executing of her purpose, she waited until the grand feast, which every year was celebrated on the king's birth-day, and which was not far off; on which occasion the king, according to the established custom of the country, granted her whatever she demanded. This day then being come, the thing which she desired of his majesty was, that the wife of Masistus should be delivered into her hands. Xerxes, who apprehended the queen's design, and who was struck with horror at the thoughts of it, as well out of regard to his brother, as on account of the innocence of the lady, against whom he perceived his wife was so violently exasperated, at first refused her request, and endeavoured all he could to dissuade her from it. But not being able either to prevail upon her, or to act with steadiness and resolution himself, he at last yielded, and was guilty of the weakest and most cruel piece of complaisance that ever was acted, making the inviolable obligations of justice and humanity give way to the arbitrary laws of a custom, that had only been established to give occasion for the doing of good, and for acts of beneficence and generosity. In consequence then of this compliance, the lady was apprehended by the king's guards, and delivered to Amestris, who caused her breasts, tongue, nose, ears and lips, to be cut off, ordered them to be cast to the dogs in her own presence, and then sent her home to her husband's house in that mutilated and miserable condition. In the mean time, Xerxes had sent for his brother, in order to prepare him for this melancholy and tragical adventure. He first gave him to understand, that he should be glad he would put away his wife; and to induce him thereto, offered to give him one of his daughters in her stead. But Masistus, who was passionately fond of his wife, could not prevail upon him to divorce her: whereupon Xerxes in great wrath, told him, that since he refused his daughter, he should neither have her nor his wife; and that he would teach him not to reject the offers his master had made him; and with this inhuman reply dismissed him.

This strange proceeding threw Masistus into the greatest anxiety; who, thinking he had reason to apprehend the worst of accidents, made all the haste he could home, to see what had passed there during his absence. On his arrival he found his wife in that deplorable condition we have just been describing. Being enraged thereat to the degree we may naturally imagine, he assembled all his family, his servants and dependants, and set out with all possible expedition for Bactriana, whereof he was governour, determined as soon as he arrived there, to raise an army and make war against the king, in order to avenge himself for his barbarous treatment. But Xerxes being informed of his hasty departure, and from thence suspecting the design he had conceived against him, sent a party of horse after him to pursue him; which having overtaken him, cut him in pieces,

together with his children and all his retinue. I do not know whether a more tragical example of revenge, than I have now related, is to be found in history.

* There is still another action, no less cruel or impious than the former, related of Amestris. She caused 14 children of the best families in Persia to be burnt alive, as a sacrifice to the infernal gods, out of compliance with a superstitious custom practised by the Persians.

† Masistus being dead, Xerxes gave the government of Bactriana to his second son Hystaspes; who being by that means obliged to live at a distance from the court, gave his younger brother Artaxerxes the opportunity of ascending the throne to his disadvantage, after the death of their father, as will be seen in the sequel.

Here ends Herodotus' history, viz. at the battle of Mycale, and the siege of the city of Sestus by the Athenians.

SECTION XII.

THE ATHENIANS REBUILD THE WALLS OF THEIR CITY, NOTWITHSTANDING THE OPPOSITION OF THE LACEDÆMONIANS.

THE war, commonly called the war of Media, which had lasted but two years, being terminated in the manner we have mentioned, the Athenians returned to their own country, sent for their wives and children, whom they had committed to the care of their friends during the war, and began to think of rebuilding their city, which was almost entirely destroyed by the Persians, and to surround it with strong walls, in order to secure it from farther violence. The Lacedæmonians having intelligence of this, conceived a jealousy, and began to apprehend that Athens, which was already very powerful by sea, if it should go on to increase its strength by land also, might take upon her in time to give laws to Sparta, and to deprive her of that authority and pre-eminence, which she had hitherto exercised over the rest of Greece. They therefore sent an embassy to the Athenians, the purport of which was, to represent to them that the common interest and safety required, that there should be no fortified city out of the Peloponnesus, lest, in case of a second irruption, it should serve for a place of arms for the Persians, who would be sure to settle themselves in it, as they had done before at Thebes, and who from thence would be able to infest the whole country, and to make themselves masters of it very speedily. Themistocles, who since the battle of Salamin, was greatly considered and respected at Athens, easily penetrated into the true design of the Lacedæmonians, though it was gilded over with the specious pretext of public good: but as the latter were able, with the assistance of their allies, to hinder the Athenians by force from carrying on the work, in case they should positively and absolutely refuse to comply with their demands, he advised the senate to make use of cunning and dissimulation as well as they. The answer therefore they made their envoys was, that they would send an embassy to Sparta, to satisfy the commonwealth concerning their jealousies and apprehensions. Themistocles got himself to be nominated one of the ambassadors, and persuaded the senate not to let his colleagues set out along with him, but to send them one after another, in order to gain time for carrying on the work. The matter was exe-

* Herod. l. vii. c. 114.

† Diod. l. xi. p. 58.

‡ A. M. 3526. Ant. J. C. 478. Thucyd. l. viii. p. 59—62. Diod. l. xi. p. 80, 81. Justin. l. ii. c. 15.

cuted pursuant to his advice ; and he accordingly went alone to Lacedæmon, where he let a great many days pass without waiting upon the magistrates, or applying to the senate. And upon their pressing him to do it, and asking him the reason why he deferred it so long, he made answer, that he waited for the arrival of his colleagues, that they might all have their audience of the senate together, and seemed to be very much surprised that they were so long in coming. At length they arrived ; but all came singly, and at a good distance of time one from another. During all this while the work was carried on at Athens with the utmost industry and vigor. The women, children, strangers and slaves, were all employed in it : nor was it interrupted night or day. The Spartans were not ignorant of the matter, but made great complaints of it to Themistocles, who positively denied the fact, and pressed them to send other deputies to Athens, in order to inform themselves better of the fact ; desiring them not to give credit to loose and flying reports, without foundation. At the same time he secretly advised the Athenians to detain the Spartan envoys as so many hostages, until he and his colleagues were returned from their embassy, fearing, not without good reason, that they themselves might be served in the same manner at Sparta. At last, when all his fellow ambassadors were arrived, he desired an audience, and declared in full senate, that it was really true the Athenians had resolved to fortify their city with strong walls ; that the work was almost completed ; that they had judged it to be absolutely necessary for their own security, and for the public good of the allies ; telling them at the same time, that after the great experience they had of the Athenian people's behaviour, they could not well suspect them of being wanting in their zeal for the common interest of their country ; that as the condition and privileges of all the allies ought to be equal, it was just the Athenians should provide for their own safety by all the methods they judged necessary, as well as the other confederates ; that they had thought of this expedient, and were in a condition to defend their city against whomsoever should presume to attack it ; and * that as for the Lacedæmonians, it was not much for their honour, that they should desire to establish their power and superiority rather upon the weak and defenceless condition of their allies, than upon their own strength and valor. The Lacedæmonians were extremely displeased with this discourse : but either out of a sense of gratitude and esteem for their country, or out of a conviction that they were not able to oppose their enterprise, they dissembled their resentment : and the ambassadors on both sides, having all suitable honors paid them, returned to their respective cities.

† Themistocles, who had always his thoughts fixed upon raising and augmenting the power and glory of the Athenian commonwealth, did not confine his views to the walls of the city. He went on with the same vigorous application to finish the building and fortifications of the Piræus ; for, from the time he entered into office, he had begun that great work. Before his time they had no other port at Athens but that of Phalerus, which was neither very large nor commodious, and consequently not capable of answering the great designs of Themistocles. For this reason he had cast his eye upon the Piræus, which seemed to invite him by its advantageous situation, and by the conveniency of its three spacious havens, which were capable of containing above 400 vessels. This undertaking was

* *Graviter castigat eos, quod non virtute, sed imbecillitate sociorum, potentiam quærent.* Justin. l. ii. c. 15.

† *Thucyd. p. 82, 65. Diod. l. xi. p. 32, 33.*

prosecuted with so much vigilance and vivacity, that the work was considerably advanced in a very little time. Themistocles likewise obtained a decree, that every year they should build 20 vessels for the augmentation of their fleet : and, in order to engage the greater number of workmen and sailors to resort to Athens, he caused particular privileges and immunities to be granted in their favour. His design was, as I have already observed, to make the whole force of Athens maritime ; in which he followed a very different scheme of politics from what had been pursued by their ancient kings, who, endeavouring all they could to alienate the minds of the citizens from seafaring business and from war, and to make them apply themselves wholly to agriculture and to peaceable employments, published this fable : That Minerva disputing with Neptune, to know which of them should be declared patron of Attica, and give their name to the city newly built, she gained her cause by showing her judges the branch of an olive-tree, the happy symbol of peace and plenty, which she had planted ; whereas Neptune had made a fiery horse, the symbol of war and confusion, rise out of the earth before them.

SECTION XIII.

THE BLACK DESIGN OF THEMISTOCLES REJECTED UNANIMOUSLY BY THE PEOPLE OF ATHENS.

THEMISTOCLES, * who conceived the design of supplanting the Lacedæmonians, and of taking the government of Greece out of their hands, in order to put it into those of the Athenians, kept his eye and his thoughts continually fixed upon that great object. And as he was not very nice or scrupulous in the choice of his measures, whatever tended towards the accomplishing of the end he had in view, he looked upon as just and lawful. On a certain day then he declared, in a full assembly of the people, that he had a very important design to propose, but that he could not communicate it to the people ; because its success required it should be carried on with the greatest secrecy : he therefore desired they would appoint a person, to whom he might explain himself upon the matter in question. Aristides was unanimously pitched upon by the whole assembly, who referred themselves entirely to his opinion of the affair : so great a confidence had they both in his probity and prudence. Themistocles therefore having taken him aside, told him, that the design he had conceived was to burn the fleet belonging to the rest of the Grecian states which then lay in a neighbouring port, and that by this means Athens would certainly become mistress of all Greece. Aristides hereupon returned to the assembly, and only declared to them, that indeed nothing could be more advantageous to the commonwealth than Themistocles' project, but that at the same time nothing in the world could be more unjust. All the people unanimously ordained that Themistocles should entirely desist from his project. We see in this instance, that the title of just was not given to Aristides, even in his life time, without some foundation ; a title, says Plutarch, infinitely superior to all those which conquerors pursue with so much ardour, and which, in some measure, approaches a man to the divinity.

I do not know whether all history can afford us a fact more worthy of admiration than this. It is not a company of philosophers (to whom it costs nothing to establish fine maxims and sublime notions of morality in the

* Plut. in Themist. p. 121, 122. in Arist. p. 332.

schools) who determine on this occasion, that the consideration of profit and advantage ought never to prevail in preference to what is honest and just. It is an entire people, who are highly interested in the proposal made to them, who are convinced that it is of the greatest importance to the welfare of the state, and who however reject it with unanimous consent, and without a moment's hesitation and that for this only reason, that it is contrary to justice. How black and perfidious, on the other hand, was the design which Themistocles proposed to them, of burning the fleet of their Grecian confederates, at a time of entire peace, solely to aggrandize the power of the Athenians! Had he an hundred times the merit ascribed to him, this single action would be sufficient to sully all his glory. For it is the heart, that is to say, integrity and probity, that constitutes and distinguishes true merit.

I am sorry that Plutarch, who generally judges of things with great justice, does not seem on this occasion to condemn Themistocles. After having spoken of the works he had effected in the Piræus, he goes on to the fact in question, of which he says, “* Themistocles projected something *“ still greater for the augmentation of their maritime power.”*”

† The Lacedæmonians having proposed in the council of the Amphictyons, that all the cities which had not taken arms against Xerxes, should be excluded from that assembly, Themistocles, who apprehended, that if the Thessalians, the Argives, and the Thebans, were excluded that council, the Spartans would by that means become masters of the suffrages, and consequently determine all affairs according to their pleasure; Themistocles, I say, made a speech in behalf of the cities they were for excluding, and brought the deputies that composed the assembly over to his sentiments. He represented to them, that the greatest part of the cities that had entered into the confederacy, which were but 31 in the whole, were very small and inconsiderable; that it would therefore be a very strange as well as a very dangerous proceeding, to deprive all the other cities of Greece of their votes and places in the grand assembly of the nation, and by that means suffer the august council of the Amphictyons to fall under the direction and influence of two or three of the most powerful cities, which for the future would give law to all the rest, and would subvert and abolish that equality of power, which was justly regarded as the basis and soul of all republics. Themistocles, by this plain and open declaration of his opinion, drew upon himself the hatred of the Lacedæmonians, who from that time became his professed enemies. He had also incurred the displeasure of the rest of the allies, by his having exacted contributions from them in too rigorous and rapacious a manner.

‡ When the city of Athens was entirely rebuilt, the people, finding themselves in a state of peace and tranquility, endeavoured by all sorts of methods to get the government into their hands, and to make the Athenian state entirely popular. This design of theirs, though kept as secret as possible, did not escape the vigilance and penetration of Aristides, who saw all the consequences with which such an innovation would be attended. But, as he considered on one hand, that the people were entitled to some regard, on account of the valour they had shown in all the late battles they had gained; and on the other, that it would be no easy matter to curb and restrain a people, who still in a manner had their arms in their hands, and

* *Μετὰ τὴν δειψίαν.*

† Plut. in Themist. p. 122.

‡ Plut. in Arist. p. 352.

who were grown more insolent than ever from their victories; on these considerations, I say, he thought it proper to observe measures with them, and to find out some medium to satisfy and appease them. He therefore passed a decree, by which it was ordained, that the government should be common to all the citizens, and that the archons, who were the chief magistrates of the commonwealth, and who used to be chosen only out of the richest of its members, viz. from among those only who received 500 medimni of grain out of the product of their lands, should for the future be elected indifferently out of all the Athenians without distinction. By thus giving up something to the people, he prevented all dissensions and commotions, which might have proved fatal, not only to the Athenian state, but to all Greece.

SECTION XIV.

THE LACEDÆMONIANS LOSE THEIR CHIEF COMMAND THROUGH THE PRIDE AND ARROGANCE OF PAUSANIAS.

THE Grecians, * encouraged by the happy success which had every where attended their victorious arms, determined to send a fleet to sea, in order to deliver such of their allies as were still under the yoke of the Persians, out of their hands. Pausanias was the commander of the fleet for the Lacedæmonians; and Aristides, and Cimon the son of Miltiades, commanded for the Athenians. They first directed their course to the isle of Cyprus, where they restored all the cities to their liberty: then steering towards the Hellespont, they attacked the city of Byzantium, of which they made themselves masters, and took a vast number of prisoners, a great part of whom were of the richest and most considerable families of Persia.

Pausanias, who from this time conceived thoughts of betraying his country, judged it proper to make use of this opportunity to gain the favour of Xerxes. To this end he caused a report to be spread among his troops, that the Persian noblemen, whom he had committed to the guard and care of one of his officers, had made their escape by night, and were fled: whereas he had set them at liberty himself and sent a letter by them to Xerxes, wherein he offered to deliver the city of Sparta and all Greece into his hands, on condition he would give him his daughter in marriage. The king did not fail to give him a favourable answer, and to send him very large sums of money also, in order to win over as many of the Grecians, as he should find disposed to enter into his designs. The person he appointed to manage this intrigue with him, was Artabazus; and to the end that he might have it in his power to transact the matter with the greater ease and security, he made him governour of all the sea coasts of Asia Minor.

† Pausanias, who was already dazzled with the prospect of his future greatness, began from this moment to change his whole conduct and behaviour. The poor, modest, and frugal way of living at Sparta; their subjection to rigid and austere laws which neither spared nor respected any man's person, but were altogether as inexorable and inflexible to the greatest, as to those of the meanest condition; all this, I say, became insupportable to Pausanias. He could not bear the thoughts of going back to Sparta, after his having been possessed of such high commands and employ-

* A. M. 3528. Ant. J. C. 470. Thucyd. l. i. p. 63. 342—86.

† Plut. in Arist. p. 332, 333.

ments, to return to a state of equality, that confounded him with the meanest of the citizens; and this was the cause of his entering into a treaty with the barbarians. Having done this, he entirely laid aside the manners and behaviour of his country; assumed both the dress and state of the Persians, and imitated them in all their expensive luxury and magnificence. He treated the allies with an insufferable rudeness and insolence; never spoke to the officers but with menaces and arrogance; required extraordinary and unusual honours to be paid to him; and by his whole behaviour rendered the Spartan dominion odious to all the confederates. On the other hand, the courteous, affable, and obliging deportment of Aristides and Cimon; and infinite remoteness from all imperious and haughty airs, which only tend to alienate people and multiply enemies; a gentle, kind, and beneficent disposition, which showed itself in all their actions, and which served to temper the authority of their commands, and to render it both easy and amiable; the justice and humanity conspicuous in every thing they did; the great care they took to offend no person whatsoever, and to do kind offices and services to all about them: all this, I say, hurt Pausanias exceedingly, by the contrast of their opposite characters and exceedingly increased the general discontent. At last this dissatisfaction publicly broke out; and all the allies deserted him, and put themselves under the command and protection of the Athenians. Thus did Aristides, says Plutarch, by the prevalence of that humanity and gentleness, which he opposed to the arrogance and roughness of Pausanias, and by inspiring Cimon his colleague with the same sentiments, insensibly drew off the minds of the allies from the Lacedæmonians, without their perceiving it, and at length deprived them of the command; not by open force, or by sending out armies and fleets against them, and still less by making use of any arts or perfidious practices; but by the wisdom and moderation of his conduct, and by rendering the government of the Athenians amiable.

It must be confessed at the same time, that the Spartan people on this occasion showed a greatness of soul and a spirit of moderation, that can never be sufficiently admired: for when they were convinced, that their commanders grew haughty and insolent from their too great authority, they willingly renounced the superiority, which they had hitherto exercised over the rest of the Grecians, and forebore sending any more of their generals to command the Grecian armies; choosing rather, adds the historian, to have their citizens wise, modest and submissive to the discipline and laws of the commonwealth, than to maintain their pre-eminence and superiority over all the Grecian states.

SECTION XV.

PAUSANIAS' SECRET CONSPIRACY WITH THE PERSIANS. HIS DEATH.

UPON * the repeated complaints the Spartan commonwealth received on all hands against Pausanias, they recalled him home to give an account of his conduct. But not having sufficient evidence to convict him of his having carried on a correspondence with Xerxes, they were obliged to acquit him on this first trial; after which he returned of his own private authority, and without the consent and approbation of the republic, to the city of Byzantium, from whence he continued to carry on his secret prac-

* A. M. 5529. Ant. J. C. 475. Thucyd. l. i. p. 86, & 89. Diod. l. ix. p. 5—86. Cor. Nep. in Pausan.

tices with Artabazus. But, as he was still guilty of many violent and unjust proceedings, whilst he resided there, the Athenians obliged him to leave the place; from whence he retired to Colonæ, a small city of Troas. There he received an order from the Ephori to return to Sparta, on pain of being declared, in case of disobedience, a public enemy and traitor to his country. He complied with the summons, and went home, hoping he should still be able to bring himself off by dint of money. On his arrival he was committed to prison, and was soon afterwards brought again upon his trial before the judges. The charge brought against him was supported by many suspicious circumstances and strong presumptions. Several of his own slaves confessed that he had promised to give them their liberty, in case they would enter into his designs, and serve him with fidelity and zeal in the execution of his projects. But, as it was the custom of the Ephori never to pronounce sentence of death against a Spartan, without a full and direct proof of the crime laid to his charge, they looked upon the evidence against him as insufficient; and the more so, as he was of the royal family, and was actually invested with the administration of the regal office; for Pausanias exercised the function of king, as being the guardian and nearest relation to Plistarchus, the son of Leonidas, who was then in his minority. He was therefore acquitted a second time, and set at liberty.

Whilst the Ephori was thus perplexed for want of clear and plain evidence against the offender, a certain slave, who was called the Argilian, came to them, and brought them a letter, written by Pausanias himself to the king of Persia, which the slave was to have carried and delivered to Artabazus. It must be observed by the way, that this Persian governour and Pausanias had agreed together, immediately to put to death all the couriers they mutually sent to one another, as soon as their packets or messages were delivered, that there might be no possibility left of tracing out or discovering their correspondence. The Argilian, who saw none of his fellow-servants that were sent expresses return back again, had some suspicion; and when it came to his turn to go, he opened the letter he was entrusted with, in which Artabazus was really desired to kill him pursuant to their agreement. This was the letter the slave put into the hands of the Ephori; who still thought even this proof insufficient in the eye of the law, and therefore endeavoured to corroborate it by the testimony of Pausanias himself. The slave, in concert with them, withdrew to the temple of Neptune in Tenaros, as to a secure asylum. Two small closets were purposely made there, in which the Ephori and some Spartans hid themselves. The instant Pausanias was informed that the Argilian had fled to this temple, he hastened thither, to inquire the reason. The slave confessed that he had opened the letter; and that finding by the contents of it, he was to be put to death, he had fled to that temple to save his life. As Pausanias could not deny the fact, he made the best excuse he could; promised the slave a great reward; obliged him to promise not to mention what had passed between them to any person whatsoever. Pausanias then left him.

Pausanias' guilt was now but too evident. The moment he was returned to the city, the Ephori were resolved to seize him. From the aspect of one of these magistrates, he plainly perceived that some evil design was hatching against him, and therefore he ran with the utmost speed to the temple of Pallas, called Chalciæcos, near that place, and got into it before the pursuers could overtake him. The entrance was immediately stopped up with great stones; and history informs us, that the criminal's

mother set the first example on that occasion. They now tore off the roof of the chapel : but as the Ephori did not dare to take him out of it by force, because this would have been a violation of that sacred asylum ; they resolved to leave him exposed to the inclemencies of the weather, and accordingly he was starved to death. His corpse was buried not far from that place ; but the oracle of Delphos, whom they consulted soon after, declared that, to appease the anger of the goddess, who was justly offended on account of the violation of her temple, two statues must be set up there in honor of Pausanias, which was done accordingly.

Such was the end of Pausanias, whose wild and inconsiderate ambition had stifled in him all sentiments of probity, honour, love of his country, zeal for liberty, and of hatred and aversion for the barbarians : sentiments which, in some measure, were inherent in all the Greeks, and particularly in the Lacedæmonians.

CHAPTER XVI.

THEMISTOCLES FLIES FOR SHELTER TO KING ADMETUS.

THEMISTOCLES* was also charged with being an accomplice of Pausanias. He was then in exile. A passionate thirst of glory, and a strong desire to command arbitrarily over the citizens, had made him very odious to them. He had built, very near his house, a temple in honour of Diana, under this title, "To Diana, goddess of good counsel;" as hinting to the Athenians, that he had given good counsel to their city, and to all Greece ; and he also had placed his statue in it, which was standing in Plutarch's time. It appeared, says he, from this statue, that his physiognomy was as heroic as his valour. Finding that men listened with pleasure to all the calumnies his enemies spread against him, to silence them, he was for ever expatiating, in all public assemblies, on the services he had done his country. As they were at last tired with hearing him repeat this so often, "How ! says he to them, "are you weary of having good offices frequently done you by the same persons?" He did not consider, that putting them so often in mind † of his services, was in a manner reproaching them with their having forgot them, which was not very obliging ; and he seemed not to know, that the surest way to acquire applause, is to leave the bestowing of it to others, and to resolve to do such things only as are praiseworthy ; and that a frequent repetition of one's own virtue and exalted actions, is so far from appeasing envy, that it only inflames it.

‡ Themistocles, after having been banished from Athens by this ostracism, withdrew to Argos. He was there when Pausanias was prosecuted as a traitor, who had conspired against his country. He had at first concealed his machinations from Themistocles, though he was one of his best friends ; but as soon as he was expelled his country, and highly resented that injury, he disclosed his projects to him, and pressed him to join in them. To induce his compliance, he showed him the letters which the king of Persia wrote to him, and endeavoured to animate him against the Athenians, by painting their injustice and ingratitude in the strongest colours. However, Themisto-

* Thucyd. l. i. p. 89, 90. Plut. in Themist. c. cxiii. cxiv. Corn. Nep. in Themist. c. viii.

† Hoc molestum est. Nam est hæc commemoratio quasi exprobatio est inremoris beneficii. Terent. in Andr.

‡ Plut. in Themist. p. 112.

ales rejected with indignation the proposals of Pausanias, and refused peremptorily to engage in any manner in his schemes: but then he concealed what had passed between them, and did not discover the enterprise he had formed; whether it was that he imagined Pausanias would renounce it of himself, or was persuaded that it would be discovered some other way; it not being possible for so dangerous and ill concerted an enterprise to take effect.

After Pausanias' death, several letters and other things were found among his papers, which raised a violent suspicion of Themistocles. The Lacedæmonians sent deputies to Athens, to accuse and have sentence of death passed upon him; and such of the citizens who envied him, joined these accusers. Aristides had now a fair opportunity of revenging himself on his rival, from the injurious treatment he had received from him, had his soul been capable of so cruel a satisfaction. But he refused absolutely to join in so horrid a combination; as little inclined to delight in the misfortunes of his adversary, as he had before been to regret his successes. Themistocles answered by letters all the calumnies with which he was charged; and represented to the Athenians, that as he had ever been fond of ruling, and his temper being such as would not suffer him to be lorded over by others, it was highly improbable that he should have a design to deliver up himself, and all Greece, to enemies and barbarians.

In the mean time, the people too strongly wrought upon by his accusers, sent some persons to seize him, that he might be tried by the council of Greece. Themistocles, having timely notice of it, went into the island of Corcyra, to whose inhabitants he had formerly done some service: however, not thinking himself safe there, he fled to Epirus; and finding himself still pursued by the Athenians and Lacedæmonians, out of despair he made a very dangerous choice, which was, to fly to Admetus, king of Molossus, for refuge. This prince, having formerly desired the aid of the Athenians, and being refused with ignominy by Themistocles, who at that time presided in the government, had retained the deepest resentment on that account, and declared, that he would take the first opportunity to revenge himself: but Themistocles, imagining that in the unhappy situation of his affairs, the recent envy of his fellow-citizens was more to be feared than the ancient grudge of that king, was resolved to run the hazard of it. Being come into the palace of that monarch, upon being informed that he was absent, he addressed himself to the queen, who received him very graciously, and instructed him in the manner it was proper to make his request. Admetus being returned, Themistocles takes the king's son in his arms, seats himself on his hearth amidst his household gods, and there telling him who he was, and the cause why he fled to him for refuge, he implores his clemency, owns that his life is in his hands, intreats him to forget the past, and represents to him that no action can be more worthy a great king than to exercise clemency. Admetus, surprised and moved with compassion in seeing at his feet, in so humble a posture, the greatest man of all Greece, and the conqueror of all Asia, raised him immediately from the ground, and promised to protect him against all his enemies. Accordingly, when the Athenians and Lacedæmonians came to demand him, he refused absolutely to deliver up a person who had made his palace his asylum, in the firm persuasion that it would be sacred and inviolable.

Whilst he was at the court of this prince, one of his friends found an opportunity to carry off his wife and children from Athens, and to send them to him; for which that person was some time after seized and condemned

to die. With regard to Themistocles' effects, his friends secured the greatest part of them for him, which they afterwards found opportunity to remit him; but all that could be discovered, which amounted to 100 * talents, was carried to the public treasury. When he entered upon the administration, he was not worth three talents. I shall leave this illustrious exile for some time in the court of king Admetus, to resume the sequel of this history.

SECTION XVII.

ARISTIDES' DISINTERESTED ADMINISTRATION OF THE PUBLIC TREASURE.—
HIS DEATH AND EULOGIUM.

I have before observed, † that the command of Greece had passed from Sparta to the Athenians. Hitherto the cities and nations of Greece had indeed contributed some sums of money towards carrying on the expence of the war against the barbarians; but this repartition or division had always occasioned great feuds, because it was not made in a just or equal proportion. It was thought proper, under this new government, to lodge in the island of Delos the common treasure of Greece; to fix new regulations with regard to the public monies; and to lay such a tax as might be regulated according to the revenue of each city and state: in order that the expences being equally borne by the several individuals who composed the body of the allies, no one might have reason to murmur. The business was, to find a person of so honest and incorrupt a mind, as to discharge faithfully an employment of so delicate and dangerous a kind, the due administration of which so nearly concerned the public welfare. All the allies cast their eyes upon Aristides; accordingly they invested him with full powers, and appointed him to levy a tax on each of them, relying entirely on his wisdom and justice.

The citizens had no cause to repent their choice. † He presided over the treasury with the fidelity and disinterestedness of a man who looks upon it as a capital crime to embezzle the smallest portion of another's possessions; with the care and activity of a father of a family, in the management of his own estate; and with the caution and integrity of a person who considers the public monies as sacred. In fine, he succeeded in what is equally difficult and extraordinary, viz. to acquire the love of all in an office, in which he that escapes the public odium gains a great point. Such is the glorious character which Seneca gives of a person charged with an employment of almost the same kind, and the noblest eulogium that can be given such as administer public revenues. It is the exact picture of Aristides. He discovered so much probity and wisdom in the exercise of his office, that no man complained; and those times were considered ever after as the golden age, that is, the period in which Greece had attained its highest pitch of virtue and happiness. And, indeed, the tax which he had fixed, in the whole, to 460 talents, was raised by Pericles to 600, and soon after to 1300 talents: it was not that the expences of the war were increased, but the treasure was employed to very useless purposes in annual distributions to the Athenians, in solemnizing of games and festi-

* 100,000 crowns French, about L. 22,500 Sterling.

† Plut. in Arist. p. 333, 334. Dioid. l. xi. p. 56.

‡ Tu quidem orbis terrarum rationes administras; tam abstinenter quam alienas, tam diligenter quam tuas, tam religiose quam publicas. In officio amorem consequeris, in quo odium vitare difficile est. Senecæ. lib. de brevitat. vitæ. cap. xviii.

vals, in building of temples and public edifices; not to mention that the hands of those who superintended the treasury, were not always so clean and incorrupt as those of Aristides. This wise and equitable conduct secured him, to latest posterity, the glorious surname of "the Just."

Nevertheless, Plutarch relates an action of Aristides, which shows that the Greeks (the same may be said of the Romans) had a very narrow and imperfect idea of justice. They confined the exercise of it to the interior, as it were, of civil society; and acknowledged that the individuals were bound to observe strictly its several maxims: but with regard to their country, to the republic (their great idol to which they reduced every thing,) they thought in a quite different manner; and imagined themselves essentially obliged to sacrifice to it, not only their lives and possessions, but even their religion and the most sacred engagements, in opposition to, and contempt of the most solemn oaths. This will appear evidently in what follows.

* After the regulation had been made in respect to the tributes of which I have just spoken, Aristides, having settled the several articles of the alliance, made the confederates take an oath to observe them punctually, and he himself swore in the name of the Athenians; and in denouncing the curses which always accompanied the oaths, he threw into the sea, pursuant to the usual custom, large bars of red hot iron. But the ill state of the Athenian affairs forcing them afterwards to infringe some of those articles, and to govern a little more arbitrarily, he entreated them to vent those curses on him, and discharge themselves thereby of the punishment due to such as had forsworn themselves, and who had been reduced to it by the unhappy situation of their affairs. Theophrastus tells us, that in general (these words are borrowed from Plutarch) Aristides, who executed all matters relating to himself or the public with the most impartial and rigorous justice, used to act, in his administration, several things, according as the exigency of affairs and the welfare of his country might require; it being his opinion, that a government, in order to support itself, is on some occasions obliged to have recourse to injustice, of which he gives the following example. One day, as the Athenians were debating in their council, about bringing to their city, in opposition to the articles of the treaty, the common treasures of Greece, which were deposited in Delos: the Samians having opened the debate; when it was Aristides' turn to speak, he said, that the dislodging of the treasure was an unjust action, but useful, and made this opinion take place. This incident shows, that the pretended wisdom of the heathens was overspread with great obscurity and error.

It was scarce possible to have a greater contempt for riches than Aristides had. Themistocles, who was not pleased with the encomiums bestowed on other men, hearing Aristides applauded for the noble disinterestedness with which he administered the public treasures, did but laugh at it; and said, that the praises bestowed upon him for it, showed no greater merit or virtue than that of a strong chest, which faithfully preserves all the monies that are shut up in it, without retaining any. This low sneer was by way of revenge for a stroke of raillery that had stung him to the quick. Themistocles saying, that, in his opinion, the greatest talent a general could possess was, to be able to foresee the designs of an enemy; "This talent," replied Aristides, "is necessary; but there is another no less noble and worthy a general, that is, to have clean hands, and a soul superior to venality and views of interest." Aristides might very justly answer The-

* Plut. in vit. Arist. p. 333, 334.

mistocles in this manner, since he was really very poor, though he had possessed the highest employments in the state. He seemed to have an innate love for poverty; and, so far from being ashamed of it, he thought it reflected as much glory on him as all the trophies and victories he had won. History gives us a shining instance of this.

Callias, who was a near relation of Aristides, and the most wealthy citizen in Athens, was cited to appear before the judges. The accuser, laying very little stress on the cause itself, reproached him especially with permitting Aristides, his wife and children, to live in poverty, at a time when he himself wallowed in riches. Callias perceiving that these reproaches made a strong impression on the judges, he summoned Aristides to declare before them whether he had not often pressed him to accept of large sums of money, and whether he had not obstinately refused to accept of his offer, with saying, that he had more reason to boast of his poverty than Callias of his riches; that many persons were to be found who had made a good use of their wealth, but that there were few who bore their poverty with magnanimity, and even joy; and that none had cause to blush at their abject condition, but such as had reduced themselves to it by their idleness, their intemperance, their profusion or dissolute conduct. * Aristides declared that his kinsman had told nothing but the truth, and added, that a man-whose frame of mind is such as to suppress a desire of superfluous things, and who confines the wants of life within the narrowest limits, besides its freeing him from a thousand importunate cares, and leaving him so much master of his time as to devote it entirely to the public, it also approaches him in some measure to the Deity, who is wholly void of cares or wants. There was no man in the assembly, but, at his leaving it, would have chosen to be Aristides, though so poor, rather than Callias with all his riches.

Plutarch gives us, in few words, Plato's glorious testimony of Aristides' virtue, for which he looks upon him as infinitely superior to all the illustrious men his cotemporaries. Themistocles, Cimon, and Pericles, says he, filled, indeed, their city with splendid edifices, with porticoes, statues, rich ornaments, and other vain superfluities of that kind; but Aristides did all that lay in his power to enrich every part of it with virtue: now to raise a city to true happiness, it must be made virtuous, not rich.

Plutarch takes notice of another circumstance in Aristides' life, which, though of the simplest kind, reflects the greatest honour on him, and may serve as an excellent lesson. It is in the beautiful † treatise, in which he inquires, whether it is proper for old men to concern themselves with affairs of government; and where he points out admirably well the various services they may do the state even in an advanced age. We are not to fancy, says he, that all public services require great motion and hurry, such as to harangue the people, to preside in the government, or to head armies: an old man, whose mind is informed with wisdom, may, without going abroad, exercise a kind of magistracy in it, which though secret and obscure, is not therefore the less important; and that is, in training up youth by good counsel, teaching them the various springs of policy, and how to act in public affairs. Aristides, adds Plutarch, was not always in office, but was always useful to it. His house was a public school of virtue, wisdom and policy. It was open to all young Athenians who were lovers of virtue, and these used to consult him as an oracle. He gave them the

* Plut. in compar. Arist. et Cat. p. 555.

† Plut. in compar. Arist. et Cat. p. 795—797.

kindest reception, heard them with patience, instructed them with familiarity, and endeavoured, above all things, to animate their courage, and inspire them with confidence. It is observed particularly, that Cimon, afterwards so famous, was obliged to him for this important service.

Plutarch * divided the life of statesmen into three ages. In the first, he would have them learn the principles of government; in the second, reduce them to practice; and in the third, instruct others.

† History does not mention the exact time when, nor place where Aristides died; but then it pays a glorious testimony to his memory, when it assures us, that this great man, who had possessed the highest employments in the republic, and had the absolute disposal of its treasures, died poor, and did not leave money enough to defray the expences of his funeral; so that the government was obliged to bear the charge of it, and to maintain his family. His daughters were married, and Lysimachus his son was subsisted, at the expence of the Prytaneum; which also gave the daughter of the latter, after his death, the pension with which those were honoured who had been victorious at the Olympic games. Plutarch relates on this occasion the liberality of the Athenians in favour of the posterity of Aristogiton their deliverer, who were fallen to decay; and he adds, that even in his time, almost 600 years after, the same goodness and liberality still subsisted. It was glorious for a city to have preserved for so many centuries its generosity and gratitude, and a strong motive to animate individuals, who were assured that their children would enjoy the rewards which death might prevent them from receiving! It was delightful to see the remote posterity of the defenders and deliverers of the commonwealth, who had inherited nothing from their ancestors but the glory of their actions, maintained for so many ages at the expence of the public, in consideration of the services their families had rendered. They lived in this manner with much more honour, and called up the remembrance of their ancestors with much greater splendour, than a multitude of citizens whose fathers had been studious only of leaving them great estates, which generally do not long survive those who raised them, and often leave their posterity nothing but the odious remembrance of the injustice and oppression by which they were acquired.

The greatest honour which the ancients have done Aristides, is in bestowing on him the glorious title of "the Just." He gained it, not by one particular action, but by the whole tenor of his conduct and actions. Plutarch makes a reflection on this occasion, which being very remarkable, I think it incumbent on me not to omit.

‡ Among the several virtues of Aristides, says this judicious author, that for which he was most renowned was his justice, because this virtue is of most general use, its benefits extending to a greater number of persons, as it is the foundation, and in a manner the soul of every public office and employment. Hence it was that Aristides, though in low circumstances, and of mean extraction, merited the title of Just; a title, says Plutarch, truly royal, or rather truly divine; but one of which princes are seldom ambitious, because generally ignorant of its beauty and excellency. They

* He applies on this occasion to the custom used in Rome, where the Vestals spent the first 10 years in learning their office, and this was a kind of noviciate; the next ten years they employed in the exercise of their functions, and the last 10 in instructing the young novices in them.

† Plut. in Arist. p. 334, 335.

‡ Vid. Book V. Art. viii.

choose rather to be called * the conquerors of cities, and the thunderbolts of war, and sometimes even eagles and lions; preferring the vain honour of pompous titles, which convey no other idea but violence and slaughter, to the solid glory of those expressive of goodness and virtue. They do not know, continues Plutarch, that of the three chief attributes of the Deity, of whom kings boast themselves the image, I mean, immortality, power, and justice; that of these three attributes, I say, the first of which excites our admiration and desire, the second fills us with dread and terror, and the third inspires us with love and respect; this last only is truly and personally communicated to man, and is the only one that can conduct him to the other two; it being impossible for man to become truly immortal and powerful but by being just.

† Before I resume the sequel of this history, it may not be improper to observe, that it was about this period the fame of the Greeks, still more renowned for the wisdom of their polity than the glory of their victories, induced the Romans to have recourse to their lights and knowledge. Rome formed under kings, was in want of such laws as were necessary for the good government of a commonwealth. † For this purpose the Romans sent deputies to copy the laws of the cities of Greece, and particularly of Athens, which were still better adapted to the popular government that had been established after the expulsion of the kings. On this model the ten magistrates, called Decemviri, and who were invested with absolute authority, were created: these digested the laws of the twelve tables, which are the basis of the Roman law.

SECTION XVIII.

DEATH OF XERXES, KILLED BY ARTABANUS.—HIS CHARACTER.

THE ill success of Xerxes in his expedition against the Greeks, and which continued afterwards, at length discouraged him. Renouncing all thoughts of war and conquest, he abandoned himself entirely to luxury and ease, and was studious of nothing but his pleasures. † Artabanus, a native of Hyrcania, captain of his guards, and who had been long one of his chief favourites, found that this dissolute conduct had drawn upon him the contempt of his subjects: he therefore imagined that this would be a favourable opportunity to conspire against his sovereign; and his ambition was so vast, that he flattered himself with the hopes of succeeding him in the throne. † It is very likely that he was excited to the commission of this crime from another motive. Xerxes had commanded him to murder Darius his eldest son, but for what cause history is silent. As this order had been given at a banquet, and when the company was heated with wine, he did not doubt but that Xerxes would forget it, and therefore was not in

* Plut. in vit. Arist. p. 321, 322. Poliorectea, Cerauni Nicanorea.

† A. M. 3532. A. Rom. 303.

† Missi legati Athenas, jussique inclytas leges Solonis describere, et aliarum Græciæ civitatum instituta, mores, juraque noscere. Decem tabularum leges perlatæ sunt (quibus adjunctæ postea duæ,) qui nunc quoque in hoc immenso aliarum super alias privatarum legum cumulo, fons omnis publici privatique est juris. Liv. l. iii. n. 31. et 34.

‡ A. M. 3551. Ant. J. C. 478. Ctes. c. ii. Diod. l. xi. p. 62. Justin l. iii. c. 1.

§ This was not the Artabanus uncle to Xerxes.


¶ Arist. Polit. l. v. c. x. p. 401.

haste to obey it: however, he was mistaken, for the king complained upon that account, which made Artabanus dread his resentment, and therefore he resolved to prevent him. Accordingly he prevailed upon Mithridates, one of the eunuchs of the palace, and great chamberlain, to engage in his conspiracy, and by his means entered the chamber where the king lay, and murdered him in his sleep. He then went immediately to Artaxerxes, the third son of Xerxes. He informed him of the murder, charging Darius his eldest brother with it; as if impatience to ascend the throne had prompted him to that execrable deed. He added, that to secure the crown to himself, he was resolved to murder him also, for which reason it would be absolutely necessary for him to keep upon his guard. These words having made such an impression on Artaxerxes (a youth) as Artabanus desired, he went immediately into his brother's apartment, where being assisted by Artabanus and his guards, he murdered him. Hystaspes, Xerxes' second son, was next heir to the crown after Darius; but as he was then in Bactriana, of which he was governor, Artabanus seated Artaxerxes on the throne, but did not design to suffer him to enjoy it longer than he had formed a faction strong enough to drive him from it and ascend it himself. His great authority had gained him a multitude of creatures; besides this, he had seven sons, who were of a very tall stature, handsome, strong, courageous, and raised to the highest employments in the empire. The aid he hoped to receive from them was the chief motive of his raising his views so high. But whilst he was attempting to complete his design, Artaxerxes being informed of this plot by Megabysus, who had married one of his sisters, he endeavoured to anticipate him, and killed him before he had an opportunity of putting his treason in execution. His death established this prince in the possession of the kingdom.

Thus we have seen the end of Xerxes, who was one of the most powerful princes that ever lived. It would be needless for me to anticipate the reader with respect to the judgment he ought to form of him. We see him surrounded with whatever is greatest and most august in the opinion of mankind, the most extensive empire at that time in the world, immense treasures, and an incredible number of land as well as sea forces. But all these things are round him, not in him, and add no lustre to his natural qualities; for, by a blindness too common to princes and great men, born in the midst of all terrestrial blessings, heir to boundless power, and a lustre that had cost him nothing, he had accustomed himself to judge of his own talents and personal merit from the exterior of his exalted station and rank. He disregards the wise counsels of Artabanus his uncle, and of Demaratus, who alone had courage enough to speak truth to him; and he abandoned himself to courtiers, the adorers of his fortune, whose only study it was to boot his passions. He proportions and pretends to regulate the success of his enterprises by the extent of his power. The slavish submission of so many nations no longer soothes his ambition, and, little affected with too easy an obedience, he takes pleasure in exercising his power over the elements, in cutting his way through mountains, and making them navigable, in chastising the sea for having broken down the bridge, and in foolishly attempting to shackle the waves, by throwing chains into them. Big-swollen with a childish vanity and a ridiculous pride, he looks upon himself as the arbiter of nature: he imagines that not a nation in the world will dare to wait his arrival; and fondly and presumptuously relies on the millions of men and ships which he drags after him. But when, after the battle of Salamin, he beholds the sad ruins, the shameful remains of his numberless

troops scattered over all Greece, * he then is sensible of the wide difference between an army and a crowd of men. In a word, to form a right judgment of Xerxes, we need but contrast him with a citizen of Athens, a Miltiades, Themistocles or Aristides. In the latter we find good sense, prudence, ability in war, valour, and greatness of soul; in the former we see nothing but vanity, pride, obstinacy, the meanest and most grovelling sentiments, and sometimes the most horrid barbarity.

* *Stratusque per totam passim Græciam Xerxes intellexit, quantum ab exercitu turba distaret. Senec. de Benef. l. vi. c. 52.*



BOOK VII.

THE

HISTORY

OF THE

PERSIANS AND GREEKANS.

PLAN.

THE first and third chapters of this book include the history of the Persians and Greeks, during 48 years and some months, which contain the reign of Artaxerxes Longimanus; the last six years of which answer to the six first of the Peloponnesian war. This space of time begins at the year of the world 3531, and ends at 3579.

The second chapter comprehends the other transactions of the Greeks, which happened both in Sicily and Italy, during the interval above mentioned.

CHAPTER I.

THIS chapter includes the history of the Persians and Greeks, from the beginning of Artaxerxes' reign to the Peloponnesian war, which began in the 42d year of that king's reign.

SECTION I.

ARTAXERXES RUINS THE FACTION OF ARTABANUS, &c.

THE Greek historians give this prince the surname of Longimanus. Strabo * says it was because his hands were so long, that when he stood upright he could touch his knees with them; but according to Plutarch, † it was because his right hand was longer than his left. Had it not been for this blemish, he would have been the most graceful man of his age. He was still more remarkable for his goodness and generosity. He reigned about 49 years.

‡ Although Artaxerxes, by the death of Artabanus, was delivered from a dangerous competitor, there were still two obstacles in his way, before he could establish himself in the quiet possession of his throne: one of which was, his brother Hystaspes, governour of Bactriana; and the other, the faction of Artabanus. He began by the latter.

Artabanus had left seven sons and a great number of partisans, who as-

* Lib. xv. p. 735. A. M. 3581. Ant. J. C. 473.

† In Artax. p. 1011.

‡ Ctes. 30.

sembled to revenge his death. These, and the adherents of Artaxerxes, fought a bloody battle, in which a great number of Persian nobles lost their lives. Artaxerxes having at last entirely defeated his enemies, put to death all who had engaged in this conspiracy. He took an exemplary vengeance of those who were concerned in his father's murder, and particularly of Mithridatus the eunuch, who had betrayed him, and who was executed in the following manner: He * was laid on his back in a kind of horse-trough, and strongly fastened to the four corners of it. Every part of him, except his head, his hands, and feet, which came out at holes made for that purpose, was covered with another trough. In this horrid situation victuals were given him from time to time; and in case of his refusal to eat it, they were forced down his throat; honey, mixed with milk, was given him to drink, and all his face was smeared with it, which by that means attracted a numberless multitude of flies, especially as he was perpetually exposed to the scorching rays of the sun. The worms which bred in his excrements, preyed upon his bowels. This criminal lived 15 or 20 days in inexpressible torments,

Artaxerxes † having crushed the faction of Artabanus, was powerful enough to send an army into Bactriana, which had declared in favour of his brother; but he was not successful on this occasion. The two armies engaging, Hystaspes stood his ground so well, that if he did not gain the victory, he at least sustained no loss; so that both armies separated with equal success; and each retired to prepare for a second battle. Artaxerxes having raised a greater army than his brother, not to mention that the whole empire declared in his favour, defeated him in a second engagement, and entirely ruined his party. By this victory he secured to himself the quiet possession of the empire.

To ‡ maintain himself in the throne, he removed all such governours of cities and provinces from their employments, as he suspected to hold a correspondence with either of the factions he had overcome, and substituted others on whom he could rely. He afterwards applied himself to the reforming the abuses and disorders which had crept into the government. By his wise conduct and zeal for the public good, he soon acquired great reputation and authority, with the love of his subjects, the strongest support of sovereign power.

SECTION II.

THEMISTOCLES FLIES TO ARTAXERXES.

ACCORDING to Thucydides, § Themistocles fled to this prince in the beginning of his reign; but other authors, as Strabo, Plutarch, Didodorus, fix this incident under Xerxes his predecessor. Dr. Prideaux is of the latter opinion; he likewise thinks that the Artaxerxes in question, is the same with him who is called Ahasuerus in scripture, and who married Esther: but we suppose, with the learned Archbishop Usher, that it was Darius the son of Hystaspes who espoused this illustrious Jewess. I have already declared more than once, that I would not engage in controversies of this kind; and therefore, with regard to the flight of Themistocles into Persia, and the history of Esther, I shall follow the opinion of the learned Usher, my usual guide on these occasions.

* Plut. in Artax. p. 1018.
 † Diod. l. xi. p. 54.

‡ Ctes. c. 51.
 § A. M. 5551.

We * have seen that Themistocles had fled to Admetus king of the Molossi, and had met with a gracious reception from him; but the Athenians and Lacedæmonians would not suffer him to live in peace, and required that prince to deliver him up; threatening, in case of refusal, to carry their arms into his country. Admetus, who was unwilling to draw such formidable enemies upon himself, and much more to deliver up the man who had fled to him for refuge, informed him of the great danger to which he was exposed, and favoured his flight. Themistocles went so far by land as Pydna, a city of Macedonia, and there embarked on board a merchant ship, which was sailing to Ionia. None of the passengers knew him. A storm having carried this vessel near the island of Naxos, then besieged by the Athenians, the imminent danger to which Themistocles was exposed, obliged him to discover himself to the pilot and master of the ship; after which by entreaties and menaces, he forced them to sail towards Asia.

† Themistocles might on this occasion call to mind the advice which his father had given him when an infant, viz. to lay very little stress on the favour of the common people. They were then walking together in the harbour. His father, pointing to some rotten galleys that lay neglected on the strand, "Behold there," says he, "son," pointing to them, "thus do the people treat their governours, when they can do them no further service."

He was now arrived in Comæ, a city of Æolia, in Asia Minor. The king of Persia had set a price upon his head, and promised 200 † talents to any man who should deliver him up. The whole coast was covered with people, who were watching for him. He fled to Ægæ, a little city of Æolia, where no one knew him except Nicogenes, at whose house he lodged. He was the most wealthy man in that country, and very intimate with all the lords of the Persian court. Themistocles was concealed some days in his house, till Nicogenes sent him under a strong guard to Susa, in one of those covered chariots in which the Persians who were extremely jealous, use to carry their wives; those who carried him telling every body, that they were carrying a young Greek lady to a courtier of great distinction.

Being come to the Persian court, he waited upon the captain of the guards, and told him that he was a Grecian by birth, and begged the king would admit him to audience, having matters of great importance to communicate to him. The officer informed him of a ceremony, which he knew was insupportable to some Greeks, but without which none were allowed to speak to the king; and this was, to fall prostrate before him. "Our laws," says he, "command us to honour the king in that manner, and to worship him as the living image of the immortal God, who maintains and preserves all things." Themistocles promised to comply. Being admitted to audience, he fell on his face before the king, after the Persian manner; and afterwards rising up, "Great king,"‡ says he, by an interpreter, "I am Themistocles the Athenian, who having been banish-

* Thucyd. l. i. p. 90, 91. Plut. in Themist. p. 125—127. Diod. l. xi. p. 42—44. Cor. Nep. in Themist. c. 8—10.

† Plut. in Themist. p. 112.

‡ 200,000 crowns, or about 45,000l. Sterling.

§ Thucydides makes him say very near the same words; but informs us that Themistocles did not speak them to the king, but sent them by way of letter before he was introduced to him.

“ed by the Greeks, am come to your court in hopes of finding an asylum in it. I have indeed brought many calamities on the Persians; but, on the other side, I have done them no less services, by the salutary advices I have given them more than once; and I now am able to do them more important services than ever. My life is in your hands. You may now exert your clemency, or display your vengeance: by the former you will preserve your suppliant; by the latter, you will destroy the greatest enemy of Greece.”

The king made him no answer at this audience, though he was struck with admiration at his great sense and boldness; but history informs us, he told his friends, that he considered Themistocles' arrival as a very great happiness; that he implored his god Arimanius, always to inspire his enemies with such thoughts, and to prompt them to banish and make away with their most illustrious personages. It is added, that when the king was asleep, he started up three times in excess of joy, and cried thrice, “I have got Themistocles the Athenian!”

The next morning at day-break, he sent for the greatest lords of his court, and commanded Themistocles to be brought before him, who expected nothing but destruction; especially after what one of his guards, upon hearing his name, had said to him the night before, even in the presence-chamber, just as he had left the king, “Thou serpent of Greece, thou compound of fraud and malice, the good genius of our prince brings thee hither!” However, the serenity which appeared in the king's face seemed to promise him a favourable reception. Themistocles was not mistaken; for the king began by making him a present of 200 talents,* which sum he had promised to any one who should deliver him up, which consequently was his due, as Themistocles had brought him his head, by surrendering himself to him. He afterwards desired him to give an account of the affairs of Greece. But as Themistocles could not express his thoughts to the king without the assistance of an interpreter, he desired time might be allowed him to learn the Persian tongue; hoping he then should be able to explain those things he was desirous of communicating to him, better than he could by the aid of a third person. It is the same says he, with the speech of a man, as with a piece of tapestry, which must be spread out and unfolded, to show the figures and other beauties wrought in it. Themistocles, having studied the Persian tongue 12 months, made so great a progress, that he spoke it with greater elegance than the Persians themselves, and consequently could converse with the king without the help of an interpreter. The prince treated him with uncommon marks of friendship and esteem: he made him marry a lady descended from one of the noblest families in Persia: gave him a palace and an equipage suitable to it, and settled a noble pension on him. He used to carry him abroad on his parties of hunting, and every banquet and entertainment: and sometimes conversed privately with him, so that the lords of the court grew jealous and uneasy upon that account. He even presented him to the princesses, who honoured him with their esteem, and received his visits. It is observed, as a proof of the peculiar favour showed him, that by the king's special order, Themistocles was admitted to hear the lectures and discourses of the Magi, and was instructed by them in all the secrets of their philosophy.

Another proof of his great credit is related. Demaratus of Sparta, who was then at court, being commanded by the king to ask any thing of him,

* £20,000 French crowns, or about 45,000l sterling.

he desired that he might be suffered to make his entry on horseback, into the city of Sardis, with the royal tiara on his head: a ridiculous vanity & equally unworthy of the Grecian grandeur, and the simplicity of a Lacedæmonian! The king exasperated at the insolence of his demand, expressed his disgust in the strongest terms, and seemed resolved not to pardon him; but Themistocles having interceded, the king restored him to favour.

In fine, Themistocles was in such great credit, that under the succeeding reigns, in which the affairs of Persia were still more mixed with those of Greece, whenever the kings were desirous of drawing over any Greek to their interest, they used to declare expressly in their letters, that he should be in greater favour with them than Themistocles had been with king Artaxerxes.

It is said also that Themistocles, when in his most flourishing condition in Persia, he was honoured and esteemed by all the world, who were emulous in making their court to him, said one day, when his table was covered magnificently, "Children, we should have been ruined, if we had not been ruined."

But at last, as it was judged necessary for the king's interest that Themistocles should reside in some city of Asia Minor, that he might be ready on any occasion which should present itself; accordingly he was sent to Magnesia, situated on the Meander; and for his subsistence, besides the whole revenues of that city, which amounted to 50 * talents every year, had those of Myunte and Lampsacus assigned him. One of the cities was to furnish him with bread, another with wine, and a third with other provisions. Some authors add two more, viz. for his furniture and clothes. Such was the custom of the ancient kings of the east: instead of settling pensions on persons they rewarded, they gave them cities, and sometimes even provinces, which, under the name of bread, wine, &c. were to furnish them abundantly with all things necessary for supporting, in a magnificent manner, their family and equipage. Themistocles lived for some years at Magnesia in the utmost splendour, till he came to his end in the manner which will be related hereafter.

SECTION III.

CIMON BEGINS TO MAKE A FIGURE AT ATHENS.

THE Athenians † having lost one of their most distinguished citizens, as well as ablest generals, by the banishment of Themistocles, endeavoured to retrieve that loss, by bestowing the command of the armies on Cimon, who was not inferior to him in merit.

He spent his youth in such excesses as did him no honour, and pressed no good with regard to his future conduct. † The example of this illustrious Athenian, who passed his juvenile years in so dissolute a manner, and afterwards rose to so exalted a pitch of glory, shows that parents must not always despair of the happiness of a son, when wild and irregular in his youth; especially when nature has endued him with genius, goodness of heart, generous inclinations, and an esteem for persons of merit. Such was the character of Cimon. The ill reputation he had drawn upon himself, having prejudiced the people against him, he at first was very ill re-

* 50,000 crowns, or about 11,250l. Sterling.

† A. M. 3554. Ant. J. C. 470. Diod. l. xi. p. 45. Plut. in Cim. p. 482, 483.

‡ Plut. in Cim. p. 482.

ceived by them : when, being discouraged by this repulse, he resolved to lay aside all thoughts of concerning himself with the affairs of the public. But Aristides perceiving that his dissolute turn of mind was united with many fine qualities, he consoled him, inspired him with hope, pointed out the paths he should take, instilled good principles into him, and did not a little contribute by the excellent instructions he gave him, and the affection he expressed for him on all occasions, to make him the man he afterwards appeared. What more important service could he have done his country ?

* Plutarch observes, that after Cimon had laid aside his juvenile extravagancies, his conduct was in all things great and noble ; and that he was not inferior to Miltiades either in courage or intrepidity, nor to Themistocles in prudence and sense ; but that he was more just and virtuous than either of them ; and that without being at all inferior to them in military virtues he surpassed them far in the practice of the moral ones.

It would be of great advantage to a state, if those, who excel in professions of every kind, would take pleasure and make it their duty to fashion and instruct such youths as are remarkable for the pregnancy of their parts and goodness of disposition. They would thereby have an opportunity of serving their country even after their death, and of perpetuating in it, in the person of their pupils, a taste and inclination for true merit, and the practice of the wisest maxims.

The Athenians, a little after Themistocles had left his country, having put to sea a fleet under the command of Cimon, the son of Miltiades, took Eion, on the banks of the Strymon, Amphipolis, and other places of Thrace ; and as this was a very fruitful country, Cimon planted a colony in it, and sent 10,000 Athenians thither for that purpose.

† The fate of Eion is of too singular a kind to be omitted here. Boges † was governour of it under the king of Persia, and acted with such a zeal and fidelity for his sovereign, as have few examples. When besieged by Cimon and the Athenians, it was in his power to have capitulated upon honourable terms, and he might have retired to Asia with his family and all his effects. However, being persuaded he could not do this with honour, he resolved to die rather than surrender. The city was assaulted with the utmost fury, and he defended it with incredible bravery. Being at last in the utmost want of provisions, he threw from the walls into the river Strymon all the gold and silver in the place ; and causing fire to be set to a pile, and having killed his wife, his children, and his whole family, he threw them into the midst of the flames, and afterwards rushed into them himself. Xerxes could not but admire, and at the same time bewail, so surprising an example of generosity. The heathens, indeed, might give this name to what is rather savage ferocity and barbarity.

Cimon made himself master also of the island of Scyros, where he found the bones of Theseus, the son of Ægeus, who had fled from Athens to that city, and there ended his days. An oracle had commanded that search should be made after his bones. Cimon put them on board his galley, adorned them magnificently, and carried them to his native country, near 800 years after Theseus had left it. The people received them with the highest expressions of joy ; and to perpetuate the remembrance of this event, they founded a disputation, or prize, for tragic writers, which became very famous, and contributed exceedingly to the improvement of

* Plut. in Cim. p. 431.

† Herod. l. vii. c. 107. Plut. p. 482.

† Plutarch calls him Butis. Herodotus seems to place this history under Xerxes ; but it is more probable, that it happened under Artaxerxes his successor.

the drama, by the wonderful emulation it excited among the tragic poets, whose pieces were represented in it. For Sophocles having, in his youth, brought his first play on the stage, the archon, or chief magistrate who presided at these games, observing there was a strong faction among the spectators, prevailed with Cimon, and the rest of the generals his colleagues, who were ten in number and chosen out of each tribe, to sit as judges. The prize was adjudged to Sophocles, which so deeply afflicted Æschylus, who till then had been considered as the greatest dramatic poet, that Athens became insupportable to him, and he withdrew to Sicily, where he died.

* The confederates had taken a great number of barbarian prisoners in Sestus and Byzantium; and as a proof of the high regard they had for Cimon, intreated him to distribute the booty. Accordingly Cimon placed all the captives stark naked, on one side, and on the other all their riches and spoils. The allies complained of this partition as too unequal; but Cimon giving them the choice, they immediately took the riches which had belonged to the Persians, and left the prisoners for the Athenians. Cimon therefore set out with his portion and was thought a person no ways qualified to settle the distribution of prizes, for the allies carried off a great number of chains, necklaces, and bracelets of gold; a large quantity of rich habits, and fine purple cloaks; whilst the Athenians had only for their share, a multitude of human creatures, quite naked, and unfit for labour. However, the relations and friends of these captives came soon after from Phrygia and Lydia, and purchased them all at a very high price; so that with the monies arising from the ransom of them, Cimon had enough to maintain his fleet four months; besides a great sum of money which was put into the exchequer, not to mention what he himself had for his own share. He afterwards used to take exceeding pleasure in relating this adventure to his friends.

† He made the best use of his riches, as Gorgias the rhetor has happily expressed in few, but strong and elegant words: † "Cimon," says he, "amassed riches only to use them; and he employed them to no other use but to acquire esteem and honour." We may here perceive, by the way, what was the scope and aim of the most exalted actions of the heathens; and with what justice Tertullian defined a pagan, how perfect soever he might appear, a vain-glorious animal, *animal gloriae*. The gardens and orchards of Cimon were always open, by his order, to the citizens in general; who were allowed to gather whatever fruits they pleased. His table was daily covered in a frugal but polite manner. It was entirely different from those delicate and sumptuous tables, to which only a few persons of great distinction are admitted, and which are covered merely to display a vain magnificence or elegance of taste. Now that of Cimon was plain, but abundant; and all the citizens were received at it without distinction. In thus banishing from his entertainments, whatever had the least air of ostentation and luxury, he reserved to himself an inexhaustible fund, not only for the expences of his house, but for the wants of his friends, his domestics, and a very great number of citizens; demonstrating, by this conduct, that he knew much better than most rich men, the true use and value of riches.

He was always followed by some servants, who were ordered to slip privately some piece of money into the hands of such poor as they met, and

* Plut. in Cim. p. 84.

† Plut. in Cim. 434. Cornel. Nep. in Cim. c. iv. Athen. l. xii. p. 535.

‡ Φοιτὸν τοῦ Κίμωνος τὰ χρημάτων κταθέντων οὐκ ἔχοντο, ἔχοντες οἱ οὐ τιμῶτο.

to give clothes to those who were in want of them. He often buried such persons as had not left money enough to defray the expences of their funeral; and what is admirable, and which Plutarch does not fail to observe, he did not act in this manner to gain credit among the people, nor to purchase their voices; since we find him, on all occasions, declaring for the contrary faction, that is, in favour of such citizens as were most considerable for their wealth or authority.

* Although he saw all the rest of the governours of his time enrich themselves by the plunder and oppression of the public, he was always incorruptible, and his hands were never stained with extortion, or the smallest present; and he continued, during his whole life, not only to speak, but to act spontaneously, and without the least view of interest, whatever he thought might be of advantage to the commonwealth.

Besides a great number of other excellent qualities, Cimon had the finest sense, extraordinary prudence, and a profound knowledge of the genius and characters of men. The allies, besides the sums of money in which each of them was taxed, were to furnish a certain number of men and ships. Several among them, who, from the retreat of Xerxes, were studious of nothing but their ease, and applied themselves entirely to tilling and cultivating their lands, to free themselves from the toils and dangers of war, chose to furnish their quota in money rather than in men, and left the Athenians the care of manning with soldiers and rowers the ships they were obliged to furnish. The other generals, who had no forecast and penetration for the future, gave such people some uneasiness at first, and were for obliging them to observe the treaty literally. But Cimon, when in power, acted in a quite different manner, and suffered them to enjoy the tranquillity they chose; plainly perceiving that the allies, from being warlike in the field, would insensibly lose their martial spirit, and be fit for nothing but husbandry and trade; whilst the Athenians, by exercising the oar perpetually, would be more and more inured to hardships, and daily increase in power. What Cimon had foreseen happened; this very people purchased themselves masters at their own expence; so that they who before had been companions and allies, became in some measure the subjects and tributaries of the Athenians.

† No Grecian general ever gave so great a blow to the pride and haughtiness of the Persian monarch as Cimon. After the barbarians had been driven out of Greece, he did not give them time to take breath; but sailed immediately after them with a fleet of upwards of 200 ships, took their strongest cities, and brought over all their allies; so that the king of Persia had not one soldier left in Asia, from Ionia to Pamphylia. Still pursuing his point, he bravely attacked the enemy's fleet, though much stronger than his own. It lay near the mouth of the river Eurymedon, and consisted of 850 sail of ships, supported by the land army on the coast. It was soon put to flight; and 200 sail were taken, besides those that were sunk. A great number of Persians had left their ships, and leaped into the sea, in order to join their land army, which lay on the shore. It was very hazardous to attempt a descent in the sight of the enemy, and to lead on troops, which were already fatigued by their late battle, against fresh forces much superior in number. However, Cimon, finding that the whole army was eager to engage the barbarians, thought proper to take advantage of the

* Plut. in Cim. p. 485.

† A. M. 3584. Ant. J. C. 470. Plut. in Cim. p. 485—487. Thucyd. l. i. p. 66. Diod. l. xi. p. 45—47.

ardour of the soldiers, who were greatly animated with their first success. Accordingly he landed, * and marched them directly against the barbarians, who waited resolutely for their coming up, and sustained the first onset with prodigious valour; however, being at last obliged to give way, they broke and fled. A great slaughter ensued, and an infinite number of prisoners and immensely rich spoils were taken. Cimon having, in one day, gained two victories which almost equalled those of Salamin and Plataea, to crown all, sailed out to meet a reinforcement of 14 Phœnician ships, which were come from Cyprus, to join the Persian fleet, and knew nothing of what had passed. They were all either taken or sunk, and most of the soldiers were killed or drowned.

Cimon having achieved such glorious exploits, returned in triumph to Athens; and employed part of the spoils in fortifying the harbour, and in beautifying the city. The riches which a general amasses in the field, are applied to the noblest uses when they are disposed of in this manner; and must reflect infinitely greater honour upon him, than if he expended them in building magnificent palaces for himself, which must one time or other devolve to strangers; whereas, works built for public use, are his property in some measure for ever, and transmit his name to the latest posterity. † It is well known that such embellishments in a city, give infinite pleasure to the people, who are always struck with works of this kind; and this, as Plutarch observes in the life of Cimon, is one of the surest and at the same time, the most lawful method of acquiring their friendship and esteem.

‡ The year following, this general sailed towards the Hellespont; and having driven the Persians out of the Thracian Chersonesus, of which they had possessed themselves, he conquered it in the name of the Athenians, though he himself had more right to it, as Miltiades his father had been its sovereign. He afterwards attacked the people of the island of Thasus, who had revolted from the Athenians, and defeated their fleet. These maintained their revolt with an almost unparalleled obstinacy and fury. ¶ As if they had been in arms against the worst of evils to fear, they made a law, that the first man who should only mention the concluding a treaty with the Athenians, should be put to death. The siege was carried on three years, during which the inhabitants suffered all the calamities of war with the same obstinacy. § The women were no less inflexible than the men; for the besieged wanting ropes for the military engines, all the women cut off their hair in a seeming transport; and when the city was in the utmost distress by famine, which swept away a great number of the inhabitants, Hegetorides the Thasian, deeply afflicted with seeing such multitudes of his fellow-citizens perish, resolutely determined to sacrifice his life for the preservation of his country. Accordingly he put a halter round his neck, and presenting himself to the assembly, "Countrymen," says he, "do with me as you please, and do not spare me if you judge proper; but let my death save the rest of the people, and prevail with you to abolish the cruel law you have enacted, so contrary to your welfare." The Thasians, struck with these words, abolished the law, but would not suffer it to cost so generous a citizen his life; for they surrendered

* We do not find the ancients made use of long boats in making descents; the reason of which perhaps was, that, as their galleys were flat bottomed, they were brought to shore without any difficulty.

† Plut. de gerend. rep. p. 818.

‡ Plut. in Cim. p. 487. Thucyd. l. i. p.

66, 67. Diœd. l. xi. p. 53.

¶ Polyæn. Str. l. ii.

§ Polyæn. l. viii.

themselves to the Athenians, who spared their lives, and only dismantled their city.

After Cimon had landed his troops on the shore opposite to Thrace, he seized on all the gold mines of those coasts, and subdued every part of that country as far as Macedonia. He might have attempted the conquest of that kingdom, and in all probability could have easily possessed himself of part of it, had he improved the occasion. And indeed, for his neglect in this point, at his return to Athens, he was prosecuted, as having been bribed by the money of the Macedonians, and of Alexander their king. But Cimon had a soul superior to all temptations of that kind, and proved his innocence in the clearest light.

* The conquests of Cimon and the power of the Athenians, which increased every day, gave Artaxerxes great uneasiness. To prevent the consequences of it, he resolved to send Themistocles into Attica with a great army, and accordingly proposed it to him.

Themistocles was in great perplexity on this occasion. On one side, the remembrance of the favours the king had heaped upon him; the positive assurances he had given that monarch, to serve him with the utmost zeal on all occasions; the instances of the king who claimed his promise; all these considerations would not permit him to refuse the commission. On the other side, the love of his country, which the injustice and ill-treatment of his fellow-citizens could not banish from his mind; his strong reluctance to sully the glory of his former laurels and mighty achievements by so ignominious a step; perhaps too, the fear of being unsuccessful in a war, in which he should be opposed by excellent generals, and particularly Cimon, who seemed to be as successful as valiant; these different reflections would not suffer him to declare against his country, in an enterprise which, whether successful or not, would reflect shame on himself.

To rid himself at once of all these inward struggles, he resolved to put an end to his life, † as the only method for him not to be wanting in the duty he owed his country, nor to the promises he had made that prince. He therefore prepared a solemn sacrifice, to which he invited all his friends, when, after embracing them all, and taking a last farewell of them, he drank bull's blood, or according to others, swallowed a dose of poison, and died in this manner at Magnesia, aged 65 years, the greatest part of which he had spent either in the government of the republic, or the command of the armies.

‡ When the king was told the cause and manner of his death, he esteemed and admired him still more, and continued his favour to his friends and domestics. But the unexpected death of Themistocles proved an obstacle to the design he meditated of attacking the Greeks. The Magnesians erected a splendid monument to the memory of that general in the public square, and granted peculiar privileges and honours to his descendants. They continued to enjoy them in Plutarch's time, that is, near 600 years after, and his tomb was still standing.

|| Atticus, in the beautiful dialogue of Cicero, entitled Brutus, refutes in an agreeable and ingenious manner, the tragical end which some writers ascribe to Themistocles, as related above, pretending that the whole is a

* A. M. 3538. Ant. J. C. 466. Thucyd. l. i. p. 92. Plut. in Themist. p. 127.

† The wisest heathens did not think that a man was allowed to lay violent hands on himself.

‡ Cic. de Senec. n. 72.

|| Brut. n. 42, 48.

fiction, invented by rhetoricians, who, on the bare rumour that this great man had poisoned himself, had added all the other particulars to embellish the story, which otherwise would have been very dry and unaffecting. He appeals for this to Thucydides, that judicious historian, who was an Athenian, and almost contemporary with Themistocles. This author indeed owns, that a report had prevailed that this general had poisoned himself; however, his opinion was, that he died a natural death, and that his friends conveyed his bones secretly to Athens, where, in * Pausanias' time, his mausoleum was standing near the great harbour. This account seems much more probable than the other.

Themistocles was certainly one of the greatest men that Greece ever produced. He had a great soul, and invincible courage, which danger even inflamed; was fired with an incredible thirst for glory, which sometimes his country's love would temper and allay, but which sometimes carried him too far; † his presence of mind was such, that it immediately suggested whatever it was most necessary to act: in fine, he had a sagacity and penetration with regard to futurity, that revealed to him, in the clearest light, the most secret designs of his enemies, pointing out to him at a distance the several measures he should take to disconcert them, and inspiring him with great, noble, bold, extensive views with regard to the honour of his country. The most essential qualities of the mind were, however, wanting in him, I mean sincerity, integrity, and fidelity; nor was he altogether free from suspicions of avarice, which is a great blemish in such as are charged with public affairs.

‡ Nevertheless, a noble sentiment as well as action is related of him, which speaks a great and disinterested soul. ¶ His daughter being asked of him in marriage, he preferred an honest poor man, to a rich one of a different character, and gave for his reason, "That in the choice of a son in law, he would much rather have merit without riches, than riches without merit."

SECTION IV.

THE EGYPTIANS RISE AGAINST PERSIA SUPPORTED BY THE ATHENIANS.

ABOUT this time the Egyptians, § to free themselves from a foreign yoke, which was insupportable to them, revolted from Artaxerxes, and made Inarus, prince of the Lybians, their king. They demanded aid of the Athenians, who, having at that time a fleet of 200 ships at the Island of Cyprus, accepted the invitation with pleasure, and immediately set sail for Egypt, judging this a very favourable opportunity to weaken the power of the Persians, by driving them out of so great a kingdom.

¶ Advice being brought Artaxerxes of this revolt, he raised an army of 300,000 men, and resolved to march in person against the rebels. But his friends advising him not to venture himself in that expedition, he gave the command of it to Archæmenes, one of his brothers. The latter be-

* Lib. i. p. 1.

† De instantibus, ut ait Thucydides, verissime judicabat, et de futuris callidissime conjiciebat. Cor. Nep. in Themist. c. 1.

‡ Plut. in Themist. p. 121.

¶ Themistocles, cum consuleretur utrum bono viro pauperi, ne minus probato diviti filiam collocaret: *Ego vero, inquit, malo virum qui pecunia eget, quam pecuniam quæ viro.* Cic. de offic. l. ii. c. 71.

§ A. M. 3538. Ant. J. C. 466. Thucyd. l. i. p. 68. & 71, 72. Ctes. c. 32—35. Diod. l. xi. p. 54—59. ¶ A. M. 3545. Ant. J. C. 459.

ing arrived in Egypt, encamped his great army on the banks of the Nile. During this interval, the Athenians having defeated the Persian fleet, and either destroyed or taken fifty of their ships, they went again up that river, landed their forces under the command of Cbaritimis their general, and having joined Inarus and his Egyptians, they charged Archæmenes, and defeated him in a great battle, in which that Persian general and 100,000 of his soldiers were slain. Those who escaped fled to Memphis, whither the conquerors pursued them, and immediately made themselves masters of two quarters of the city; but the Persians having fortified themselves in the third, called the White Wall, which was the largest and strongest of the three, they were besieged in it near three years, during which they made a most vigorous defence, till they were at last delivered by the forces sent to their aid.

Artaxerxes * hearing of the defeat of his army, and how much the Athenians had contributed to it, to make a diversion of their forces, and oblige them to turn their arms another way, he sent ambassadors to the Lacedæmonians, with a large sum of money, to engage them to proclaim war against the Athenians. But the Lacedæmonians having rejected the offer, their refusal did not abate his ardour, and accordingly † he gave Megabysus and Artabazus the command of the forces designed against Egypt. These generals immediately raised an army of 300,000 men in Cilicia and Phœnicia. They were obliged to wait till the fleet was equipped, which was not till the next year. ‡ Artabazus then took upon him the command of it, and sailed towards the Nile, whilst Megabysus, at the head of the land army, marched towards Memphis. He raised the siege of that city, and afterwards fought Inarus. All the forces on both sides engaged in this battle, in which Inarus was entirely defeated; but the Egyptians who had rebelled, suffered most in this slaughter. After this defeat, Inarus, though wounded by Megabysus, retreated with the Athenians, and such Egyptians as were willing to follow him, and reached Bibles, a city in the island of Prosopitis, which is surrounded by two arms of the Nile, and both navigable. The Athenians ran their fleet into one of those arms, where it was secured from the attacks of the enemy, and held out a siege of a year and a half.

After the battle, all the rest of Egypt submitted to the conqueror, and was re-united to the empire of Artaxerxes, except Amyrteus, who had still a small party in the fens, where he long supported himself through the difficulty the Persians found in penetrating far enough to reduce him.

The siege of Prosopitis was still carrying on. ¶ The Persians finding that they made no advances in attacking it after the usual methods, because of the stratagems and intrepidity of the besieged, they therefore had recourse to an extraordinary expedient, which soon produced what force had not been able to effect. They turned the course, by different canals, of the arm of the Nile in which the Athenians lay, and by that means opened themselves a passage for their whole army to enter the island. Inarus seeing that all was lost, compounded with Megabysus for himself, for all his Egyptians, and about 50 Athenians, and surrendered upon condition that their lives should be spared. The remainder of the auxiliary forces, which formed a body of 6000 men, resolved to hold out longer, and for this purpose they set fire to their ships, and drawing up in order of battle, resolved to die sword in hand, and sell their lives as dear as they could, in

* A. M. 3546. Ant. J. C. 458.

† A. M. 3548. Ant. J. C. 456.

‡ A. M. 3547. Ant. J. C. 457.

¶ A. M. 3550. Ant. J. C. 454.

imitation of the Lacedæmonians, who refused to yield, and were all cut to pieces at Thermopylæ. The Persians, hearing they had taken so desperate a resolution, did not think it advisable to attack them. A peace was therefore offered them, with a promise that they should all be permitted to leave Egypt, and have free passage to their native country either by sea or land. They accepted the conditions, put the conquerors in possession of *Biblos*, and of the whole Island, and went by sea to Cyrene, where they embarked for Greece; but most of the soldiers who had served in this expedition perished in it.

But this was not the only loss the Athenians sustained on this occasion. Another fleet of 50 ships, which they sent to the aid of their besieged countrymen, sailed up one of the arms of the Nile, just after the Athenians had surrendered, to disengage them, not knowing what had happened. But the instant they entered, the Persian fleet, which kept out at sea, followed them and attacked their rear, whilst the army discharged showers of darts upon them from the banks of the river; thus only a few ships escaped, which opened themselves a way through the enemy's fleet, and all the rest were lost. Here ended the fatal war carried on by the Athenians for six years in Egypt, which kingdom was now united again to the Persian empire, and continued so during the rest of the reign of Artaxerxes, of which this is the twentieth year.* But the prisoners who were taken in this war, met with the most unhappy fate.

SECTION V.

INARUS IS DELIVERED UP TO THE KING'S MOTHER.—MEGABYSUS' AFFLICTION AND REVOLT.

ARTAXERXES,† after refusing to gratify the request of his mother, who for five years together had been daily importuning him to put Inarus and his Athenians into her hands, in order that she might sacrifice them to the manes of Archæmenes her son, at last yielded to her solicitations. But how blind, how barbarously weak must this king have been, to break through the most solemn engagements merely through complaisance; who, deaf to remorse, violated the law of nations, solely to avoid offending a most unjust mother. † This inhuman princess, without regard to the faith of solemn treaties, caused Inarus to be crucified, and beheaded all the rest. Megabysus was in the deepest affliction on that account; for as he had promised that no injury should be done them, the affront reflected principally on him. He therefore left the court, and withdrew to Syria, of which he was governour; and his discontent was so great that he raised an army and revolted openly.

‡ The king sent Osiris, who was one of the greatest lords of the court, against him with an army of 200,000 men. Megabysus engaged Osiris, wounded him, took him prisoner, and put his army to flight. Artaxerxes sending to demand Osiris, Megabysus generously dismissed him, as soon as his wounds were cured.

§ The next year Artaxerxes sent another army against him, the command of which he gave to Menostanes, son to Artarius the king's brother,

* A. M. 3550. Ant. J. C. 454.

† A. M. 3556. Ant. J. C. 448. Ctes. c. xxxv—xl.

‡ Thucyd. l. 1. p. 73.

§ A. M. 3557. Ant. J. C. 447.

§ A. M. 3558. Ant. J. C. 446.

and governour of Babylon. This general was not more fortunate than the former. He was also defeated and put to flight, and Megabysus gained as signal a victory as the former.

Artaxerxes finding he could not reduce him by force of arms, sent his brother Artarius and Amytis his sister, who was the wife of Megabysus, with several other persons of the first quality, to persuade the latter to return to his allegiance. They succeeded in their negociation; the king pardoned him, and he returned to court.

One day as they were hunting, a lion, raising himself on his hinder feet, was going to rush upon the king, when Megabysus, seeing the danger he was in, and fired with zeal and affection for his sovereign, hurled a dart at the lion which killed him. But Artaxerxes, upon pretence that he had affronted him, in darting at the lion first, commanded Megabysus' head to be struck off. Amytis, the king's sister, and Amystris, with the greatest difficulty prevailed upon the king to change this sentence into perpetual banishment. Megabysus was therefore sent to Cyrra, a city on the Red Sea, and condemned to end his days there: however, five years after, disguising himself like a leper, he made his escape, and returned to Susa, where by the assistance of his wife and mother in law, he was restored to favour and continued so till his death, which happened some years after, in the seventy-sixth year of his age. Megabysus was extremely regretted by the king and the whole court. He was a man of the greatest abilities in the kingdom, and at the same time the best general. Artaxerxes owed * both his crown and life to him: but it is of dangerous consequence for a subject, when his sovereign is under too many obligations to him. This was the cause of all the misfortunes of Megabysus.

It is surprising that so judicious a prince as Artaxerxes, should have been so imprudent, as to be fired with jealousy against a nobleman of his court, merely because in a party of hunting he had wounded the beast they were pursuing before him. Could any thing be so weak? and was this placing the point of honour in a manner worthy a king? Nevertheless, history furnishes us with many instances of this kind. I am apt to believe, from some expressions of † Plutarch, that Artaxerxes was ashamed of the wild fury to which this false delicacy had raised him, and that he made some public kind of atonement for it: for, according to this author, he published a decree, importing that any man who was hunting with the king, should be allowed to throw his javelin first at the beast, if opportunity should offer; and he, according to Plutarch, was the first Persian monarch who granted such a permission.

SECTION VI.

ARTAXERXES SENDS ESDRAS, AND AFTERWARDS NEHEMIAH TO JERUSALEM.

BEFORE I proceed in the history of the Persians and Greeks, I shall relate, in few words, the several things which happened to the people of God, during the first 20 years of Artaxerxes, which is an essential part of the history of that prince.

‡ In the seventh year of the reign of Artaxerxes, Esdras obtained of

* Beneficia eo usque læta sunt, dum videntur exsolvi posse; ubi multum anteveneri, pro gratia odium redditur. Tacit. Annal. l. iv. c. 18.

† Plut. in Apophthegm. p. 175.

‡ A. M. 3597. Ant. J. C. 467. 1 Esdras vii. 7, &c.

the king and his seven counsellors, an ample commission empowering him to return to Jerusalem with all such Jews as would follow him thither, in order to settle the Jewish government and religion agreeably to their own laws. Esdras was descended from Saraia, who was high priest of Jerusalem, when destroyed by Nebuchodonosor, and was put to death by his command. Esdras was a very learned and pious man, and was chiefly distinguished from the rest of the Jews, by his great knowledge in the scriptures; it being said of him, * "That he was very ready in the law of Moses that was given by the God of Israel." He now set out from Babylon with the gifts and offerings which the king, his courtiers, and such Israelites as had staid at Babylon, had put into his hands for the service of the temple, and which he gave to the priests upon his arrival in Jerusalem. It appears by the commission which Artaxerxes gave him, that this prince had a high veneration for the God of Israel, as, in commanding his officers to furnish the Jews with all things necessary for their worship, he adds, † "Let all things be performed after the law of God diligently, unto the most high God, that wrath come not upon the kingdom of the king and his son." This commission, as I observed, empowered him to settle the religion and government of the Jews, pursuant to the law of Moses; to appoint magistrates and judges, to punish evil doers, not only by imprisoning their persons, and confiscating their possessions, but also by sending them into banishment, and even sentencing them to death, according to the crimes they should commit. Such was the power with which Esdras was invested, and which he exercised faithfully during 13 years, till Nehemiah brought a new commission from the Persian court.

‡ Nehemiah was also a Jew of distinguished merit and piety, and one of the cupbearers to king Artaxerxes. This was a very considerable employment in the Persian court, because of the privilege annexed to it, viz. of being often near the king's person, and of being allowed to speak to him in the most favorable moments. However, neither his exalted station, nor the settlement of his family in that land of captivity, could obliterate from his mind the country of his ancestors, nor their religion: neither his love for the one, nor his zeal for the other, were abated; and his heart was still in Sion. Some Jews who were come from Jerusalem, having informed him of the sad state of that city, that its walls lay in ruin, its gates were burned down, and the inhabitants thereby exposed to the insults of their enemies, and made the scorn of all their neighbours; the affliction of his brethren, and the dangers with which they were menaced, made such an impression on his mind, as might naturally be expected from one of his piety. One day, as he was waiting upon the king, the latter observing an unusual air of melancholy in Nehemiah's countenance, asked him the cause of it; a proof that this monarch had a tenderness of heart rarely found in kings, and which is nevertheless much more valuable than the most shining qualities. Nehemiah took this opportunity to acquaint him with the calamitous state of his country, owned that was the subject of his grief and humbly intreated that leave might be given him to go to Jerusalem, in order to repair the fortifications of it. The kings of Persia, his predecessors, had permitted the Jews to rebuild the temple, but not the walls of Jerusalem. But Artaxerxes immediately decreed, that the walls and gates of Jerusalem should be rebuilt; and Nehemiah, as governor of Judea, was appointed to put this decree in execution. The king,

* 1 Esdras viii. 3.

† 1 Esdras viii. 21.

‡ A. M. 3550. Ant. J. C. 454. Nehem. c. i. et ii.

to do him the greater honour, ordered a body of horse, commanded by a considerable officer to escort him thither. He likewise wrote to all the governours of the provinces on this side the Euphrates, to give him all the assistance possible in forwarding the work for which he was sent. This pious Jew executed every part of his commission with incredible zeal and activity.

* It is from this decree, enacted by Artaxerxes in the 20th year of his reign, for the rebuilding of the walls of Jerusalem, that we date the beginning of the 70 weeks mentioned in the famous prophecy of Daniel, after which the Messiah was to appear and be put to death. I shall here insert the whole prophecy, but without giving the explication of it, as it may be found in other writers, and is not a part of this history.

† "Thou art greatly beloved, therefore understand the matter, and consider the vision. Seventy weeks are determined upon thy people, and upon thy holy city, to finish the transgression, and to make an end of sins, and to make reconciliation for iniquity, and to bring in everlasting righteousness, and to seal up the vision and prophecy, and to anoint the Most Holy. Know therefore and understand, *that from the going forth of the commandment to restore and to rebuild Jerusalem, unto the Messiah the prince shall be seven weeks, and three score and two weeks; the street shall be built again; and the wall even in troublous times. And after three score and two weeks shall Messiah be cut off, but not for himself: and the people of the prince that shall come shall destroy the city and the sanctuary; and the end thereof shall be with a flood; and unto the end of the war desolations are determined. And he shall confirm the covenant with many for one week; and in the midst of the week he shall cause the sacrifice and the the oblation to cease, and for the overspreading of abomination, he shall make it desolate, even until the consummation, and that determined shall be poured upon the desolate.*"

‡ When Esdras was in power, as his chief view was to restore religion to its ancient purity, he disposed the books of scripture into their proper order, revised them all very carefully, and collected the incidents relating to the people of God in ancient times; in order to compose out of them the two books of Chronicles, to which he added the history of his own times, which was finished by Nehemiah. It is their books that end the long history which Moses had begun, and which the writers who came after them continued in a direct series, till the repairing of Jerusalem. The rest of the sacred history is not written in that uninterrupted order. Whilst Esdras and Nehemiah were compiling the latter part of that great work, Herodotus' whom profane authors call the Father of History, began to write. Thus we find that the latest authors of the books of scripture, flourished about the same time with the first authors of the Grecian history; and when it began, that of God's people, to compute only from Abraham, included already 15 centuries. Herodotus made no mention of the Jews in his history; for the Greeks desired to be informed of such nations only, as were famous for their wars, their commerce, and grandeur; so that as Judea was then but just rising from its ruins, it did not excite the attention of that people.

* Dan. ix. 25—27.

† Ibid.

‡ Bishop of Meaux's Universal History.

SECTION VII.

CHARACTER OF PERICLES, &c.

I now return to Greece. From the banishment of Themistocles, and the death of Aristides, the exact time of which is not known, two citizens, Cimon and Pericles, divided all credit and authority in Athens. Pericles was much younger than Cimon, and of a quite different character. As he will make a very considerable figure in the following history, it is of importance to the reader to know who he was, in what manner he had been educated, and his scheme and method of government.

* Pericles was descended, by the mother's as well as father's side, from the greatest and most illustrious families of Athens. His father, Xanthippus, who defeated at Mycale the king of Persia's lieutenants, married Agarista, niece to Cleisthenes, who expelled the Pisistratides, descendants of Pisistratus the tyrant, and established a popular government in Athens. Pericles had long prepared himself for the design he formed of engaging in state affairs.

He was brought up under the most learned men of his age, and particularly Anaxagoras of Clazomene, surnamed the intelligent, from his being the first, as we are told, who ascribed human events, as well as the formation and government of the universe, not to chance, as some philosophers, nor to a fatal necessity, but to a superior intelligence, who disposed and governed all things with wisdom. This tenet or opinion subsisted long before his time; but he perhaps set it in a stronger light than all others had done, and taught it methodically and from principles. Anaxagoras instructed his pupil perfectly in the part of philosophy that relates to nature, and which is therefore called Physics.† This study gave him a strength and greatness of soul which raised him above an infinite number of vulgar prejudices and vain practices generally observed in his time; and which, in affairs of government and military enterprises, either disconcerted often the wisest and most necessary measures, or defeated them by scrupulous delays, authorised and covered with the specious veil of religion. These were sometimes dreams or auguries, at other times dreadful phenomena, as eclipses of the sun or moon, or else omens and presages; not to mention the wild chimeras of judicial astrology. The knowledge of nature, free from the grovelling and weak superstitions to which ignorance gives birth, inspired him, says Plutarch, with a well grounded piety towards the gods, attended with a strength of mind that was immovable, and a calm hope of the blessings to be expected from them. Although he found infinite charms in this study, he did not however devote himself to it as a philosopher, but as a statesman; and he had so much power over himself (a very difficult thing,) as to prescribe himself limits in the pursuit of knowledge.

But the talent he cultivated with the greatest care, because he looked upon it as the most necessary instrument to all who are desirous of conducting and governing the people, was eloquence. And indeed those who possessed this talent, in a free state like that of Athens, were sure of reigning in the assemblies, engrossing suffrages, determining affairs, and exercising a kind of absolute power over the hearts and minds of the peo-

* Plut. in vit. Pericl. p. 153—156.

† The ancients under this name, comprehended what we call physics and metaphysics; that is, the knowledge of spiritual things, as God and spirits; and that of bodies.

ple. He therefore made this his chief object, and the mark to which all his other improvements, as well as the several sciences he had learned from Anaxagoras, * were directed; exalting (to borrow Plutarch's expression) the study of philosophy with the dye of rhetoric; the meaning of which is, that Pericles, to embellish and adorn his discourse, heightened the strength and solidity of reasoning with the colouring and graces of eloquence.

He had no cause to repent his having bestowed so much time in this study, for his success far exceeded his utmost hopes. The poets, † his contemporaries, used to say, that his eloquence was so powerful, that he lightened, thundered, and agitated all Greece. ‡ It had those piercing and lively strokes, that reach the inmost soul; and his discourse left always an irresistible incentive, a kind of spur, behind it in the minds of his auditors. He had the art of uniting beauty with strength; and Cicero observes, that at the very time he opposed, with the greatest tenaciousness, the inclinations and desires of the Athenians, he had the art to make even severity itself, and the kind of cruelty with which he spoke against the flatterers of the people, popular. There was no resisting the solidity of his arguments, or the sweetness of his words; whence it was said, that the goddess of persuasion, with all her graces, resided on his lips. And indeed, as Thucydides, § his rival and adversary was one day asked, whether he or Pericles was the best wrestler? "Whenever," says he, "I have given him a fall, he affirms the contrary in such strong and forcible terms, that he persuades all the spectators that I did not throw him, though they themselves saw him on the ground." Nor was he less prudent and reserved than strong and vehement in his speeches; and it is related that he never spoke in public, till after he had besought the gods not to suffer any expression to drop from him, either incongruous to his subject, or offensive to the people. ¶ Whenever he went into the assembly, before he came out of his house, he used to say to himself, "Remember, Pericles, that thou art going to speak to men born in the arms of liberty; to Greeks, to Athenians."

The uncommon endeavours which Pericles, according to historians, used, in order to improve his mind in knowledge, and to attain to a perfection in eloquence, are an excellent lesson to such persons as are one day to fill the important offices of state; and a just censure of those, ¶ who, disregarding whatever is called study and learning, bring into those employments, upon which they enter without knowledge or experience, nothing but a ridiculous self-sufficiency, and a rash boldness in deciding. ** Plutarch, in a treatise where he shows that it is to statesmen that a philosopher

* Βαφα τῆ ρητορικῆ τῆ φυσιολογίᾳ ἀποχρηματός.

† Ab Aristophane poeta fulgurare, tonare, permiscere Greciam dictus est. Cic. in Orat. n. 29.

‡ Quid Pericles? De cujus dicendi copia sic accepimus, ut cum contra voluntatem Atheniensium loqueretur pro salute patriæ, severius tamen id ipsum, quod ille contra populares homines diceret, populare omnibus et jucundum videretur: cujus in labris veteres comici—leporem habitasse dixerunt: tantamque vim in eo fuisse, ut in eorum mentibus, qui audissent, quasi aculeos quosdam reliquerit. Cic. l. iii. de Orat. n. 188.

§ Not the historian.

¶ Plut. in Symp. l. i. p. 610.

** Nunc contra plerique ad honores adipiscendos, et ad remp. gerendam, nudi veniunt et inermes, nulla cognitione rerum, nulla scientia ornati. Cic. l. iii. de Orat. n. 186.

** Plut. in Symp. lib. i. p. 777.

ought chiefly to attach himself, preferably to any other class of men, because in instructing them, he at the same time teaches whole cities and republics, verifies his assertion from the example of the greatest men both of Greece and Italy, who derived this help from philosophy. Pericles, of whom we now write, was taught by Anaxagoras; Dionysius of Syracuse, by Plato: many princes of Italy by Pythagoras; Cato, the famous censor, travelled to the place where Athenodorus lived, for the same purpose; and, lastly, the famous Scipio, the destroyer of Carthage, always kept Panetius the philosopher near his person.

One of the chief endeavours of Pericles also was, to study thoroughly the genius and disposition of the Athenians, that he might discover the secret springs which were to be employed in order to set them in motion; and the manner it was proper to act for acquiring their confidence; * for it was principally in that the great men among the ancients used to make their skill in politics consist. He found by the reflections he had made on the several transactions of his time, that the predominant passions of this people were, a violent aversion to tyranny, and a strong love of liberty, which inspired them with sentiments of fear, jealousy, and suspicion, of all such citizens as were too conspicuous for their birth, their personal merit, their own credit and authority, or that of their friends. He not only was very like Pisistratus, with regard to the sweetness of his voice, and fluency of expression, but he also resembled him very much in the features of his face, and his whole air and manner; and he observed, that the most ancient Athenians who had seen the tyrant, were prodigiously struck at the resemblance. Besides, he was very rich, was descended from an illustrious family, and had very powerful friends. To prevent, therefore, his being obnoxious to the suspicion and jealousy of the people, he at first shunned all affairs of government, which require a constant attendance in the city; and was solely intent upon distinguishing himself in war and dangers.

Seeing Aristides dead, Themistocles banished, and Cimon engaged almost continually in foreign wars, and absent from Greece, he began to appear in public with greater confidence than before, and entirely devoted himself to the party of the people; but not out of inclination, for he was far from affecting popular power, but to remove all suspicions of his aspiring to tyranny, and still more, to raise a strong bulwark against the credit and authority of Cimon, who had joined with the nobles.

At the same time, he quite changed his conduct and way of life; and assumed in all things the character of a statesman, wholly busied in affairs of government, and entirely devoted to the service of his country. He was never seen in the streets, except when he was going either to the assembly of the people, or to the council. He left off going to banquets, assemblies, and other diversions of that kind, which he had used to frequent; and during the many years that he presided in the administration, he was never seen to go to supper with his friends, except once at the nuptials of a near relation.

† He knew that the people, † who are naturally fickle and inconstant, commonly increase their disregard for those who are always in their sight;

* Olim noscenda vulgi natura, et quibus modis temperanter haberetur; senatusque et optimatum ingenia qui maxime perdidicerant, calldi temporum et sapientes credebantur. Tacit. Annal. l. iv. c. 33.

† Plut. de sui laude, p. 441.

† *Ista nostra assiduitas, Servi, nosis quantum interdum offerat hominibus fasti-*

and that too strong a desire to please them, grows at last tiresome and importunate: and it was observed that such a behaviour did Themistocles great prejudice. To avoid this error, he used to go very rarely to the assemblies; and never appeared before the people but at intervals, in order to make himself desired; and to preserve such an ascendant over their minds as might be always new, and not worn, and in a manner withered, by an over-great assiduity; wisely reserving himself for great and important occasions. * Hence it was said that he imitated Jupiter, who, in the government of the world, according to some philosophers, busied himself in great events only, and left the direction of those of less importance to subaltern deities. And indeed Pericles used to transact all petty affairs by his friends, and by certain orators that were entirely devoted to him, among whom was Ephialtes.

† Pericles employed his whole industry and application to gain the favour and esteem of the people, in order to counterbalance the fame and credit of Cimon. However, he could not equal the magnificence and liberality of his rival, whose immense riches gave him an opportunity of bestowing such largesses as appears to us almost incredible, so much they differ from our behaviour in that respect. Finding it impossible for him to rival Cimon in this particular, he had recourse to another expedient, in order to gain the love of the populace, no less effectual perhaps but certainly not so lawful and honourable. He was the first who divided the conquered lands among the citizens; who distributed among them the public revenues for the expences of their games and shows, and annexed pensions to all public employments: so that certain sums were bestowed on them regularly, as well to gratify them at the games, as for their presence in the courts of justice, and the public assemblies. It is impossible to say how fatal these unhappy politics were to the republic, and the many evils with which they were attended: for these new regulations, besides their draining the public treasury, gave the people a luxurious and dissolute turn of mind, whereas they before were sober and modest, and contented themselves with getting a livelihood by their sweat and labour.

By † such arts as these, Pericles had gained so great an ascendant over the minds of the people, that he may be said to have attained a monarchicall power under a republican form of government; moulding the citizens into what shape he pleased, and presiding with unlimited authority in all their assemblies. And indeed Valerius Maximus makes scarce any other difference between Pisistratus and Pericles, except that the one exercised a tyrannical power by force of arms, and the other by the strength of his eloquence, in which he had made a very great progress under Anaxagoras.

This credit and authority, however enormous, could not yet restrain the comic writers from lashing him very severely in the theatres; and it does not appear that any of the poets who censured Pericles with so much boldness, were ever punished, or even called to account for it by the people. Perhaps it was out of prudence and policy that he did not attempt to curb

dii, quantum satietatis. Utrique nostram desiderium nihil obfuisset. Cic. pro Mur. n. 21.

* Plut. de ger. rep. p. 811.

† Plut. in Pericl. p. 156.

† Pericles felicissimæ naturæ incrementis, sub Anaxagora præceptore summo studio perpolitus et instructus, liberis Athenarum cervicibus jugum servitutis imposuit; egit enim ille urbem et versavit arbitrio suo. Quid inter Pisistratum et Periclem interfuit, nisi quod ille armatus, hic sine armis, tyrannidem exercuit? Val. Max. l. viii. c. 0.

this licentiousness of the stage, nor to silence the poets; that he might amuse and content the people by this vain shadow of liberty, and prevent their discovering that they really were enslaved.

* But Pericles did not stop here. He boldly resolved, if possible, to weaken the authority of the tribunal of the Areopagus, of which he was not a member, because he had never been elected either † Archon, Thesmotheta, king of the sacrifices, nor Polemarch. These were different employments in the republic, which from time immemorial had been given by lot; and none but those who had behaved uprightly in them, were allowed a seat in the Areopagus. Pericles, taking advantage of Cimon's absence, set Ephialtes, who was his creature, to work clandestinely; and at last lessened the power of that illustrious body, in which the chief strength of the nobility consisted. The people, emboldened and supported by so powerful a faction, subverted all the fundamental laws and ancient customs; took from the senate of the Areopagus the cognizance of most causes that used to be brought before it, leaving it very few, and such only as were of little consequence, and made themselves absolute masters of all the tribunals.

Cimon, being returned to Athens, was afflicted to see the dignity of the senate trampled under foot, and therefore set every engine at work to restore it to its pristine authority, and to revive the aristocracy, in the same form as it had been established under Clisthenes. But now his enemies began to exclaim, and excite the people against him; reproaching him, among many other things, with his strong attachment to the Lacedæmonians. Cimon had himself given some room for this reproach, by his not paying sufficient regard to the Athenian delicacy: for, in speaking to them he would for ever extol Lacedæmonia; and whenever he censured their conduct on any occasion, he used to cry, "The Spartans do not act in this manner." Such expressions as these drew upon him the envy and hatred of his fellow-citizens; but an event, in which he nevertheless had no share, made him the object of their utmost detestation.

SECTION VIII.

AN EARTHQUAKE IN SPARTA, &c.

IN the fourth year of the reign of Archidamus, † there happened the most dreadful earthquake in Sparta that had ever been known. In several places the country was entirely swallowed up; Taygetus and other mountains were shaken to their foundations; many of their summits, being torn away, came tumbling down; and the whole city was laid in ruins, five houses only excepted. To heighten the calamity, the helots, who were slaves to the Lacedæmonians, looked upon this as a favourable opportunity to recover their liberty, flew up and down every part of the city to murder such as had escaped the earthquake: but finding them under arms, and drawn up in order for battle, by the prudent foresight of Archidamus, who had assembled them round him, they retired into the neighbouring cities,

* Plut. in Pericl. p. 157. In Cim. p. 438.

† After some change had been made in the form of the Athenian government, the supreme authority was at last vested in nine magistrates, called Archons, and lasted but one year. One was called Rex, another Polemarchus, a third Archon, and this magistrate was properly at the head of the rest, and gave his name to the year; and six Thesmotheta, who presided immediately over the laws and decrees.

‡ A. M. 3534. Ant. J. C. 470. Plut. in Cim. p. 438, 439.

and commenced that very day upon war, having entered into alliance with several of the neighbouring nations, and being strengthened by the Messinians, who at that time were engaged in a war with the Spartans.

The Lacedæmonians in this extremity sent to Athens to implore succour; but this was opposed by Ephialtes, who declared that it would be no way advisable to assist them, nor to rebuild a city that was the rival of Athens, which, he said, ought to be left in its ruins, and the pride of Sparta thereby humbled for ever. But Cimon, being struck with horror at these politics, did not hesitate a moment to prefer the welfare of the Lacedæmonians to the aggrandizing of his country; declaring in the strongest terms, that it was absolutely weak and inconsistent, "to leave Greece lame of one of its legs, and Athens without a counterpoise;" the people came into his opinion, and accordingly a succour was voted. Sparta and Athens might indeed be considered as the two limbs on which Greece stood; so that if one of them was destroyed, the rest were inevitably crippled. It is also certain, that the Athenians were so elated with their grandeur, and were become so proud and enterprising, that they wanted a curb; for which none was so proper as Sparta, that state being the only one that was capable of being a counterpoise to the headstrong disposition of the Athenians. Cimon therefore marched to the aid of the Lacedæmonians with 4000 men.

We have here an example of the prodigious influence which a man of fine talents and abilities has in a state, when a great fund of merit unites in his person, with a well established reputation for probity, disinterestedness, and a zeal for the good of his country. Cimon, with very little difficulty, prevails so far as to inspire the Athenians with noble and magnanimous sentiments, which in outward appearance interfered with their interest; and this in spite of the suggestions of a secret jealousy, which never fails to show itself in the most sensible manner on these occasions. By the ascendant and authority which his virtue gives him, he raises them above the grovelling and unjust, though too common, political views, that prompt a people to consider the calamities of their neighbours as an advantage, which the interest of their own country permits and even enjoins them to lay hold of. The counsels of Cimon were perfectly wise and equitable; but it is surprising how he could prevail so far as to make a whole people approve them, since this is all that could be expected from an assembly of the wisest and gravest senators.

* Some time after, the Lacedæmonians again implored the aid of the Athenians against the Messinians and helots, who had seized upon Ithoma. But these forces being arrived under the command of Cimon, the Spartans began to dread their intrepidity, their power, and great fame; so that the city affronted them so far as to send them back, upon the suspicion of their harbouring ill designs, and of intending to turn their arms against them.

The Athenians being returned full of anger and resentment, they declared themselves from that very day enemies to all who should favour the Lacedæmonian interest; for which reason they banished Cimon by the ostracism, the first opportunity that presented itself for that purpose. This is the first time that the misunderstanding between these two nations, which afterwards augmented through mutual discontent, displayed itself in so strong a manner. It was nevertheless suspended for some years by truces and treaties, which prevented its consequences; but it at last broke out in the most violent manner in the Peloponnesian war.

* Plut. in Cim. Thucyd. l. i. p. 67, 68.

Those who had shut themselves up in Ithoma, after making a ten year's defence in it, surrendered at last to the Lacedæmonians, who gave them their lives, upon condition that they should never return to Peloponnesus. The Athenians, to exasperate the Lacedæmonians, received them with their wives and children, and settled them at Naupactus, of which they had just before possessed themselves. * The inhabitants of Megara at the same time went over from the Spartans to the Athenians. In this manner several leagues were concluded on both sides, and many battles were fought, the most famous of which was that of Tanagra in Bœotia, which Diodorus equals with those of Marathon and Platæa, and in which Myronidus the Athenian general defeated the Spartans who came to the aid of the Thebans.

† It was on this occasion, that Cimon, thinking himself dispensed from his proscription, repaired with some soldiers to his tribe to serve his country, and to fight in the Athenian country against the Lacedæmonians; but his enemies caused him to be ordered to retire. However, before he went away, he exhorted his companions, who were no less suspected than himself of favouring the Lacedæmonians, to exert themselves to the utmost, and fight with the greatest courage, to prove their innocence, and, if possible, to efface from the minds of the citizens a suspicion so injurious to them all. Accordingly those brave soldiers, who were 100 in number, fired by these words, demanded his whole armour of him, which they placed in the centre of their little battalion, in order to have him in a manner present and before their eyes. They fought with so much valour and fury, that they were all cut to pieces, to the great regret of the Athenians, who deeply repented their having accused them so unjustly.

I omit several events of little importance.

SECTION IX.

CIMON IS RECALLED.—HIS DEATH.

THE Athenians perceiving the great occasion they had for Cimon, † recalled him from banishment, in which he had spent five years. It was Pericles himself who proposed and drew up that decree; so moderate in those times, says Plutarch, were feuds and animosities, and so easy to be appeased, when the welfare of their country required it; and so happily did ambition, which is one of the strongest and most lively passions, yield to the necessity of the times, and comply with the occasions of the public.

‡ The instant Cimon returned, he stilled the sparks of war which were going to break out among the Greeks, reconciled the two cities and prevailed with them to conclude a truce for five years. And to prevent the Athenians, who were grown haughty, in effect of the many victories they had gained, from having an opportunity, or harbouring a design to attack their neighbours and allies, he thought it advisable to lead them at a great distance from home against the common enemy; thus endeavouring in an honourable way to inure the citizens to war, and enrich them at the same time. Accordingly he put to sea with a fleet of 200 sail. He sent 60 of these into Egypt, to the aid of Amyrteus, and himself sailed with the rest against the island of Cyprus. Artabazus was at that time in those seas,

* A. M. 5548. Ant. J. C. 456. Thucyd. l. i. p. 69—71. Diod. l. xi. p. 59—65.

† Plut. in Cim. p. 489.

‡ Ibid. p. 490.

§ A. M. 3554. Ant. J. C. 450. Plut. in Cim. p. 490. Diod. xii. p. 75, 71.

with a fleet of 300 sail; and Megabysus, the other general of Artaxerxes, with an army of 300,000 men, on the coast of Cilicia. As soon as the squadron which Cimon sent into Egypt had joined his fleet, he sailed and attacked Artabazus, and took 100 of their ships. He sunk many of them, and chased the rest as far as the coast of Phœnicia. But, as if this victory had been only a prelude to a second, he made a descent on Cilicia in his return, attacked Megabysus, defeated him, and cut to pieces a prodigious number of his troops. He afterwards returned to Cyprus with this double triumph, and laid siege to Citium, a strong city of very great importance. His design, after he had reduced that island, was, to sail for Egypt, and again embroil the affairs of the barbarians; for he had very extensive views, and meditated no less a prospect than that of the entire subversion of the mighty empire of Persia. The rumours which prevailed, that Themistocles was to command against him, added fresh fire to his courage; and almost assured of success, he was infinitely pleased with the occasion of trying his abilities with those of that general. But we have already seen that Themistocles laid violent hands on himself about this time.

* Artaxerxes, tired with a war in which he had sustained such great losses, resolved, with the advice of his council, to put an end to it. Accordingly, he sent orders to his generals to conclude a peace with the Athenians upon the most advantageous conditions they could, Megabysus and Artabazus sent ambassadors to Athens to propose an accommodation. Plenipotentiaries were chosen on both sides, and Callias was at the head of those of Athens. The conditions of the treaty were as follow: 1. That all the Grecian cities of Asia should enjoy their liberty, with such laws and forms of government as they should think fit to choose. 2. That no Persian ship of war should be allowed to enter the seas between the Cyanean and Chelidonian islands, that is, from the Euxine sea to the coasts of Pamphilia. 3. That no Persian general should march any troops within three days, march of those seas. 4. That the Athenians should not invade any part of the dominions of the king of Persia. These articles being ratified by both parties, peace was proclaimed.

† Thus ended this war, which, from the burning of Sardis by the Athenians, had lasted 51 years complete, and in which infinite numbers of Persians as well as Greeks had perished.

‡ Whilst this treaty was negotiating, Cimon died, either of sickness, or of a wound he had received at the siege of Citium. When he was near his end, he commanded his officers to sail with the fleet immediately for Athens, and to conceal his death with the utmost care. Accordingly this was executed with so much secrecy, that neither the enemy nor the allies once suspected it; and they returned safe to Athens, still under the conduct and auspices of Cimon, though he had been dead above thirty days.

Cimon was universally regretted, || which is no wonder, since he was possessed of all those qualities which dignify the soul; the most tender son; a faithful friend; zealous for the good of his country: a great politician; an accomplished general; modest when raised to the highest employments and most distinguished honours; liberal and beneficent almost to profusion; simple and averse to ostentation of every kind, even in the

* Diod. p. 74, 75.

† A. M. 3555. Ant. J. C. 449.

‡ Plut. in Cim. p. 491.

|| Sic se gerendo, minime est mirandum, si et vita ejus fuit secunda, et non acerba. Cor. Nep. in Cim. c. 4.

midst of riches and abundance ; in fine so great a lover of the poor citizens as to share his whole estate with them, without being ashamed of such companions of his fortune. History mentions no statues or monuments erected to his memory, nor any magnificent obsequies celebrated after his death ; but the greatest honour that could be paid him was the sighs and tears of the people.* These were permanent and lasting statues which are not obnoxious to the inclemencies of the weather or the injuries of time, and endear the memory of the good and virtuous to the remotest ages ; for the more splendid mausolæums, the works of brass and marble, that are raised in honour of wicked great men, are despised by posterity, as sepulchres which inclose nothing but vile dust and putrefaction.

What followed, proved more strongly the loss which Greece had sustained by his death ; for Cimon was the last of all the Grecian generals who did any thing considerable or glorious against the barbarians. Excited by the orators, who gained the strongest ascendant over the minds of the people, and sowed the seeds of division in their public assemblies, they turned their animosity against each other, and at last proceeded to open war, the fatal consequences of which no one endeavoured to prevent ; a circumstance that was of great advantage to the king of Persia, and the utmost prejudice to the affairs of Greece.

SECTION X.

THUCYDIDES IS OPPOSED TO PERICLES, &c.

THE nobles of Athens seeing Pericles raised to the highest degree of power,† and far above all the rest of the citizens, resolved to oppose him with a man who in some measure might make head against him, and prevent his great authority from growing up to monarchy. Accordingly they opposed him with Thucydides, Cimon's brother in law, a man who had displayed his wisdom on numberless occasions. He indeed did not possess the military talents in so eminent a degree as Pericles, but then he had as great an influence over the people, shaping their opinions, and directing their assemblies as he pleased ; and as he never stirred out of the city, but continually combatted Pericles in all his designs, he soon restored things to an equilibrium. On the other side, Pericles was solicitous of pleasing the people on all occasions, and slackened the rein more than ever ; entertaining them as often as possible with shows, festivals, games, and other diversions,

He found means to maintain, during eight months in the year, a great number of poor citizens, by putting them on board a fleet, consisting of 60 ships, which he fitted out every year ; and thereby did his country an important service, by training up a great number of seamen for its defence. He also planted several colonies in Chersonæus, in Naxos, in Andros, and among the Bisaltæ in Thrace. There was a very noble one in Italy, of which we shall soon have occasion to speak, and which built Thurium. Pericles had different views in settling these colonies, besides the particular design he might have of gaining the affections of the people by that means. His chief motives were, to clear the city of a great number of idle persons, who were ever ready to disturb the government ; to relieve the wants of the lowest class of people, who were before unable

* *Hæ pulcherrimæ effigies et mansuræ. Nam, quæ saxo struuntur, si judicium posterorum in odium vertit, pro sepulchris spernuntur.* Tacit. *Annal.* l. iv. c. 38.

† *Plut. in Pericl. p. 158—161.*

to subsist themselves; in fine, to awe the allies, by setting native Athenians among them as so many garrisons, which might prevent their engaging in any measures contrary to the interest of that people. The Romans acted in the same manner; and it may be said, that so wise a policy was one of the most effectual methods used by them to secure the tranquillity of the state.

But the circumstance which did Pericles the greatest honour in the sense of the people, was his adorning the city with magnificent edifices and other works, which raised the admiration and astonishment, of all foreigners, and gave them a mighty idea of the power of the Athenians. It is surprising that in so short a space, so many works of architecture, sculpture, engraving, and painting, should be performed, and at the same time be carried to the highest perfection; for it is generally found, that edifices raised in haste boast neither a solid and durable grace, nor the regularity required in works of an exquisitely beautiful kind. Commonly nothing but length of time, joined to assiduous labour, can give them such a strength as may preserve, and make them triumph over ages; and this raises our wonder still more in regard to the works of Pericles, which were finished with so much rapidity, and however subsisted through so great a length of time. For each of those works, the very instant it was finished, had the beauty of an antique; and at this time, *i. e.* above 500 years after, says Plutarch, they retain a freshness and youth as if just come out of the artist's hand; so happily do they preserve the graces and charms of novelty, which will not suffer time to diminish their lustre; as if an ever blooming spirit, and a soul exempt from age, were diffused into every part of those works.

But that circumstance, which excited the admiration of the whole world, raised the jealousy of the people against Pericles. His enemies were for ever crying aloud in the assemblies, that it was dishonorable to the Athenians to appropriate to themselves the bank of all Greece, which he had sent for from Delos, where it had been deposited; that the allies must necessarily consider such an attempt as a manifest tyranny, when they found that the sums which had been extorted from them, upon pretence of their being employed in the war, were laid out by the Athenians in gilding and embellishing their city, in making magnificent statues, and raising temples that cost millions. They did not amplify on these occasions; for the temple of Minerva only, called the Parthenone, had cost 3,000,000 of livres.*

Pericles, on the contrary, remonstrated to the Athenians, that they were not obliged to give the allies an account of the monies they had received from them; that it was enough they defended them from, and repulsed the barbarians, whilst the allies furnished neither soldiers, horses, nor ships; and were excused for some sums of money, which, from the instant they were paid in, were no longer the property of the donors, but of those who received them, provided they performed the conditions agreed upon, and in consideration of which they were received. He added, that as the Athenians were sufficiently provided with all things necessary for war, it was but just that they should employ the rest of their riches in edifices and other works, which, when finished, would give immortal glory to their city; and the whole time they were carrying on, diffused a plenty of all things, and gave bread to an infinite number of citizens: that they themselves had all kinds of materials, as timber, stone, brass, ivory, gold,

* About 145,000 sterling.

ebony, and cypress wood ; and all sorts of artificers capable of working them, as carpenters, masons, smiths, stone-cutters, dyers, goldsmiths, artificers in ebony, painters, embroiderers, and turners ; men fit to conduct their naval affairs, as merchants, sailors, and experienced pilots ; others for land-carriage, as cartwrights, waggoners, carters, ropemakers, pavers, &c. that it was for the advantage of the state to employ these different artificers and workmen, who, as so many separate bodies, formed, when united, a kind of peaceable and domestic army, whose different functions and employments diffused gain, and increase throughout all sexes and ages : lastly, that whilst men of robust bodies, and of an age fit to bear arms, whether soldiers or mariners, and those who were in the different garrisons, were supported with the public monies, it was but just that the rest of the people who lived in the city should also be maintained in their way ; and that as all were members of the same republic, they all should reap the same advantages, by doing it services, which, though of a different kind, did however all contribute to its security or ornament.

One day, as the debates were growing warm, Pericles offered to defray the expence of all these things, provided it should be declared in the public inscriptions that he only had been at the charge of them. At these words, the people, either admiring his magnanimity, or fired with emulation, and determined not to let him engross that glory, cried with one voice, that he might take out of the public treasury all the sums necessary for his purpose.

Phidias, the celebrated sculptor, presided over all these works, as director-general. It was he who particularly cast the gold * and ivory statue representing Pallas, which was so highly valued by all the judges of antiquity. There arose an incredible ardour and emulation among the several artificers, who all strove to excel each other, and immortalize their names by masterpieces of art.

The odeon, or music theatre, which had a great number of seats and columns within it, and whose roof grew narrower by degrees, and terminated in a point, was built, as history informs us, after the model of king Xerxes' tent, according to the direction of Pericles. It was at that time he proposed, with great warmth, a decree, by which it was ordained, that musical games should be celebrated on the festival called Panathenæa ; and having been chosen the judge and distributor of the prizes, he regulated the manner in which musicians should play on the flute and the lyre, as well as sing. From that time the musical games were always exhibited in this theatre.

I have already taken notice, that the more the beauty and splendour of these works were admired, the greater envy and clamour were raised against Pericles. The orators of the opposite faction were eternally exclaiming against him, and tearing his character to pieces ; accusing him of squandering the public monies, and laying out very unseasonably the revenues of the state in edifices, whose magnificence was of no use. At last the rupture between him and Thucydides rose to such a height, that one or other of them must necessarily be banished by the ostracism. He got the better of Thucydides, prevailed to have him banished, crushed by that means the faction which opposed him, and obtained a despotic authority over the city and government of Athens. He now disposed at pleasure

* Non Minervæ Athenis factæ amplitudine utimur, cum ea sit cubitorum xxvi. Ebores hoc et auro cœstat. Plin. l. xxxvi. c. 5. This statue was 26 cubits in height.

of the public monies, troops and ships. The islands and sea were subject to him; and he reigned singly and alone in that wide domain, which extended not only over the Greeks, but the barbarians also, and which was cemented and strengthened by the obedience and fidelity of the conquered nations, by the friendship of kings, and treaties concluded with various princes.

Historians expatiate greatly on the magnificent edifices and other works with which Pericles adorned Athens, and I have related faithfully their testimony; but I cannot say whether the complaints and murmurs raised against him were very ill grounded. And indeed, was it just in him to expend, in superfluous buildings and vain decorations, the immense * sums intended for carrying on the war? and would it not have been better to have eased the allies of part of the contributions, which in Pericles' administration were raised to a third part more than before? According to Cicero,† such edifices and other works only are worthy of admiration as are of use to the public, as aqueducts, city-wall citadels, arsenals, sea-ports; and to these we must add, the work made by Pericles, to join Athens to the port of Piræus. But Cicero observes, at the same time, that Pericles was blamed for squandering away the public treasure, merely to embellish the city with superfluous ornaments. ‡ Plato, who formed a judgment of things not from their outward splendour, but from truth, observes, after his master Socrates, that Pericles, with all his grand edifices and other works, had not improved the mind of one of the citizens in virtue, but rather corrupted the purity and simplicity of their ancient manners.

SECTION XI.

PERICLES CHANGES HIS CONDUCT WITH REGARD TO THE PEOPLE.

WHEN Pericles saw himself invested with the whole authority, he began to change his behaviour. ¶ He now was not so mild and tractable as before, nor did he submit or abandon himself any longer to the whims and caprice of the people, as so many winds; but drawing in, says Plutarch, the reins of this too loose popular government, in the same manner as we screw up the strings of an instrument when too slack, he changed it into an aristocracy, or rather a kind of monarchy, without departing, however, from the public good. Choosing always what was most expedient, and becoming irreproachable in all things, he gained so mighty an ascendant over the minds of the people, that he turned and directed them at pleasure. Sometimes, by his bare counsel, and by persuasive methods, he would win them over gently to his will, and gain their assent spontaneously: at other times, when he found them obstinate, he would in a manner drag them forward against their will to those things which were for their good; imitating on this occasion a skilful physician, who, in a tedious and stubborn disease, knows what times are proper for him to indulge his patient in innocent medicaments that are pleasing, in order after to administer those of a strong and violent nature, which indeed put him to pain, but are alone capable of restoring his health.

And indeed it is manifest that the utmost skill and abilities were required

* They amounted to upwards of 10,000,000 French money.

† *Offic. l. ii. n. 60.*

‡ *In Gorg. p. 515. In Alcib. c. i. p. 119.*

¶ *Plut. in Peric. p. 161.*

to manage and govern a populace haughty from their power, and exceedingly capricious: and on this occasion Pericles succeeded wonderfully. He used to employ, according to the different situation of things, sometimes hope, and at other times fear, as a double helm, either to check the wild transports and starts of the people, or to raise them when dejected and desponding. By this conduct he showed that eloquence, as Plato observes, is only the art of directing the minds of the people at will; and that the chief excellency of this art consists in moving seasonably the various passions, whether gentle or violent; which being to the soul what strings are to a musical instrument, need only be touched by an ingenious and skilful hand to produce their effect.

It must nevertheless be confessed, that the circumstance which gave Pericles this great authority, was not only the force of his eloquence, but, as Thucydides observes, the reputation of his life, and great probity.

* Plutarch points out in Pericles one quality which is very essential to statesmen, a quality well adapted to win the esteem and confidence of the public, and which supposes a great superiority of mind; and that is, for a man to be fully persuaded that he wants the counsels of others, and is not able to manage and direct all things alone; to associate with himself persons of merit in his labour, to employ each of these according to his talents; and to leave them the management of small matters, which only consume time, and deprive him of the liberty of mind, so necessary in the conduct of important affairs. Such a conduct, says Plutarch, is productive of two advantages. First, it extinguishes, or at least breaks the force of envy and jealousy, by dividing, in some measure, a power, which is grating and offensive to us, when we see it united in one single person, as if all merit centered in him alone. Secondly, it advances and facilitates the execution of affairs, and makes their success more certain. Plutarch, the better to explain his thought, employs a very natural and beautiful comparison. The hand, says he, which from its being divided into fingers, so far from being weaker, is the stronger, the more active, and better adapted to motion on that very account. It is the same of a statesman, who has the skill to divide his cares and functions in a proper manner, and who by that means makes his authority more active, more extensive, and decisive: whereas the indiscreet fire of a narrow minded man, who takes umbrage at, and is for engrossing all things, serves to no other purpose but to set his weakness and incapacity in a stronger light, and to disconcert his affairs. But Pericles, says Plutarch, did not act in this manner: like a skilful pilot, who, though he stands almost motionless himself, however puts every thing in motion, and will sometimes seat subaltern officers at the helm; so Pericles was the soul of the government; and, seeming to do nothing of himself, he actuated and governed all things; employing the eloquence of one man, the credit and interest of another, the prudence of a third, the bravery and courage of a fourth, and so on.

† To what has been here related, we may add another quality which is no less rare and valuable, I mean, a noble and disinterested soul. Pericles had so great a disinclination to the receiving of gifts, so utter a contempt for riches, and was so far above all rapaciousness and avarice, that though he had raised Athens to the richest and most flourishing state; though his power had surpassed that of many tyrants and kings; though he had long disposed in an absolute manner of the treasures of Greece, he did not

* Plut. in præc. de rep. ger. p. 812.

† Plut. in vit. Pericl. p. 161, 162.

however add a single drachm to the estate he inherited from his father. This was the source, the true cause of the supreme authority of Pericles in the republic; the just and deserved fruit of his integrity and perfect disinterestedness.

It was not only for a few short moments, nor during the first heats of favour, which are generally short lived, that he preserved his authority. He maintained it 40 years, notwithstanding the opposition of Cimon, of Tolmides, of Thucydides, and many others, who had all declared against him; and of these 40 years, he spent 16 without a rival, from the time of Thucydides' banishment, and disposed all affairs with absolute power. Nevertheless, in the midst of this supreme authority, which he had rendered perpetual and unlimited in his own person, his soul was always superior to the charms and allurements of wealth, though he never neglected improving his estate to the utmost of his power. For Pericles did not act like those rich men, who, notwithstanding their immense revenues, either through negligence or want of economy, or the expences of pride and folly, are always poor in the midst of their riches; unable and unwilling to do the least service to their virtuous friends, or their faithful and zealous domestics; and at last die in every one's debt, whence their name and memory are had in the utmost detestation by their unfortunate creditors. I shall not expatiate on another extreme, to which this negligence and want of economy generally lead, I mean rapine, a love of gifts and exactions; for here, as well as in the management of the public monies, the maxim of Tacitus takes place, * viz. that when a man has squandered away his estate, he then makes it his whole study to retrieve the loss of it by all sorts of methods, not excepting the most criminal.

Pericles knew much better the use a statesman ought to make of riches. He was sensible that he ought to expend them in the service of the public, such as the procuring of able men to assist him in the administration; the relieving good officers, who too often are in unhappy circumstances; the rewarding and encouraging merit of every kind, and a thousand such things; to which, doubtless, either on account of the exquisite joy they give, or the solid glory that results from them, no one will be so thoughtless as to compare the expences lavished away in entertainments, equipages, or gaming. In this view, Pericles managed his estate with the utmost economy; having himself taught one of his old servants to take care of his domestic concerns; and he always had the account brought him, at stated times, of all things that had been received as well as expended; confining himself and his family to a decent subsistence, from which he banished severely all superfluities of a vain and ostentatious kind, suitable to his estate and condition. This way of life, did indeed no way please his children when they were come to years of maturity, and much less his wife. They thought Pericles did not live at a sufficient expence for persons of their rank; and murmured at that low sordid economy, as they called it, which carried no air of the plenty which generally reigns in houses where riches and authority are united. However, Pericles had little regard to these complaints, and directed his views to things of much greater importance.

I believe it will not be improper to apply on this occasion, a very just remark of Plutarch, in his parallel of Aristides and Cato. After saying that political virtue, or the art of governing cities and kingdoms, is the greatest and most perfect that man can acquire, he adds, that economy is not one

* Si ambitione ærarium exhauserimus, per scelera supplendum erit. Tacit. Annal. l. ii. c. 38.

of the most inconsiderable branches of this virtue. And indeed, as riches are one of the means which may most contribute to the security or ruin of a state; the art that teaches to dispose of, and make a good use of them, and which is called economy, is certainly a branch of the art of policy; and not one of the most inconsiderable branches of it, since great wisdom is required, in order to the observing a just medium on these occasions, and to the banishing poverty and too great opulence from a country. It is this art which, avoiding industriously all trifling and needless expences, prevents a magistrate from being forced to overburden a people with taxes; and keeps always in reserve, in the public coffers, monies sufficient for the supporting a war that may break out, or for providing against any unforeseen accident. Now, what is said of a kingdom, or of a city, may be applied to particular persons. For a city, which is composed of an assemblage of houses, and which forms a whole of several parts united, is either powerful or weak when taken together, in proportion as all the members of which it consists, are powerful or weak. Pericles certainly acquitted himself well with regard to that part of this science which relates to the government of a family: but I do not know whether the same may be said of his administration of the public revenues.

SECTION XII.

JEALOUSY AND CONTESTS ARISE BETWEEN THE ATHENIANS AND LACEDÆMONIANS.

SUCH was the conduct of Pericles with respect to his domestic concerns; * and he was no less famous for his administration of public affairs. The Lacedæmonians beginning to grow jealous of the prosperity of the Athenians, and to take umbrage at it, Pericles, to inspire his citizens with greater courage and magnanimity, published a decree, importing, that orders should be sent to all the Greeks, inhabiting either Europe or Asia, and to all the cities great or small, to send immediately their deputies or representatives to Athens, to examine and debate on ways and means to rebuild the temples that had been burnt by the barbarians; to perform the sacrifices, which they had engaged themselves to offer up, for the preservation and safety of Greece, when war was carrying on against them; as also to consider on the necessary expedients for establishing such an order and discipline in their navy, that all ships might sail in safety, and the Greeks live in peace one with another.

Accordingly 20 persons were chosen for this embassy, each of whom was upwards of 50 years old. Five of these were sent to the Ionians and Dorians of Asia, and the inhabitants of the islands as far as Lesbos and Rhodes; five to the countries of the Hellespont and Thrace, as far as Byzantium. Five were ordered to go to Bœotia, to Phocis, and Peloponnesus; and from thence, by the country of the Locrians, to proceed to the several cities of the upper continent, as far as Acarnania and Ambracia. The last five were ordered to cross Eubœa, and to go to the people of Mount Ceta, and those of the gulf of Malea, and to the inhabitants of Phthiotis, of Achala, and of Thessaly; to induce the several nations to come to the assembly convened in Athens, and to assist at the debates which should be there carried on concerning peace, and the general affairs of Greece. I judge it necessary to enter into this detail, as it shows how

* Plut. in Pericl. p. 162.

far the power of the Greeks extended, and the authority which the Athenians enjoyed among them.

But all these solicitations were in vain; the cities not sending their deputies, which, according to historians, was owing to the opposition made by the Lacedæmonians, a circumstance we are not to wonder at. They were sensible, that Pericles' design was to have Athens acknowledged as mistress and sovereign of all the other Grecian cities; and Lacedæmon was far from allowing it that honour. A secret leaven of dissension had, for some years, begun to disturb the tranquility of Greece; and we shall find by the sequel, that disgusts augmented continually.

Pericles had acquired great fame for the wisdom with which he formed and conducted his enterprises. The troops reposed the highest confidence in him, and whenever they followed him, assured themselves of success. His chief maxim of war was, never to venture a battle unless he were almost certain of victory, and not to lavish the blood of the citizens. He used to say frequently, that were it in his power they should be immortal; that when trees were felled, they shoot to life again in a little time, but when once men die, they are lost for ever. A victory that was only the effect of a happy temerity, appeared to him as little worthy of praise, though it often was much admired.

His expedition into the Thracian Chersonesus did him great honour, and was of great advantage to all the Greeks of that country; for he not only strengthened the Grecian cities of that peninsula, by the colonies of Athenians which he carried thither, but also shut up the isthmus with a strong wall, with forts at proper distances from sea to sea, securing by that means the whole country from the perpetual incursions of the Thracians, who were very near neighbours to it.

He also sailed with 100 ships round Peloponnesus, spreading the terror of the Athenian arms wherever he came, the success of which was not once interrupted on this occasion.

He advanced as far as the kingdom of Pontus with a large, well manned, and magnificent fleet, and granted the Grecian cities all they thought fit to ask of him. At the same time he displayed to the barbarian nations in that neighbourhood, to their kings and princes, the greatness of the power of the Athenians, and proved to them, by the security with which he sailed to all parts, that they possessed the empire of the seas without a rival.

* But so constant and shining a fortune began to dazzle the eyes of the Athenians. Intoxicated with the idea of their power and grandeur, they now revolved nothing but the boldest and most lofty projects. They were for ever talking of new attempts upon Egypt; of attacking the maritime provinces of the great king; of carrying their arms into Sicily, a fatal and unhappy design, which at that time did not take effect, though it was revived soon after; and to extend their conquests towards Hetruria, on one side, and Carthage on the other. Pericles was far from giving in to such idle views, or supporting them with his credit or approbation. On the contrary, his whole study was to damp that restless ardour, and check an ambition which no longer knew either bounds or measure. It was his opinion that the Athenians ought to employ their forces for the future, only in securing and preserving their present acquisitions; and he thought he had gained a great point, in restraining the power of the Lacedæmonians,

* Plut. in Pericl. p. 164.

the reducing of which he always meditated; and this was particularly seen in the sacred war.

* This name was given to the war which was raised on account of Delphos. The Lacedæmonians, having entered armed into the country where that temple is situated, had dispossessed the people of Phocis of the superintendance of that temple, and bestowed it on the Delphians. As soon as they left it, Pericles went thither with an army, and restored the Phocenses.

The Eubœans having rebelled at the same time, Pericles was obliged to march thither with an army. He was no sooner arrived there, but news was brought that the inhabitants of Megara had taken up arms, and that the Lacedæmonians, headed by Plistonax their king, were on the frontiers of Attica. This obliged him to quit Eubœa, and to go with all possible expedition to defend his country. The Lacedæmonian army being retired, he returned against the rebels, and again subjected all the cities of Eubœa to the Athenians.

† After this expedition, a truce for 30 years was concluded between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians. This treaty restored things to a tranquillity for the present; but as it did not descend to the root of the evil, nor cure the jealousy and enmity of the two nations, this calm was not of long duration.

SECTION XIII.

NEW SUBJECTS OF CONTENTION BETWEEN THE TWO NATIONS.

THE Athenians, six years after, took up arms against Samos in favour of Miletus.‡ These two cities were contesting for that of Priene, to which each claimed a right. It is pretended that Pericles fomented this war to please a famous courtesan, of whom he was very fond; her name was Aspasia, a native of Miletus. After several events and battles, Pericles besieged the capital of the island of Samos. It is said that this was the first time he used military engines, as battering rams, and tortoises invented by Artemon the engineer, who was lame, and was therefore always carried in a chair to the batteries, whence he was surnamed Periphoretus. The use of these machines had been long known in the east. The Samians, after sustaining a nine months siege, surrendered. Pericles razed their walls, dispossessed them of their ships, and demanded immense sums to defray the expences of the war. Part of this sum they paid down, agreed to disburse the rest at a certain time, and gave hostages by way of security for the payment.

After the reduction of Samos, Pericles being returned to Athens, buried in a splendid manner all who had lost their lives in this war, and pronounced in person the funeral oration over their graves. This custom, which he first introduced, was afterwards regularly observed. The senate of the Areopagus, always appointed the orator on these occasions. He was chosen, ten years after, for the like ceremony, in the beginning of the Peloponnesian war.

* Plut. in Pericl. p. 164.

† A. M. 3558. Ant. J. C. 446. Thucyd. l. i. p. 75. Diod. p. 87.

‡ A. M. 3564. Ant. J. C. 440. Thucyd. l. i. p. 75, 76. Diod. p. 88, 89. Plut. in Pericl. p. 165—167.

* Pericles, who foresaw that a rupture would soon ensue between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians, advised the former to send aid to the people of Corcyra, whom the Corinthians had invaded, and to win over to their interest that island, which was so very formidable at sea; foretelling them, that they would be attacked by the Peloponnesians. The occasion of the quarrel between the people of Corcyra and Corinth, which gave rise to that of Peloponnesus, one of the most considerable events in the Grecian history, was as follows :

† Epidamnium, a maritime city of Macedonia, among the Taulantii, was a colony of Corcyrans, founded by Phalius of Corinth. This city growing in time very large and populous, divisions arose in it, and the common people expelled the most wealthy inhabitants, who went over to the neighbouring nations, and infested them greatly with their incursions. In this extremity, they first had recourse to the Corcyrans, and being refused by them, they addressed the Corinthians, who took them under their protection, sent succours to and settled other inhabitants in it. But they did not continue long unmolested there, the Corcyrans besieging it with a large fleet. The people of Corinth hastened to its aid, but having been defeated at sea, the city surrendered that very day, upon condition that the foreigners should be slaves, and the Corinthians prisoners, till further orders. The Corcyrans erected a trophy, murdered all their prisoners except the Corinthians, and laid waste the whole country.

The year after the battle, the Corinthians raised a greater army than the former, and fitted out a new fleet. The people of Corcyra, finding it would be impossible for them to make head alone against such powerful enemies, sent to the Athenians to desire their alliance. The treaty of peace, concluded between the states of Greece, left such Grecian cities as had not declared themselves, the liberty of joining whom they pleased, or of standing neuter. This the Corcyrans had hitherto done, judging it their interest not to espouse any party, in consequence of which they had hitherto been without allies. They now sent for this purpose to Athens, which the Corinthians hearing, they also sent deputies thither. The affair was debated with great warmth in presence of the people, who heard the reasons on both sides, and it was twice put to the vote in the assembly. The Athenians declared the first time in favour of the Corinthians; but afterwards changing their opinion (doubtless on the remonstrances of Pericles,) they received the Corcyrans into their alliance. However, they did not go so far as to conclude a league offensive and defensive with them; for they could not declare war against Corinth, without breaking at the same time with all Peloponnesus; but only agreed to succour each other mutually, in case they should be attacked, either personally, or in their allies. The real design was to set those two states, very powerful by sea, at variance, and after each should have exhausted the other by a tedious war, to triumph over the weakest; for at that time there were but three states in Greece who possessed powerful fleets, and these were Athens, Corinth, and Corcyra. They also had a design on Italy and Sicily, which their taking the island of Corcyra would very much promote.

On this plan they concluded an alliance with the Corcyrans, and accordingly sent them ten galleys, but with an order for them not to engage the Corinthians, unless they should first invade the island of Corcyra, or some

* A. M. 5572. Ant. J. C. 432. Thucyd. l. i. p. 17—57. Diod. i. x. p. 90—95. Plut. in Pericl. p. 167.

† This city was afterwards called Dyrrachium.

other place belonging to their allies. This precaution was used, in order that the articles of the truce might not be infringed.

But it was very difficult to obey these orders. A battle was fought between the Corcyrans and the Corinthians, near the island of Sibotis, opposite to Corcyra. It was one of the most considerable, with regard to the number of ships, that ever was fought between the Greeks. The advantage was almost equal on both sides. About the end of the battle, as night was drawing on, 20 Athenian galleys came up. The Corcyrans, with this reinforcement, sailed next day by day-break towards the port of Sibotis, whither the Corinthians had retired, to see if they would venture a second engagement. However, the latter contented themselves with sailing away in order of battle, without fighting. Both parties erected a trophy in the island of Sibotis, each ascribing the victory to himself.

* From this war arose another, which occasioned an open rupture between the Athenians and Corinthians, and afterwards the war of Peloponnesus. Potidæa, a city of Macedonia, was a colony belonging to the Corinthians, who sent magistrates thither annually; but it was dependant at that time on Athens, and paid tribute to it. The Athenians, fearing this city would revolt, and prevail with the rest of the Thracian allies to join them, commanded the inhabitants to demolish their walls on the side near *Pallene*; to deliver hostages to them as sureties for their fidelity; and to send back the magistrates which Corinth had given them. Demands of so unjust a nature only fomented the revolt. † The Potidæans declared against the Athenians, and several neighbouring cities followed their example. Both Athens and Corinth armed and sent forces thither. The two armies engaged near Potidæa, and that of the Athenians had the advantage. Alcibiades, who was then very young, and Socrates his master, signalized themselves on this occasion. It is something very singular, to see a philosopher put on his coat of mail; as well as to consider his behaviour and conduct in a battle. There was not a soldier in the whole army who so resolutely supported all the toils and the fatigues of the campaign as Socrates. Hunger, thirst, and cold, were enemies he had long accustomed himself to despise and subdue with ease. Thrace, the scene of this expedition, was a frozen region. Whilst the other soldiers covered with thick clothes and warm furs, lay close in their tents, and scarce ever dared to stir out of them; Socrates used to come into the open air as thin clad as usual, and barefooted. His gaiety and wit were the life of all tables; and induced others to put the glass round cheerfully, though he himself never drank wine to excess. When the armies engaged, he performed his duty to a miracle. Alcibiades having been thrown down and wounded, Socrates placed himself before him, defended him valiantly, and, in sight of the whole army, prevented him and his arms from being taken by the enemy. The prize of valour was justly due to Socrates; but as the generals seemed inclined to decree it to Alcibiades, on account of his illustrious birth, Socrates, who only sought for opportunities to inflame him with desire for true glory, contributed more than any other person, by the noble eulogium he made on his courage, to cause the crown and complete suit of armour which was the prize of valour, to be adjudged to Alcibiades.

Notwithstanding the loss which the Corinthians had sustained in the battle, the inhabitants of Potidæa did not change their conduct. The city

* Thucyd. l. i. p. 37—42. Diod. l. xii. p. 93, 94.

† Plut. in Conviv. p. 219, 220. Plut. in Alcib. p. 194.

was therefore besieged. * The Corinthians, fearing to lose a place of so much importance, addressed their allies in the strongest terms; who all, in conjunction with them, sent a deputation to Lacedæmon, to complain of the Athenians, as having infringed the articles of peace. The Lacedæmonians admitted them to audience in one of their ordinary assemblies. The people of Ægina, though very much disgusted at the Athenians, did not send a deputation publicly thither, for fear of giving umbrage to a republic to which they were subject; but they acted in secret as strenuously as the rest. The Megarians complained vehemently against the Athenians, that, contrary to the law of nations, and in prejudice to the treaty concluded between the Greeks, they had prohibited them, by a public decree, access to their fairs and markets, and excluded them from all the ports dependant on them. † By that decree, according to Plutarch, ‡ the Athenians declared an eternal and irreconcilable hatred against Megara; and ordained that all Megarians should be put to death, that set foot in Athens; and that all the Athenian generals, when they took the usual oath, should swear expressly, that they would send a body of soldiers twice a year to lay waste the territories of the Megarenses.

The chief complaints were made by the Corinthian ambassador, who spoke with the utmost force and freedom. He represented to the Lacedæmonians, that as they themselves never swerved from the most inviolable integrity, either in public or private transactions, they, for that very reason, were less suspicious of the probity of others; and that their own moderation prevented their discovering the ambition of their enemies: that instead of flying, with instant activity, to meet dangers and calamities, they never attempted to remedy them, till they were quite crushed by them: that by their indolence and supineness, they had given the Athenians an opportunity of attaining, by insensible degrees, their present height of grandeur and power: that it was quite different with regard to the Athenians: "that this active, vigilant, and indefatigable people, were never at rest themselves, nor would suffer any other nation to be so. Employed (says he) wholly in their projects, they form only such as are of the greatest and most intrepid nature; their deliberations are speedy, and their excursions the same. One enterprise serves only as a step to a second. Whether they are successful or unfortunate, they turn every thing to their advantage; and never stop in their career, or are discouraged. But you, who are oppressed by such formidable enemies, are lulled asleep in a fatal tranquility; and do not reflect, that a man who desires to live calm and easy, must not only forbear injuring others, but also not let any ill be done to himself; and that justice consists, not only in forbearing to commit evil ourselves, but in avenging that done to us by others. Shall I be so free as to say it? Your integrity is of too antique a cast for the present state of affairs. It is necessary for men in politics, as well as in all other things, to conform always to the times. When a people are at peace, they may follow their ancient maxims; but when they are involved in a

* Thucyd. l. i. p. 43—59

† Plut. in Pericl. p. 163.

‡ According to Plutarch, some persons pretended that Pericles had caused this decree to be enacted, to revenge the private injury done to Aspasia, from whose house the people of Megara had carried off two courtesans; and he cites some verses of Aristophanes, who, in a comedy intitled, The Acharnians, reproaches Pericles with this action. But Thucydides, a contemporary author, and who was very well acquainted with all the transactions of Athens, does not say a word of this affair; and he is much more worthy of belief than a poet who was a professed slanderer and satirist.

“ variety of difficulties, they must try new expedients, and set every engine at work to extricate themselves. It was by these arts that the Athenians have increased their power so much. Had you imitated their activity, they would not have dispossessed us of Corcyra, and would not now be laying siege to Potidæa. Follow, at least, their example on this occasion, by succouring the Potidæans and the rest of your allies, as your duty obliges you; and do not force your friends and neighbours, by forsaking them, to have recourse, out of despair, to other powers.”

The Athenian ambassador, who was come to Sparta upon other affairs, and was in the assembly, did not think it advisable to let this speech go unanswered: but put the Lacedæmonians in mind of the still recent services that the republic, by which he was sent, had done to all Greece, which, he said, merited some regard; and that therefore it ought not to be envied, much less should endeavours be used to lessen its power: that the Athenians could not be charged with having usurped an empire over Greece; since it was merely at the entreaty of their allies, and in some measure with the consent of Sparta, that they have been forced to take the abandoned helm: that those who murmured, did it without grounds; and only from the aversion which mankind in general have to dependance and subjection, though of the gentlest and most equitable kind; that he exhorted them to employ a sufficient time in deliberating, before they came to a resolution; and not involve themselves and all Greece in a war, which would necessarily be attended with the most fatal consequences: that gentle methods may be found for terminating the differences of the allies, without breaking at once into open violence; however that the Athenians in case of an invasion, were able to oppose force with force, and would prepare for a vigorous defence, after having invoked, against Sparta, the deities who take vengeance on those that forswear themselves, and who violate the faith of treaties:

The ambassadors being withdrawn, and the affair debated, the majority were for war. But before it passed into an act, Archidamus king of Sparta, setting himself above those prejudices which so strongly biassed the rest, and directing his views to futurity, made a speech, in which he set forth the dreadful consequences of the war they were going to embark in; showed the strength of the Athenians; exhorted them first to try gentle methods, which they themselves had seemed to approve; but to make, in the mean time, the necessary preparations for carrying on so important an enterprise, and not to be under any apprehensions, that their moderation and delays would be branded with the name of cowardice, since their past actions secured them from any suspicion of that kind.

But, notwithstanding all these wise expostulations, a war was resolved. The people caused the allies to return into the assembly, and declared to them, that in their opinion the Athenians were the aggressors; but that it would be expedient first to assemble all who were in the alliance, in order that peace or war might be agreed upon unanimously. This decree of the Lacedæmonians was made the 14th year of the truce; and was not owing so much to the complaints of the allies, as to the jealousy of the Athenian power, which had already subjected a considerable part of Greece.

* Accordingly the allies were convened a second time. They all gave their votes, in their several turns, from the greatest city to the least, and war was resolved by a general consent. However as they had not yet made any preparations, it was judged advisable to begin them immediate-

* Thucyd. l. i. p. 77—81, et 95.

ly; and while this was doing, in order to gain time, and observe the necessary formalities, to send ambassadors to Athens, to complain of the violation of the treaty.

The first who were sent thither, reviving an ancient complaint, required of the Athenians to expel out of their city the descendants of those who had profaned the temple of Minerva in the affair of * Cylon. As Pericles was of that family by the mother's side, the view of the Lacedæmonians, in their making this demand, was, either to procure his banishment, or lessen his authority. However, it was not complied with. The second ambassadors required, that the siege of Potidæa should be raised, and the liberty of Ægina restored, and above all, that the decree against the Megarians should be repealed; declaring that otherwise no accommodation could take place. In fine, a third ambassador came, who took no notice of any of these particulars, but only said, that the Lacedæmonians were for peace; but that this could never be, except the Athenians should cease to infringe the liberties of Greece.

SECTION XIV.

TROUBLES EXCITED AGAINST PERICLES, &c. &c.

PERICLES opposed all these demands with great † vigour, and especially that relating to the Megarians. He had great credit in Athens, and at the same time had many enemies. Not daring to attack him at first in person, they cited his most intimate friends, and those for whom he had the greatest esteem, as Phidias, Aepasia, and Anaxagoras, before the people; and their design in this was, to sound how the people stood affected towards Pericles himself.

Phidias was accused of having embezzled considerable sums in the casting the statue of Minerva, which was his masterpiece. The prosecution having been carried on with the usual forms, before the assembly of the people, not a single proof of Phidias' pretended embezzlement appeared: for the artist, from beginning that statue, had, by Pericles' advice, contrived the workmanship of the gold in such a manner, that all of it might be taken off and weighed; which accordingly Pericles bid the informers do in presence of all the spectators. But Phidias had witnesses against him, the truth of whose evidence he could neither dispute nor silence; these were the fame and beauty of his works, the ever existing causes of the envy which attacked him. The circumstance which they could least forgive in him was, his having represented to the life, in the battle of the Amazons, engraved on the shield of the goddess, his own person, and that of Pericles: † and, by an imperceptible art he had so blended and incorporated these figures with the whole work, that it was impossible to erase them, without disfiguring and taking to pieces the whole statue. Phidias was therefore dragged to prison, where he came to his end, either by the common course of nature, or by poison. Other authors say, that he was only banished, and that after his exile he made the famous statue of Jupiter at

* This Cylon seized on the citadel of Athens above 100 years before. Those who followed him, being besieged in it, and reduced to extreme famine, fled for shelter to the temple of Minerva; where they afterwards were taken out by force, and cut to pieces. Those who advised this murder were declared guilty of impiety and sacrilege, and as such banished. However they were recalled some time after.

† Plut. in Pericl. p. 168, 169.

† Aristot. in tractat. de mund. p. 615.

Olympia. It is not possible to excuse, in any manner the ingratitude of the Athenians in thus making a prison or death the reward of a masterpiece of art; nor their excessive rigour, in punishing, as a capital crime, an action that appears innocent in itself; or which, to make the worst of it, was a vanity very pardonable in so great an artist.

Aspasia, a native of Miletus in Asia, had settled in Athens, where she was become very famous, not so much for the charms of her person, as for her vivacity and solidity of wit, and her great knowledge. All the illustrious men in the city thought it an honour to frequent her house. *Socrates himself used to visit her constantly, and was not ashamed to pass for her pupil, and to own that he had learned rhetoric from her. Pericles declared also, that he was obliged to Aspasia for his eloquence, which so greatly distinguished him in Athens; and that it was from her conversation he had imbibed the principles of the art of policy, for she was exceedingly well versed in the maxims of government. Their intimacy was owing to still stronger motives. Pericles did not love his wife; he resigned her very freely to another man and supplied her place with Aspasia, whom he loved passionately, though her reputation was more than suspicious. Aspasia was therefore accused of impiety and dissolute conduct; and it was with the utmost difficulty that Pericles saved her, by his entreaties, and by the compassion he had raised in the judges, by shedding abundance of tears whilst her cause was pleading, a behaviour little consistent with the dignity of his character, and the rank of supreme head of the most powerful state of Greece.

A decree had passed, by which informations were ordered to be taken out against all such † persons as denied what was ascribed to the ministry of the gods; or those philosophers and others who taught preternatural things, and the motions of the heavens; doctrines on this occasion considered injurious to the established religion. The scope and aim of this decree was, to make Pericles suspected with regard to these matters, because Anaxagoras had been his master. This philosopher taught, that one only intelligence had modified the chaos, and disposed the universe in the beautiful order in which we now see it; which tended directly to depreciate the gods of the pagan system. Pericles thinking it would be impossible for him to save his life, sent him out of the city to a place of safety.

The enemies of Pericles seeing that the people approved and received with pleasure all these accusations, impeached that great man himself, and charged him with embezzling the public monies during his administration. A decree was made, by which Pericles was obliged to give in immediately his accounts; was to be tried for oppression and rapine; and the cause to be adjudged by 1500 judges. Pericles had no real cause of fear, because in the administration of the public affairs his conduct had always been irreproachable, especially on the side of interest; he could not however but be under some apprehensions from the ill will of the people, when he considered their great levity and inconstancy. One day when Alcibiades, then very young, went to visit Pericles, he was told that he was not to be spoke with, because of some affairs of great consequence in which he was

* Plut. in Menex. p. 255.

† Τα θεία μη νομιζοντας η λογος περι των μεταρσιων διδασκοντας. Anaxagoras teaching that the divine intelligence alone gave a regular motion to all the parts of nature, and presided in the government of the universe, destroyed by that system the plurality of gods, their powers and all the peculiar functions which were ascribed to them.

then engaged. Alcibiades inquiring what these mighty affairs were, was answered, that Pericles was preparing to give in his accounts. "He ought rather," says Alcibiades, "not give them in;" and indeed this was what Pericles at last resolved. To allay the storm, he made a resolution to oppose the inclinations the people discovered for the Peloponnesian war no longer, preparations for which had been long carrying on, firmly persuaded that this would soon silence all complaints against him; that envy would yield to a more powerful motive; and that the citizens, when in such imminent danger, would not fail of throwing themselves into his arms, and submit implicitly to his conduct, from his great power and exalted reputation.

* This is what some historians have related; and the comic poets, in the life time, and under the eye as it were, of Pericles, spread such a report in public, to sully, if possible, his reputation and merit, which drew upon him the envy and enmity of many. Plutarch, on this occasion, makes a reflection which may be of great service, not only to those in the administration of public affairs, but to all sorts of persons, as well as of advantage in the ordinary commerce of life. He thinks it strange when actions are good in themselves, and manifestly laudable in all respects, that men, purely to discredit illustrious personages, should pretend to dive into their hearts; and from a spirit of the vilest and most abject malice, should ascribe such views and intentions to them, as they possibly never so much as imagined. He, on the contrary, wishes, when the motive is obscure, and the same action may be considered in different lights, that men would always view it in the most favourable, and incline to judge candidly of it. He applies this maxim to the reports which had been spread concerning Pericles, as the fomentor of the Peloponnesian war, merely for private views of interest; whereas the whole tenor of his past conduct ought to have convinced every body, that it was wholly from reasons of state, and for the good of the public, that he at last acquiesced in an opinion, which he had hitherto thought it incumbent on him to oppose.

† Whilst this affair was carrying on at Athens, the Lacedæmonians sent several embassies thither, one after another, to make the various demands above mentioned. At last the affair was debated in the assembly of the people, and it was resolved that they should first deliberate upon all the articles before they gave a positive answer. Opinions, as is usual in these cases, were divided; and some were for abolishing the decree enacted against Megara, which seemed the chief obstacle to the peace.

Pericles spoke on this occasion with the utmost force of eloquence, which his view to the public welfare, and the honour of his country, rendered more vehement and triumphant than it had ever appeared before. He shewed in the first place, that the decree relating to Megara, on which the greatest stress was laid, was not of so little consequence as they imagined; that the demand made by the Lacedæmonians on that head, was merely to sound the disposition of the Athenians, and to try whether it would be possible to frighten them out of their design: that should they recede on this occasion, it would betray fear and weakness: that the affair was of no less importance than the giving up to the Lacedæmonians the empire which the Athenians had possessed during so many years, by their courage and resolution; that should the Athenians submit on this occasion, the Lacedæmonians would immediately prescribe new laws to them,

* Plut. de Herod. malign. p. 355, 356.

† Thueyd. l. i. p. 93—99. Diod. l. xii. p. 95—97.

as to a people seized with dread ; whereas, if they made a vigorous resistance, their opponents would be obliged to treat them, at least, on the foot of equals ; that with regard to the present matters in dispute, arbiters might be chosen, in order to adjust them in an amicable way ; but that it did not become the Lacedæmonians to command the Athenians, in a magisterial way, to quit Potidæa, to free Ægina, and to revoke the decree relating to Megara : that such imperious behaviour was directly contrary to the treaty, which declared in express terms, “ that should any disputes arise among the allies, they should be decided by pacific methods, and *without any party's being obliged to give up any part of what they possessed :*” that the surest way to prevent a government from being eternally contesting about its possessions, is to take up arms, and dispute its rights sword in hand : that the Athenians had just reason to believe they would gain their cause this way ; and to give them a stronger idea of this truth, he set before them in the most pompous light the present state of Athens, giving a very particular account of its treasures, revenues, fleets, land as well as sea forces, and those of its allies, contrasting these several things with the poverty of the Lacedæmonians, who, he said, had no money, which is the sinew of war, not to mention the poor condition of their navy, on which they most depended. * And indeed it appeared by the treasury, that the Athenians had brought from Delos to their city, 9600 talents, which amounted to about 1,200,000 sterling. The annual contributions of the allies amounted to 460 talents, that is, to near 1,400,000 French livres. In cases of necessity, the Athenians would find infinite resources from the ornaments of the temples, since those of the statue of Minerva only, amounted to 50 talents of gold, that is, 1,500,000 French livres, which might be taken from the statue without spoiling it in any manner, and be afterwards fixed on again in more auspicious times. With regard to the land forces, they amounted to near 30,000 men, and the fleet consisted of 300 galleys. Above all he advised them not to venture a battle in their own country, against the Peloponnesians, whose troops were superior in number to theirs, nor to regard the laying waste of their lands, as they might easily be restored to their former condition ; but to consider the loss of their men as highly important, because irretrievable ; to make their whole policy consist in defending their city, and preserving the empire of the sea, which would certainly one day give them the superiority over their enemies. He laid down the plan for carrying on the war, not for a single campaign, but during the whole time it might last ; and enumerated the evils they had to fear if they deviated from that system. Pericles, after adding other considerations, taken from the genius or character, and the internal government of the two republics : the one uncertain and fluctuating in its deliberations, and rendered still slower in the execution, from its being obliged to wait for the consent of its allies ; the other speedy, determinate, independent, and mistress of its resolutions which is no indifferent circumstance with regard to the success of enterprises ; Pericles, I say, concluded his speech, and gave his opinion as follows : “ We have no more to do than to dismiss the ambassadors, and to give them this answer, That we permit those of Megara to trade with Athens, upon condition that the Lacedæmonians do not prohibit either us, or our allies to trade with them. With regard to the cities of Greece, we shall leave those free who were so at the time of our agreement, provided they shall do the same with regard to those dependant on them.

* Diod. l. xii. p. 96, 97.

“ We do not refuse to submit the decision of our differences to arbitration, and will not commit the first hostilities; however, in case of being attacked, we shall make a vigorous defence.”

The ambassadors were answered as Pericles had dictated. They returned home, and never again came to Athens; soon after which the Peloponnesian war broke out.

CHAPTER II.

TRANSACTIONS OF THE GREEKS IN SICILY AND ITALY.

AS the Peloponnesian war is a great event, of considerable duration, before I enter upon the history of it, it may be proper to relate, in a few words, the most considerable transactions which had happened in Græcia Major, to the time we now speak of, whether in Sicily or Italy.

SECTION I.

THE CARTHAGINIANS DEFEATED IN SICILY.—OF GELON AND HIS TWO BROTHERS.

I. GELON.

We have seen that Xerxes,* whose project tended to no less than the total extirpation of the Greeks, had prevailed with the Carthaginians to make war against the people of Sicily. They landed in it an army of above 300,000 men, and sent thither a fleet of 2000 ships, and upwards of 3000 small vessels for the baggage, &c. Hamilcar, the ablest of the Carthaginian generals at that time, was charged with this expedition. However, the success was not answerable to these mighty preparations; the Carthaginians were entirely defeated by Gelon, who at that time had the chief authority in Syracuse.

† This Gelon was born in a city of Sicily, situated on the southern coast between Agrigentum and Camarina, called Gelas, whence perhaps he received his name. He had signalized himself very much in the wars which Hippocrates, tyrant of Gela, carried on against the neighbouring powers, most of whom he subdued and was very near taking Syracuse. After the death of Hippocrates, Gelon, upon pretence of defending the rights and possession of the tyrant's children, took up arms against his own citizens, and having overcome them in a battle, possessed himself of the government in his own name. Some time after, he made himself master also of Syracuse, by the assistance of some exiles, whom he had caused to return into it, and who had engaged the populace to open the gates of that city to him. He then gave Gela to Hiero his brother, and applied himself wholly in extending the limits of the territory of Syracuse, and soon rendered himself very powerful. We may form a judgment of this from the army which he offered the Grecian ambassadors,‡ who came to desire his aid against the king of Persia; and by his demand of being appointed generalissimo of all their forces, which however they refused. The fear he

* A. M. 3520. Ant. J. C. 484. Diod. l. xi. p. 1. et 16—22.

† Her. l. vii. c. 153—167.

‡ He promised to furnish 200 ships and 80,000 men.

was in at that time of being soon invaded by the Carthaginians, was the chief occasion of his not succouring the Greeks. He was extremely political in his conduct; and when news was brought him of Xerxes having crossed the Hellespont, he sent a trusty person with rich presents, with orders for him to wait the issue of the first battle, and in case Xerxes should be victorious, to pay homage to him in his name, otherwise to bring back the money. I now return to the Carthaginians.

They were landed in Sicily, at the earnest solicitation of Terillus, formerly tyrant of Himera, but dethroned by Theron another tyrant, who reigned at Agrigentum. The family of the latter was one of the most illustrious of all Greece, being descended in a direct line from Cadmus. He married into the family, which at that time ruled at Syracuse, and which consisted of four brothers, Gelon, Hiero, Polyzelus, and Thrasylbulus. He married his daughter to the first, and himself married the daughter of the third.

Hamilcar having landed at Panormus, began by laying siege to Himera. Gelon hastened with a great army to the succour of his father-in-law; when uniting, they defeated the Carthaginians. This was perhaps the most complete victory ever gained.

The battle was fought the same day with that of Thermopylæ,* the circumstances of which I have related in the history of the Carthaginians.† One remarkable circumstance in the conditions of the peace which Gelon prescribed the conquered, was, that they should cease to sacrifice their children to the God Saturn; which shows at the same time, the cruelty of the Carthaginians, and the piety of Gelon.

The spoils won on this occasion were of immense value. Gelon allotted the greatest part of them for the ornament of the temples in Syracuse. They also took an incredible number of prisoners. These he shared with the utmost equity with his allies, who employed them, after putting irons on their feet, in cultivating their lands, and in building magnificent edifices, as well for the ornament as the utility of the cities. Several of the citizens of Agrigentum had each 500 for his own share.

Gelon‡, after so glorious a victory, so far from growing more proud and haughty, behaved with greater affability and humanity than ever towards the citizens and his allies. Being returned from the campaign, he convened the assembly of the Syracusans, who were ordered to come armed into it. However he himself came unarmed thither: declared to the assembly every step of his conduct; the uses to which he had applied the several sums with which he had been entrusted, and in what manner he had employed his authority; adding, that if they had any complaints to make against him, his person and life were at their disposal. All the people struck with so unexpected a speech, and still more with the unusual confidence he reposed in them, answered by acclamations of joy, praise and gratitude; and immediately, with one consent, invested him with the supreme authority, and the title of king. ¶ And to preserve to

* Herodotus says that this battle was fought on the same day with that of Salamin, which does not appear so probable: for the Greeks, informed of Gelon's successes, entreated him to succour them against Xerxes, which they would not have done after the battle of Salamin, that exalted their courage so much, that after this battle they imagined themselves strong enough to resist their enemies, and put an end to the war to their own advantage, without the assistance of any other power.

† Vol. I. Plut. in Apophth. p. 175.

‡ A M. 3525. Ant. J. C. 479.

¶ Plut. in Timol. p. 247. Ælian. l. xiii. c. 37.

latest posterity the remembrance of Gelon's memorable action, who had come into the assembly, and put his life into the hands of the Syracusans, they erected a statue in honour of him, wherein he was represented in the ordinary habit of a citizen, unguarded and unarmed. This statue met afterwards with a very singular fate, and worthy of the motives which occasioned its setting up. Timoleon, above 130 years after; having restored the Syracusans to their liberty, thought it advisable in order to erase from it all traces of tyrannical government, and at the same time to assist the wants of the people, to sell publicly all the statues of those princes and tyrants who had governed it till that time. But, first, he brought them to a trial, as so many criminals; hearing the depositions and witnesses upon each of them. They all were condemned unanimously, the statue of Gelon only excepted, which found an eloquent advocate and defender in the warm and sincere gratitude which the citizens retained for that great man, whose virtue they revered as if he had been still alive.

The Syracusans had no cause to repent their having entrusted Gelon with unlimited power and authority. This did not add to his known zeal for their interest, but only enabled him to do them more important services; * for by a change till then unheard of, and of which Tacitus† found no example, except in Vespasian, he was the first man whom the sovereignty made the better man. He made upwards of 10,000 foreigners, who had served under him, denizens. His views were to people the capital, to increase the power of the state, to reward the services of his brave and faithful soldiers, and to attach them more strongly to Syracuse, from the sense of the advantageous settlement they had obtained in being incorporated with the citizens.

‡ He was particularly famous for his inviolable sincerity, truth and fidelity to his engagements; a quality very essential to a prince, the only one capable of gaining him the love and confidence of his subjects and of foreigners, and which therefore ought to be considered as the basis of all just policy and good government. Having occasion for money to carry on an expedition he meditated, (this, very probably, was before he had triumphed over the Carthaginians) he addressed the people, in order to obtain a contribution from them; but finding the Syracusans unwilling to be at that expence, he told them, that he asked nothing but a loan, and that he would engage to repay it as soon as the war should be over. The money was advanced, and repaid punctually at the promised time. How happy is that government where such justice and equity are exercised; and how mistaken are those ministers and princes who violate them in the least!

§ One of the chief objects of his attention, and in which his successor imitated him, was to make the cultivation of the lands be considered as an honourable employment. It is well known how fruitful Sicily was in corn; and the immense revenues which might be produced from so rich a soil when industriously cultivated. He animated the husbandman by his presence, and delighted sometimes in appearing at their head, in the same manner as on other occasions he had marched at the head of armies. His intention, says Plutarch, was not merely to make the country rich and fruitful, but also to exercise his subjects, to accustom and inure them to toils,

* Diod. l. xi. p. 55.

† Solus omnium ante se principum in melius mutatus est. Hist. l. i. c. 50.

‡ Plut. in Apophth. p. 175.

§ Plut. in Apophth. p. 175.

and by these means to preserve them from a thousand disorders, which inevitably follow a soft and indolent life. There are few maxims, in point of policy, on which the ancients have insisted more strongly, than on that relating to the cultivation of their lands; a manifest proof of their great wisdom, and the profound knowledge they had of what constitutes the strength and solid happiness of a state. * Xenophon, in a dialogue, the subject of which is government, entitled *Hiero*, shows the great advantage it would be to a state, were the king studious to reward those who should excel in husbandry, and whatever relates to the cultivation of lands. He says the same of war, of trade, and of all the arts; on which occasion, if honours were paid to all those who should distinguish themselves in them, it would give universal life and motion; would excite a noble and laudable emulation among the citizens, and give rise to a thousand inventions for the improvement of those arts.

It does not appear that Gelon had been educated in the same manner as the children of the rich among the Greeks, who were taught music and the art of playing on instruments very carefully. Possibly this was because of his mean birth, or rather was owing to the little value he set on those kind of exercises. † One day at an entertainment, when, according to the usual custom, a lyre was presented to each of the guests: when it was Gelon's turn, instead of touching the instrument as they had done, he caused his horse to be brought, mounted him with wonderful agility and grace, and showed that he had learned a nobler exercise than playing on the lyre.

‡ From the defeat of the Carthaginians in Sicily, the several cities of it enjoyed a profound peace, and Syracuse was particularly happy in its tranquillity, under the auspicious government of Gelon. He was not born in Syracuse, and yet all the inhabitants of that city, though so extremely jealous of their liberty, had forced him in a manner to be their king. Though an alien, the supreme power went in search of him, not courted with any art or inducement but those of merit. Gelon was thoroughly acquainted with all the duties of the regal office, as well as its great weight; and he accepted it with no other view but the good of his people. He thought himself only king for the defence of the state, to preserve the good order of society, to protect innocence and justice, and to exhibit to all his subjects, in his simple, modest, active, and regular life, a pattern of every civil virtue. The whole of royalty that he assumed was the toils and cares of it, a zeal for the public welfare, and the sweet satisfaction which results from making millions happy by his cares: in a word, he considered the sovereignty as an obligation, and a mean to procure the felicity of a greater number of men. He banished from it pomp, ostentation, licentiousness, and impunity for crimes. He did not affect the appearance of reigning, but contented himself with making the laws reign. He never made his inferiors feel that he was their master, but only inculcated to them that both himself and they ought to submit to reason and justice. To induce their obedience, he employed no other methods but persuasion and a good example, which are the weapons of virtue, and alone produce a sincere and uninterrupted obedience.

A revered old age, a name highly dear to all his subjects, a reputation equally diffused within and without his kingdoms; these were the fruits of that wisdom which he retained on the throne to the last gasp. His reign was short, and only just showed him in a manner to Sicily, to exhibit in

* Plut. in *Apophth.* p. 916, 917.† *Ibid.*‡ *Diod. l. xi. p. 29, 30.*

his person an example of a great, good, and true king. He left the world, after having reigned only seven years, to the infinite regret of all his subjects. Every family imagined itself deprived of its best friend, its protector, and father. The people erected, in the place where his wife Demarata had been buried, a splendid mausoleum, surrounded with nine towers of a surprising height and magnificence; and decreed those honours to him which were then paid to the demi-gods or heroes. The Carthaginians afterwards demolished the mausoleum, and Agathocles the towers; but, says the historian, neither violence, envy, nor time, which destroys all grosser things, could destroy the glory of his name, or abolish the memory of his exalted virtues and noble actions, which love and gratitude had engraved in the hearts of the Sicilians.

II. **HIERO.** After Gelon's death, the sceptre continued near 12 years in his family; * he was succeeded by Hiero, his eldest brother.

It will be necessary for us, in order to reconcile the authors who have writ on this prince, some of whom declare him to have been a good king, and others a detestable tyrant; it will be necessary, I say, to distinguish the periods. It is very probable, that Hiero, dazzled in the beginning of his reign, by the glitter of sovereign power, and corrupted by the flattery of his courtiers, studiously endeavoured to deviate from that path which his predecessor had pointed out to him, and in which he had found himself so happy. † This young prince was avaricious, headstrong, unjust, and studious of nothing but the gratification of his passions, without ever endeavouring to acquire the esteem and affection of the people; who, on the other side, had the utmost aversion for a prince, whom they looked upon as a tyrant over them, rather than as a king; and nothing but the veneration they had for Gelon's memory, prevented from breaking out.

‡ Some time after he had ascended the throne he had violent suspicions of Polyzelus his brother, whose great credit among the citizens made him fear that he had a design to depose him. However, in order to rid himself without noise of an enemy whom he fancied very dangerous, he resolved to put him at the head of some forces he was going to send to the succour of the Sibaritæ against the Crotonienses, hoping that he would perish in the expedition. His brother's refusal to accept this command made him the more violent against him. Theron, who had married Polyzelus' daughter, joined with his father-in-law. This gave rise to great differences of long duration between the kings of Syracuse and Agrigentum; however, they at last were reconciled by the wise mediation of Simonides § the poet; and to make their reconciliation lasting, they cemented it by a new alliance, Hiero marrying Theron's sister; after which the two kings always lived on good intelligence with each other.

¶ At first, an infirm state of health, which was increased by repeated illnesses, gave Hiero an opportunity of thinking seriously; after which he resolved to send for men of learning, who might converse agreeably with him, and furnish him with useful instructions. The most famous poets of the age came to his court, as Simonides, Pindar, Bacchylides, and Epicharmus; and it is affirmed that their delightful conversation did not a little contribute to soften the cruel and savage disposition of Hiero.

¶ Plutarch relates a noble saying of his, which shows an excellent disposition in a prince. He declared that his palace and his ears should be always

* A. M. 5552. Ant. J. C. 472.

† Diod. l. xxi. p. 51.

‡ Ibid. l. xi. p. 36.

§ Schol. in Pind.

¶ Ælian. l. iv. c. 15.

¶ Plut. in Apophth. p. 175.

open to every man who would tell him the truth, and that without disguise or reserve.

The poets above mentioned excelled, not only in poetry, but were also possessed of a great fund of learning, and considered and consulted as the sages of their times. This is what Cicero * says particularly of Simonides. He had a great ascendant over the king; and the only use he made of it was to incline him to virtue.

† They often used to converse on philosophical subjects. I observed on another occasion, that Hiero, in one of these conversations, asked Simonides his opinion with regard to the nature and attributes of the Deity. The latter desired one day's time to consider of it; the next day he asked two, and went on increasing in the same proportion. The prince pressing him to give his reasons for these delays, he confessed, that the subject was above his comprehension, and that the more he reflected, the more obscure it appeared to him.

Xenophon has left us an excellent treatise on the art of governing well, entitled Hiero, and wrote by way of dialogue between this prince and Simonides. Hiero undertakes to prove to the poet, that tyrants and kings are not so happy as is generally imagined. Among the great number of proofs alledged by him, he insists chiefly on their vast unhappiness in being deprived of the greatest comfort and blessing in this life, viz. the enjoyment of a true friend, to whose bosom they may safely confide their secrets and afflictions; who may share with them in their joy and sorrow; in a word, a second self, who may form but one heart, one soul with them. Simonides, on the other side, lays down admirable maxims with respect to the well governing of a kingdom. He represents to him that a king is not so for himself, but for others: that his grandeur consists, not in building magnificent palaces for his own residence, but in erecting temples, and fortifying and embellishing cities: that it is his glory, not that his people should fear, but be afraid for him: that a truly royal care is, not to enter the lists with the first comer at the Olympic games (for the princes of that age were passionately fond of them, and especially Hiero, †) but to contend with the neighbouring kings, who should succeed best in diffusing wealth and abundance throughout his dominions, and endeavouring to form the felicity of his people.

Nevertheless, another poet, Pindar, praises Hiero for the victory he had won in the horse-race. "This prince," says he, in his ode, "who governs with equity the inhabitants of opulent Sicily, has gathered the fairest flower in the garden of virtue. He takes a noble delight in the most exquisite performances of poetry and music. He loves melodious airs, such as it is customary for us to play at the banquets given us by our dearest friends. Rouse then thyself, take thy lyre, and raise it to the Doric pitch. If thou feelest thyself animated by a glorious fire in favour of Pisa and Phœrenice; if they have waked the sweetest transports in thy breast, when that generous courser, without being quickened by the spur, flew

* Simonides, non poeta solum suavis, verum etiam ceteroqui doctus sapiensque traditur. Lib. i. de Nat. Deor. n. 60.

† Cic. l. i. de Nat. Deor. n. 60.

‡ It is said that Themistocles, seeing him arrive at the Olympic games with a splendid equipage, would have had him forbid them, because he had not succoured the Greeks against the common enemy, any more than Gelon his brother; which motion did honour to the Athenian general. Ælian. l. ix. c. 5.

§ Pisa was the city near to which the Olympic games were solemnized; and Phœrenice the name of Hiero's courser signifying the victor.

“along the banks of the Alpheus, and carried his royal rider to glorious victory: O sing the king of Syracuse, the ornament of the Olympic course!”

The whole ode, translated by the late Mr. Massieu, is in the sixth volume of the memoirs of the Academy of Inscriptions of Belles Lettres, from which I have made the small extract above. I was very glad to give the reader some idea of Pindar, by this little specimen.

The next ode to this was composed in honour of Theron, king of Agrigentum, victorious in the chariot-race. The diction of it is so sublime, the thought so noble, and the moral so pure, that many look upon it as Pindar's masterpiece.

I cannot say how far we may depend on the rest of the praises which Pindar gives Hiero, for poets are not always very sincere in the eulogiums they bestow on princes: however, it is certain that Hiero had made his court the resort to all persons of wit and sense; and that he had invited them to it by his affability and engaging behaviour, and much more by his liberality, which is a great merit in a king.

We cannot bestow on Hiero's court, the eulogium which Horace * gives the house of Mæcenas, in which a character prevailed rarely found among scholars, and nevertheless worth all their erudition. This amiable house says Horace, was an utter stranger to the mean and grovelling sentiments of envy and jealousy; and men saw, in those who shared in the master's favour, a superior merit or credit, without taking the least umbrage at it. † But it was far otherwise in the court of Hiero, or of Theron. It is said that Simonides, and Bacchylides his nephew, employed all kinds of criticism to lessen the esteem which those princes had for Pindar's works. The latter by way of reprisal, ridicules them very strongly in his ode to Theron, in comparing “them to ravens, who croak in vain against the divine “bird of Jove.” But modesty was not the virtue which distinguished Pindar.

‡ Hiero, having drove the ancient inhabitants of Catania and Naxos from their country, settled a colony of 10,000 men there, half of whom were Syracusans, and the rest Peloponnesians. This prompted the inhabitants of these two cities to appoint, after his death, the same solemnities in his honour, as were bestowed on heroes or demi-gods, because they considered them as their founder.

§ He showed great favour to the children of Anaxilaus, formerly tyrant of Zancle, and a great friend to Gelon his brother; as they were arrived at years of maturity, he exhorted them to take the government into their own hands; after Miccythus, their tutor, should have informed them of the perfect state of it, and how he himself had behaved in the administration. The latter, having assembled the nearest relations and most intimate friends of the young princes, gave in their presence so good an account of his guardianship, that the whole assembly, in perfect admiration, bestowed the highest encomiums on his prudence, integrity and justice. Matters were carried so far, that the young princes were extremely urgent with him to preside in the administration, as he had hitherto done. However, the wise tutor preferring the sweets of ease to the splendour of au-

* ——— Non isto vivimus illic,
Quo tu rere, modo: domus hac nec purior ulla est,
Nec magis his aliena malis: nil mi officit unquam,
Ditior hic, aut est quia doctior: est locus uni-
Cuique suus. Hor. lib. i. sat.

† Scholiast. Pind.

‡ Diod. l. xi. p. 37.

§ Ibid. p. 50.

thority, and persuaded at the same time, that it would be for the interest of the state, if the young princes took the government into their own hands, resolved to retire from business. Hiero died, after having reigned eleven years.

III. THRASYBULUS. * He was succeeded by Thrasybulus his brother, who, by his evil conduct, contributed very much to the making him be regretted. Swelled with pride, and a brutal haughtiness, he considered men as mere worms; vainly fancying that they were created for him to trample upon, and that he was of a quite different nature from them. He abandoned himself implicitly to the flattering counsels of the giddy young courtiers who surrounded him. He treated all his subjects with the utmost severity: banishing some, confiscating the possessions of others, and putting great numbers to death. So severe a slavery grew soon insupportable to the Syracusans, and therefore they implored the succour of the neighbouring cities, whose interest it was also to throw off the tyrant's yoke. Thrasybulus was besieged even in Syracuse, the sovereignty of part of which he had reserved to himself, viz. Acradina, and the island, which was very well fortified; but the third quarter of the city, called Tyche, was possessed by the enemy. After making a feeble resistance, and demanding to capitulate, he left the city, and withdrew into banishment among the Locrians. He had reigned but a year. In this manner the Syracusans recovered their liberty. They also delivered the rest of the cities of Sicily from tyrants; established a popular government in all places, and maintained that form themselves during 60 years, till the reign of Dionysius the tyrant, who again enslaved them.

† After Sicily had been delivered from the government of tyrants, and all the cities of it were restored to their liberty; as the country was extremely fruitful itself and the peace which all places enjoyed gave the inhabitants of this island an opportunity of cultivating their lands, and feeding their flocks; the people grew very powerful, and amassed great riches. To perpetuate to latest posterity the remembrance of the happy day in which they had thrown off the yoke of slavery, by the banishment of Thrasybulus, it was decreed in the general assembly of the nation, that a colossal statue should be set up to Jupiter the Deliverer; that on the anniversary of this day, a festival should be solemnised, by way of thanksgiving, for the restoration of their liberty; and that there should be sacrificed in honour of the gods 450 bulls, with which the people should be entertained as a common feast.

There, nevertheless, lay concealed in the minds of many, I know not what secret leaven of tyranny, which frequently disturbed the harmony of this peace, and occasioned several tumults and commotions in Sicily, the particulars of which I shall omit. † To prevent the evil consequences of them, the Syracusans established the petalism, which differed very little from the Athenian ostracism, and was so called from the Greek *πεταλον*, signifying a leaf, because the votes were then given on an olive leaf. This judgment was pronounced against such citizens whose great power made the people apprehensive that they aspired at the tyranny and it banished them for ten years; however it did not long continue in force, and was soon abolished; because the dread of falling under its censure, having prompted the most virtuous men to retire, and renounce the government, the

* Diod. l. xi. p. 51, 52.

† A. M. 3544. Ant. J. C. 420. Diod. l. xi. p. 55, &c.

‡ Diod. l. xi. p. 65.

chief employments were now filled by such citizens only as had the least merit.

DEUCETIUS,* according to Diodorus, was chief over the people who were properly called Sicilians. Having united them all, the inhabitants of Hybla excepted, into one body, he became very powerful, and formed several great enterprises. It was he who built the city Palica, near the temple of the gods called Palici. This city was very famous on account of some wonders which are related of it; and still more from the sacred nature of the oaths which were then taken, the violation whereof was said to be always followed by a sudden and exemplary punishment. This was a secure asylum for all persons who were oppressed by superior power; and especially for slaves who were unjustly abused, or too cruelly treated by their masters. They continued in safety in this temple, till certain arbiters and mediators had made their peace; and there was not a single instance of a master's having ever forfeited the promise he had made to pardon his slave; so famous were the gods who presided over this temple, for the severe vengeance they took on those who violated their oaths.

This Deucetius, after having been successful on a great many occasions, and gained several victories, particularly over the Syracusans, saw his fortune change on a sudden by the loss of a battle, and was abandoned by the greatest part of his forces. In the consternation and despondency into which so general and sudden a desertion threw him, he formed such a resolution as despair only could suggest. He withdrew in the night to Syracuse, advanced as far as the great square of the city, and there falling prostrate at the foot of the altar, he abandoned his life and dominions to the mercy of the Syracusans, that is, to his professed enemies. The singularity of this spectacle drew great numbers of people to it. The magistrates immediately convened the people, and debated on the affair. They first heard the orators, whose business was generally to address the people by their speeches; and these animated them prodigiously against Deucetius, as a public enemy whom Providence seemed to throw into their way, to revenge and punish by his death all the injuries he had done the republic. A speech, in this cast, struck all the virtuous part of the assembly with horror. The most ancient and wisest of the senators represented, "That they were not to consider what punishment Deucetius deserved, but how it behoved the Syracusans to behave on that occasion; that they ought not to look upon him any longer as an enemy, but as a suppliant, a character by which his person was become sacred and inviolable: That there was a goddess, Nemesis, who took vengeance of crimes, especially of cruelty and impiety, and who doubtless would not suffer that to go unpunished: That besides the baseness and inhumanity there is in insulting the unfortunate, and in crushing those who are already under one's foot, it was worthy the grandeur and goodness natural to the Syracusans, to exert their clemency even to those who least deserved it." All the people came into this opinion, and with one consent, spared Deucetius' life. He was ordered to reside in Corinth, the metropolis and fountress of Syracuse; and the Syracusans engaged to furnish Deucetius with all things necessary for his subsisting honourably there. What reader, who compares these two different opinions, does not perceive which of them was the noblest and most generous?

* Diod. l. xi. p. 67—79.

SECTION II.

FAMOUS PERSONS AND CITIES IN GRÆCIA MAJOR, &c.

I. PYTHAGORAS.

IN treating of what relates to Græcia Major in Italy, I must not omit Pythagoras, who was the glory of it. He was born in Samos.* After having travelled into a great many regions, and enriched his mind with the most excellent learning of every kind, he returned to his native country, but did not make a long stay in it, because of the tyrannical government Polycrates had established in it, who however had the highest regard for him, and showed him all the esteem due to his rare merit. But the study of the sciences, and particularly of philosophy, is scarce compatible with slavery, though of the mildest and most honourable kind. He therefore went into Italy, and resided usually either at Croton, Metapontum, Heraclea, or Tarentum. Servius Tullius,† or Tarquinius Superbus, reigned in Rome at that time; which absolutely refutes the opinion of those who imagined that Numa Pompilius, the second king of the Romans, who lived upwards of 100 years before, had been Pythagoras' disciple; an opinion that very probably was grounded on the resemblance of their manners, disposition and principles.

‡ The whole country soon felt very happy effects from the presence of this excellent philosopher. An inclination for study, and a love of wisdom, diffused themselves almost universally in a very short time. Multitudes flocked from all the neighbouring cities to get a sight of Pythagoras, to hear him, and to improve by his salutary counsels. The several princes of the country took a pleasure in inviting him to their courts, which they thought honoured by his presence; and all were delighted with his conversation, and glad to learn from him the art of governing nations with wisdom. His school became the most famous that had ever been till that age. He had no less than 400 or 500 disciples. Before he admitted them in that quality, they were probationers five years, during which time he obliged them to keep the strictest silence, thinking it proper for them to be instructed before they should attempt to speak. I shall take notice of his tenets and sentiments, when I come to speak of the various sects of philosophers; it was well known that the transmigration of souls was one of the chief of them. His disciples had the greatest reverence for every word he uttered; and if he did but barely aver a thing, he was immediately believed without its being once examined; and to affirm the truth of any thing, they used to express themselves in this manner, § "The master said it." However, the disciples carried their deference and docility too far, in thus waving all enquiry, and in sacrificing implicitly their reason and understanding; a sacrifice that ought to be made only to the divine authority, which is infinitely superior to our reason and all our knowledge; and which, consequently, is authorised to prescribe laws to us, and dictate absolute obedience.

The school of Pythagoras, bred a great number of illustrious disciples, who did infinite honour to their master, as wise legislators, great

* A. M. 5480. Ant. J. C. 524. Diog. Laert. in vit. Pythag.

† Liv. l. i. n. 18.

‡ Pythagoras, cum in Italiam venisset, exornavit eam Græciam, quæ magna dicta est. et privatim et publice, præstantissimis et institutis, et artibus. Cic. Tuscul. Quæst. l. v. n. 10.

§ Αυτος εφη.

politicians, persons skilled in all the sciences, and capable of governing states, and being the ministers of the greatest princes.* A long time after his death, that part of Italy which he had cultivated and improved by his instructions, was still considered as the nursery and seat of men skilled in all kinds of literature, and maintained that glorious character for several ages. † The Romans certainly entertained a high opinion of Pythagoras' virtue and merit, since the oracle of Delphos having commanded that people, during the war of the Samnites, to erect two statues in the most conspicuous part of Rome, the one to the wisest, and the other to the most valiant among the Greeks; they accordingly set up two in the "Comitium," representing Pythagoras and Themistocles. Historians are not exact with respect to the time and place of Pythagoras' death.

II. CROTON. SYBARIS. THURIUM. † Croton was founded by Myscellus, chief of the Achaians, the third year of the 17th Olympiad. This Myscellus being come to Delphos to consult the oracle of Apollo, about the spot on which he should build his city, met Archias the Corinthian there, who was arrived upon the same account. The god gave him a favourable audience; and after having determined them with regard to the place that would best suit their new settlements, he proposed different advantages to them; and left them, among other particulars, the choice of riches or health. The offer of riches struck Archias, but Myscellus desired health; and, if history is to be credited, Apollo performed his promise faithfully to both. Archias founded Syracuse, which soon became the most opulent city of Greece. ‖ Myscellus laid the foundation of Croton, which became so famous for the long life and innate strength of its inhabitants, that its name was used proverbially, to signify a very healthy spot, whose air was extremely pure. The people of it signalized themselves in a great number of victories in the Grecian games; and Strabo relates, that in the same Olympiad seven Crotonians were crowned in the Olympic games, and carried off all the prizes of the stadium.

§ Sybaris was 10 leagues (200 stadia) from Croton, and had also been founded by the Achaians, but before the other. This city became afterwards very powerful. Four neighbouring states, and 25 cities were subject to it; so that it was alone able to raise an army of 300,000 men. The opulence of Sybaris was soon followed by luxury, and such a dissoluteness as is scarcely credible. The citizens employed themselves in nothing but banquets, games, shows, parties of pleasure, and carouels. Public rewards and marks of distinction were bestowed on those who gave the most magnificent entertainments; and even to such cooks as were best skilled in the important art of making new discoveries in the dressing dishes, and inventing new refinements to tickle the palate. The Sybarites carried their delicacy and effeminacy to such a height, that they carefully removed from their city all such artificers whose work was noisy; and would not suffer any cocks in it, lest their shrill piercing crow should disturb their balmy slumbers.

* Pythagoras tenuit magnam illam Græciam cum honore, et disciplina, tum etiam auctoritate, multaque secula postea sic viguit Pythagoreorum nomen, ut nulli alii docti viderentur. Tusc. Quæst. l. i. n. 38.

† Plin. l. xxxiv. c. 6.

‡ A. M. 3295. Ant. J. C. 709. Strab. l. vi. p. 262, et 269. Dionys. Halicarn. Antiq. Rom. l. ii. p. 121.

‖ Κροτωνος υγιιστος.

§ Strab. l. vi. p. 263. Athen. l. xii. p. 513—520.

* All these evils were heightened by dissension and discord, which at last proved their ruin. Five hundred of the wealthiest in the city, having been expelled by the faction of one Telys, fled to Croton. Telys demanded that he surrender to him; and on the refusal of the Crotonians to deliver them up, prompted to this generous resolution by Pythagoras, who then lived among them, war was declared. The Sybarites marched 300,000 men into the field, and the Crotonians only 100,000; but then they were headed by Milo, the famous champion, of whom we shall soon have occasion to speak, over whose shoulders a lion's skin was thrown, and himself armed with a club, like another Hercules. The latter gained a complete victory, and made a dreadful havoc of those who fled, so that very few escaped, and their city was depopulated. About threescore years after, some Thessalians came and settled in it; however, they did not long enjoy peace, being driven out by the Crotonians. Being thus reduced to the most fatal extremity, they implored the succour of the Lacedæmonians and Athenians. The latter, moved to compassion at their deplorable condition, after causing proclamation to be made in Peloponnesus, that all who were willing to assist that colony were at liberty to do it, sent the Sybarites a fleet of ten ships, under the command of Lampon and Xenocrates.

† They built a city near the ancient Sybaris, and called it Thurium. Two men, greatly renowned for their learning, the one an orator, and the other an historian, settled in this colony. The first was Lysias, at that time but 15 years of age. He lived in Thurium, till the ill fate which befel the Athenians in Sicily, and then went to Athens. The second was Herodotus. Though he was born in Halicarnassus, a city of Caria, he was however considered as a native of Thurium, because he settled there with that colony. I shall speak more largely of him hereafter.

Divisions soon broke out in the city, on occasion of the new inhabitants, whom the rest would exclude from all public employments and privileges. But as these were much more numerous, they repulsed all the ancient Sybarites, and got the sole possession of the city. Being supported by the alliance they made with the people of Croton, they soon grew vastly powerful; and having settled a popular form of government in their city, they divided the citizens into ten tribes, which they called by the names of the different nations whence they sprung.

III. CHARONDAS, the legislator. They now bent their whole thoughts to the strengthening of their government by wholesome laws, for which purpose they made choice of Charondas, who had been educated in Pythagoras' school, to digest and draw them up. I shall quote some of them in this place.

1. He excluded from the zenate, and all public employments, all such as should marry a second wife, in case any children by their first wife were living; being persuaded, that any man who was so regardless of his children's interest, would be equally so of his country's, and be as worthless a magistrate as he had been a father.

2. He sentenced all false accusers to be carried through every part of the city, crowned with heath or broom, as the vilest of men; an ignominy which most of them were not able to survive. The city thus delivered from those pests of society, was restored to its former tranquility. And

* A. M. 3474. Ant. J. C. 530. Dioid. l. xii. p. 76—85.

† A. M. 3560. Ant. J. C. 441. Dionys. Halicarn. in vit. Lys. p. 82. Strab. l. xiv. p. 656.

indeed, * from calumniators generally arise all feuds and contests, whether of a public or private nature ; and yet, according to Tacitus' observation, they are too much tolerated in most governments.

3. He enacted a new kind of law against another species of pests, which in a state generally first occasions depravity of manners ; by suffering all those to be prosecuted who should form a correspondence, or contract a friendship with wicked men, and by laying a heavy fine upon them.

4. He required all the children of the citizens to be educated in the *Belles Lettres* ; the effect of which is to polish and civilize the minds of men, inspiring them with gentleness of manners, and inclining them to virtue ; all which constitute the felicity of a state, and are equally necessary to citizens of all conditions. In this view he appointed salaries (paid by the state) for masters and preceptors ; in order that learning, by being communicated gratis, might be acquired by all. He considered ignorance as the greatest of evils, and the source whence all vices flowed.

5. He made a law with respect to orphans, which appears sufficiently judicious, by intrusting the care of their education to their relations by the mother's side, as their lives would not be in danger from them ; and the management of their estates to their paternal relations, it being the interest of these to make the greatest advantage of them, since they would inherit them in case of the demise of their wards.

6. Instead of putting deserters to death, and those who quitted their ranks and fled in battle, he only sentenced them to make their appearance during three days, in the city, drest in the habit of women, imagining, that the dread of so ignominious a punishment would produce the same effect as putting to death ; and being at the same time desirous of giving such cowardly citizens an opportunity of atoning for their fault.

7. To prevent his laws from being too rashly or easily abrogated, he imposed a very severe and hazardous condition on all persons who should propose to alter or amend them in any manner. These were sentenced to appear in the public assembly with a halter about their necks ; and in case the alteration proposed did not pass, they were to be immediately strangled. There were but three amendments ever proposed, and all of them admitted.

Charondas did not long survive his own laws. Returning one day from pursuing some thieves, and finding a tumult in the city, he came armed into the assembly, though he himself had prohibited this by an express law. A certain person objected to him in severe terms, that he violated his own laws ; " I do not violate them," says he, " but thus seal them with my blood ;" saying which, he plunged his sword into his bosom, and expired.

IV. ZALEUCUS, another lawgiver. At † the same time, there arose among the Locrians another famous legislator, Zaleucus by name, who, as well as Charondas, had been Pythagoras' disciple. There is now scarce any thing extant of his, except a kind of preamble to his laws, which gives a most advantageous idea of them. He requires above all things, of the citizens, to believe, and be firmly persuaded that there are gods ; and adds, that the bare casting up our eyes to the heavens, and contemplating their order and beauty, are sufficient to convince us that it is impossible so wonderful a fabric could have been formed by mere chance or human power. As the natural consequence of this belief, he exhorts men to honour and revere the gods, as the authors of whatever is good and just among mor-

* *Delatores, genus hominum publico exitio repertum, et poenis quidem nunquam satis coercitum.* Tacit. *Annal.* l. iv. c. 50.

† *Diod.* l. xii. p. 79—85.

tals; and to honour them, not merely by sacrifices and splendid gifts, but by a sage conduct, and by purity and innocence of manners; these being infinitely more grateful to the immortals than all the sacrifices that can be offered.

After this religious exordium, in which he describes the Supreme Being as the source whence all laws flow, as the chief authority which commands obedience to them, as the most powerful motive for our faithful observance of them, and as the perfect model to which mankind ought to conform; he descends to the particulars of those duties which men owe to one another, and lays down a precept which is very well adapted to preserve peace and unity in society, by enjoining the individuals of it not to make their hatred and dissensions perpetual, which would argue an unsociable and savage disposition, but to treat their enemies as men who would soon be their friends. This is carrying morality to as great a perfection as could be expected from heathens.

With regard to the duty of judges and magistrates, after representing to them, that in pronouncing sentence, they ought never to suffer themselves to be biassed by friendship, hatred, or any other passion, he only exhorts them not to behave with the least haughtiness or severity towards the parties engaged in law, since such are but too unhappy, in being obliged to undergo all the toils and fatigues inseparable from lawsuits. The office, indeed, of judges, how laborious soever it may be, is far from giving them a right to use the contending parties with ill nature; the very form and essence of their employment requiring them to behave with impartiality, and to do justice on all occasions; and when they distribute this even with mildness and humanity, it is only a debt they pay, and not a favour they grant.

To banish luxury from his republic, which he looked upon as the certain destruction of a government, he did not follow the practice established in some nations, where it is thought sufficient, for the restraining it, to punish, by pecuniary mulcts, such as infringe the laws made on that occasion: but he acted, says the historian, in a more artful and ingenious, and at the same time more effectual manner. He prohibited women from wearing rich and costly stuffs, embroidered robes, precious stones, earrings, necklaces, bracelets, gold rings, and such like ornaments; excepting none from this law but common prostitutes. He enacted the like law with regard to the men, excepting, in the same manner, from the observance of it, such only as were willing to pass for debauchees and infamous wretches. By these regulations he easily, and without violence, preserved the citizens from the least approaches to luxury and effeminacy; * for no person was so abandoned to all sense of honour, as to be willing to wear the badges of his shame, under the eye, as it were, of all the citizens, since this would make him the public laughing-stock, and reflect eternal infamy on his own family.

V. MILO the champion. We have seen him at the head of an army obtain a great victory. However, he was still more renowned for his athletic strength than for his military bravery. He was surnamed Crotonensis, from Croton, the place of his birth. It was his daughter whom, as before related, Democedes the famous physician, and Milo's countryman, married, after he had fled from Darius' court to Greece, his native country.

* More inter veteres recepto, qui satis pœnarum adversus impudicas in ipsa professione flagitii credebant. Tacit. Annal. l. ii. c. 85.

* Pausanias relates, that Milo when but a child, was seven times victorious in one day at the Pythian games; that he won six victories at wrestling in the Olympic games, one of which was also gained in his childhood; and that challenging a seventh time in Olympia any person to wrestle with him, he could not engage for want of an opponent. He would hold a pomegranate in such a manner, that without breaking it, he would grasp it so fast in his hand, that no force could possibly wrest it from him. He would stand so firm on a discus,† which had been oiled to make it the more slippery, that it was impossible to move him on these occasions. He would bind his head with a cord, after which holding his breath strongly, the veins of his head would swell so prodigiously as to break the rope. When Milo, fixing his elbow on his side, stretched forth his right hand quite open, with his fingers held close one to the other, his thumb excepted, which he raised, the utmost strength of man could not separate his little finger from the other three.

All this was only a vain and puerile ostentation of his strength. Chance, however, gave him an opportunity of making a much more laudable use of it.‡ One day as he was attending the lectures of Pythagoras, (for he was one of his most constant disciples) the pillar which supported the ceiling of the school in which the pupils were assembled being shaken by some accident, Milo supported it by his single strength, gave the auditors time to get away, and afterwards escaped himself.

What is related of the voracious appetite of the Athletæ, is almost incredible. ||Milo's appetite was scarce satiated with twenty minæ (pounds) of meat, the same quantity of bread, and three "congiis" of wine every day. Athenæus relates, that this champion having run the whole length of the stadium with a bull of four years old on his shoulders, he afterwards knocked him down with one stroke of his fist, and eat the whole beast that very day. I will take it for granted that all the other particulars related of Milo are true; but is it probable that one man could devour a whole ox in so short a time?

¶ We are told that Milo, when advanced to a very great age, seeing the rest of the champions wrestling, and gazing upon his own arms which once were so vigorous and robust, but were then very much enfeebled by time, he burst into tears, and cried, "Alas! these are now dead."

** And yet he either forgot or concealed his weakness from himself; the strong persuasion he entertained of his own strength, and which he preserved to the last, proving fatal to him. Happening to meet, as he was travelling, an old oak, which had been opened by some wedges that were forced into it, he undertook to split it in two by his bare strength: but after forcing out the wedges, his arms were caught in the trunk of the tree, by the violence with which it closed; so that being unable to disengage his hands, he was devoured by wolves.

†† An author has judiciously observed, that this surprisingly robust champion, who prided himself so much in his bodily strength, was the weakest of men with regard to a passion which often subdues and captivates the strongest; a courtesan having gained so great an ascendant over Milo, that she tyrannized over him in the most imperious manner and made him obey whatever commands she laid upon him.

* Lib. vi. p. 369, 370.

† Strab. l. vi. p. 263.

‡ Thirty pounds, or fifteen quarts.

** Pausan. l. ii. p. 370.

† This discus was a kind of quoit, flat and round,

|| Athen. l. x. p. 412.

¶ Cic. de Senec. n. 27.

†† Ælian. l. ii. c. 24.

CHAPTER III.

THE WAR OF PELOPONNESUS.

THE Peloponnesian war,* which I am now entering upon, began about the end of the first year of the 87th Olympiad, and lasted 27 years. Thucydides has written the history of it to the 21st year inclusively. He gives us an accurate account of the several transactions of every year, which he divides into campaigns and winter-quarters. However, I shall not be so minute, and shall only extract such parts of it as appear most entertaining and instructive. Plutarch and Diodorus Siculus, will also be of great assistance to me on this occasion.

SECTION I.

THE SIEGE OF PLATÆA BY THE THEBANS, &c. &c.

THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.

THE first act of hostility by which the war began,† was committed by the Thebans who besieged Plataea, a city of Bœotia, in alliance with Athens. They were introduced into it by treachery; but the citizens falling upon them in the night, killed them, about 200 excepted, who were taken prisoners, and who a little after were put to death. The Athenians, as soon as the news was brought of the action at Plataea, sent succours and provisions thither, and cleared the city of all persons who were incapable of bearing arms.

The truce being evidently broke, both sides prepared openly for war; and ambassadors were sent to all places to strengthen themselves by the alliance of the Greeks and barbarians. Every part of Greece was in motion, some few states and cities excepted, which continued neuter, till they should see the event of the war. The majority were for the Lacedæmonians, as being the deliverers of Greece, and espoused their interest very warmly, because the Athenians, forgetting that the moderation and gentleness with which they commanded over others had procured them many allies, had afterwards alienated the greatest part of them by their pride and the severity of their government, and incurred the hatred, not only of those who were then subject to them, but of all such as were apprehensive of becoming their dependants. In this temper of mind were the Greeks at that time. The confederates of each of those states were as follow:

All Peloponnesus, Argos excepted, which stood neuter had declared for Lacedæmonia. The Achaïans, the inhabitants of Pellene excepted, had also joined them; but the latter also engaged insensibly in that war. Out of Peloponnesus were the people of Megara, Locris, Bœotia, Phocis, Ambracia, Leucadia, and Anactorium.

The confederates of the Athenians were, the people of Chios, Lesbos, Plataea, the Messenians of Naupactus; the greatest part of the Acarnanians, Corcyrans, Cephallenians, and Zacynthians: besides the several tributary countries as maritime Caria, Doria, which lies near it, Ionia, the Hellespont; and the cities of Thrace, Chalcis, and Potidæa excepted; all the

* A. M. 5573. Ant. J. C. 481.

† Thucyd. l. ii. p. 98—122. Diod. l. xii. p. 97—100. Plut. in Pericl. p. 170.

islands between Crete and Peloponnesus, eastward ; and the Cyclades, Melos and Thera excepted.

Immediately after the attempt on Platæa, the Lacedæmonians had ordered forces to be levied both within and without Peloponnesus, and made all the preparations necessary for entering the enemy's country. All things being ready, two thirds of the troops marched to the isthmus of Corinth, and the rest were left to guard the country. Archidamus, king of Lacedæmonia, who commanded the army, assembled the generals and chief officers, and calling up the remembrance of the great actions performed by their ancestors, and those they themselves had done, or been eye witnesses to, he exhorted them to support with the utmost efforts of their valour, the pristine glory of their respective cities, as well as their own fame. He declared that the eyes of all Greece were upon them ; and that in expectation of the issue of a war which would determine its fate, they were incessantly addressing heaven in favour of a people who were as dear to them as the Athenians were become odious : that, however, he could not deny but that they were going to march against an enemy, who though greatly inferior to them in numbers and in strength, were nevertheless very powerful, warlike, and daring, and whose courage would doubtless be still more inflamed by the sight of danger, and the laying waste of their territories :* that therefore they must exert themselves to the utmost to spread an immediate terror in the country they were going to enter, and to inspire the allies with new vigour. The whole army answered in the loudest acclamations of joy, and assured their generals that they would do their duty.

The assembly breaking up, Archidamus, still zealous for the welfare of Greece, and meditating how he might best prevent a rupture, the dreadful consequences of which he foresaw, sent a Spartan to Athens, to endeavour, before they should come to hostilities, to prevail, if possible, with the Athenians to lay aside their designs, since otherwise an army would soon march into Attica. But the Athenians, so far from admitting him to audience, or hearing his reasons, would not so much as suffer him to come into their city ; Pericles having prevailed with the people to make an order, that no herald or ambassador should be received from the Lacedæmonians till they had first laid down their arms. In consequence of this, the Spartan was commanded to leave the country that very day ; and an escort was sent to guard him to the frontiers, and to prevent his speaking to any person by the way. At his taking leave of the Athenians, he told them, that from that day great calamities would ensue to all Greece. Archidamus seeing no hopes of a reconciliation, marched for Attica, at the head of 60,000 chosen forces.

Pericles before the Lacedæmonians had entered this country, declared to the Athenians, that should Archidamus, when he was laying waste their territories, spare his (Pericles) lands, either on account of the right of hospitality which subsisted between them, or to furnish his enemies, and those who envied him, with a handle to slander him, as holding intelligence with him, he declared that from that day he made over all his lands and houses to the city of Athens. He remonstrated to the Athenians, that it was their interest to consume the enemy's troops, by protracting the war ; and that, for this purpose, they must immediately remove all their effects out of the country, retire to the city, and shut themselves up in it without ever hazarding a battle. The Athenians, indeed, had not forces

* *Gnarus primis eventibus metum aut fiduciam gigni.* Tacit. Ann. l. xiii. c. 51.

enough to take the field and oppose the enemy. Their troops, exclusive of those in garrison, amounted but to 13,000 heavy armed soldiers, and 16,000 inhabitants, including young and old, the citizens as well as others, who were appointed to defend Athens: and besides these, 1200 troopers, including the archers who rode on horseback, and 1600 foot archers. This was the whole army of the Athenians. But their chief strength consisted in a fleet of 300 galleys, part of which were ordered to lay waste the enemy's country, and the rest to awe the allies, on whom contributions were levied, without which the Athenians could not defray the expenses of the war.

The Athenians, animated by the warm exhortations of Pericles, brought from the country their wives, their children, their moveables, and all their effects, after which they pulled down their houses, and even carried off the timber of them. With regard to the cattle of all kinds, they conveyed them into the island of Eubœa and the neighbouring isles. However, they were deeply afflicted at the sad and precipitate migration, and it even forced tears from their eyes. From the time the Persians left their country, that is, for near 50 years, they had enjoyed the sweets of peace, wholly employed in cultivating their lands, and feeding their flocks. But now, sad fate of war! they were obliged to abandon every thing. They took up their habitations in the city, as conveniently as they could, in the midst of such confusion; retiring either to their relations or friends; and some withdrew even to the temples and other public places.

In the mean time the Lacedæmonians, being set out upon their march, entered the country, and encamped at Œnoe, which is the first fortress towards Bœotia. They employed a long time in preparing the attack, and raising the batteries; for which reason complaints were made against Archidamus, as if he carried on the war indolently, because he had not approved of it. He was accused of being too slow in his marches, and of encamping too long near Corinth. He was also charged with having been too dilatory in raising the army, and having desired to give the Athenians opportunity to carry off all their effects out of the country; whereas, they said, had he marched speedily into it, all they had might have been plundered and destroyed. His design, however, was to engage the Athenians, by these delays, to agree to an accommodation, and to prevent a rupture, the consequences of which he foresaw would be pernicious to all Greece. Finding, after making several assaults, that it would be impossible for him to take the city, he raised the siege, and entered Attica in the midst of the harvest. Having laid waste the whole country, he advanced as far as Acharnæ, one of the greatest towns near Athens, and but 1500 paces from the city. He there pitched his camp, in hopes that the Athenians, exasperated to see him advanced so near, would sally out to defend their country, and give him an opportunity of coming to a battle.

It indeed was a great mortification to the Athenians, haughty and imperious, to be braved and insulted in this manner by an enemy, whom they did not think superior to themselves in courage. They were eye-witnesses of the dreadful havoc made of their lands, and saw all their houses and farms in a blaze. This sad spectacle was now so shocking, that they could not bear it any longer, and therefore demanded fiercely to be led out against the Lacedæmonians, be the consequence what it would. Pericles saw plainly, that the Athenians would thereby hazard every thing, and expose their city to certain destruction, should they march out to engage, under the walls of their city, an army of 60,000 fighting men, composed of the choicest troops at that time in Bœotia and Peloponnesus.

Besides, he had made it his chief maxim to spare the blood of the citizens, since that was an irreparable loss. Pursuing inflexibly therefore the plan he had laid down, and studious of nothing but how he might check the impatience and ardour of the Athenians, he was particularly careful not to assemble either the senate or the people, lest they should form some fatal resolution, in spite of all the opposition in his power. His friends used all the entreaties imaginable to make him change his conduct. His enemies, on the other side, endeavoured to stagger him by their menaces and slanderous discourses. They strove to rouse him by songs and satires, in which they aspersed him as a man of a cowardly, insensible cast of mind, who basely gave up his country to the sword of the enemy. But no man showed so much rancour against Pericles as Cleon.* He was the son of a currier, and also followed that trade. He had raised himself by faction, and probably by a species of merit which those must possess who would rise in popular governments. He had a thundering, and at the same time a specious voice; and besides he possessed, in a wonderful manner, the art of gaining the people, and bringing them over to his interest. It was he who enacted a law, that three oboli, not two as before, should be given to each of the 6000 judges. The characteristics which more immediately distinguished him were, an insupportably vain opinion of his own abilities, a ridiculous persuasion of his uncommon merit, and a boldness of speech, which he carried to so high a pitch of insolence as to spare no man. But none of these things could move Pericles. † His great strength of mind raised him above low vulgar clamours. Like a good pilot in a raging storm, who after he has given out the proper orders, and taken all the precautions necessary, is studious of nothing but how to make the best use of his art, without suffering himself to be moved by the tears or entreaties of those whom fear has distracted; Pericles, in like manner, after having put the city in a good posture of defence, and posted guards in all places to prevent a surprise, followed those counsels which his prudence suggested, entirely regardless of the complaints, the taunts, and licentious discourses of the citizens; from a firm persuasion, that he knew much better than they in what manner they were to be governed. ‡ It then appeared evidently, says Plutarch, that Pericles was absolute master of the minds of the Athenians, since he prevailed so far, at such a juncture as this as || to keep them from sallying out of the city, as if he had kept the keys of the city in his own possession, and fixed on their arms the seal of his authority, to forbid their making use of them. Things happened exactly as Pericles had foretold; for the enemy, finding the Athenians were determined not to stir out of their city, and having advice that the enemy's fleet carried fire and sword into their territories, they raised their camp, and after making dreadful havoc in the whole country through which they marched, they returned to Peloponnesus, and returned to their several homes.

It might here be asked, why Pericles acted on this occasion in a quite different manner from what Themistocles had done about 50 years before, when, at Xerxes' approach, he made the Athenians march out of their city, and abandon it to the enemy. But a little reflection will show that the circumstances differed widely. Themistocles being invaded by all the for-

* It is he whom Aristides has inveighed so much against, in several of his comedies.

† *Sperendis rumoribus validus.* Tacit.

‡ *Plot. An Seni ger. si...*

|| *Διακαλυψε μουσιν ε τωσπλα τω δημω και τας κλεις ται πυλαι αποφραγιγαμενωσ.*

ces of the East, justly concluded that it would be impossible for him to withstand, in a single city, those millions of barbarians, who would have poured upon it like a deluge, and deprived him of all hopes of being succoured by his allies. This is the reason given by Cicero. *Fluctum enim lotius barbaricæ ferre urbs una non poterat.* It was therefore prudent in him to retire for some time, and to let the confused multitude of barbarians consume and destroy one another. But Pericles was not engaged in so formidable and oppressive a war. The odds were not very great, and he foresaw it would allow him time to breathe. Thus, like a judicious man and an able politician, he kept close in Athens, and could not be moved either by the remonstrances or murmurs of the citizens. Cicero,* writing to his friend Atticus, condemns absolutely the resolution which Pompey formed and executed, to abandon Rome to Cæsar; whereas he ought, in imitation of Pericles, to have shut himself up in it with the senate, the magistrates, and the worthiest of the citizens who had declared in his favour.

After the Lacedæmonians were retired, the Athenians put troops into all the important posts both by sea and land, pursuant to the plan they intended to follow as long as the war continued. They also came to a resolution, to keep always 1000 talents in reserve, and 100 galleys; and never to use them except the enemy should invade Attica by sea; at the same time making it death for any man to propose the employing them any other way.

The galleys which had been sent into Peloponnesus made dreadful havoc there, which consoled the Athenians in some measure for the losses they had sustained. One day as the forces were going on board, and Pericles was entering his own ship, a sudden and total eclipse of the sun ensued, and the earth was overspread with the deepest gloom. This phenomenon filled the minds of the Athenians with the utmost terror; superstition, and the ignorance of natural causes, making them consider such events as fatal omens. Pericles seeing the pilot who was on board his ship astonished, and incapable of managing the helm, threw his cloak over his face, and asked him whether he saw: the pilot answering, that the cloak took away all objects from his sight, Pericles then gave him to understand, that a like cause, viz. the interposition of the vast body of the moon between his eyes and the sun, prevented his seeing its splendour.

† The first year of the war of Peloponnesus being now elapsed, the Athenians, during the winter solemnized public funerals, according to ancient custom; a practice truly humane and expressive of a just gratitude, in honour of those who had lost their lives in that campaign, a ceremony they observed during the whole course of the war. For this purpose they set up, three days before, a tent, in which the bones of the deceased citizens were exposed, and every person strewed flowers, incense, perfumes, and things of the same kind, upon those remains. They afterwards were put on a kind of chariots, in coffins made of cypress wood, every tribe having its particular coffin and chariot; but in one of the latter a large empty coffin was carried, in honour of those whose bodies had not been found. The procession marched with a grave, majestic, and religious pomp; a great number of inhabitants, both citizens and foreigners, assisted at this mournful solemnity. The relations of the deceased officers and soldiers stood weeping at the sepulchre. These bones were carried to a public monument, in the finest suburb of the city, called the Ceramicus; where

* Lib. vii. Epist. 11.

† Thucyd. l. ii. p. 122—150.

† These are called Cenotaphia.

were buried in all ages, those who had lost their lives in the field, except the warriors of Marathon, who, to immortalize their rare valour, were interred in the field of battle. Earth was afterwards laid over them, and then one of the citizens of the greatest distinction pronounced their funeral oration. Pericles was now appointed to exercise this honourable office. When the ceremony was ended, he went from the sepulchre to the tribunal, in order to be the better heard, and spoke the oration, the whole of which Thucydides has transmitted to us. Whether it was really composed by Pericles, or by the historian, we may affirm that it is truly worthy the reputation of both these great men, as well for the noble simplicity of the style, as for the just beauty of the thoughts, and the greatness of the sentiments which shine in every part of it. * After having paid, in so solemn a manner, this double tribute of tears and applauses, to the memory of those brave soldiers who had sacrificed their lives to defend the liberties of their country; the public who did not confine their gratitude to empty ceremonies and tears, maintained their widows, and all their infant orphans. This was a powerful † incentive to animate the courage of the citizens; for great men are formed where merit is best rewarded.

About the close of the same campaign, the Athenians concluded an alliance with Sitacles, king of the Odrysians in Thrace; and in consequence of this treaty his son was admitted a citizen of Athens. They also made an accommodation with Perdiccas, king of Macedonia, by restoring him the city of Thermæ; after which they joined their forces, in order to carry on the war in Chalcis.

SECTION II.

THE PLAGUE MAKES DREADFUL HAVOC IN ATTICA, &c. &c. SECOND AND THIRD YEARS OF THE WAR.

IN the beginning of the second campaign, † the enemy made an incursion into the country as before, and laid it waste. But the plague made a much greater devastation in Athens; the like having never been known. It is related that it began in Ethiopia, whence it descended into Egypt, from thence spread over Lybia, and a great part of Persia; and at last broke at once, like a flood, upon Athens. Thucydides, who himself was seized with that deadly disease, has described very minutely the several circumstances and symptoms of it, in order, says he, that a faithful and exact relation of this calamity may serve as an instruction to posterity, in case the like should ever happen. || Hippocrates, who was employed to visit the sick, has also described it in a medical, and § Lucretius in a poetical way. This pestilence baffled the utmost efforts of art; the most robust constitutions were unable to withstand its attacks; and the greatest care and skill of the physicians were a feeble help to those who were infected. The instant a person was seized, he was struck with despair, which quite disabled him from attempting a cure. The assistance that was given them was ineffectual, and proved mortal to all such of their relations as had the courage to approach them. The prodigious quantity of baggage, which had been removed out of the country into the city, proved very noxious. Most of the inhabi-

* Thucyd. l. ii. p. 130.

† Ἄλλα γὰρ οἱ καίτοι κριτῆς μεγίστη, τοῖς δὲ καὶ ἀνδρῶν πολιτευούσι.

‡ A. M. 3574. Ant. J. C. 480. Thucyd. l. ii. p. 13—147. Diod. p. 101, 102. Plut. in Pericl. p. 171.

|| Epidem. l. iii. c. 3.

§ Lib. ii. c. 47.

tants, for want of lodging, lived in little cottages, in which they could scarce breathe, during the raging heat of the summer, so that they were seen either piled one upon the other, the dead as well as those who were dying, or else crawling through the streets; or lying along by the side of fountains, to which they had dragged themselves, to quench the raging thirst which consumed them. The very temples were filled with dead bodies, and every part of the city exhibited a dreadful image of death; without the least remedy for the present, or the least hopes with regard to futurity.

* The plague, before it spread into Attica, had made wild havoc in Persia. Artaxerxes, who had been informed of the mighty reputation of Hippocrates of Cos, the greatest physician of that or any other age, caused his governours to write to him, to invite him into his dominions, in order that he might prescribe to those who were infected. The king made him the most advantageous offers; setting no bounds to his rewards on the side of interest, and with regard to honours, promising to make him equal with the most considerable persons in his court. The reader has already been told the prodigious regard which was shown to the Grecian physicians in Persia; and indeed was it possible that so useful a man as Hippocrates could be too well rewarded? However, all the glitter of the Persian riches and dignities were not capable to corrupt him, nor stifle the hatred and aversion which was become natural to the Greeks for the Persians, ever since the latter had invaded them. This great physician therefore sent no other answer but this, that he was free from either wants or desires; that he owed all his cares to his fellow-citizens and countrymen; and was under no obligation to barbarians, the declared enemies of Greece. Kings are not used to denials. Artaxerxes, therefore, in the highest transports of rage, sent to the city of Cos, the native place of Hippocrates, and where he was at that time, commanding them to deliver up to him that insolent wretch, in order that he might be brought to condign punishment; and threatening, in case they refused, to lay waste their city and island in such a manner, that not the least footsteps of it should remain. However, the inhabitants of Cos were not under the least terror. They made answer, that the menaces of Darius and Xerxes had not been able to prevail with them to give them earth and water, or to obey their orders; that Artaxerxes' threats would be equally impotent; that, let what would be the consequence, they would never give up their fellow-citizen; and that they depended upon the protection of the gods.

Hippocrates had said in one of his letters, that he owed himself entirely to his country. And indeed the instant he was sent for to Athens, he went thither, and did not once stir out of the city till the plague was quite ceased. He devoted himself entirely to the service of the sick; and to multiply himself, as it were, he sent several of his disciples into all parts of the country; after having instructed them in what manner to treat their patients. The Athenians were struck with the deepest sense of gratitude for this generous care of Hippocrates. They therefore ordained, by a public decree, that Hippocrates should be initiated in the most exalted mysteries, in the same manner as Hercules the son of Jupiter; that a crown of gold should be presented him, of the value of 1000 staters, † amounting to 500 pistoles French money; and that the decree by which it was granted him should be read aloud by a herald in the public games, on the solemn festi-

* Hippocrat. in Epist.

† The Attic stater was a gold coin weighing two drachmas. It is the original
χρυσος στατηρις.

val of Panathenæa : that the freedom of the city should be given him, and himself be maintained at the public charge in the Prytaneum all his lifetime, in case he thought proper : in fine, that the children of all the people of Cos, whose city had given birth to so great a man, might be maintained and brought up in Athens, in the same manner as if they had been born there.

In the mean time the enemy having marched into Attica, came down towards the coast, and advancing still forward, laid waste the whole country. Pericles still adhering to the maxim he had established, not to expose the safety of the state to the hazard of a battle, would not suffer his troops to sally out of the city : however, before the enemy left the plains, he sailed to Peloponnesus with 100 galleys, in order to hasten their retreat by his making so powerful a diversion ; and after having made a dreadful havoc, as he had done the first year, he returned into the city. The plague was still there as well as in the fleet, and it spread to those troops that were besieging Potidæa.

The campaign being thus ended, the Athenians, who saw their country depopulated by two great scourges, war and pestilence, began to despond, and to murmur against Pericles ; considering him as the author of all their calamities, as he had involved them in that fatal war. They then sent a deputation to Lacedæmonia, to obtain if possible, an accommodation by some means or other, firmly resolved to make whatever concessions should be demanded of them : however, the ambassadors returned back without being able to obtain any terms. Complaints and murmurs now broke out afresh ; and the whole city was in such a trouble and confusion, as seemed to prognosticate the worst of evils. Pericles, in the midst of this universal consternation, could not forbear assembling the people ; and endeavoured to soften, and at the same time to encourage them, by justifying himself. “ The reasons,” says he, “ which determined you to undertake this war, and which you approved at that time, are still the same ; and are not changed by the alteration of circumstances, which neither you nor myself could foresee. Had it been left to your option to make choice of peace or war, the former would certainly have been the more eligible : but as there was no other means for preserving your liberty, but by drawing the sword, was it possible for you to hesitate ? If we are citizens, who truly love our country, will our private misfortunes make us neglect the common welfare of the state ? Every man feels the evil which afflicts him, because it is present ; but no one is sensible of the good which will result from it, because it is not come. Have you forgot the strength and grandeur of your empire ? Of the two parts which form this globe of ours, viz. the land and sea, you have absolute possession of the latter ; and no king or any other power is able to oppose your fleets. It is now your duty to preserve this glory and this empire, or to resign it for ever. Be not therefore grieved because you are deprived of a few country houses and gardens, which ought to be considered no otherwise than as the frame of the picture, though you would seem to make them the picture itself. Consider, that if you do but preserve your liberty, you will easily recover them ; but that should you suffer yourselves to be deprived of this blessing, you will lose every valuable possession with it. Do not show less generosity than your ancestors, who, for the sake of preserving it, abandoned even their city ; and who, though they had not inherited such a glory from their ancestors, yet suffered the worst of evils, and engaged in the most perilous enterprises, to transmit it to you. I will confess that your present calamities are exceedingly grievous, and

“ I myself, am *duly sensible* and deeply afflicted for them. But is it just
 “ in you to exclaim against your general, merely for an accident that was
 “ not to be diverted by all the prudence of man ; and to make him respon-
 “ sible for an event, in which he has not the least concern ? We must sub-
 “ mit patiently to those evils which heaven inflicts upon us, and vigorous-
 “ ly oppose such as arise from our fellow-creatures. As to the hatred and
 “ jealousy which attend on your prosperity, they are the usual lot of all
 “ who believe themselves worthy of commanding. However, hatred and
 “ envy are not long lived, but the glory that accompanies exalted actions
 “ is immortal. Revolve therefore perpetually in your minds how shameful
 “ and ignominious it is for men to bow the neck to their enemies, and how
 “ glorious it is to triumph over them ; and then, animated by this double
 “ reflection, march on to danger with joy and intrepidity, and do not
 “ crouch so tamely in vain to the Lacedæmonians ; and call to mind, that
 “ those who display the greatest bravery and resolution in dangers, acquire
 “ the most esteem and applause.”

The motives of honour and fame, the remembrance of the great actions of their ancestors, the soothing title of sovereigns of Greece, and above all the jealousy of Sparta, the ancient and perpetual rival of Athens, were the usual motives which Pericles employed to influence and animate the Athenians, and had hitherto never failed of success. But on this occasion, the sense of the present evils prevailed over every other consideration, and stifled all other thoughts. The Athenians indeed did not design to sue the Lacedæmonians any more for peace, but the sight and presence only of Pericles was insupportable to them. They therefore deprived him of the command of the army, and sentenced him to pay a fine, which, according to some historians, amounted to 15 talents,* and according to others 50.

However, this public disgrace of Pericles was not to be very lasting. The anger of the people was appeased by the first effort, and had spent itself in this injurious treatment of him, as the bee leaves its sting in the wound. But he was not now so happy with regard to his domestic evils ; for, besides his having lost a great number of his friends and relations by the pestilence, feuds and divisions had long reigned in his family. Xanthippus, his eldest son, who was himself extremely profuse, and had married a young wife no less extravagant, could not bear his father's exact economy, who allowed him but a very small sum for his pleasures. This made him borrow money in his father's name. When the lender demanded his debt of Pericles, he not only refused to pay, but even prosecuted him for it. Xanthippus was so enraged, that he inveighed in the most heinous terms against his father, exclaiming against him in all places, and ridiculing openly the assemblies he held at his house, and his conferences with the Sophists. He did not know that a son, though treated unjustly, which was far otherwise in his case, ought to submit patiently to the injustice of his father, as a citizen is obliged to suffer that of his country.

The plague carried off Xanthippus. At the same time Pericles lost his sister with many of his relations and best friends, whose assistance he most wanted in the administration. But he did not sink under these losses ; his strength of mind was not shaken by them ; and he was not seen to weep or show the usual marks of sorrow at the grave of any of his relations till the death of Paralus, the last of his legitimate children. That rude stroke quite amazed him, though he did his utmost to preserve his

* 15 or 50,000 French crowns.

usual tranquility, and not show any outward symptoms of sorrow. But when he was to put the crown of flowers upon the head of his dead son, he could not support the cruel spectacle, nor stifle the transports of his grief which forced its way in cries, in sobs, and a flood of tears.

Pericles, misled by the principles of a false philosophy, imagined, that bewailing the death of his relations and children, would betray a weakness that no way suited the greatness of soul he had ever shown; and that on this occasion, the sensibility of the father would sully the glory of the conqueror. Exceeding error! childish illusion! which either makes heroism consist in wild and savage cruelty, or, leaving the same grief and confusion in the mind, assumes a vain outside of constancy and resolution, merely to be admired. But does martial bravery extinguish nature? Is a man dead to all human sentiments because he makes a considerable figure in the state? Antoninus the emperor, had a much juster way of thinking, when, on occasion of Marcus Aurelius' lamenting the death of the person who had brought him up, he said, "Suffer him to be a man, for "neither philosophy nor sovereignty renders us insensible.*"

Fickleness and inconstancy were the prevailing characters of the Athenians; and as these carried them on a sudden to the greatest excesses, they soon brought them back again within the bounds of moderation and gentleness. It was not long before they repented the injury they had done Pericles, and earnestly wished to see him again in their assemblies. By dint of suffering they began to bear patiently their domestic misfortunes, and to be fired more and more with a zeal for their country's glory; and in their ardour for re-instating its affairs, they did not know any person more capable than Pericles of the administration. Pericles at that time never stirred out of his house, and was in the utmost grief for the loss he had sustained. However, Alcibiades and the rest of his friends entreated him to go abroad, and show himself in public. The people asked him pardon for their ungrateful usage of him; and Pericles, moved with their entreaties, and persuaded that it did not become a good man to harbour the least resentment against his country, resumed the government.

About the end of the second campaign, some ambassadors had set out from Lacedæmon, in order to solicit the king of Persia's alliance, and engage him to furnish a sum of money for maintaining the fleet. This reflected great ignominy on the Lacedæmonians, who called themselves the deliverers of Greece, since they thereby retracted or sullied the glorious actions they had formerly achieved in her defence against Persia. They went by the way of Thrace, in order to disengage, if possible, Sitacles from the alliance of the Athenians, and prevail with him to succour Potidæa. But they here met with some Athenian ambassadors, who caused them to be arrested as disturbers of the public peace, and afterwards to be sent to Athens, where, without suffering them to be heard, they were put to death the same day, and their bodies thrown into the open fields, by way of reprisal on the Lacedæmonians, who treated all who were not of their party in the same inhuman manner. It is scarce possible to conceive how two cities, which a little before were so strongly united, and ought to have showed a mutual civility and forbearance for each other, could contract so inveterate an hatred, and break into such cruel acts of violence, as infringe all the laws of war, humanity, and nations; and prompted them

* Permitte illi ut homo sit: neque enim vel philosophia vel imperium tollit affectus. Jul. Capitol. in vit. Antonini Pii.

to exercise greater cruelties upon one another than if they had been at war with barbarians.

Potidæa had now been besieged almost three years, when the inhabitants reduced to extremities, and in such want of provisions that some fed on human flesh, and not expecting any succours from the Peloponnesians, whose attempts in Attica had all proved abortive, surrendered on conditions. The circumstances which made the Athenians treat them with lenity, were, the severity of the weather, which exceedingly annoyed the besiegers, and the prodigious expence of the siege, which had already cost* 2000 talents. They therefore came out of the city with their wives and children, as well citizens as foreigners, with each but one suit of clothes, and the women two, and only a little money to carry them home. The Athenians blamed their generals for granting this capitulation without their order, because otherwise, as the citizens were reduced to the utmost extremities, they would have surrendered at discretion. They sent a colony thither.

† The first thing that Pericles did, after his being re-elected generalissimo, was to propose the abrogation of that law, which he himself had caused to be enacted against bastards, when they were legitimate children. It declared that such only should be considered as true and legitimate Athenians, whose fathers and mothers were both natives of Athens; and it had been executed just before with the utmost rigour. For the king‡ of Egypt having sent to Athens a present of 40,000 measures of corn to be distributed among the people, the bastards, on account of this new law, were involved in a thousand difficulties till then unpractised, and which had not been so much as thought of. Near 5000 of them were condemned and sold as slaves, whilst 14,040 citizens were confirmed in their privileges, and recognized as true Athenians. It was thought very strange that the author and promoter of this law should himself desire to have it repealed. But the Athenians were moved to compassion at the domestic calamities of Pericles; so that they permitted him to enter his bastard in his own name in the register of the citizens of his tribe.

A little after, he himself was infected with the pestilence. Being extremely ill and ready to breathe his last, the principal citizens, and such of his friends as had not forsaken him, discoursing together in his bed-chamber about his rare merit, they ran over his exploits, and computed the number of his victories; for whilst he was generalissimo of the Athenians, he had erected for the glory of their city nine trophies, in memory of as many battles gained by him. They did not imagine that Pericles heard what they were saying, because he seemed to have lost his senses; but it was far otherwise, for not a single word of their discourse had escaped him; when, breaking suddenly from his silence, "I am surprised," says he, "that you should treasure up so well in your memories, and extol so highly a series of actions, in which fortune had so great a share, and which are common to me with so many other generals, and at the same

* The army which besieged Potidæa consisted of 5000 men exclusive of the 1600 who had been sent under the command of Phormio. Every soldier received daily two drachms, or 20d. French, for master and man; and those of the galleys had the same pay. Thucyd. l. 3. p. 182.

† A. M. 3975. Ant. J. C. 429.

‡ Plutarch does not name this king. Perhaps it was Inarus, son Psammetichus king of Libya, who had caused part of the Egyptians to take up arms against Artaxerxes, and to whom the Athenians, above 30 years before, had sent succours against the Persians. Thucyd. l. i. p. 68.

"time should forget the most glorious circumstance in my life, I mean, "my never having caused a single citizen to put on mourning." Excellent words! which very few in high stations can declare with truth. The Athenians were deeply afflicted at his death.

The reader has doubtless observed, from what has been said of Pericles, that in him were united most qualities which constitute the great man; as those of the admiral, by his great skill in naval affairs: of the great captain, by his conquests and victories; of the high-treasurer, by the excellent order in which he put the finances; of the great politician, by the extent and justness of his views, by his eloquence in public deliberations, and by the dexterity and address with which he transacted the affairs; of a minister of state, by the methods he employed to increase trade and promote the arts in general; in fine, of father of his country, by the happiness he procured to every individual, and which he always had in view, as the true scope and end of his administration.

But I must not omit another characteristic which was peculiar to him. He acted with so much wisdom, moderation, disinterestedness, and zeal for the public good; he discovered in all things so great a superiority of talents, and gave so exalted an idea of his experience, capacity and integrity, that he acquired the confidence of all the Athenians, and fixed in his own favour, during 40 years that he governed the Athenians, their natural fickleness and inconstancy. He suppressed that jealousy which an extreme fondness for liberty had made them entertain against all citizens distinguished by their merit and great authority. But the most surprising circumstance is, he gained this great ascendant merely by persuasion, without employing force, mean artifices, or any of those arts which a mean politician excuses in himself, upon the specious pretence, that the necessity of the public affairs and reasons of state make them necessary.

Anaxagoras * died the same year as Pericles. Plutarch relates a circumstance concerning him, which happened some time before, which must not be omitted. He says, that this philosopher, who had voluntarily reduced himself to excessive poverty, in order that he might have the greater leisure to pursue his studies, finding himself neglected in his old age by Pericles, who, in the multiplicity of the public affairs, had not always time to think of him, wrapped his cloak about his head, † and threw himself on the ground, in the fixed resolution to starve himself. Pericles hearing of this accidentally, ran with the utmost haste to the philosopher's house in the deepest affliction. He conjured him, in the strongest and most moving terms, not to throw his life away; adding, that it was not Anaxagoras, but himself that was to be lamented, if he was so unfortunate as to lose so wise and faithful a friend; one who was so capable of giving him wholesome counsels with regard to the pressing occasions of the state. Anaxagoras then, uncovering his head a little, spoke thus to him: "Pericles, those who use a lamp take care to feed it with oil." This was a gentle, and at the same time a strong and piercing reproach. Pericles ought to have supplied his wants unasked. Many lamps are extinguished in this manner in a country by the criminal negligence of those who ought to supply them.

* Plut. in Pericl. p. 162.

† It was the custom for those to cover their heads with their cloaks who were reduced to despair, and resolved to die.

SECTION III.

THE LACEDÆMONIANS BESIEGE PLATÆA.—FOURTH AND FIFTH YEARS OF THE WAR.

THE most memorable transaction of the following years * was the siege of Platæa by the Lacedæmonians. This was one of the most famous sieges in antiquity, on account of the vigorous efforts of both parties; but especially for the glorious resistance made by the besieged, and their bold and industrious stratagem, by which several of them got out of the city, and by that means escaped the fury of the enemy. The Lacedæmonians besieged this place in the beginning of the third campaign. As soon as they had pitched their camp round the city, in order to lay waste the places adjacent to it, the Platæans sent some deputies to Archidamus, who commanded on that occasion, to represent that he could not attack them with the least shadow of justice, because, that, after the famous battle of Platæa, Pausanias, the Grecian general, offering up a sacrifice in their city to Jupiter the Deliverer, in presence of all the allies, had given them their freedom to reward their valour and zeal; and therefore, that they ought not to be disturbed in the enjoyment of their liberties, since it had been granted them by a Lacedæmonian. Archidamus answered, that their demand would be very reasonable, had they not joined with the Athenians, the professed enemies to the liberty of Græce; but that if they would disengage themselves from their present alliance, or at least remain neuter, they then should be left in the full enjoyment of their privileges. The deputies replied, that they could not possibly come to any agreement without first sending to Athens, whither their wives and their children were retired. The Lacedæmonians permitted them to send thither, when the Athenians promising solemnly to succour them to the utmost of their power, the Platæans resolved to suffer the last extremities rather than surrender; and accordingly they informed the Lacedæmonians from their walls that they could not comply with what was desired.

Archidamus then, after calling upon the gods to witness that he did not first infringe the alliance, and was not the cause of the calamities which might befall the Platæans for having refused the just and reasonable conditions offered them, prepared for the siege. He surrounded the city with a circumvallation of trees, which were laid long-ways, very close together, with their boughs interwoven, and turned towards the city, to prevent any person from going out of it. He afterwards threw up a platform to set the batteries on, in hopes that as so many hands were employed, they should soon take the city. He therefore caused trees to be felled on mount Cithæron, and interwove them with fascines, in order to support the terra on all sides; he then threw in wood, earth and stones, in a word, whatever could help to fill it up. The whole army worked night and day, without the least intermission, during seventy days; one half of the soldiers reposing themselves whilst the rest were at work.

The besieged observing that the work began to rise, they threw up a wooden wall upon the walls of the city opposite to the platform, in order that they might always out-top the besiegers, and filled the hollow of this wooden wall with the bricks they took from the rubbish of the neighbouring houses; so that the wall of timber served in a manner as a defence to

* A. M. 3576. Ant. J. C. 426. Thucyd. l. ii. p. 147—151. Diod. l. xxii. p. 102. 103.

keep the wall from falling as it was carrying up. It was covered on the outside with hides both raw and dry, in order to shelter the works and the workmen from the fires discharged against it. In proportion as it rose, the platform was raised also, which in this manner was carried to a great height. But the besieged made a hole in the opposite wall, in order to carry off the earth that sustained the platform; which the besiegers perceiving, they put large panniers filled with mortar in the place of the earth which had been removed, because these could not be so easily carried off. The besieged, therefore, finding their first stratagem defeated, made a mine under ground as far as the platform, in order to shelter themselves, and to remove from it the earth and other materials of which it was composed, and which they gave from hand to hand, as far as the city. The besiegers were a considerable time without perceiving this, till at last they found that their work did not go forward, and that the more earth they laid on, the weaker it grew. But the besieged judging that the superiority of numbers would at length prevail, without amusing themselves any longer at this work, or carrying the wall higher on the side towards the battery, they contented themselves with building another within, in the form of a half moon, both ends of which joined to the wall, in order that the besieged might retire behind it when the first wall should be forced, and so oblige the enemy to make fresh works.

In the mean time, the besiegers having set up their machines, doubtless after they had filled up the ditch, though Thucydides does not say this, shook the city wall in a very terrible manner, which, though it alarmed the citizens very much, did not however discourage them. They employed every art that fortification could suggest against the enemy's batteries. They prevented the effect of the battering-rams by ropes * which turned aside their strokes. They also employed another artifice: The two ends of a great beam were made fast by long iron chains to two large pieces of timber, supported at due distance upon the wall, in the nature of a balance; so that whenever the enemy played their machine, the besieged lifted up this beam, and let it fall back on the head of the battering-ram, which quite deadened its force, and consequently made it of no effect.

The besiegers finding the attack did not go on successfully, and that a new wall was raised against their platform, despaired of being able to storm the place, and therefore changed the siege into a blockade. However, they first endeavoured to set fire to it, imagining that the town might easily be burnt down as it was so small, whenever a strong wind should rise; for they employed all the artifices imaginable to make themselves masters of it as soon as possible, and with little expence. They therefore threw fascines into the intervals between the walls of the city and the intrenchment with which they had surrounded them, and filled these intervals in a very little time because of the multitude of hands employed by them, in order to set fire at the same time to different parts of the city. They then lighted the fire with pitch and sulphur, which in a moment made such a prodigious blaze, that the like was never seen. This invention was very near carrying the city, which had baffled all others; for the besieged could not make head at once against the fire and the enemy in several parts of the town; and had the weather favoured the besiegers, as they flattered them-

* The end downward of these ropes formed a variety of slip-knots, with which they caught the head of the battering-ram, which they raised up by the help of the machine.

selves it would, it had certainly been taken ; but history informs us that an exceeding heavy rain fell, which extinguished the fire.

This last effort of the besiegers having been defeated as successfully as all the rest, they now turned the siege into a blockade, and surrounded the city with a brick wall, strengthened on each side with a deep fosse. The whole army was engaged successively in this work, and when it was finished, they left a guard over half of it, the Bœotians offering to guard the rest ; upon which the Lacedæmonians returned to Sparta about the month of October. There were now in Platæa but 400 inhabitants, and 80 Athenians, with 110 women to dress their victuals, and no other person, whether freeman or slave ; all the rest having been sent to Athens before the siege.

During the campaign some engagements were fought both by sea and land, which I omit, because of no importance.

* The next summer, which was the fourth year of the war, the people of Lesbos, the citizens of Methymne excepted, resolved to break their alliance with the Athenians. They had designed to rebel before the war was declared, but the Lacedæmonians would not receive them at that time. The citizens of Methymne sent advice of this to the Athenians, assuring them that if an immediate succour was not sent, the island would be inevitably lost. The affliction of the Athenians, who had sustained great losses by the war and the plague, was greatly increased when news was brought of the revolt of so considerable an island, whose forces, which were quite fresh, would now join the enemy, and reinforce them on a sudden by the addition of a powerful fleet. The Athenians therefore sent 40 galleys designed for Peloponnesus, which accordingly sailed for Mitylene. The inhabitants, though in great consternation, because they were unprepared, yet put on an appearance of bravery, and sailed out of the port with their ships ; however, being repulsed, they proposed an accommodation, which the Athenians listened to, from an apprehension that they were not strong enough to reduce the island to their allegiance. A suspension of arms was therefore agreed upon, during which the Mitylenians sent ambassadors to Athens. The fear of not obtaining their demands, made them send others to Lacedæmonia, to desire succours. This was not ill-judged, the Athenians sending them an answer which they had no reason to interpret in their favour.

The ambassadors of Mitylene, after a dangerous voyage, being arrived in Lacedæmonia, the Spartans deferred giving them audience till the solemnization of the Olympic games, in order that the allies might hear the complaints they had to make. I shall repeat their whole speech on that occasion, as it may serve at once to give a just idea of *Thucydides'* style, and of the disposition of the several states with regard to the Athenians and Lacedæmonians. " We are sensible," said the ambassadors, " that it is the custom to use deserters well at first, because of the service they do those whom they fly to, but to despise them afterwards, as traitors to their country and friends. This is far from being unjust, when they have no inducement to such a change ; when the same union subsists, and the same aids are reciprocally granted. But it is far otherwise between us and the Athenians ; and we entreat you not to be prejudiced against us, because, after having been treated mildly by the Athenians during the peace, we now renounce their alliance when they are unfortunate : for being come hither to demand admittance into the number of your friends and allies, we ought to begin our own justification, by showing the justice

* *Thucyd.* l. iii. p. 174—207. *Diod.* l. xii. p. 108, 109.

“and necessity of our procedure, it being impossible for a true friendship to be established between individuals, or a solid alliance between cities, unless both are founded on virtue, and uniformity of principles and sentiments.

“To come to the point: the treaty we concluded with the Athenians, was not to enslave Greece, but to free it from the yoke of the barbarians; and it was concluded after the retreat of the Persians, when you renounced the command. We adhered to it with pleasure, so long as the Athenians continued to entertain just designs; but when we saw that they discontinued the war they were carrying on against the enemy, merely to oppress the allies, we could not but suspect their conduct. And as it was extremely difficult, in so great a diversity of interests and opinions, for all of them to continue in strict union, and still harder to make head against them, when alone and separated, they have subjected, by insensible degrees, all the allies, except the inhabitants of Chios, and our people, and used our own forces for this end: for, at the same time that they left us seemingly at our liberty, they obliged us to follow them, though we could no longer rely on their words, and had the strongest reason to fear the like treatment. And indeed what probability is there, after their enslaving all the other states, that they should show a regard to us only, and admit us upon the foot of equals, if they may become our masters whenever they please, especially as their power increases daily, in proportion as ours lessens? A mutual fear between confederates is a strong motive to make an alliance lasting, and to prevent unjust and violent attempts, by its keeping all things in an equilibrium. Their leaving us the enjoyment of our liberties, was merely because they could not intrench upon them by open force, but only by that equity and specious moderation they have shown us. First, they pretended to prove, from their moderate conduct in regard to us, that as we are free, we should not have marched in conjunction with them against the other allies, had they not given them just grounds for complaint. Secondly, by attacking the weakest first, and subduing them one after another, they enabled themselves, by their ruin, to subject the most powerful without difficulty who at last would be left alone and without support; whereas, had they begun by invading us, at the time that the allies were possessed of all their troops, and were able to make some stand, they could not so easily have completed their designs. Besides, as we had a large fleet, which would strengthen considerably whatever party we should declare for, this was a check upon them. Add to this, that the high regard we have always shown for their republic, and the endeavours we have used to gain the favour of those who commanded it, have suspended our ruin. But we had been undone, had not this war broke out, which the fate of others leaves no room to doubt.

“What friendship then, what lasting alliance can be concluded with those who never are friends and allies, but when force is employed to make them continue such? For, as they were obliged to caress us during the war, to prevent our joining with the enemy, we were constrained to treat them with the same regard in time of peace, to prevent their falling upon us. That which love produces in other places, was with us the effect of fear. It was this circumstance that made an alliance subsist some time, which both parties were determined to break upon the very first favourable occasion. Let therefore no one accuse us for the advantage we now take. We had not always the same opportunity to

“ save as they had to rain us, but were under a necessity of waiting for one before we could venture to declare ourselves.

“ Such are the motives which now oblige us to solicit your alliance, the equity and justice of which appear very strong to us, and consequently call upon us to provide for our safety. We should have claimed your protection before, had you been sooner inclined to afford it us, for we offered ourselves to you even before the war broke out. We are now come, at the persuasion of the Bœotians your allies, to disengage ourselves from the oppressors of Greece, and join our arms with its defenders, and to provide for the security of our state, which is now in imminent danger. If any thing can be objected to our conduct, it is our declaring so precipitately, with more generosity than prudence, and without having made the least preparations: but this also ought to engage you to be more ready in succouring us, that you may not lose the opportunity of protecting the oppressed, and avenging yourselves on your enemies. There never was a more favourable conjuncture than that which now offers itself; a conjuncture, when war and pestilence have consumed their forces, and exhausted their treasure; not to mention that their fleet is divided, by which means they will not be in a condition to resist you, should you invade them at the same time by sea and land; for they will either leave us to attack you, and give us an opportunity of succouring you: or they will oppose us altogether, and then you will have but half their forces to deal with.

“ For the rest, let no one imagine that you will expose yourselves to danger for a people incapable of doing you service. Our country indeed lies at a considerable distance from you, but our aid is near at hand; for the war will be carried on, not in Attica, as is supposed, but in that country whose revenues are the support of Attica, and we are not far from it. Consider also, that in abandoning us, you will increase the power of the Athenians, by the addition of ours, and that no state will then dare to take up arms against them: but in succouring us, you will strengthen yourselves with a fleet, which you so much want; you will induce many other people, after our example, to join you; and you will take off the reproach cast upon you, of abandoning those who have recourse to your protection, which will be no inconsiderable advantage to you during the course of the war.

“ We therefore implore you, in the name of Jupiter Olympius, in whose temple we now are, not to frustrate the hopes of the Greeks, nor reject suppliants, whose preservation may be highly advantageous, and whose ruin may be infinitely pernicious to you. Show yourselves such now, as the idea entertained of your generosity, and the extreme danger to which we are reduced, may demand; that is, the protectors of the afflicted, and the deliverers of Greece.”

The allies, struck with these reasons, admitted them into the alliance of Peloponnesus. An incursion into the enemy's country was immediately resolved, and that the allies should rendezvous at Corinth with two thirds of their forces. The Lacedæmonians arrived first, and prepared engines for transporting the ships from the gulf of Corinth into the sea of Athens, in order to invade Attica both by sea and land. The Athenians were no less active on their side; but the allies, being employed in their harvest, and beginning to grow weary of the war, were a long time before they met.

During this interval, the Athenians, who perceived that all these preparations were made against them from a supposition that they were very

weak, to undeceive the world, and show that they alone were able to support a fleet without the aid of Lesbos, put to sea a fleet of 100 sail, which they manned with citizens as well as foreigners, not exempting a single citizen, except such only as were obliged to serve on horseback, or whose revenue amounted to 500 measures of corn. After having showed themselves before the isthmus of Corinth, the more to display their power they made descents into whatever parts of Peloponnesus they pleased.

The world never saw a finer fleet. The Athenians guarded their own country, and the coast of Eubœa and Salamis, with a fleet of 100 ships; they cruised round Peloponnesus with another fleet of the like number of vessels, without including their fleet before Lesbos and other places. The whole amounted to upwards of 250 galleys. The expences of this powerful armament entirely exhausted their treasure, which had been very much drained before by that of the siege of Potidæa.

The Lacedæmonians, greatly surprised at so formidable a fleet, which they noways expected, returned with the utmost expedition to their own country, and only ordered 40 galleys to be fitted out for the succour of Mitylene. The Athenians had sent a reinforcement thither consisting of 1000 heavy armed troops, by whose assistance they made a contravallation, with forts in the most commodious places; so that it was blocked up both by sea and land in the beginning of winter. The Athenians were in such great want of money for carrying on this siege, that they were reduced to assess themselves, which they had never done before, and by this means 200 talents were sent to it.

* The people of Mitylene being in want of all things, and having waited to no purpose for the succours which the Lacedæmonians had promised them, surrendered, upon condition that no person should be put to death or imprisoned, till the ambassadors, whom they should send to Athens, were returned; and that, in the mean time, the troops should be admitted into the city. As soon as the Athenians had got possession of the city, such of the factious Mityleneans as had fled to the altars for refuge, were conveyed to Tenedos, and afterwards to Athens. There the affair of the Mityleneans was debated. As their revolt had greatly exasperated the people, because not preceded by any ill treatment, and it seemed a mere effect of their hatred for the Athenians, in the first transports of their rage, they resolved to put all the citizens to death indiscriminately, and to make all the women and children slaves: and immediately they sent a galley to put the decree in execution.

But night gave them leisure to make different reflections. This severity was judged too cruel, and carried farther than consisted with justice. They imagined to themselves the fate of that unhappy city entirely abandoned to slaughter, and repented their having involved the innocent with the guilty. This sudden change of the Athenians gave the Mitylenean ambassadors some little glimmerings of hope; and they prevailed so far with the magistrates as to have the affair debated a second time. Cleon, who had suggested the first decree, a man of a fiery temper, and who had great authority over the people, maintained his opinion with great vehemence and heat. He represented, that it was unworthy a wise government to change with every wind, and to annul in the morning what they had decreed the night before; and that it was highly important to take an exemplary vengeance of the Mityleneans, in order to awe the rest of their allies, who were every where ready to revolt.

* A. M. 3577. Ant. J. C. 427.

Diodorus who had contradicted Cleon in the first assembly, now opposed his reflections more strongly than before. After describing in a tender and pathetic manner the deplorable condition of the Mityleneans, whose minds, he said, must necessarily be on the rack, whilst they were expecting a sentence that was to determine their fate, he represented to the Athenians, that the fame of their mildness and clemency had always reflected the highest honour on them, and distinguished them gloriously from all other nations. He observed, that the citizens of Mitylene had been drawn involuntarily into the rebellion; a proof of which was their surrendering the city to them the instant it was in their power to do it: they therefore, by this decree, would murder their benefactors, and consequently be both unjust and ungrateful in punishing the innocent with the guilty. He observed farther, that supposing the Mityleneans in general were guilty, it would however be for the interest of the Athenians to dissemble, in order that the rigorous punishment they had decreed, might not exasperate the rest of the allies; and that the best way to put a stop to the evil, would be to leave room for repentance, and not plunge people into despair, by the absolute and irrevocable refusal of a pardon. His opinion therefore was, that they should examine very deliberately the cause of those factious Mityleneans who had been brought to Athens, and pardon all the rest.

The assembly was very much divided, so that Diodorus carried it only by a few votes. A second galley was therefore immediately fitted out. It was furnished with every thing that might accelerate its course, and the ambassadors of Mitylene promised a great reward to the crew, provided they arrived time enough. They therefore did not quit their oars, even when they took sustenance, but ate and drank as they rowed, and took their rest alternately; and very happily for them the wind was favourable.

The first galley had got a day and night's sail before them; but as those on board carried ill news, they did not make great haste. Its arrival before the city had spread the utmost consternation in every part of it; but it increased infinitely, when the decree, by which all the citizens were sentenced to die, was read in a full assembly. Nothing was now heard in all places but cries and loud lamentations. The moment that the sentence was going to be put in execution, advice came that a second galley was arrived. Immediately the cruel massacre was suspended. The assembly was again convened; and the decree which granted a pardon, was listened to with such a silence and joy, as is much easier conceived than expressed.

All the factious Mityleneans, though upwards of 1000, were put to death. The city was afterwards dismantled, the ships delivered up, and the whole island, the city of Methymne excepted, was divided into 3000 parts or portions, 300 of which were consecrated to the service of the gods, and the rest divided by lot among such Athenians as were sent thither, to whom the natives of the country gave a revenue of two minæ for every portion, on which condition they were permitted to keep possession of the island, but not as proprietors. The cities which belonged to the Mityleneans on the coast of Asia, were all subjected by the Athenians.

* During the winter of the preceding campaign, the inhabitants of Plataea having lost all hopes of succour, and being in the utmost want of provisions, formed a resolution to cut their way through the enemy; but half of them, struck with the greatness of the danger, and the boldness of the enterprise, entirely lost courage when they came to the execution; but the

* Thucyd. l. iii. p. 125—128.

rest, who were about 220 soldiers, persisted in their resolution, and escaped in the following manner.

Before I begin the description of their escape, it will be proper to inform my readers in what sense I use certain expressions I shall employ in it. In strictness of speech, the line or fortification which is made round a city when besieged, to prevent sallies, is called *contravallation*; and that which is made to prevent any succours from without, is named *circumvallation*. Both these fortifications were used in the siege; however, for brevity's sake, I shall use only the former term.

The *contravallation* consisted of two walls at 16 feet distance, one from the other. The space between the two walls being a kind of platform or terrace, seemed to be but one single building, and composed a range of caserns or barracks, where the soldiers had their lodgings. Lofty towers were built around it at proper distances, extending from one wall to the other, in order that they might be able to defend themselves at the same time against any attack from within and without. There was no going from one casern to another without crossing these towers; and on the top of the wall was a parapet on both sides, where a guard was commonly kept; but, in rainy weather, the soldiers used to shelter themselves in the towers, which served in the nature of guardhouses. Such was the *contravallation*, on both sides of which was a ditch, the earth of which had been employed in making the bricks of the wall.

The besieged first took the height of the wall, by counting the rows of bricks which composed it, and this they did at different times, and employed several men for that purpose, in order that they might not mistake in the calculation. This was the easier, because as the wall stood but a small distance, every part of it was very visible. They then made ladders of a proper length.

All things being now ready for executing the design, the besieged left the city one night when there was no moon, in the midst of a storm of wind and rain. After crossing the first ditch, they drew near to the wall undiscovered, through the darkness of the night, not to mention that the noise made by the rain and wind prevented their being heard. They marched at some distance from one another, to prevent the clashing of their arms, which were light, in order that those who carried them might be the more active; and one of their legs was naked to keep them from sliding so easily in the mire. Those who carried the ladders laid them in the space between the towers, where they knew no guard was posted, because it rained. That instant 12 men mounted the ladders, armed only with a coat of mail and a dagger, and marched directly to the towers, six on each side. They were followed by soldiers armed only with javelins, that they might mount the easier; and their shields were carried after them to be used in the charge.

When the most of these were got to the top of the wall they were discovered by the falling of a tile, which one of their comrades, in taking hold of the parapet, had thrown down. The alarm was immediately given from the towers, and the whole camp approached the wall without discovering the occasion of the outcry, from the gloom of the night, and the violence of the storm. Besides which, those who had staid behind in the city, beat an alarm at the same time in another quarter, to make a diversion; so that the enemy did not know which way to turn themselves, and were afraid to quit their posts. But a corps de reserve of 300 men, who were kept for any unforeseen accident that might happen, quitted the *contravallation*, and ran to that part where they heard the noise; and torches

were held up towards Thebes, to show that they must run that way. But those in the city, to render the signal of no use, made others at the same time in different quarters, having prepared them on the wall for that purpose.

In the mean time, those who had mounted first having possessed themselves of the two towers which flanked the interval where the ladders were set, and having killed those who guarded them, posted themselves there to defend the passage, and keep off the besiegers. Then setting ladders from the top of the wall against the two towers, they caused a good number of their comrades to mount, in order to keep off, by the discharge of their arrows, as well those who were advancing to the foot of the wall, as the others who were hastening from the neighbouring towers. Whilst this was doing, they had time to set up several ladders, and to throw down the parapet, that the rest might come up with greater ease. As fast as they came up, they went down on the other side, and drew up near the fosse on the outside, to shoot at those who appeared. After they were passed over, the men who were in the towers came down last, and made to the fosse to follow after the rest.

That instant the guard of 300, with torches, came up. However, as the Plateans saw their enemies by this light better than they were seen by them, they took a surer aim, by which means the last crossed the ditch, without being attacked in their passage: however this was not done without difficulty, because the ditch was frozen over, and the ice would not bear, on account of the thaw and heavy rains. The violence of the storm was of great advantage to them.

After all were passed, they took the road towards Thebes, the better to conceal their retreat, because it was not likely that they had fled towards a city of the enemy's. Immediately they perceived the besiegers, with torches in their hands, pursuing them in the road that led to Athens. After keeping that of Thebes about six or seven * stadia, they turned short towards the mountain, and resumed the rout of Athens, whither 212 arrived out of 220 who had quitted the place; the rest having returned back to it through fear, one archer excepted, who was taken on the side of the fosse of contravallation. The besiegers, after having pursued them to no purpose, returned to their camp.

In the mean time, the Plateans who remained in the city, supposing that all their companions had been killed, because those who were returned, to justify themselves, affirmed they were, sent a herald to demand the dead bodies; but being told the true state of the affair, he withdrew.

† About the end of the following campaign, which is that wherein Mitylene was taken, the Plateans, being in absolute want of provisions, and unable to make the least defence, surrendered, upon condition that they should not be punished till they had been tried and adjudged in form of justice. Five commissioners came for this purpose from Lacedæmon, and these, without charging them with any crime, barely asked them whether they had done any service to the Lacedæmonians and the allies in this war? The Plateans were much surprised as well as puzzled at this question, and were sensible that it had been suggested by the Thebans, their professed enemies, who had vowed their destruction. They therefore put the Lacedæmonians in mind of the services they had done to Greece in general; both at the battle of Artemisium and that of Plateæ, and particularly in

* Upwards of a quarter of a league.

† Thucyd. l. iii. p. 208—220. Diocl. l. xii. p. 109.

Lacedæmonia, at the time of the earthquake, which was followed by the revolt of their slaves. The only reason, they declared, of their having joined the Athenians afterwards, was, to defend themselves from the hostilities of the Thebans, against whom they had implored the assistance of the Lacedæmonians to no purpose: that if that was imputed to them for a crime, which was only their misfortune, it ought not however entirely to obliterate the remembrance of their former services. "Cast your eyes," said they, "on the monuments of your ancestors which you see here, to whom we annually pay all the honours which can be rendered to the manes of the dead. You thought fit to intrust their bodies with us, as we were eye-witnesses of their bravery, and yet you will now give up their ashes to their murderers, in abandoning us to the Thebans, who fought against them at the battle of Platæa. Will you enslave a province where Greece recovered its liberty? Will you destroy the temples of those gods to whom you owe the victory? Will you abolish the memory of their founders, who contributed so greatly to your safety? On this occasion we may venture to say, our interest is inseparable from your glory; and you cannot deliver up your ancient friends and benefactors to the unjust hatred of the Thebans, without eternal infamy to yourselves."

One would conclude that these just remonstrances should have made some impression on the Lacedæmonians; but they were biassed more by the answer the Thebans made, and which was expressed in the most haughty and bitter terms against the Platæans; and besides, they had brought their instructions from Lacedæmon. They stood therefore to their first question, "Whether the Platæans had done them any service since the war?" and making them pass one after another, as they severally answered No, he was immediately butchered, and not one escaped. About 200 were killed in this manner; and 25 Athenians, who were among them, met with the same unhappy fate. Their wives, who had been taken prisoners, were made slaves. The Thebans afterwards peopled their city with exiles from Megara and Platæa; but the year after they demolished it entirely. It was in this manner the Lacedæmonians, in the hopes of reaping great advantages from the Thebans, sacrificed the Platæans to their animosity, 93 years after their first alliance with the Athenians.

* In the sixth year of the war of Peloponnesus the plague broke out anew in Athens, and again swept away great numbers.

SECTION IV.

THE ATHENIANS POSSESS THEMSELVES OF PYLUS, &c.—SIXTH AND SEVENTH YEARS OF THE WAR.

I PASS over several particular incidents of the succeeding campaigns, which differ very little from one another; the Lacedæmonians making regularly every year incursions into Attica, and the Athenians into Peloponnesus: I likewise omit some sieges in different places: † that of Pylus, a little city of Messenia, only 400 furlongs † from Lacedæmon, was one of the most considerable. The Athenians, headed by Demosthenes, had tak-

* A. M. 5578. Ant. J. C. 426. Thucyd. l. viii. p. 232.

† A. M. 5579. Ant. J. C. 425. Thucyd. l. iv. p. 259—280. Died. l. xii. p. 112—114.

‡ 20 French leagues.

on that city, and fortified themselves very strongly in it; this was the seventh year of the war. The Lacedæmonians left Attica immediately, in order to go and recover, if possible, that place; and accordingly they attacked it both by sea and land. Brasidas, one of their leaders, signalized himself here by the most extraordinary acts of bravery. Opposite to the city was a little island called Sphacteria, whence the besieged might be greatly annoyed, and the entrance of the harbour shut up. They therefore threw a chosen body of Lacedæmonians into it, making in all 420, exclusive of the Helots. A battle was fought at sea, in which the Athenians were victorious, and accordingly erected a trophy. They surrounded the island, and set a guard in every part of it, to prevent any of the inhabitants from going out, or any provisions from being brought in to them.

The news of the defeat being come to Sparta, the magistrate thought the affair of the utmost importance, and therefore came himself upon the spot, in order that he might be better able to take proper measures; when concluding that it would be impossible for him to save those who were in the island, and that they at last must necessarily be starved out, or be taken by some other means, he proposed an accommodation. A suspension of arms was concluded, in order to give the Lacedæmonians time to send to Athens, but upon condition that in the mean time they should surrender up all their galleys, and not attack the place either by sea or land till the return of the ambassadors: that if they complied with these conditions, the Athenians would permit them to carry provisions to those who were in the island, at the * rate of so much for the master and half for the servant; and that the whole should be done publicly, and in sight of both armies: that, on the other side, the Athenians should be allowed to keep guard round the island, to prevent any thing from going in or out of it, but should not attack it in any manner: that in case this agreement should be infringed in the least, the truce should be broke; otherwise, that it should continue in full force till the return of the ambassadors, whom the Athenians obliged themselves by the articles to convey backwards and forwards; and that then the Lacedæmonians should have their ships restored, in the same condition in which they had been delivered up. Such were the articles of the treaty. The Lacedæmonians began to put it in execution, by surrendering about 60 ships; after which they sent ambassadors to Athens.

Being admitted to audience before the people, they began by saying, that they were come to the Athenians to sue for that peace which they themselves were a little before in a condition to grant: that they now might acquire the glory of having restored the tranquillity of all Greece, as the Lacedæmonians consented to their being arbitrators in this treaty: that the danger to which their citizens were exposed in the island, had determined them to take such a step as could not but be very grating to the Lacedæmonians: however, that their affairs were far from being desperate, and therefore, that now was the time to establish between the two republics a firm and solid friendship, because the affairs of both were still fluctuating, and fortune had not yet declared absolutely in favour of either: that the gods frequently abandoned those whom success makes proud, by shifting the scene, and rendering them as unfortunate as they before had been happy; that they ought to consider that the fate of arms is very uncertain, and that the means to establish a lasting peace is not to triumph over an en-

* For the masters, two Attic chœnices of flour, making about four pounds and a half, two cotyles, or half pints of wine, and a piece of meat; with half this quantity for the servants,

emy by oppressing him, but to agree to a reconciliation on just and reasonable terms; for then, conquered by generosity and not by violence, his future thoughts being all employed, not on revenge, but on gratitude, he is delighted, and thinks it his duty to observe his engagements with inviolable fidelity.

The Athenians had now an happy opportunity for terminating the war, by a peace which would have been as glorious to them as advantageous to all Greece: But Cleon, who had a great ascendant over the people, prevented its taking effect. They therefore answered, by his advice, that those who were in the island should first surrender at discretion, and afterwards be carried to Athens, on the condition of being sent back from it as soon as the Lacedæmonians should have restored the cities, &c. which the Athenians had been forced to give up by the last treaty; and that these things being done, a firm and lasting peace should be concluded. The Lacedæmonians demanded that deputies should be appointed, and that the Athenians should engage to ratify what they should conclude. But Cleon exclaimed against this proposal, and said, it was plain they did not deal fairly, since they would not transact with the people, but with particular men, whom they might easily bribe; and that, if they had any thing to offer, they should do it immediately. The Lacedæmonians finding there was no possibility for them to treat with the people without advising with their allies, and that if any thing had been granted by them to their prejudice, they must be responsible for it, went away without concluding any thing, fully persuaded that they must not expect equitable treatment from the Athenians in the present state of their affairs and disposition from prosperity.

As soon as they were returned to Pylus, the suspension ceased; but when the Lacedæmonians came to demand back their ships, the Athenians refused to give them up, upon pretence that the treaty had been infringed in some particulars of little consequence. The Lacedæmonians inveighed strongly against this refusal, as being a manifest perfidy; and immediately prepared for war with greater vigour and animosity than before. A haughty carriage in success, and want of faith in the observation of treaties, never fail at last to involve a people in great calamities. This will appear by what follows.

The Athenians continued to keep a strict guard round the island, to prevent any provisions from being brought into it, and hoped they should soon be able to starve out the inhabitants. But the Lacedæmonians engaged the whole country in their interest by the views of gain, laying a heavy tax upon provisions, and giving such slaves their freedom as should run any into it. Provisions were therefore now brought, at the hazard of men's lives, from all parts of Peloponnesus. There were even divers who swam from the coast to the island, opposite to the harbour, and drew after them goat skins filled with pounded linseed, and poppies mixed with honey.

Those who were besieged in Pylus were reduced to almost the like extremities, being in want both of water and provisions. When advice was brought to Athens that their countrymen, so far from reducing the enemy by famine, were themselves almost starved, it was feared, that as it would not be possible for the fleet to subsist during the winter on a desert coast, which belonged to the enemy, nor to lie at anchor in so dangerous a road, the island must by that means be less securely guarded, which would give the prisoners an opportunity of escaping. But the circumstance they chiefly dreaded, was, lest the Lacedæmonians, after their countrymen

were once extricated from their danger, should refuse to hearken to any conditions of peace; so that they now repented their having refused it when offered them.

Cleon saw plainly that these complaints would terminate in him. He therefore began by asserting that it was all a false report concerning the extreme want of provisions, to which the Athenians, both within and without Pylus, were said to be reduced. He next exclaimed, in presence of the people, against the supineness and inactivity of the leaders who besieged the island, pretending, that were they to exert the least bravery, they might soon take the island; and that had he commanded, he would soon have taken it. Upon this he was immediately appointed to command the expedition; Nicias, who was before elected, resigning voluntarily that honour to him, either through weakness, (for he was naturally timid) or out of a political view, in order that the ill success which it was generally believed Cleon would meet with in this enterprise, might lose him the favour of the people. But now Cleon was greatly surprised as well as embarrassed; for he did not expect that the Athenians would take him at his word, he being a finer talker than soldier, and much more able with his tongue than his sword. However, he desired leave to waive the honour they offered him, for which he alleged several excuses: but finding that the more he declined the command, the more they pressed him to accept it, he changed his note, and supplying his want of courage with rhodomontade, he declared before the whole assembly with a firm and resolute air, that he would bring in twenty days those of the island prisoners, or lose his life. The whole assembly on hearing those words, set up a laugh, for they knew the man.

Cleon however, contrary to the expectation of every body, made good his words. He and Demosthenes (the other chief) landed in the island, attacked the enemy with great vigour, drove them from post to post, and gaining ground perpetually, at last forced them to the extremity of the island. The Lacedæmonians had stormed a fort that was thought inaccessible. There they drew up in battle array, faced about to that side only where they could be attacked, and defended themselves like so many lions. As the engagement had held the greatest part of the day, and the soldiers were oppressed with heat and weariness, and parched with thirst, the general of the Messenians, directing himself to Cleon and Demosthenes, said, that all their efforts would be to no purpose, unless they charged the enemy's rear; and promised, if they would give him but some troops armed with missile weapons, that he would endeavour to find a passage. Accordingly he and his followers climbed up certain steep and craggy places which were not guarded, when coming down unperceived into the fort, he appeared on a sudden at the backs of the Lacedæmonians, which entirely damped their courage, and afterwards completed their overthrow. They now made but a very feeble resistance, and being oppressed with numbers, attacked on all sides, and dejected through fatigue and despair, they began to give way; but the Athenians seized on all the passes to cut off their retreat. Cleon and Demosthenes, finding that should the battle continue, not a man of them would escape, and being desirous of carrying them alive to Athens, they commanded their soldiers to desist, and caused proclamation to be made by a herald, for them to lay down their arms, and surrender at discretion. At these words, the greatest part lowered their shields, and clapped their hands in token of approbation. A kind of suspension of arms was agreed upon, and their commander desired leave might be granted him to dispatch a messenger to the camp, to

know the resolution of the generals. This was not allowed, but they called heralds from the coast, and after several messages, a Lacedæmonian advanced forward, and cried aloud, that they were permitted to treat with the enemy, provided they did not submit to dishonourable terms. Upon this they held a conference, after which they surrendered at discretion, and were kept till the next day. The Athenians then raising a trophy, and restoring the Lacedæmonians their dead, embarked for their own country, after distributing the prisoners among the several ships, and committing the guard of them to the captain of the galleys.

In this battle 128 Lacedæmonians fell out of 420, which was their number at first; so that there survived not quite 300, 120 of whom were Spartans, that is, inhabitants of the city of Sparta. The siege of the island, to compute from the beginning of it, including the time employed in the truce, had lasted 72 days. They all now left Pylus; and Cleon's promise, though so vain and rash, was found literally true. But the most surprising circumstance was the capitulation that had been made; for it was believed that the Lacedæmonians, so far from surrendering their arms, would die sword in hand.

Being come to Athens, they were ordered to remain prisoners till a peace should be concluded, provided the Lacedæmonians did not make any incursions into their country, for that then they should all be put to death. The Messenians of Naupactus, who had formerly possessed it, sent thither the flower of their youth, who very much infested the Lacedæmonians by their incursions; and as these Messenians spoke the language of the country, they prevailed with a great number of slaves to join them. The Lacedæmonians dreading a greater evil, sent deputations to Athens, but to no purpose; the Athenians being too much elated with their prosperity, and especially their late success, to listen to any terms.

* In the seventh year of the Peloponnesian war, Artaxerxes sent to the Lacedæmonians an ambassador named Artaphernes, with a letter written in the Assyrian language, in which he said, that he had received many embassies from them, but the purport of them all differed so widely, that he could not comprehend in any manner what it was they requested: that in this uncertainty, he had thought proper to send a Persian, to acquaint them that if they had any proposal to make, they should send a person in whom they could confide along with him, from whom he might be exactly informed in what they desired. This ambassador arriving at Eion on the river Strymon in Thrace, was there taken prisoner about the close of this year, by one of the admirals of the Athenian fleet, who sent him to Athens. He was treated with the utmost civility and respect; the Athenians being extremely desirous of recovering the favour of the king his master.

The year following, as soon as the season would permit the Athenians to put to sea, they sent the ambassador back in one of their ships at the public expence; and appointed some of their citizens to wait upon him to the court of Persia, in quality of ambassadors. Upon landing at Ephesus, they were informed that Artaxerxes was dead; whereupon the Athenian ambassadors, thinking it not advisable to proceed farther after this news, took leave of Artaphernes, and returned to their own country.

* Thucyd. l. iv. p. 285, 286.

BOOK VIII.

THE

HISTORY

OF THE

PERSIANS AND GRECIANS,

CONTINUED DURING THE REIGNS OF
XERXES II. OF SOGDIANUS, AND OF DARIUS NOTHUS.

CHAPTER I.

THIS chapter contains 13 years of the Peloponnesian war, to the 19th inclusively.

SECTION I.

THE VERY SHORT REIGNS OF XERXES II. AND SOGDIANUS, &c.

ARTAXERXES died about the beginning of the 49th year of his reign.* Xerxes, who succeeded him, was the only son which the queen his wife brought him: but he had 17 others by his concubines, among whom were Sogdianus (who is called Secondianus by Ctesias,) Ochus, and Arsites. † Sogdianus, in concert with Pharnacias, one of Xerxes' eunuchs, came insidiously, one festival day, to the new king, who, after drinking too immoderately, was retired to his chamber, in order to give the fumes of the wine he had drank time to evaporate; where he killed him without any difficulty, after he had reigned but 45 days; and was declared king in his stead.

He was scarce on the throne, but he put to death Bagorazus, the most faithful of his father's eunuchs. It was he who had been appointed to superintend the interment of Artaxerxes, and of the queen, Xerxes' mother, who died the same day with her royal consort. After having deposited the two bodies in the mausoleum, where the kings of Persia were interred, he found at his return Sogdianus on the throne, who did not receive him favourably, upon account of some difference with him in the lifetime of his father. But the new king did not stop here; not long after he took an opportunity to quarrel with him on some trifling circumstance relating to the obsequies of his father, and caused him to be stoned.

* A. M. 3579. Ant. J. C. 426. Ctes. c. xlvii—li. Diod. l. xii. p. 115.

† A. M. 3589. Ant. J. C. 424.

By these two murders, that of his brother Xerxes and of Bagorazus, he became the horror of the army and nobility, so that he did not think himself safe on a throne, to which he had forced his way by such horrid murders. He suspected that his brothers harboured the like design; and Ochus, to whom his father had left the government of Hyrcania, was the chief object of his suspicion. Accordingly he sent for him, with the intention of getting him murdered as soon as he arrived. However Ochus, who saw through his design, delayed coming upon various pretences; which he continued till he advanced at the head of a strong army, which he openly declared he would employ to revenge the death of his brother Xerxes. This declaration brought over to him a great number of the nobility, and several governours of the provinces, they being justly dissatisfied at Sogdianus' cruelty and ill conduct. They put the tiara on Ochus' head, and proclaimed him king. Sogdianus, seeing himself abandoned in this manner, was as mean and cowardly in the slight defence he made to maintain his crown, as he had before been unjust and barbarous in usurping it. Contrary to the advice of his best friends, and the wisest persons who still adhered to him, he concluded a treaty with his brother, who getting him into his hands, caused him to be thrown into ashes, where he died a cruel death.

* This was a kind of punishment peculiar to the Persians, and exercised only on great criminals. One of the largest towers was filled to a certain height with ashes. The criminal then was thrown headlong from the top of the tower into them; after which the ashes were by a wheel turned perpetually round him till he was suffocated. Thus this wicked prince lost his life and empire, which he enjoyed six months and fifteen days.

Ochus, by the death of Sogdianus, now saw himself possessed of the empire. As soon as he was well settled in it, he changed * his name from Ochus to that of Darius. To distinguish him, historians add the epithet *Nobos*, signifying bastard. He reigned 19 years.

Arsites, seeing in what manner Sogdianus had supplanted Xerxes, and had himself been dethroned by Ochus, meditated to serve the latter in the same manner. Though he was his brother by the father's as well as the mother's side, he openly revolted against him, and was assisted in it by Artyphius, son of Megabysus. Ochus, whom hereafter we shall always call Darius, sent Artasyras, one of his generals, against Artyphius; and himself at the head of another army, marched against Arsites. Artyphius with the Grecian troops in his pay, defeated twice the general sent against him. But engaging a third time, the Greeks were corrupted, and he himself was beat and forced to surrender, upon his being flattered with hopes that a pardon would be granted him. The king would have had him put to death, but was diverted from that resolution by queen Parysatis, Darius' sister and queen. She also was the daughter of Artaxerxes, but not by the same mother as Darius: she was an intriguing artful woman, and the king her husband was governed by her on most occasions. The counsel she now gave was perfidious to the last degree. She advised him to exercise his clemency towards Artyphius, and show him kind usage, in order that his brother might hope, when he heard of his treating a rebellious servant with so much generosity, that he himself should meet at least with as mild treatment, and thereby be prompted to lay down his arms. She added, that when once he should have seized that prince, he might dispose of him and Artyphius as he pleased. Darius followed her counsel, which proved suc-

* Val. Max. l. ix. c. ii. 2 Maccab. c. xiii. l. iii.

* A. M. 5381. Ant. J. C. 123.

cessful. Arsites being informed of the gentle usage which Artyphius met with, concluded, that as he was the king's brother, he should consequently meet with more indulgent treatment ; and with this hope he concluded a treaty, and surrendered himself. Darius was very much inclined to save his life ; but Parysatis, by inculcating to him that he ought to punish this rebel to secure himself, at last prevailed with him to put his brother to death, and accordingly he was suffocated in ashes with Artyphius. However, Darius had a violent struggle with himself, before he could give orders for this sacrifice, having a very tender affection for his brother. He afterwards put some other persons to death ; which executions did not procure him the tranquillity he had expected from them ; for his reign was afterwards disturbed with such violent commotions, that he enjoyed but little repose.

* One of the most dangerous commotions was occasioned by the rebellion of Pisuthnes, who being governour of Lydia, wanted to throw off his allegiance to the Persian empire, and make himself king in his province. What flattered him with the hopes of succeeding in this attempt, was, his having raised a considerable body of Grecian troops, under the command of Lycon the Athenian. Darius sent Tissaphernes against this rebel, and gave him with a considerable army, the commission of governour of Lydia, of which he was to dispossess Pisuthnes. Tissaphernes, who was an artful man, and capable of acting in all characters, found means of tampering with the Greeks under Pisuthnes ; and by dint of presents and promises, brought over the troops with their general to his party. Pisuthnes, who by this desertion was unable to carry on his design, surrendered upon his being flattered with the hopes of obtaining his pardon ; but the instant he was brought before the king, he was sentenced to be suffocated in ashes, and accordingly met with the same fate as the rest of the rebels. But his death did not put an end to all troubles ; † for Amonges his son, with the remainder of his army, still opposed Tissaphernes ; and for two years laid waste the maritime provinces of Asia Minor, till he at last was taken by the Greeks of Peloponnesus, in Iasus, a city of Ionia, and delivered up by the inhabitants to Tissaphernes, who put him to death.

‡ Darius was involved in fresh troubles by one of his eunuchs. This kind of officers had for many years engrossed all power in the court of Persia ; and we shall find, by the sequel of this history, that they always governed absolutely in it. ¶ We may know their character, and the danger to which they expose princes, by the picture which Dioclesian, after he had resigned the empire, and reduced himself to a private station of life, drew of freedmen, who had gained a like ascendant over the Roman emperors. "Four or five persons," says he, "who are closely united, and resolutely determined to impose on a prince, may do it very easily. They never show things to him but in such a light as they are sure will please. They conceal whatever would contribute to enlighten him ; and as they only besiege him continually, he cannot be informed of any thing but through their channel, and does nothing but what they think fit to suggest to him. Hence it is that he bestows employments on those he ought to exclude from them ; and, on the other side, removes from offices such persons as are most worthy of filling them. In a word, the best prince is often sold by these men, though he be ever so vigilant, and even sus-

* A. M. 3590. Ant. J. C. 414. Ctes. c. li.

† Thucyd. l. viii. p. 554—568.

‡ Ctes. c. lii.

¶ Vopis. in vit. Aurelian. Imper.

"picious of them. *Quid multa? Ut Diocletianus ipse dicebat, bonus, cautus, optimus venditur imperator.*"

In this manner was Darius' court governed. Three eunuchs had usurped all power in it;* an infallible mark that a government is bad, and the prince of little merit. But one of those three eunuchs, whose name was Artoxares, presided over, and governed the rest. He had found Darius' weak side, by which he insinuated himself into his confidence. He had studied all his passions, to know how to indulge them, and govern his prince by their means. He plunged him continually in pleasures and amusements, to engross his whole authority to himself. In fine, under the name and protection of queen Parysatis, to whose will and pleasure he was the most devoted of slaves, he disposed of all the affairs of the empire, and nothing was transacted but by his orders. Intoxicated by the supreme authority, which the favour of his sovereign gave him, he resolved to make himself king, instead of being prime minister; and accordingly formed a design to get Darius out of the way, and afterwards ascend the throne. However, his plot being discovered, he was seized and delivered up to Parysatis, who put him to a most ignominious and cruel death.

† But the greatest misfortune which happened in Darius' reign, was the revolt of the Egyptians. This terrible blow fell out the same year with Pisuthnes' rebellion. But Darius could not reduce Egypt as he had done that rebel. ‡ The Egyptians, weary of the Persian government, flocked from all parts to Amyrtæus of Sais, who at last was come out of the fens where he had defended himself, from the suppression of the revolt of Inarus. The Persians were drove out, and Amyrtæus proclaimed king of Egypt, where he reigned six years.

After having established himself securely on the throne, and entirely expelled the Persians out of Egypt, he prepared to pursue them as far as Phœnicia, and had already concerted measures with the Arabians, to attack them in that country. News of this being brought to the king of Persia, he recalled the fleet which he had promised the Lacedæmonians, to employ it in the defence of his own dominions.

Whilst Darius was carrying on the war in Egypt and Arabia, the Medes rebelled; however they were defeated, and reduced to their allegiance by force of arms. To punish them for this revolt, their yoke, till then easy enough, was made heavier: a fate that rebellious subjects always experience, when the government, which they endeavoured to throw off, gains the upper hand.

|| Darius' arms seem to have had the like success against the Egyptians. Amyrtæus dying after he had reigned six years (he possibly was killed in a battle,) Herodotus observes, it was by the assistance of the Persians that Pausiris his son succeeded him in the throne. To effect this, they must either have been masters of Egypt, or their party the strongest in that kingdom.

§ After having crushed the rebels in Media, and restored the affairs of Egypt to their former situation, Darius gave Cyrus, the youngest of his sons, the supreme command of all the provinces of Asia Minor: an important commission, by which he commanded all the provincial governments in that part of the empire.

I thought it necessary to anticipate times, and draw together the facts

* Scis præcipuum esse indicium non magni principis, magnos libertos. Plin. ad Trajan.

† Euseb. in Chron.

|| Herod. l. iii. c. 15.

‡ Thucyd. l. i. p. 72, 73.

§ A. M. 5597. Ant. J. C. 407.

which relate to the kings of Persia ; to prevent my being often obliged to interrupt the history of the Greeks, to which I now return.

SECTION II.

THE ATHENIANS MAKE THEMSELVES MASTERS OF THE ISLAND OF CYTHERA, &c. &c.

THE EIGHTH YEAR OF THE WAR.

THE three or four campaigns which followed the reduction of the small island of Sphacteria, were distinguished by very few considerable events.

* The Athenians under Nicias took the little island of Cythera, situated on the coast of Lacedæmonia, near cape Malea, and from thence they infested the whole country.

† Brasidas, on the other side, marched towards Thrace. The Lacedæmonians were induced by more than one motive to undertake this expedition ; imagining they should oblige the Athenians, who had fallen upon them in their country, to divide their forces. The inhabitants of it invited them thither, and offered to pay the army. In fine, they were extremely glad to embrace that opportunity, to rid themselves of the Helots whom they expected to rise in rebellion, from the taking of Pylus. They had already made away with 2000 of them in a most horrid manner. Upon the specious pretence of rewarding merit even in slaves, but in reality to get rid of a body of men whose courage they dreaded, they caused proclamation to be made, that such of the Helots as had done the greatest service to the state in the last campaigns, should enter their names in the public registers, in order for their being made free. Accordingly 2000 gave in their names. They were carried in procession through the temples, with chaplets of flowers on their heads, as if they were really to be set at liberty. After this ceremony they all disappeared, and were never heard of more. We have here an instance, in what manner an umbrageous policy and power, when filled with jealousy and distrust, excite men to the commission of the blackest crimes, without scrupling to make even religion itself, and the authority of the gods subservient to their dark designs.

They therefore sent 700 Helots with Brasidas, whom they had appointed to head this enterprise. This general brought over several cities, either by force or intelligence, and still more by his wisdom and moderation. The chief of these were Acanthus and Stagyra, which were two colonies from Andros. † He also marched afterwards towards Amphipolis, an Athenian colony, on the River Strymon. The inhabitants immediately dispatched a messenger to † Thucydides the Athenian general, who was then in Thasus, a little island of the Ægean sea, half a day's journey from Amphipolis. He instantly set sail with seven ships that were near him, to secure the place before Brasidas could seize it ; or, at worst, to get into Eion, which lay near Amphipolis. Brasidas, who was afraid of Thucydides, from his great credit in all that country, where he was possessed of some gold mines, made all the dispatch imaginable to get thither before him, and offered such advantageous conditions to the besieged, who did

* A. M. 5580: Ant. J. C. 424. Thucyd. l. iv. p. 286.

† Thucyd. l. iv. p. 304—311. Diod. l. xii. p. 117, 118.

‡ Thucyd. l. iv. p. 320—324.

¶ The same who wrote the history of the Peloponnesian war.

not expect succours so soon, that they surrendered. Thucydides arrived the same evening at Eion; and had he failed to come that day, Brasidas would have taken possession of it the next morning by day-break. Although Thucydides had made all imaginable dispatch, the Athenians however charged him with being the cause of the taking of Amphipolis, and accordingly banished him.

The Athenians were greatly afflicted with the loss of that city, as well because they drew great revenues from it, and timber to build their ships, as because it was a kind of gate for entering Thrace. They were afraid that all their allies in that neighbourhood would revolt, especially as Brasidas discovered great moderation and justice, and continually gave out that he came with no other view but to free the country. He declared to the several nations, that at his leaving Sparta he had taken an oath in presence of the magistrates, to leave all those the enjoyment of their liberties who would conclude an alliance with him; and that he ought to be considered as the most abandoned of men, should he employ oaths to ensnare their credulity: "For," according to Brasidas, "a fraud, cloaked with a specious pretence, reflects infinitely greater dishonour on persons of high stations, than open violence; because the latter is the effect of the power which fortune has put into our hands; and the former is founded wholly on perfidy, which is the pest of society. Now I," said he, "should do a great disservice to my country, besides dishonouring it eternally, if, by procuring it some slight advantages, I should ruin the reputation it enjoys, of being just and faithful to its promises, which renders it much more powerful than all its forces united together, because it acquires it the esteem and confidence of other states." Upon such noble and equitable principles as these Brasidas always formed his conduct, believing that the strongest bulwark of a nation is justice, moderation, integrity, and a firm persuasion which their neighbours and allies entertain, that they are not so base as to harbour a design to usurp their dominions, or deprive them of their liberty. By this conduct he brought over a great number of the enemy's allies.

* The Athenians, under the command of Demosthenes and Hippocrates, had entered Bœotia, expecting that several cities would join them the moment they should appear. The Thebans marched out to meet them near Delium. A considerable engagement ensued, in which the Athenians were defeated and put to flight. † Socrates was in the battle; and Laches, who accompanied that great man in it, gives the following testimony of him in Plato, that had the rest of the army behaved as gallantly as Socrates, the Athenians would not have sustained so great a loss before Delium. He was borne away by the crowds who fled, and was on foot. Alcibiades, who was on horseback, when he saw him, rode up to him, and did not stir from him, but defended him with the utmost bravery from the enemy who were pursuing him.

After the battle, the victors besieged the city. Among other engines employed by them to batter it, they used one of a very extraordinary kind. This was a long piece of timber cut into two parts, and afterwards made hollow and joined again, so that its shape resembled very much that of a flute. At one of the ends was fixed a long iron tube, to which a cauldron was hung: so that by blowing a large pair of bellows at the other end of the piece of timber, the wind being carried from thence into the tube,

* Thucyd. l. iv. p. 311—319.

† Plat. in Lach. p. 181. In conviv. p. 221. Plut. in Alcib. p. 195.

lighted a great fire with pitch and brimstone that lay in the cauldron. This engine being carried on carts as far as the rampart to that part where it was lined with stakes and fascines, threw out so great a flame, that the rampart being immediately abandoned, and the pallisadoes burned, the city was easily taken.

SECTION III.

A TWELVEMONTH'S TRUCE IS AGREED UPON BETWEEN THE TWO STATES,
&c. &c.

NINTH, TENTH, AND ELEVENTH YEARS OF THE WAR.

THE losses and advantages on both sides were pretty equal* ; and the two nations began to grow weary of a war, which put them to great expence, and did not procure them any real advantage. A truce for a year was therefore concluded between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians. The former resolved on it, in order to check the progress of Brasidas' conquests ; to secure their cities and fortresses ; and afterwards to conclude a general peace, in case they judged it would be of advantage to them. The latter were induced to it, in order that by the sweets of repose, peace might become desirable to the enemy ; and to get out of their hands such of their citizens as the Athenians had taken prisoners in the island of Sphacteria ; and which they could never expect to do, if Brasidas extended his conquests farther. The news of this accommodation sensibly afflicted Brasidas, as it stopped him in the midst of his career, and disconcerted all his projects. He could not even prevail with himself to abandon the city of Scione, which he had taken two days before, but without knowing that a truce was concluded. He went still farther, and did not scruple to take Mende, a little city not far from Scione, that surrendered to him as the former had done, which was a direct violation of the treaty : but Brasidas pretended that he had other infractions to object to the Athenians.

It will naturally be supposed that they were far from being pleased with this conduct of Brasidas. Cleon, in all public assemblies was for ever inflaming the minds of the Athenians, and blowing up the fire of war. † His great success in the expedition of Sphacteria had raised his credit infinitely with the people : he now was grown insupportably proud, and his audaciousness was not to be restrained. He had a vehement, impetuous, and furious kind of eloquence, which prevailed over the minds of his auditors, not so much by the strength of his arguments, as by the boldness and fire of his style and utterance. It was Cleon who first set the example of bawling in assemblies, where the greatest decorum and moderation had till then been observed ; of throwing his robe behind him, to give him the more liberty to display his arms ; of striking his thigh ; and of running up and down the rostra whilst he was making his speech. In a word, he first introduced among the orators, and all those who were in public employments, an ungovernable licentiousness, and a contempt of decency ; a licentiousness and contempt, which soon introduced terrible irregularities and confusion in public affairs.

‡ Thus two men, each on his own side, opposed the tranquillity of Greece, and raised, but in a very different way, an invincible obstacle to its peace. These were Cleon and Brasidas. The former, because the

* A. M. 5581. Ant. J. C. 425. Thucyd. l. iv. p. 328—333. Dioid. lxii. p. 120.

† Plut. in. vit. Niciæ, p. 528.

‡ Ibid.

war screened his vices and malversations ; and the latter, because it added a new lustre to his virtues. And indeed it gave Cleon an opportunity of committing enormous oppressions, and Brasidas of performing great and noble actions. But their death, which happened about the same time made way for a new accommodation.

* The Athenians had appointed Cleon to command the troops which were to oppose Brasidas, and reduce those cities that had revolted from their allegiance. The Athenians were solicitous for none of them so much as Amphipolis : and Brasidas threw himself into that city in order to defend it. Cleon had written to Perdicas king of Macedonia, and to the king of Odomantes, to furnish him with as many troops as possible, and with the utmost expedition. He waited for them, and had resolved not to march immediately towards the enemy ; but finding his soldiers, who had followed him involuntarily and with regret, grow weary of continuing so long inactive, and beginning to compare his cowardice and inexperience with the ability and valour of Brasidas, he could no longer bear their contempt and murmurs ; and imagining himself a great captain by his taking Sphacteria, he now fancied the same good fortune would attend him at Amphipolis. He therefore approached it, as he said, to take a view of the place, and till such time as all his forces should be come up ; not that he thought he wanted them for carrying that city, or that he doubted in any manner his success, for he was persuaded that no one would dare to oppose him, but only to enable him to invest the place on all sides, and afterwards to take it by storm. Accordingly he encamped before Amphipolis ; when viewing very leisurely its situation, he fondly supposed that it would be in his power to retire whenever he pleased, without drawing the sword ; for not a man came out or appeared on the walls, and all the gates of the city were kept shut ; so that Cleon began to repent his not having brought the engines, imagining that he wanted only these to make himself master of the city. Brasidas, who was perfectly well acquainted with Cleon's disposition and character, studiously affected an air of fear and reserve, to increase his temerity, and the good opinion he had of himself : besides, he knew that Cleon had brought with him the flower of the Athenian forces, and the choicest troops of Lemnos and of Imbrus. Accordingly Cleon, despising an enemy who did not dare to appear before him, but shut himself up in a cowardly manner in the city, went boldly from place to place without precaution, or observing any discipline among his soldiers. Brasidas, whose intention was to attack him on a sudden, before all his forces should be come up, thought this the critical juncture. He had concerted proper measures, and given the orders necessary. Accordingly, he made a sudden sally on the Athenians, which surprised and disconcerted them exceedingly. Immediately the left wing drew off from the main body, and fled. Brasidas then turned the whole force of his arms against the right wing, which gave him a warm reception. Here he was wounded and disabled, upon which his soldiers carried him off unperceived by the Athenians. As for Cleon, not having resolved to fight, he fled, and was killed by a soldier who happened to meet him. The troops he commanded defended themselves for some time, and sustained two or three attacks without giving ground, but at last they were universally broke and routed. Brasidas was then carried into the city, where he survived his victory but a few moments.

* A. M. 3582. Ant. J. C. 422. Thucyd. l. iii. p. 342—351. Diod. l. xii. p. 121, 122.

The whole army being returned from the pursuit, stripped the dead and set up a trophy ; after which all the allies under arms solemnized the funeral obsequies of Brasidas in a public manner ; and the inhabitants of Amphipolis celebrated funeral honours every year to his memory, as to a hero, with games, combats, and sacrifices. They considered him as their founder ; and to secure this title the better to him, they demolished all the monuments of him * who had really been so, as that they might not appear to owe their establishment to an Athenian, and at the same time make their court to the Lacedæmonians, on whom they depended wholly for their security. The Athenians, after having carried off, with the consent of their victors, their dead, returned to Athens, during which the Lacedæmonians settled the affair of Amphipolis.

† A saying is ascribed to the mother of Brasidas, which strongly intimates the Spartan character. As some persons were applauding, in her presence, the fine qualities and exalted actions of her son, and declared him superior to all other generals : “ You are mistaken,” says she ; “ my son was a valiant man ; but Sparta has many citizens braver than he.” A mother’s generosity, in thus preferring the glory of the state to that of her son, was admired, and did not go unrewarded ; for the ephori paid her public honours.

‡ After this last engagement, in which the two persons who were the greatest obstacles to the peace lost their lives, both nations seemed more inclined to an accommodation, and the war was suspended on both sides. The Athenians, from the loss of the battles of Delium and Amphipolis, which had very much brought down their haughtiness, were undeceived with regard to the opinion they had hitherto entertained of their own strength, which had made them refuse the advantageous offers of their enemies. Besides, they were afraid of the revolt of their allies, who, being discouraged by their losses, might thereby be induced to abandon them, as several had already done. These reflections made them strongly repent their not having concluded a treaty, after the advantages they had gained at Pylus. The Lacedæmonians on the other side, no longer flattered themselves with the hopes of being able to ruin the Athenians by laying waste their country, and were besides dejected and terrified by their loss in the island, the greatest they had ever sustained. They also considered that their country was depopulated by the garrisons of Pylus and Cythera ; that their slaves deserted ; that they had reason to dread a more considerable revolt ; and that as the truce they had concluded with the inhabitants of Argos was near expiring, they had reason to be apprehensive of being abandoned by some of their allies of Peloponnesus, as they accordingly were. These several motives, enforced by the desire they had of recovering the prisoners, the greatest part of whom were the most considerable citizens of Sparta, made them desire a peace.

Those who were most solicitous for having it concluded, and whose interest it was chiefly to wish it, were the chiefs of the two states, viz. Plistonax king of Sparta, and Nicias general of the Athenians. The former was lately returned from banishment, to which he had been sentenced, on account of his being suspected to have received a bribe, in order to draw off his troops from the Athenian territories ; and to this precipitate retreat were ascribed several misfortunes which followed after it. He also was charged with having corrupted by gifts the priestess of Delphos, who had

* Agnon the Athenian.

† Dioid. lxii. p. 122.

‡ Thucyd. l. v. p. 351—354.

commanded the Spartans in the name of the god to recal him from his exile. Plistonax was therefore desirous of peace, in order to put an end to the reproaches, which, on account of the perpetual calamities of the war, were daily revived. As for Nicias, the most fortunate general of his age, he was afraid lest some unhappy accident should eclipse his glory, and he wished to enjoy the fruits of peace in ease and tranquillity, and that his country might possess the same happiness.

* Both states began by agreeing to a suspension of arms for 12 months, during which, being every day together, and tasting the sweets of security and repose, and the pleasure of corresponding with their friends and with foreigners, they grew passionately desirous of leading an easy, undisturbed life, remote from the alarms of war, and the horrors of blood and slaughter. They heard with the utmost demonstrations of joy the chorusses of their tragedies sing, "May spiders henceforward weave their cobwebs on our lances and shields!" And they remembered with pleasure him who said, "Those who sleep in the arms of peace, do not start from it at the sound of the trumpet; and nothing interrupts their slumbers but the peaceful crowing of the cock."

† The whole winter was spent in conferences and interviews, in which each party proposed their rights and pretensions. † At last a peace was concluded and ratified for 50 years; one of the chief articles of which was, that they should reciprocally restore the prisoners on each side. This treaty was concluded ten years and some days from the first declaration of the war. The Bœotians and Corinthians were exceedingly disgusted at it, and for that reason used their utmost endeavours to excite fresh troubles. || But Nicias persuaded the Athenians and Lacedæmonians to give the last hand to this peace, by concluding an alliance offensive and defensive, which would render them more formidable to those who should desire to break with them, and more assured with regard to each other. The Athenians, in consequence of this treaty, at last restored the prisoners they had taken in the island of Sphacteria.

SECTION IV.

ALCIBIADES' CHARACTER.—BANISHMENT OF HYPERBOLUS, &c. &c.

TWELFTH YEAR OF THE WAR.

ALCIBIADES δ began now to advance himself in the state, and appear in the public assemblies. Socrates had attached himself to him for many years, and adorned his mind with a great variety of the noblest erudition.

The strict intimacy between Alcibiades and Socrates is one of the most remarkable circumstances in his life. This philosopher observing excellent natural qualities in him, which were greatly heightened by the beauty of his person, bestowed incredible pains in cultivating so valuable a plant, lest, being neglected, it should wither as it grew, and absolutely degenerate. And indeed Alcibiades was exposed to numberless dangers; the greatness of his extraction, his vast riches, the authority of his family, the credit of his guardians, his personal talents, his exquisite beauty, and still more than these, the flattery and complaisance of all who approached him. One would have concluded, says Plutarch, that fortune had surrounded and in-

* Thucyd. l. v. p. 554. Plut. in Nic. p. 528, 529.

† Diod. l. xiii. p. 122.

‡ A. M. 3563. Ant. J. C. 421.

|| Thucyd. l. v. p. 553, 559.

§ Plut. in Alcib. p. 192 & 194.

vested him with all these pretended advantages, as with so many ramparts and bulwarks, to render him inaccessible and invulnerable to all the darts of philosophy; those salutary darts which strike to the very heart, and leave in it the strongest incitements to virtue and solid glory. But those very obstacles redoubled the zeal of Socrates.

Notwithstanding the strong endeavours that were used to divert this young Athenian from a correspondence which alone was capable of securing him from so many snares, he devoted himself entirely to it. As he had abundance of wit, he was fully sensible of Socrates' extraordinary merit; and could not resist the charms of his sweetly insinuating eloquence, which at that time had a greater ascendant over him than the allurements of pleasure. He was so zealous a disciple of that great master that he followed him wherever he went, took the utmost delight in his conversation, was extremely well pleased with his principles, received his instructions and even his reprimands with wonderful docility, and would be so moved with his discourses as even to shed tears, and abhor himself; so weighty was the force of truth in the mouth of Socrates, and in so ugly and odious a light did he expose the vices to which Alcibiades abandoned himself.

Alcibiades, in those moments when he listened to Socrates, differed so much from himself, that he appeared quite another man. However, his headstrong fiery temper, and his natural fondness for pleasure, which was heightened and inflamed by the discourses and advice of young people, soon plunged him into his former irregularities, and tore him, as it were, from his master; who was obliged to run after him as after a slave who had escaped. This vicissitude of flights and returns, of virtuous resolutions and relapses into vice, continued a long time; but still Socrates was not disgusted by his levity, and always flattered himself with the hope of bringing him back to his duty. And hence certainly arose the strong mixture of good and evil, which always appeared in his conduct; the instructions which his master had given him, sometimes prevailing; and at other times the fire of his passions hurrying him, in a manner against his own will, into things of a quite opposite nature.

This intimacy, which continued as long as they lived, did not pass uncensured. But some persons* of great learning pretend, that these censures and suspicions, when duly examined, quite disappear; and that they ought to be considered as the effect of the malice of the enemies of both. Plato, in one of his dialogues, gives us a conversation between Socrates and Alcibiades, by which the genius and character of the latter may be known, who henceforward will have a very great share in the affairs of the republic of Athens. I shall make a very short extract from it in this place, which I hope will not displease my readers.

† In this dialogue, Socrates is introduced conversing with Alcibiades, who at that time was under the guardianship of Pericles. He was then very young, and had been educated like the rest of the Athenians; that is, he had been taught polite literature, and to play on instruments, and had practised wrestling and other bodily exercises. It does not appear that Pericles had hitherto taken much pains in Alcibiades' education, a fault too common in the greatest men, since he had put him under the tutorage of Zopyrus, a Thracian, a man far advanced in years, and who, of all Peri-

* Abbe Fraguier justifies Socrates in one of his dissertations. *Memoirs of the Academy of Belles Lettres*, tom. iv. p. 372.

† *Plut. in Alcib. l.*

cles' slaves, both from his turn of mind and age, was the least qualified to educate this young Athenian. And indeed Socrates told Alcibiades, that should he compare him with the youths of Lacedæmonia, who displayed a spirit of valour, a greatness of soul, a strong desire of glory, a love of labour, attended with gentleness, modesty, temperance, and a perfect obedience to the laws and discipline of Sparta, he would seem a mere child to them. Nevertheless, his high birth, his riches, the great families he was related to, and the authority of his guardian; all these things had conspired to make him exceedingly vain and haughty. He was full of esteem for himself, and of contempt for all others. He was preparing to enter upon the administration of the public affairs, and promised himself no less than to eclipse entirely the glory of Pericles, and to attack the king of Persia even upon his throne. Socrates seeing him going to mount the rostra, in order to give the people some advice relating to the public affairs, demonstrates to him, by various questions, and by Alcibiades' answers, that he is quite ignorant of the affairs about which he is going to speak, as he had never studied them himself, nor been informed in them by others. After making Alcibiades confess this, he paints in the strongest colours, the absurdity of his conduct, and makes him fully sensible of it. What, says Socrates, would Amestris the mother of Artaxerxes, who then reigned in Persia, say, were she to hear, that there is a man now in Athens who is meditating war against her son, and even intends to dethrone him? She doubtless would suppose him to be some veteran general, a man of intrepid courage, of great wisdom, and the most consummate experience: that he is able to raise a mighty army, and march it wherever he pleases; and at the same time that he has long before taken the proper measures for putting so vast a design in execution. But were she to hear that there are none of these circumstances, and that the person in question is not 20 years old; that he is utterly ignorant of public affairs; has not the least knowledge of war, and no credit with the citizens or the allies; would it be possible for her to refrain from laughing at the folly and extravagance of such an enterprise? This nevertheless, says Socrates, directing himself to Alcibiades, is your picture; and unhappily resembles most of those who thrust themselves into the public employments. Socrates however excepts Pericles on this occasion; his solid merit and exalted reputation being acquired by his close study, during a long course of years, of every thing capable of forming his mind, and of qualifying him for public employments. Alcibiades could not deny that this was his case; he was ashamed of his conduct, and blushing to see himself so void of merit, he asks how he must act for the attainment of it. Socrates being unwilling to discourage his pupil, tells him, that as he is so young, these evils might be remedied; and afterwards continually gave him the wisest counsels. He had entire leisure to improve from them; as upwards of 20 years passed between this conversation and his engaging in public affairs.

Alcibiades was of a convertible genius, that would take any impression which the difference of times and circumstances might require, still veering either to good or evil, with the same facility and ardour, and shifting almost in an instant from one extreme to its opposite; so that people applied to him what Homer observes of the land of Egypt, "That it produces a great number of very excellent medicinal drugs, and at the same time as many poisons." * It might be said of Alcibiades, that he was not one single man, but, if so bold an expression might be used, a com-

* *Quemvis hominem secum attulit ad nos.* Juvenal.

pound of several men ; either serious or gay ; austere or affable ; an imperious master, or a grovelling slave ; a friend to virtue and the virtuous, or abandoned to vice and vicious men ; capable of supporting the most painful fatigues and toils, or insatiably desirous of voluptuous delights.

* His irregularities and dissolute conduct were become the talk of the whole city ; and Alcibiades would very willingly have put a stop to these reports, but without changing his course of life, as appears from a saying of his. He had a very handsome dog, of a prodigious size, which had cost him 70 minæ, † or 3500 French livres. By this we find that a fondness for dogs was of great antiquity. Alcibiades caused his tail which was the greatest beauty he had about him, to be cut off. His friends censured him very much on that account, and said, that the whole city blamed him very much for spoiling the beauty of so handsome a creature. " 'This is the very thing I want," replied Alcibiades with a smile ; " I would have the Athenians discourse about what I have done to my dog, that they may not entertain themselves with saying worse things of me."

‡ Among the various passions that were discovered in him, the strongest and most prevailing was a haughty turn of mind, which would force all things to submit to it, and could not bear a superior, or even an equal. Although his birth and uncommon talents smoothed the way to his attaining the highest employments in the republic, there was nothing however to which he was so fond of owing the credit and authority he wanted to gain over the people, as to the force of his eloquence, and the persuasive grace of his orations. To this his intimacy with Socrates might be of great service.

§ Alcibiades, with such a cast of mind as we have here described, was not born for repose, and had set every engine at work to traverse the treaty lately concluded between the two states ; but not succeeding in his attempt, he endeavoured to prevent its taking effect. He was disgusted at the Lacedæmonians, because they directed themselves only to Nicias, of whom they had a very high opinion ; and on the contrary seemed to take no manner of notice of him, though his ancestors had enjoyed the rights of hospitality among them.

The first thing he did to infringe the peace was this : Having been informed that the people of Argos only wanted an opportunity to break with the Spartans, whom they equally hated and feared, he flattered them secretly with the hopes that the Athenians would succour them, by suggesting to them that they were ready to break a peace which was no way advantageous to them.

And indeed the Lacedæmonians were not very careful to observe the several conditions of it religiously, having concluded an alliance with the Bœotians, in direct opposition to the design and tenor of the treaty ; and having surrendered up the fort of Panacton to the Athenians, not fortified, and in the condition it was in at the concluding of the treaty, as they had stipulated to do, but quite dismantled. Alcibiades, observing the Athenians to be extremely exasperated at this breach of faith, did his utmost to widen the difference ; and taking this opportunity to embarrass Nicias, he

* Plut. in Alcib. p. 195.

† About 160l. sterling. The Attic mina was worth 100 drachms, and the drachm ten pence, French money.

‡ Το φιλονικια, και το φιλοπραγειν. Plut. in Alcib. p. 195, 198.

§ A. M. 5584. Ant. J. C. 420. Thucyd. l. v. p. 368—378. Plut. in Alcib. p. 197, 198.

made him odious to the people, by causing them to entertain a suspicion of his being too strongly attached to the Lacedæmonians ; and by charging him with crimes which were not altogether improbable, though they were absolutely false.

This new attack quite disconcerted Nicias ; but happily for him there arrived at that very instant ambassadors from Lacedæmonia, who were invested with full powers to put an end to all the divisions. Being introduced into the council or senate, they set forth their complaints, and made their demands, which every one of the members thought very just and reasonable. The people were to give them audience the next day. Alcibiades, who was afraid they would succeed with them, used his utmost endeavours to engage the ambassadors in a conference with him. He represented to them, that the council always behaved with the utmost moderation and humanity towards those who addressed them ; but that the people were haughty and extravagant in their pretensions ; that should the ambassadors mention full powers, they the people would not fail to take advantage of this circumstance, and oblige them to agree to whatever they should take into their heads to ask. He concluded with assuring them that he would assist them with all his credit, in order to get Pylus restored to them ; to prevent the alliance with the people of Argos, and to get that with them renewed : and he confirmed all these promises with an oath. The ambassadors were extremely well pleased with this conference, and greatly admired the profound policy and vast abilities of Alcibiades, whom they looked upon as an extraordinary man ; and indeed they were not mistaken in their conjecture.

On the morrow, the people being assembled, the ambassadors were introduced. Alcibiades asked them, in the mildest terms, the subject of their embassy, and the purport of the powers with which they were invested. They immediately answered that they were come to propose an accommodation, but were not empowered to conclude any thing. These words were no sooner spoke, but Alcibiades exclaims against them ; declares them to be treacherous knaves ; calls upon the council as witness to the speech they had made the night before ; and desires the people not to believe or hear men who so impudently advanced falsehoods, and spoke and perverted so unaccountably, as to say one thing one day, and the very reverse the next.

Words could never express the surprise and confusion with which the ambassadors were seized, who, gazing wildly on one another, could not believe either their eyes or ears. Nicias, who did not know the treacherous stratagem of Alcibiades, could not conceive the motive of this change, and tortured his brain to no purpose to find out the reason of it. The people were that moment going to send for the ambassadors of Argos, in order to conclude the league with them ; when a great earthquake came to the assistance of Nicias, and broke up the assembly. It was with the utmost difficulty he prevailed so far, in that of next day, as to have a stop put to the proceedings, till such time as ambassadors should be sent to Lacedæmon. Nicias was appointed to head them ; but they returned without having done the least good. The Athenians then repented very much their having delivered up, at his persuasion, the prisoners they had taken in the island, and who were related to the greatest families in Sparta. However, though the people were highly exasperated at Nicias, they did not proceed to any excesses against him, but only appointed Alcibiades their general ; made a league with the inhabitants of Mantinea and Elis, who had quitted the party of the Lacedæmonians, in which the Argives

were included, and sent troops to Pylus to lay waste Laconia. In this manner they again involved themselves in the war which they were so lately desirous of avoiding.

* Plutarch, after relating the intrigue of Alcibiades, adds, "No one can approve the methods he employed to succeed in his design; however it was a master-stroke to disunite and shake almost every part of Peloponnesus in this manner, and raise up in one day so many enemies against the Lacedæmonians." In my opinion this is too soft a censure of so knavish and perfidious an action, which, how successful soever it might have been, was notwithstanding horrid in itself, and of a nature never to be sufficiently detested.

† There was in Athens, a citizen, Hyperbolus by name, a very wicked man, whom the comic poets generally made the object of their raillery and invectives. He was hardened in evil, and become insensible to infamy, by renouncing all sentiments of honour, which could only be the effect of a soul abandoned entirely to vice. Hyperbolus was not agreeable to any one; and yet the people made use of him to humble those in high stations, and involve them in difficulties. Two citizens, Nicias and Alcibiades, engrossed at that time all the authority in Athens. The dissolute life of the latter shocked the Athenians, who besides dreaded his audacity and haughtiness. On the other side, Nicias, by always opposing, without the least reserve, their unjust desires, and by obliging them to take the most useful measures, was become very odious to them. One would have imagined, that as the people were thus alienated from both, they would not have failed to put the ostracism in force against one of them. Of the two parties which prevailed at that time in the city, one consisted of the young men, who were eager for war, the other of the old men, who were desirous for peace; the former endeavoured to procure the banishment of Nicias, and the latter of Alcibiades. Hyperbolus, whose only merit was his impudence, in hopes of succeeding whichever of them should be removed, declared openly against them, and was eternally exasperating the people against both. However, the two factions being afterwards reconciled, he himself was banished by, and put an end to the ostracism, which seemed to have been demeaned in being employed against a man of so base a character; for hitherto there was a kind of honour and dignity annexed to this punishment. Hyperbolus was therefore the last who was sentenced by the ostracism; as Hipparchus, a near relation of Pisistratus the tyrant, had been the first.

SECTION V.

ALCIBIADES ENGAGES THE ATHENIANS IN THE WAR OF SICILY.

SIXTEENTH AND SEVENTEENTH YEARS OF THE WAR.

I PASS over several inconsiderable events,† to hasten to the relation of that of the greatest importance, the expedition of the Athenians into Sicily, to which they were especially excited by Alcibiades. This is the 16th year of the Peloponnesian war.

‡ Alcibiades had gained a surprising ascendant over the minds of the people, though they were perfectly well acquainted with his character.

* In Alcib. p. 198.

† Plut. in Alcib. p. 196, 197. In Nic. p. 530, 531.

‡ A. M. 3588. Ant. J. C. 416. Thueyd. l. viii. p. 350—409.

§ Plut. in Alcib. 198—200. In Nic. p. 531.

For his great qualities were united with still greater vices, which he did not take the least pains to conceal. He passed his life in such an excess of luxury and voluptuousness, as was a scandal to that city. Nothing was seen in his house but festivals, rejoicings, and parties of pleasure and debauchery. He showed very little regard to the customs of his country, and less to religion and the gods. All persons of sense and judgment, besides the strong aversion they had for his irregularities, dreaded exceedingly the consequences of his audacity, profusion and utter contempt of the laws, which they considered as so many steps by which Alcibiades would rise to tyrannical power.

Aristophanes, in one of his comedies,* shows admirably well, in a single verse, the disposition of the people with regard to him: "They hate Alcibiades," says he, "and yet cannot do without him." And indeed the prodigious sums he squandered on the people; the pompous games and shows he exhibited to please them; the magnificent and almost incredible presents which he made the city; the grace and beauty of his whole person; his eloquence; his bodily strength, joined to his courage and experience; in a word, this assemblage of great qualities made the Athenians wink at his faults, and bear them patiently, always endeavouring to lessen and screen them under soft and favourable names; for they called them sports, polite pastimes, and indications of his humanity and good nature.

Timon, the man-hater, morose and savage as he was, formed a better judgment of this conduct of Alcibiades. Meeting him one day as he was coming out of the assembly, vastly pleased at his having been gratified in all his demands, and to see the greatest honours paid him by the people in general, who were attending him in crowds to his house; so far from shunning him as he did all other men, on the contrary he ran to meet him, and stretching out his hand to him in a friendly way; "Courage my son," says he, "thou dost right in pushing thy fortune, for thy advancement will be the ruin of all these people." The war of Sicily will show that Timon was not mistaken.

The Athenians, from the time of Pericles, had meditated the conquest of Sicily. However, that wise guide had always endeavoured to check this ambitious and wild project. He used frequently to inculcate to them that by living in peace, by supporting their fleet, by contenting themselves with the conquests they had already gained, and by not engaging in hazardous enterprises, they would raise their city to a flourishing condition, and be always superior to their enemies. The authority he had at that time over the people, though it kept them from invading Sicily, could not suppress the desire they had to conquer it, and their eyes were continually upon that island. † Some time after Pericles' death, the Leontines being invaded by the Syracusans, had sent a deputation to Athens to demand aid. They were originally of Chalcis, an Athenian colony. The chief of the deputies was Gorgias, a famous rhetorician, who was reputed the most eloquent man of his time. His elegant and florid diction, heightened by shining figures which he first employed, charmed the Athenians, who were prodigiously affected with the beauties and graces of eloquence. Accordingly the alliance was concluded, and they sent ships to Rhegium to the aid of the Leontines. The year following they sent a greater number. Two years after they sent a new fleet, something stronger than the former; but the Sicilians having put an end to all their divisions, by the advice of

* The Frogs, act 5. scene 4.

† Diod. l. xii. p. 89.

Hermocrates, the fleet was sent back ; and the Athenians not being able to prevail with themselves to pardon their generals for not conquering Sicily, sent two of them, Pythodorus and Sophocles, into banishment ; and sentenced the third, Eurymedon, to pay a heavy fine ; their prosperity having blinded them to so prodigious a degree, that they were persuaded no power was able to resist them. They made several attempts afterwards ; and upon pretence of sending from time to time arms and soldiers to such cities as were unjustly treated or oppressed by the Syracusans, they by that means were preparing to invade them with a greater force.

But the person who most inflamed this ardour, was Alcibiades, by his feeding the people with splendid hopes, with which he himself was ever filled, or rather intoxicated. He was every night in his dreams taking Carthage, subduing Africa, crossing from thence into Italy, and possessing himself of all Peloponnesus ; looking upon Sicily not as the scope and end of this war, but as the beginning and the first step of the exploits he revolved in his mind. All the citizens favoured his views, and, without enquiring seriously into matters, were enchanted with the mighty hopes he gave them. This expedition was the only topic of all conversations. The young men, in the places where the public exercises were performed, and the old men in their shops and elsewhere, were employed in nothing but in drawing the plan of Sicily ; in discoursing on the nature and quality of the sea with which it is surrounded ; on its good harbours, and flat shores towards Africa : for these people, infatuated by the speeches of Alcibiades, were like him, persuaded that they should make Sicily only their place of arms and their arsenal, from whence they should set out for the conquest of Carthage, and make themselves masters of all Africa and the sea, as far as the pillars of Hercules.

* It is related, that neither Socrates nor Methon the astronomer, believed this enterprise would be successful ; the former being inspired, as he insinuated, by his familiar spirit, who always warned him of the evils with which he was threatened ; and the other, directed by his reason and good sense, which, pointing out what he had to apprehend in respect to the future, induced him to act the madman on this occasion, and to demand, in consideration of the unhappy condition to which he was reduced, that the Athenians would not force away his son, and would dispense with his carrying arms.

SECTION VI.

ACCOUNT OF THE SEVERAL PEOPLE WHO INHABITED SICILY.

BEFORE I enter on the relation of the war of Sicily, it will not be improper to give a plan of the country, and of the nations who inhabited it. Thucydides begins in the same manner.

† It was first inhabited by the Lestrygonas and the Cyclops, of whom we do not know any particulars, except what we are told by the poets. The most ancient, after these, were the Sicani, who called themselves the original inhabitants of this country, though they are thought to have come into it from the neighbourhood of a river in Spain, called Sicanus, whose name they gave to the island, which before was called Trinacria : these people were afterwards confined to the western part of the island.

* Plut. in Alcib. p. 199. In Nic. p. 532.

† Thucyd. l. vi. p. 410—413.

Some Trojans, after the burning of their city, came and settled near them, and built Erik, and * Egesta, who all assumed the name of Elymæi, and were afterwards joined by some inhabitants of Phocis, at their return from the siege of Troy. Those who are properly called Sicilians, came from Italy in very great numbers, and having gained a considerable victory over the Sicani, confined them to a corner of their island, about 300 years before the arrival of the Greeks; and in Thucydides' time they still inhabited the middle part of the island, and the northern coast. From them the island was called Sicily. The Phœnicians also spread themselves along the coast, and in the little islands which border upon it, for the convenience of trade; but after the Greeks began to settle there, they retired into the country of the Elymæi, in order to be nearer Carthage, and abandoned the rest. It was in this manner the barbarians first settled in Sicily.

† With regard to the Greeks, the first of them who crossed into Sicily, were the Chalcidians of Eubœa, under Theocles, who founded Naxos. The year after, which, according to Dionysius Halicarnassus, was the third of the 17th Olympiad, Archias the Corinthian, laid the foundation of Syracuse. Seven years after, the Chalcidians founded Leontium and Catania, after having drove out the inhabitants of the country, who were Sicilians. Other Greeks, who came from Megara, a city of Achaia, about the same time, founded Megara, called Hyblæa, or barely Hybla, from Hyblon a Sicilian king, by whose permission they settled in his dominions. It is well known that the Hyblæan honey was very famous among the ancients. An hundred years after, the inhabitants of that city built Selinunta. Zancle, called afterwards Messana or Messene, by Anaxilas, tyrant of Rhegium, who was of Messene, a city of Peloponnesus, had several founders, and at different periods. The Zancians built the city of Hymera; the Syracusans built Acre, Casmene, and Camarina. These are most of the nations, whether Greeks or barbarians, who settled in Sicily.

SECTION VII.

THE PEOPLE OF EGESTA IMPLORE AID OF THE ATHENIANS.

ATHENS † was in the disposition above related, when ambassadors were sent from the people of Egesta, who, in quality of their allies, came to implore their aid against the inhabitants of Selinunta, who were assisted by the Syracusans. It was the sixteenth year of the Peloponnesian war. They represented, among other things, that should they be abandoned, the Syracusans, after seizing their city, as they had done that of Leontium, would possess themselves of all Sicily, and not fail to aid the Peloponnesians, who were their founders; and that they might put them to as little charge as possible, they offered to pay the troops that should be sent to succour them. The Athenians, who had long waited for an opportunity to declare themselves, sent deputies to Egesta to inquire into the state of affairs, and to see whether there was money enough in the treasury to defray the expence of so great a war. The inhabitants of that city had been so artful as to borrow from the neighbouring nations a great number of gold and silver vases, worth an immense sum of money; and of these

* It is called Segesta by the Romans.

† A. M. 5294. Ant. J. C. 710.

† A. M. 5588. Ant. J. C. 416. Thucyd. l. vi. p. 413—414. Diod. l. xii. p. 129, 130. Plut. in Alcib. p. 200. In Nic. p. 531.

they made a show when the Athenians arrived. * The deputies returned with those of Egæta, who carried 60 talents in ingots, as a month's pay for the galleys which they demanded, and a promise of larger sums, which they said were ready both in the public treasury and in the temples. The people, struck with these fair appearances, the truth of which they did not give themselves the leisure to examine, and seduced by the advantageous reports which their deputies made, in the view of pleasing them, immediately granted the Egæstans their demand, and appointed Alcibiades, Nicias, and Lamachus, to command the fleet, with full power not only to succour Egæta, and restore the inhabitants of Leontium to their city, but also to regulate the affairs of Sicily in such a manner as might best suit the interests of the republic.

Nicias was appointed one of the generals, to his very great regret; for, besides other motives which made him dread that command, he shunned it, because Alcibiades was to be his colleague. But the Athenians promised themselves greater success from this war, should they not resign the whole conduct of it to Alcibiades, but temper his ardour and audacity with the coolness and wisdom of Nicias.

† Five days after, to hasten the execution of the decree, and make the necessary preparations, a second assembly was held. Nicias, who had had time enough to reflect deliberately on the affair proposed, and was still better convinced of the difficulties and dangers which would ensue from it, thought himself obliged to speak with some vehemence against a project, the consequences of which he foresaw might be very fatal to the republic. He said, "That it was surprising so important an affair should have been determined the moment almost it was taken into deliberation: that without once inquiring into matters, they had given credit to whatever was told them by foreigners, who were very lavish of their promises, and whose interest it was to offer mighty things, in order to extricate themselves from their imminent danger. After all, what advantage," says he, "can accrue from thence to the republic? Have we so few enemies at our doors, that we need go in search of others at a distance from us? Will you act wisely to hazard your present possessions, on the vain hopes of an uncertain advantage? To meditate new conquests, before you have secured your ancient ones? To study nothing but the aggrandizing of your state, and quite neglect your own safety? Can you depend in any manner on a truce, which you yourselves know is very precarious, which you are sensible has been infringed more than once, and which the least defeat on our side may suddenly change into an open war? You are not ignorant how the Lacedæmonians have always been, and still continue disposed with regard to us. They detest our government as different from theirs; it is with grief and disdain they see us possessed of the empire of Greece; they consider our glory as their shame and confusion; and there is nothing they would not attempt to humble a power which excites their jealousy, and keeps them perpetually in fear. These are our real enemies, and it is they we ought to guard against. Will it be a proper time to make these reflections, when (after having divided our troops, and our arms will be employed elsewhere, and unable to resist them) we shall be attacked at once by all the forces of Peloponnesus? We do but just begin to breathe, after the calamities in which war and the plague had plunged us; and we are now going to plunge ourselves into greater danger.

* A. M. 3589. Ant. J. C. 415.

† Thucyd. l. vi. p. 405—428.

“ If we are ambitious of carrying our arms into distant countries, would it not be more expedient to march and reduce the rebels of Thrace, and other nations who are still wavering and unfixed in their allegiance, than to fly to the succour of the inhabitants of Egesta, about whose welfare we ought to be very indifferent ? And will it suit our interest to attempt to revenge their injuries, at a time that we do not discover the least resentment for those we ourselves receive ? Let us leave the Sicilians to themselves, and not engage in their quarrels, which it is their business to decide. As the inhabitants of Egesta undertook the war without us, let them extricate themselves from it as well as they can. Should any of our generals advise you to this enterprise, from an ambitious or self-interested view ; merely to make a vain parade of his splendid equipages, or to raise money to support his extravagance ; be not guilty of so much imprudence as to sacrifice the interest of the republic to his, or permit him to involve it in the same ruin with himself. An enterprise of so much importance ought not to be committed wholly to the conduct of a young man. Remember it is prudence, not prejudice and passion, that gives success to affairs.” Nicias concluded, with declaring it his opinion, that it would be proper to deliberate again on the affair, in order to prevent the fatal consequences with which their taking rash resolutions might be attended.

It was plain he had Alcibiades in view, and that his enormous luxury was the object of his censure. And indeed he carried it to an incredible height, and lavished prodigious sums of money on horses, equipages, and moveables ; not to mention the delicacy and sumptuousness of his table. He disputed the prize at the Olympic games with seven sets of chariot horses, which no private man had ever done before him ; and he was crowned more than once on that occasion. Extraordinary resources were necessary for supporting such luxury ; and as avarice often serves as a resource to ambition, there were some grounds to believe that Alcibiades was no less solicitous for conquering Sicily and Carthage, which he pretended to possess afterwards as his own, to enrich his family, than to render it glorious. It is natural to suppose that Alcibiades did not let this speech of Nicias go unanswered.

“ This,” says Alcibiades, “ is not the first time that merit has excited jealousy, and glory been made the object of envy. That very thing which is imputed to me for a crime, is, I will presume to say it, the honor of my country, and ought to gain me applause. The splendour in which I live ; the great sums I expend, particularly in the public assemblies ; besides their being just and lawful, at the same time give foreigners a greater idea of the glory of Athens, and show that it is not in such want of money as our enemies imagine. But this is not our present business. Let the world form a judgment of me, not from passion and prejudice ; but from my actions. Was it an inconsiderable service I did the republic in bringing over in one day to its alliance the people of Elis, of Mantinea, and of Argos, that is the chief strength of Peloponnesus ? Make use, therefore, to aggrandize your empire of Alcibiades’ youth and folly, since his enemies give it that name, as well as of the wisdom and experience of Nicias ; and do not repent from vain and idle fears, your engaging in an enterprise publicly resolved upon, and which may redound infinitely both to your glory and advantage. The cities of Sicily, weary of the unjust and cruel government of their princes, and still more of the tyrannical authority which Syracuse exercises over them, wait only for a favourable opportunity to declare themselves, and are ready to

“ open their gates to whomsoever shall offer to take off the yoke under which they have so long groaned. Though the citizens of Egeata, in quality of your allies, should not have a right to your protection, yet the glory of Athens ought to engage you to support them. Republics aggrandize themselves by succouring the oppressed, and not by living inactive. In the present state of your affairs, the only way to dispirit your enemies, and show that you are not afraid of them, will be, to harass one nation, to check the progress of another, to keep them all employed, and carry your arms into distant countries. Athens was not formed for ease; and it was not by inactivity that your ancestors raised it to the height in which we now see it. For the rest, what hazards will you run by engaging in the enterprize in question? If it should be crowned with success, you will then possess yourselves of all Greece; and should it not answer your expectations, your fleet will give you an opportunity of retiring whenever you please. The Lacedæmonians, indeed, may make an incursion into our country, but, besides that it would not be in our power to prevent it, though we should not invade Sicily, we still shall preserve the empire of the sea in spite of them; a circumstance which makes our enemies entirely despair of ever being able to conquer us. Be not therefore biassed by Nicias' reasons. The only tendency of them is to sow the seeds of discord between the young and the old men, who can do nothing without one another, since it is wisdom and courage, counsel and execution, that give success to all enterprises; and this in which we are going to embark, cannot but turn to your advantage.”

* The Athenians flattered and pleased with Alcibiades' speech persisted in their first opinion. Nicias, on the other side, did not depart from his; but at the same time did not dare oppose Alcibiades any farther. Nicias was naturally of a soft and timid disposition. He was not, like Pericles, master of that lively and vehement eloquence, which, like a torrent, bears down all things in its way. And indeed the latter, on several occasions and at several times, had never failed to check the wild starts of the populace, who even then meditated the expedition into Sicily, because he was always inflexible, and never slackened the reins of that authority and kind of sovereignty which he had acquired over the people; whereas Nicias, † both by acting and speaking in an easy and gentle manner, so far from winning over the people, suffered himself to be forcibly and involuntarily carried away; and accordingly he at last yielded to the people, and accepted the command in a war which he plainly foresaw would be attended with the most fatal consequences.

Plutarch makes this reflection in his excellent treatise, where speaking of the qualities requisite in a statesman, he shows how very necessary eloquence and inflexible constancy and perseverance are to him.

Nicias, not daring to oppose Alcibiades any longer openly, endeavoured to do it indirectly, by starting a great number of difficulties, drawn especially from the great expence of this expedition. He declared, that since they were resolved upon war, they ought to carry it on in such a manner as might suit the exalted reputation to which Athens had attained; that a fleet was not sufficient to oppose so formidable a power as that of the Syracusans and their allies; that they must raise an army, composed of good horse and foot, if they desired to act in a manner worthy of so grand a design; that besides their fleet, which was to make them masters at sea,

* Plut. in præc. de ger. rep. p. 802.

† Καθ' ἑσπερινὴν ἀνδραγαθίαν καὶ λόγῳ πειρασμένος ἀποσφραδίζει τὸν δῆμον, ἢ κατεχέει.

they must have a great number of transports to carry provisions perpetually to the army, which otherwise could not possibly subsist in an enemy's country; that they must carry vast sums of money with them, without waiting for that promised them by the citizens of Egæta, who perhaps were ready in words only, and very probably might break their promise; that they ought to weigh and examine the disparity there was between themselves and their enemies with regard to the conveniences and wants of the army, the Syracusans being in their own country, in the midst of powerful allies, disposed by inclination, as well as engaged by interest, to assist them with men, arms, horses, and provisions; whereas the Athenians would carry on the war in a remote country, possessed by their enemies, where in the winter, news could not be brought them in less than four months time; a country where all things would oppose the Athenians, and nothing be procured but by force of arms; that it would reflect the greatest ignominy on the Athenians, should they be forced to abandon their enterprise, and thereby become the scorn and contempt of their enemies, by their neglecting to take all the precautions which so important a design required; that as for himself, he was determined not to go, unless he was provided with all things necessary for the expedition, because the safety of the whole army depended on that circumstance; and that he would not rely on the caprice or the precarious engagements of the allies.

* Nicias had flattered himself that this speech would cool the ardour of the people, whereas it only inflamed it the more. Immediately the generals had full powers given them to raise as many troops and fit out as many galleys as they should judge necessary; and the levies were accordingly carried on in Athens and other places with inexpressible activity.

SECTION VIII.

THE ATHENIANS PREPARE TO SET SAIL, &c. &c.

WHEN all things were ready for their departure,† and they were preparing to set sail, there happened several bad omens, which filled the minds of the people with trouble and disquietude. The † women were at that time celebrating the festival of Adonis, during which the whole city was in mourning, and full of images representing dead persons and funeral processions; and every part echoed with the cries and groans of the women, who followed those statues with lamentations of that kind; whence it was feared that this gay and magnificent armament would soon lose all its splendour, and † wither away like a flower.

The general affliction was increased by another accident. The statues of Mercury, which stood at the entrance of private houses and temples, were all mutilated in one night, and particularly in the face; and although a great reward was promised to any person who should discover the authors of so audacious a crime, no one was accused. The citizens could not forbear considering this uncommon event, not only as an unlucky omen,

* Diod. l. xiii. p. 134.

† A. M. 3589. Ant. J. C. 415. Thueyd. l. vi. p. 428. Plut. in Alcib. p. 200, 201.

‡ This superstitious rite had extended even to God's people. "And behold, there sat women weeping for Tamuz." Ezek. viii. 14. N. B. The Latin version of the Bible, which Mr. Rollin follows, says, "weeping for Adonis," which is the same as Tamuz, the Hebrews calling Adonis by that name.

§ The historian alludes to the plants and flowers that were carried in that ceremony, and which went by the name of Adonis' gardens.

but as a contrivance of some factious men, who harboured very ill designs. Some young people had already been accused of committing much the like crimes in the midst of their cups, and particularly of having wantonly mimicked the ceremonies and mysteries of Ceres and Proserpine, with Alcibiades, who represented the high-priest, at their head.* It highly concerns all those in exalted stations to be extremely careful of every step they take, and not to give the least opportunity to the most inveterate malice to censure them. They ought to call the mind, says Plutarch, that the eyes of all men are upon their conduct, and that they are ever eagle-eyed on these occasions; that not only their outward actions pass the most severe scrutiny, but that they penetrate to their most private apartments, and there take the strictest notice of their discourses, their diversions, and the most secret things transacted by them. It was this dread of the piercing eye of the people, that kept Themistocles and Pericles perpetually on their guard, and obliged them to refrain from most of those pleasures in which others indulge themselves.

As for Alcibiades, he did not know what it was to lay himself under any restraints; and accordingly, as his character was so well known, people were persuaded he very probably had been concerned in what had happened. His luxury, libertinism, and irreligion gave an air of probability to this charge, and the accuser was not afraid of telling his name. This attack staggered the constancy and resolution of Alcibiades; but hearing the soldiers and sailors declare that they were induced to engage in this expedition by no other motive but their affection for Alcibiades, and that, should the least injury be done him, they would all leave the service; he took heart, and appeared at his trial on the day appointed for that purpose. His enemies, upon pretence that it was necessary for the fleet to set sail, got the judgment superseded. It was to no purpose for Alcibiades to insist upon being tried, in case he was guilty, and not be ruined in his absence, and to represent, that it would be the most shocking and barbarous injustice to oblige him to embark for so important an expedition, without first making due inquiry into the accusations and horrid slanders which were cast upon him, the bare thoughts of which would keep him in perpetual fear and anxiety. However, none of these remonstrances proved effectual, and the fleet was ordered to set out.

† They accordingly prepared to set sail, after having appointed Corcyra the rendezvous for most of the allies, and such ships as were to carry the provisions, &c. All the citizens, as well as foreigners in Athens, flocked by day-break to the port of Pyræus. The former attended their children, relations, friends or companions, with a joy overcast with a little sorrow, upon their bidding adieu to persons that were as dear to them as life, who were setting out on a far distant and very dangerous expedition, from which it was uncertain whether they ever would return, though they flattered themselves with the hopes that it would be successful. The foreigners came thither to feed their eyes with a sight which was highly worthy their curiosity; for no single city in the world had ever fitted out so gallant a fleet. Those indeed which had been sent against Epidaurus and Potidæa, were as considerable with regard to the number of soldiers and ships; but then they were not equipped with so much magnificence, neither was their voyage so long, nor their enterprise so important. Here were seen a land and a naval army, provided with the utmost care, and at the expence of

* Plut. in præc. de rep. p. 800.

† Thucyd. p. 430—432. Diod. l. xiii. p. 135.

particular persons as well as of the public, with all things necessary, on account of the length of the voyage and the duration of the war. The city furnished 100 empty galleys, that is, 60 light ones, and 40 to transport the soldiers heavily armed. Every mariner received daily a drachm, or ten pence French, for his pay, exclusively of what the captains of ships gave the rowers* of the first bench. Add to this, the pomp and magnificence that was displayed universally, every one striving to eclipse the rest, and each captain endeavouring to make his ship the lightest, and at the same time the gayest in the whole fleet. I shall not take notice of the choice of the soldiers and seamen, who were the flower of the Athenians, nor of their emulation with regard to the beauty and neatness of their arms and equipage, any more than of their officers, who had laid out considerable sums purely to distinguish themselves, and to give foreigners an advantageous idea of their persons and circumstances; so that this sight had the air of a tournament, in which the utmost magnificence is displayed, rather than of a warlike expedition. But the boldness and greatness of the design still exceeded its expence and splendour.

When the ships were loaded, and the troops got on board, the trumpet sounded, and solemn prayers were offered up for the success of the expedition; gold and silver cups were filling every where with wine, and the accustomed libations were poured out; the people who lined the shore, shouting at the same time, and lifting up their hands to heaven, to wish their fellow citizens a good voyage and success. And now the hymn being sung, and the ceremonies ended, the ships sailed one after another, out of the harbour, after which they strove to outsail one another, till the whole fleet met at Ægina. From thence it made for Corcyra, where the army of the allies was assembling with the rest of the fleet.

SECTION IX.

SYRACUSE IS ALARMED. THE ATHENIAN FLEET ARRIVES IN SICILY.

ADVICE † of this expedition coming to Syracuse from all quarters, it was thought so improbable that at first nobody would believe it. But as it was more and more confirmed every day, the Syracusans began to think seriously of making the necessary preparations, and sent deputations to every part of the island, to ask assistance of some, and send succours to others. They garrisoned all the castles and forts in the country, reviewed all the soldiers and horses, examined the arms in the magazines, and settled and prepared all things as if the enemy had been in their country.

In the mean time the fleet sailed in three squadrons, each under the command of its particular general. It consisted of 136 ships, 100 whereof belonged to Athens, and the rest to the allies. On board these ships were 5000 heavy armed soldiers, 2200 of whom were Athenian citizens, viz. 1500 of those who had estates, and 700 ‡ who had none, but were equally citizens: the rest consisted of allies. With regard to the light infantry, there were 80 archers of Crete, and 400 of other countries, 700 Rhodian slingers, and 120 exiles of Megara. There was but one company of horse, consisting of 30 troopers, who had embarked on board a vessel

* They were called *ῥοῦραι*. They had longer oars than the rest, and consequently more trouble in rowing.

† Thucyd. l. vi. p. 432—445. Diod. l. xiii. p. 155, 156.

‡ These were called *ῥοῦραι*.

proper for transporting cavalry. Both the fleet and the land forces were afterwards increased considerably. Thirty vessels carried the provisions and cooks, with masons, carpenters, and their several tools, the whole followed by 100 small vessels for the service, exclusive of merchant ships, of which there were great numbers. All this fleet had sailed together for Corcyra. Having met with but an indifferent reception from the people of Tarentum and Locris; they sailed with a favourable wind for Rhegium, where they made some stay. The Athenians were very urgent with the inhabitants of Rhegium to succour those of Lontium, who came originally from Chalcis, as well as themselves; but these answered that they were determined to stand neuter, and to undertake nothing but in concert with the rest of Italy. Here they debated on the manner in which it was necessary to carry on the war, and waited for the coming up of those ships that had been sent out to make discoveries of a proper place for landing, and to enquire whether the citizens of Egesta had got their money ready. Upon their return, they brought advice that they had but 30 talents in the treasury. This Nicias had foreseen, but no regard had been paid to his salutary counsels.

* He did not fail the instant this news was brought to expatiate on the counsel he had given in Athens: to show the wrong step they had taken in engaging in this war, and to amplify the fatal consequences which might be expected from it; in all which he acted very imprudently. It was extremely judicious in Nicias to oppose it in the beginning, and to set every engine at work, to crush if possible this ill-fated project. But as it was resolved, and he himself had accepted of the command, he ought not to be perpetually looking backward, nor to have repeated incessantly that this war had been undertaken in opposition to all the maxims of prudence, and by that means to cool the ardour of his two colleagues in the command, to dispirit the soldiers, and to blunt that edge of confidence and ardour, which assure the success of great enterprises. The Athenians on the contrary, ought to have advanced boldly towards the enemy, should have attacked them with vigour, and have spread an universal terror, by a sudden and unexpected descent.

But Nicias acted in a quite different manner. His opinion in the council of war was, that they should sail for Selinunta, which had been the first occasion of this expedition, and then, if the citizens of Egesta performed their promise, and gave a month's pay to the army, to proceed forward, or otherwise to oblige them to furnish provisions for the 60 galleys they had demanded, and continue in that road till they should have concluded a peace with the citizens of Selinunta, either by force of arms, or some other way. He said, that they afterwards should return to Athens, after having thus made a parade of their forces, and the assistance they gave their allies, unless they should have an opportunity of making some attempt in favour of the Leontines, or of bringing over some city into their alliance.

Alcibiades answered, that it would be inglorious, after their sailing out with so noble a fleet, to return without doing any thing; and that they should first endeavour to conclude an alliance with the Greeks and barbarians, in order to divide them from the Syracusans, and procure troops and provisions from them; and especially to send a deputation to Messina, which was a kind of key to Sicily, and its harbour capacious enough to hold all the fleet. He declared further, that after seeing who were their friends and who their enemies, and strengthening themselves by the affi-

tion of a new reinforcement, they then should attack either Selinunta or Syracuse, in case the one should refuse to conclude a peace with Egesta, and the other not permit the Leontines to return to their city.

Lamachus offered a third opinion, which perhaps was the most prudent; that was, to sail directly for Syracuse, before its citizens had time to recover from their surprise, or prepare for their defence. He observed, that the sudden arrival of an armed force always strikes the greatest terror; and that when enemies are allowed time to reflect and make preparations, it also revives their courage; whereas, when they are suddenly attacked, and still in confusion, they are generally overcome; that as they would be masters of the open country, they should not be in want of any thing, but on the contrary would oblige the Sicilians to declare for them; that at last they should settle in Megara, which was quite desert, and a near neighbour to Syracuse, and there lay up their fleet in safety. However, his counsel not being followed, he agreed to that of Alcibiades. Accordingly they sailed for Sicily, where Alcibiades took Catania by surprise.

SECTION X.

ALCIBIADES RECALLED, &c. &c.

THIS was the first and last exploit performed by Alcibiades in this expedition,* he being immediately recalled by the Athenians, in order to be tried upon the accusation against him; for, from the departure of the fleet, his enemies, who had no regard to the welfare of their country, and who, upon the specious pretence of religion, which is often made a cloak to cover the darkest designs, meditated nothing but satiating their hatred and revenge; his enemies, I say, taking advantage of his absence, had proceeded in the affair with greater vigour than ever. All those against whom informations were lodged, were thrown into prison, without so much as being suffered to be heard, and that too on the evidence of the most profligate and abandoned citizens, as if, says Thucydides, it was not as great a crime to punish the innocent, as to suffer the guilty to escape. One of the informers was proved to be perjured by his own words; having declared that he saw and knew one of the accused by moon-light; whereas it appeared that there was no moon at that time. But notwithstanding this manifest perjury, the populace were as furious as ever. The remembrance of the tyranny of the Pisistratides made them apprehensive of the like fate; and strongly possessed with this fear, they would not give ear to any thing.

At last they sent out the † ship of Salamin, ordering the captain not to carry off Alcibiades by force, for fear of raising a tumult in the army, but only to order him to return to Athens, to pacify the people by his presence. Alcibiades obeyed the order, and went immediately on board his galley: but the instant he was arrived at Thurium, and had got on shore, he disappeared, and eluded the pursuit of those who sought after him. Being asked, whether he would not rely on his country, with regard to the judgment it might pass on him? "I would not," says he, "rely on my mother, for fear lest she should inadvertently mistake a ‡ black bean for a white

*Thucyd. l. vi. p. 446—450. Plut. in Alcib. p. 202.

† This was a sacred vessel appointed to fetch criminals.

‡ The judges made use of beans in giving their suffrages, and the black bean denoted condemnation.

"one." The galley of Salamin returned back without the commander, who was ashamed of his having suffered his prey to escape him in that manner. Alcibiades was sentenced to die for his contumacy. His whole estate was confiscated, and all priests and priestesses were commanded to curse him. Among the latter was one Theano, who alone had the courage to oppose this decree, saying, * "That she had been appointed priestess, not to curse, but to bless." Some time after, news being brought him that the Athenians had condemned him to die, "I shall make them sensible," says he, "that I am alive."

† Much about this time Diagoras of Miliæ, was prosecuted at Athens. He had settled himself in the latter city, where he taught Atheism, and was brought to a trial for his doctrine. † Diagoras escaped the punishment which would have been inflicted on him, by flying from the city; but he could not wipe off the ignominy of the sentence which condemned him to death. The Athenians had so great an abhorrence for the impious principles inculcated by him, that they even set a price upon his head, and promised the reward of a talent to any man who should bring him dead or alive.

‡ About 20 years before, a like affair had happened to Protagoras, for having only treated the same question by way of problem. He had said in the beginning of one of his books, "Whether the gods do or do not exist, is a question which I know not whether I ought to affirm or deny: for our understandings are too much clouded, and the life of man is too short for the solution of so nice and difficult a point." But the Athenians could not bear to have a subject of this nature made a doubt; and for this reason, they ordered proclamation to be made by the public crier, for all persons who had any copies of this book to bring them to the magistrates: after which they were burnt as infamous pieces, and the author was banished for ever from all the territories of the Athenians.

Diagoras and Protagoras had been the disciples of Democritus, who first invented the philosophy of atoms. I shall speak of him in another place.

§ From the departure of Alcibiades, Nicias had possessed the whole authority: for Lamachus his colleague, though a man of bravery and experience, was however in no credit, because of his extreme poverty, for which he was despised by the soldiers. But the Athenians were not always in this way of thinking; for we have seen that Aristides, poor as he was, was not less esteemed and respected on that account. But in this last expedition, the people in general had imbibed a passion for luxury and magnificence; the natural consequences of which is a love of riches. As Nicias therefore governed all affairs solely, all his actions were of the same cast with his disposition, that is, of a slow and fearful kind; he suffered every thing to languish, sometimes either by lying still and undertaking nothing, sometimes by only sailing along the coast, or losing time in consulting and deliberating; all which soon suppressed, on one side, the ardour and confidence the troops expressed at first; and on the other, the fear and terror with which the enemy had been seized, at the sight of so terrible an armament. He besieged Hybla; and though it was but a small city, he was however obliged to raise the siege some days after, which

* *Θεοποιον ουχουν ου καταραται ιερεις υψουσιαι.*

† Joseph. contr. App.

† Diod. l. xiii. p. 157.

‡ Diog. Laert. in Protag. Joseph. contr. App. Cic. l. i. de Nat. Deor. n. 62.

§ Thucyd. p. 452, 453. Plut. in Nic. p. 553.

brought him into the highest contempt. He retired at last to Catania, after having performed but one exploit, viz. the ruining of Hyccara, a small town inhabited by barbarians; from which place it is said that *Lais* the courtesan, at that time very young, was sold with the rest of the captives, and carried to Peloponnesus.

* In the mean time, Alcibiades, having left Thurium, was arrived at Argos; and as he quite despaired of ever being recalled home, he sent a messenger to the Spartans, desiring leave to reside among them, under their guard and protection. He promised in the most solemn manner, that if they would consider him as their friend, he would perform greater service for their state than he before had done injuries to it. The Spartans received him with open arms, and soon after his arrival in their city, he gained the love and esteem of all its inhabitants. He charmed, and even enchanted them by his conforming himself so easily to their way of living. Such people as saw Alcibiades shave himself to the skin, bathe in cold water, eat of the coarse heavy cakes, which were their usual food, and be so well satisfied with their black broth, could not persuade themselves that a man who submitted so cheerfully to this kind of life, had ever kept cooks in his palace, had used essences and perfumes, had wore the rich stuffs of Miletus; in a word, that he had hitherto lived in the midst of voluptuousness and profusion of all things. But flexibility was the characteristic that chiefly distinguished Alcibiades. Cameleon-like, he could assume all shapes and colours, to win the favour of those among whom he resided. He immediately assumed their manners, and adapted himself to their taste, as if they had been natural to him; and though he inwardly had an aversion to them, he could however cover his disgust with an easy, simple, and unconstrained air. With some he had all the graces and vivacity of the gayest youth, and with others all the gravity of old age. In Sparta, he was laborious, frugal, and austere; in Ionia, enjoyment, idleness and pleasure, made up his whole life; in Thrace, he was always on horseback, or carousing; and when he resided with Tissaphernes the satrap, he exceeded all the magnificence of the Persians in luxury and profusion.

But he was not barely satisfied with gaining the esteem of the Lacedæmonians. He insinuated himself so far into the affection of *Timea*, the wife of king *Agis*, that he had a son by her, who in public went by the name of *Leotychides*; though his mother in private, and among her women and female friends, did not blush to call him Alcibiades; so violent was her passion for that Athenian. *Agis* was informed of this intrigue, and therefore refused to own *Leotychides* for his son; for which reason he was afterwards excluded the throne.

SECTION XI.

DESCRIPTION OF SYRACUSE.

AS the siege of Syracuse is one of the most considerable in the Grecian history, the particular circumstances of which I thought proper to relate for that reason, in order to give my readers an idea of the manner of besieging by the ancients, I judge it necessary, before I enter into that detail, to give the reader a description and plan of the city of Syracuse, in which he will also find the different fortifications both of the Athenians and Syracusans mentioned in this siege.

* Plut. in Alcib. p. 280:

* Syracuse stood on the eastern coast of Sicily. Its vast extent, its advantageous situation, the conveniency of its double harbour, its fortifications built with the utmost care and labour, and the multitude and wealth of its inhabitants, made it one of the greatest, the most beautiful, and most powerful among the Grecian cities. † We are told its air was so pure and serene, that there was no day in the year, how cloudy soever it might be, in which the sun did not display its beams.

‡ It was built by Archias the Corinthian, a year after Naxos and Megara had been founded on the same coast.

When the Athenians besieged this city, it was divided into three parts, viz. the Island, Achradina, and Tyche. Thucydides mentions only these three divisions. Two more, viz. Neapolis and Epipolæ, were afterwards added.

The island, situated to the south, was called Νῆσος, Nasos, signifying in Greek, an island, but pronounced according to the Doric dialect; and Ortygia. It was joined to the continent by a bridge. || It was in this island that the Syracusans afterwards built the citadel and the palace of their kings. This quarter or division of the city was of very great importance, because it might render those who possessed it, masters of the two ports which surrounded it. It was for this reason the Romans, when they took Syracuse, would not suffer any Syracusans to inhabit the island.

§ There was in this island a very famous spring called Arethusa. The ancients, or rather the poets, from reasons which have not the least shadow of probability, supposed that Alpheus, a river of Elis in Peloponnesus, rolled its waters either through or under the waves of the sea, without ever mixing them, as far as the spring or fountain of Arethusa. It was this fiction gave occasion to the following lines of Virgil:—

Extremum hunc, Arethusa, mihi concede laborem.—
Sic tibi, cum fluctus subterlabere Sicanos,
Doris amara suam non intermisceat undam.

VIRG. Eclog. 10.

Thy sacred succour, Arethusa, bring,
To crown my labour: 'Tis the last I sing.—
So may thy silver streams beneath the tide,
Unmix'd with briny seas, securely glide.

DRYDEN.

Achradina, situated entirely on the sea-side, towards the east, was the most spacious, the most beautiful, and best fortified quarter of the city.

Tyche, so called from the temple of Fortune, Τυχη which embellished that part of the city, extended along Achradina westward from the north towards the south, and was very well inhabited. It had a famous gate called Hexapylum, which led into the country, and was situated to the north of the city.

Epipolæ was a hill without the city, which it commanded. It was situ-

* Cic. Verr. 6. n. 117—119.

† Urbem Syracusas elegerat, cujus hic situs atque hæc natura esse loci cœlique dicitur, ut nullus unquam dies tam magna turbulentaque tempestate fuerit, quia aliquo tempore solem ejus diei homines viderent. Cic. Verr. 7. n. 26.

‡ A. M. 3295. Ant. J. C. 709. Strab. l. 6. p. 269.

|| Cic. Verr. 7. n. 97.

§ Strab. l. vi. 270. Senec. Nat. Quæst. l. iii. c. 26.

ated between Hexapylum and the point of Euryelus, towards the north and west. It was exceedingly steep in several places, and for that reason of very difficult access. At the time of the siege in question, it was not surrounded with walls, and the Syracusans defended it with a body of troops against the attack of the enemy. Euryelus was the pass or entrance which led to Epipolæ. On the small hill of Epipolæ, was a fort called Labdalon, or Labdalum.

It was not till long after, under Dionysius the tyrant, that Epipolæ was surrounded with walls, and inclosed within the city, of which it formed a fifth part, but was thinly inhabited. A fourth division had been added before called Neapolis, that is, the new city, which covered Tyche.

* The river Anapis ran at almost half a league distance from the city. The space between them was a large and beautiful plain, terminated by two fens or moors, the one called Syraco, whence the city was named, and the other Lysimelia. This river emptied itself into the great harbour. Near its mouth, southward, was a kind of castle, called Olympia, from the temple of Jupiter Olympius standing there, and in which were great riches. It was 500 paces from the city.

Syracuse had two harbours very near one another, and separated only by the isle, viz. the great harbour and the small one, called otherwise Laccus. According to the † description which the Roman orator gives of them, both were surrounded with buildings as parts of the city.

The great harbour was a little above ‡ 5000 paces, or two leagues in circumference. It had a gulf called Dascon. The entrance of this port was but 500 paces wide. It was formed on one side by the point of the island Ortygia, and on the other by the little island and cape of Plemmyrium, which was commanded by a fort or castle of the same name.

Above Achradina was a third port, called the harbour of Trogilius.

SECTION XII.

NICIAS, AFTER SOME ENGAGEMENTS, BESIEGES SYRACUSE, &c. &c.

EIGHTEENTH YEAR OF THE WAR.

AT the end of the summer,|| news was brought Nicias that the Syracusans, having resumed courage, intended to march against him. Accordingly their cavalry advanced with an air of insolence to attack him even in his camp; and asked with a loud laugh, whether he was come into Sicily to settle in Catana. These severe reproaches roused him a little, so that he resolved to sail for Syracuse. The enterprise was bold and dangerous. Nicias could not, without running the utmost hazard, attempt to land in presence of an enemy who waited for him with the greatest resolution, and would not fail to charge him the instant he should offer to make a descent. Nor was it safer for him to march his troops by land, because, as he had no cavalry, that of the Syracusans, which was very numerous, upon the first advice they should have of their march, would come to blows, and overpower him by the superiority of forces.

* Plut. in Dionys. vit. p. 970.

† Portus habet prope in ædificatione aspectuque urbis inclusos. Cic. Verr. 6. n. 117.

‡ According to Strabo, it is 80 stadia in circumference, which is twice its real extent; a plain proof that this passage of Strabo is corrupt.—Culver. p. 16.

|| Thucyd. l. vi. p. 453—461. Plut. in Nic. p. 533, 534. Diod. l. cxxxvii. cxxxviii.

To extricate himself from this perplexity, and enable himself to seize, without opposition, upon an advantageous post which a Syracusan exile had discovered to him, Nicias had recourse to stratagem. He caused a false piece of news to be given to the enemy, viz. that by means of a conspiracy, which was to take effect on a certain day, they might seize on his camp, and possess themselves of all the arms and baggage. The Syracusans on this promise, marched towards Catana, and pitched their camp near Leontium. The moment the Athenians had advice of this, they embarked with all their troops and ammunition, and in the evening steered for Syracuse. They arrived by day-break in the great harbour, landed near Olympia, in the place which had been pointed out to them, and there fortified themselves. The enemy finding themselves shamefully overreached, returned immediately to Syracuse, and in the greatest rage drew up in battle-array some days after before the walls of the city. Nicias marched out of the trenches, and a battle was fought. Victory was a long time doubtful, but a very heavy shower of rain, accompanied with thunder and lightning, coming unexpectedly, the Syracusans, who were unexperienced, and the greatest part of them having never carried arms before, were frightened at the tempest, whilst their enemies laughed at it as the mere effect of the season, and regarded nothing but the enemy, who were much more to be dreaded than the storm. The Syracusans, after making a long and vigorous resistance, were forced to give way. The Athenians could not pursue them far, because their horse, which were still in a body, and had not been defeated, covered their retreat. The Syracusans retreated in good order into the city, after having thrown a body of troops into the temple of Olympia to prevent its being plundered.

This temple stood pretty near the camp of the Athenians, who were very desirous of taking it, because it abounded with gold and silver offerings, which the piety of kings and nations had consecrated. Nicias having delayed sending troops to seize it, lost the opportunity, and gave the Syracusans time to throw into it, as was before observed, a detachment to defend it. It was thought he did this on purpose, and out of reverence to the gods, because, had the soldiers plundered this temple, the public would not have reaped any benefit by it, and himself only had been accused of the sacrilege.

After the battle, the Athenians, who were not yet in a condition to attack Syracuse, retired with their fleet to Naxos and Catana to winter there, with design to return in the beginning of the next spring, and lay siege to the city. To do this, they wanted money, provisions, and particularly horse, of which they were absolutely destitute. The Athenians depended upon obtaining part of these succours from the people of Sicily, who they supposed would join them the instant they should hear of their victory; and at the same time they sent an express to Athens to solicit the like aid. They also addressed the Carthaginians for their alliance; and sent deputies to some cities of Italy, situated on the coast of the Tuscan sea, which had promised to assist them.

The Syracusans were far from desponding. Hermocrates, who of all their leaders was most distinguished for his valour, his judgment, and experience, represented to them, in order to raise their hopes, that they had not been wanting in courage, but in conduct; that the enemies though very brave, owed their victory to their good fortune rather than to their merit; that they having a multitude of leaders (they were 15 in number,) from which confusion and disobedience are inseparable, had done them prejudice; that it would be absolutely necessary for them to choose experienced

generals, to keep the rest in their duty, and exercise their forces continually during the winter season. This advice being followed, Hermocrates and two more were elected generals; after which they sent deputies to Corinth and Lacedæmon to renew the alliance, and at the same time to engage them to make a diversion, in order to oblige, if possible, the Athenians to recal their troops out of Sicily, or at least to prevent their sending a reinforcement thither. The fortifying of Syracuse was the chief object of their care. Accordingly they took into the city by a wall all the tract of land towards Epipolæ, from the northern extremity of Tyche, descending westward towards the quarter or division of the city called afterwards Neapolis, in order to remove the enemy to a greater distance, and to give them more trouble in making their contravallation, by obliging them to give a larger extent to it. This part, in all probability, had been neglected, because it seemed to be sufficiently defended by its rugged and steep situation. They also garrisoned Megara and Olympia, and drove stakes into all those parts of the sea shore where the enemy might easily make a descent. Hearing afterwards that the Athenians were at Naxos, they went and burnt the camp of Catana, and retired, after laying waste the country adjacent to it.

* The ambassadors of Syracuse, being arrived among the Corinthians, asked succour of them, as having been their founders, which was immediately granted; and at the same time they sent an embassy to the Lacedæmonians, to invite them to declare in their favour. Alcibiades enforced their demand with all his credit and eloquence, which his resentment against Athens inflamed prodigiously. He advised and exhorted the Lacedæmonians to appoint Gylippus their general, and send him into Sicily; and at the same time to invade the Athenians, in order to make a powerful diversion. In the third place, he counselled them to fortify Decelia in Attica, which quite completed the ruin of the city of Athens, it not being able ever to recover that blow: for by this fort the Lacedæmonians made themselves masters of the country, by which the Athenians were deprived of their silver mines of Laurium, and of the revenues of their lands; nor could they be succoured by their neighbours, Decelia becoming the asylum of all the malecontents and partisans of Sparta.

† Nicias had received some succours from Athens. It consisted of 250 horsemen, who the Athenians supposed would be furnished with horses in Sicily (the troops bringing only the furniture,) and of 30 horse-archers, with 300 talents, that is, 300,000 French crowns.‡ Nicias now began to prepare for action. He was accused of often letting slip opportunities, by his losing time in deliberating, arguing, and concerting measures; however, when once he entered upon action, he was as bold and vigorous in executing, as before he had been slow and timorous in undertaking, as he showed on the present occasion.

The Syracusans hearing that the Athenians had a reinforcement of cavalry, and would soon march and lay siege to their city; and knowing they could not possibly approach it, or make a contravallation, unless they should possess themselves of the hill of Epipolæ, which commanded Syracuse, they resolved to guard the avenue to it, which was the only pass by which the enemy could get up to it, every other part being rugged and inaccessible. Marching therefore down into the meadow or plain, border-

* Thucyd. l. vi. p. 471—482. Plut. in Alcib. p. 203. In Nic. p. 584, 585. Diod. l. xii. p. 138.

† A. M. 3590. Ant. J. C. 414.

‡ About 67,000l. sterling.

ed by the river Anapis, and reviewing their troops there, they appointed 700 foot, under the command of Diomilus, to guard that important post; and commanded them to repair to it, at the first signal which should be given for that purpose. But Nicias conducted his design with so much prudence, expedition, and secrecy, that they had not time to do this. He sailed from Catana with all his fleet, without the enemy's having the least suspicion of his design. Being arrived at the port of Trogilus near Leontium, which is but a quarter of a league (six or seven furlongs) from Epipolæ, he put his land forces on shore, after which he retired with his fleet to Thapsus, a small peninsula of Syracuse, the entrance to which he shut up with a stacado.

The land forces marched with the utmost expedition to seize on Epipolæ, by the pass of Euryelus, before the enemy, who were in the plains of Anapis, at above a league's distance, had the least notice of their arrival. At the first news of this, the 700 soldiers, under the command of Diomilus, advanced forward in confusion, but were easily defeated, and 300 of them, with their leader, left dead in the field. The Athenians, after setting up a trophy, built a fort in Labdalon, on the summit of Epipolæ, in order to secure their baggage and most valuable effects in it, whenever they should be forced to fight, or work at the contravallation.

Soon after the inhabitants of Egesta sent the Athenians 300 horse, to which some of their Sicilian allies added 100 more; that with the 250 sent before by the Athenians, and who had furnished themselves with horses in Sicily, made a body of 650 horse.

The plan laid down by Nicias, in order for taking Syracuse, was, to surround all the city on the land side with a strong contravallation, in order to cut off all communication with the place from without, in hopes, no doubt, that his fleet would afterwards enable him to prevent the Syracusans from receiving any succours or provisions by sea.

Having left a garrison in Labdalon, he came down from the hill, advanced towards the northern extremity of Tyche, and halting there, he employed the whole army in throwing up a line of contravallation, to shut up their city northward from Tyche as far as Trogilus, situated on the sea side. This work was carried on with such a rapidity as terrified the Syracusans. They thought it absolutely necessary to prevent the carrying on of this work, and accordingly made some sallies and attacks, but always with disadvantage, and even their cavalry was routed. The day after the action, the contravallation, northward, was continued by part of the army, during which the rest carried stones and other materials towards Trogilus, in order to finish it.

The besieged, by the advice of Hermocrates, thought it advisable not to venture a second battle with the Athenians; and only endeavoured to put a stop to their works, at least to render them useless, by running a line to cut that carried on by the Athenians. They imagined, that in case they should be suffered to complete their wall, it would be impossible for the Athenians to make any farther progress in their work; or that, should they endeavour to prevent it, it would suffice for the Syracusans to oppose them with a part of their forces, after having shut up such avenues as were most accessible with strong palisades; and that the Athenians, on the contrary, would be obliged to send for all their forces, and entirely abandon their works.

Accordingly they came out of their city, and working with inexpressible ardour, they began to raise a wall; and in order to carry it on with less molestation, they covered it with strong palisades, and flanked it with wood-

en towers, at proper distances, to defend it. The Athenians suffered the Syracusans to carry on their works undisturbed, because had they marched only part of their troops against them, they would have been too weak; and if they had brought them all, they then must have been obliged to discontinue their works, which they were resolved not to do. The work being completed, the Syracusans left a body of troops to defend the palisade, and guard the wall, and then returned into the city.

In the mean time the Athenians cut off the canals by which water was conveyed into the city; and observing the Syracusan soldiers, who had been left to guard the wall, very negligent in their duty, some returning at noon either into the city or their tents, and the rest not keeping a proper guard; they detached 300 chosen soldiers, and some light infantry, to attack this post; during which the rest of the army marched towards the city, to prevent any succours from coming out of it. Accordingly the 300 soldiers having forced the palisade, pursued those who guarded it as far as that part of the city wall which covered Temenos; where, pouring in indiscriminately with them, they were repulsed by the inhabitants with loss. The whole army afterwards demolished the wall, and pulled up the palisades of the intrenchment, and carried them off.

After this success, whereby the Athenians were masters of the northern parts, they began the very next day a still more important work, and which would quite finish their inclosure of the city, viz. to carry a wall from the hills of Epipolæ, westward, through the plain and the fens as far as the great harbour. To prevent this, the besieged beginning the same kind of work as they had carried on on the other side, ran a trench, lined with palisades, from the city through the fens, to prevent the Athenians from carrying their contravallations as far as the sea. But the latter, after finishing the first part of the wall on the hills of Epipolæ, resolved to attack this new work. For this purpose, they ordered their fleet to sail from Thapsus to the great harbour of Syracuse, it having continued in that road hitherto; and the besieged had always the sea open to them, by which the besiegers were obliged to get their provisions from Thapsus by land. The Athenians came down therefore from Epipolæ into the plain before day-break; when throwing planks and beams in that part where the fen was only slimy and more firm than in other places, they immediately carried the greatest part of the fosse lined with palisades, and then the rest, after having beaten the Syracusans, who gave way and retired; such as were on the right towards the city, and the rest towards the river. Three hundred chosen Athenians having attempted to cut off the passage of the latter, flew towards the bridge; but the enemy's cavalry, the greatest part of which were drawn up in battle, repulsed them; and afterwards charged the right wing of the Athenians, and put the first battalions into disorder. Lamachus perceiving this from the left wing, where he commanded, ran thither with the Argives and some archers; but having passed a trench, and being abandoned by his soldiers, he was killed with five or six who followed him. The enemy immediately passed the river, and seeing the rest of the army come up, they retired.

At the same time the right wing, which had returned towards the city, resumed courage from this success, and drew up in order of battle before the Athenians; after having detached some troops to attack the fort on the hills of Epipolæ, which served as a magazine to the enemy, and was thought to be unguarded. They forced an intrenchment that covered the fort, but Nicias saved it. He was sick in this fort, and at that time in his bed, with only his domestics about him. Animated by the danger, and the presence

of the enemy, he struggles with his indisposition, rises up, and commands his servants to set fire immediately to all the timber lying between the intrenchment and the fort for the military engines, and to the engines themselves. This unexpected conflagration stopped the Syracusans, saved Nicias, the fort, and all the rich effects of the Athenians, who made haste to the relief of that general. At the same time the fleet was seen sailing into the great barbour, according to the orders given for that purpose. The Syracusans having perceived this from the hill, and fearing they should be attacked from behind, and overpowered by the land forces, they retired, and returned to the city with all their forces; now no longer expecting, after having lost their fosse lined with palisades, that it would be possible for them to prevent the enemy from carrying on their contravallation as far as the sea.

In the mean time the Athenians who had contented themselves with building a single wall on the hills of Epipolæ, and through such places as were craggy and of difficult access, being come down into the plain, began to build, at the foot of the hills, a double wall, intending to carry it as far as the sea, viz. a wall of contravallation against the besieged, and another of circumvallation against those Syracusan troops which were out of the city, and such allies as might come to its aid.

From thenceforth Nicias, who now was sole general, conceived great hopes; for several cities of Sicily, which hitherto had not declared for either side, came and joined him; and there arrived from all quarters vessels laden with provisions for his army, all parties being eager to go over to him, because he had acquired the superiority, and been exceedingly successful in all his undertakings. The Syracusans, seeing themselves blocked up both by sea and land, and losing all hopes of being able to defend their city any longer, already proposed an accommodation. Gylippus, who was coming from Lacedæmon to their assistance, having heard in his passage the extremity to which they were reduced, and looking upon the whole island as lost, sailed forward nevertheless; not in the view of defending Sicily, but only to preserve to the nations of Italy such cities as were subject to them in that island, if it were not too late, and if this could be done. For fame had declared in all places that the Athenians had already possessed themselves of the whole island; and were headed by a general, whose wisdom and good fortune rendered him invincible. Nicias himself, now, contrary to his natural disposition, confiding in his own strength, and elate from his success; persuaded also by the secret advices which were brought him daily from Syracuse, and the messengers who were sent to him, that the city would immediately capitulate; did not regard Gylippus' approach, and in consequence took no precautions to prevent his landing, especially when he heard that he brought but very few vessels; terming him a trifling pirate, not worthy in any manner his notice. But a general ought to be extremely careful not to abate his cares and vigilance upon account of success, because the least negligence may ruin every thing. Had Nicias sent the smallest detachment to oppose Gylippus' landing, he would have taken Syracuse, and the whole affair had been ended.

SECTION XIII.

THE SYRACUSANS RESOLVE TO CAPITULATE, BUT GYLIPPUS' ARRIVAL
CHANGES THE FACE OF AFFAIRS, &c.

NINETEENTH YEAR OF THE WAR.

THE fortifications of the Athenians were now almost completed; * and they had drawn a double wall, near half a league in length, along the plain and the fens towards the great port, and had almost reached it. There now remained, on the side towards Trogius, only a small part of the wall to be finished. The Syracusans were therefore on the brink of ruin, and had no hopes left, as they were no longer able to defend themselves, and did not expect any succours. For this reason they resolved to surrender. Accordingly a council was held to settle articles of capitulation, in order to present them to Nicias; and several were of opinion that it would be proper to capitulate soon, before the city should be entirely invested.

It was at that very instant, and at the most critical juncture, that an officer, Gongyles by name, arrived from Corinth on board a ship with three benches of oars. At his arrival, all the citizens flocked around him. He informed them, that Gylippus would be with them immediately, and was followed by a great many other galleys, which came to their aid. The Syracusans, astonished, or rather stupefied, as it were, with this news, could scarce believe what they heard. Whilst they were thus fluctuating and in doubt, a courier arrived from Gylippus to inform them of his approach, and order them to march out all their troops to meet him. He himself, after having taken a fort (Jeges) in his way, marched in battle directly for Epipolæ; and ascending by Euryelus, as the Athenians had done, he prepared to attack them from without, whilst the Syracusans should charge them, on their side, with the forces of Syracuse and his. The Athenians, exceedingly surprised by his arrival, drew up hastily, and without order, under the walls. With regard to himself, laying down his arms when he approached, he sent word by a herald, that he would allow the Athenians five days to leave Sicily. Nicias did not condescend to make the least answer to this proposal; and some of his soldiers bursting out a laughing, asked the herald, "Whether the presence of a Lacedæmonian privateer, and a trifling wand, could make any change in the present state of the city?" Both sides therefore prepared for battle.

Gylippus stormed the fort of Labdalon, and cut to pieces all who were found in it. The same day an Athenian galley was taken, as it sailed into the harbour. The besieged afterwards drew a wall from the city, towards Epipolæ, in order to cut, about the extremity of it, the single wall of the Athenians; and to deprive them of all communication with the troops posted in the intrenchments which surrounded the city on the north side towards Tyche and Trogius. The Athenians, after having finished the wall, which extended as far as the sea towards the great harbour, were returned to the hills. Gylippus perceiving, in the single wall which the Athenians had built on the hills of Epipolæ, a part that was weaker and lower than the rest, marched thither in the night with his troops; but being discovered by the Athenians, who were encamped without, he was forced to retire, upon seeing them advance directly towards him. They raised the wall

A. M. 3507. Ant. J. C. 415. Thueyd. l. vii. p. 485—489. Plut. in Nic. p. 535, 536. Diod. l. xiii. p. 139, 139.

higher, and themselves undertook the guard of it; after having fixed their allies in the several posts of the remainder of the intrenchment.

Nicias, on the other side, thought proper to fortify the cape of Plemmyrium, which, by its running into the sea, straitened the mouth of the great harbour; and his design thereby was to procure provisions, and all other things he might want, the more easily; because the Athenians, by possessing themselves of that post, drew near the little port, wherein lay the chief naval forces of the Syracusans, and were the better able to observe the various motions of it; and that besides, by having the sea open, they would not be forced to have all their provisions from the bottom of the great harbour; as they must have been, should the enemy, by seizing on the mouth of it, oblige them to keep close in the harbour, in the manner they then did. For Nicias, from the arrival of Gylippus, had no hopes left but from the side next the sea. Sending therefore his fleet and part of his troops thither, he built three forts, by which the ships were enabled to lie at anchor; he also secured there a great part of the baggage and ammunition. It was then that the troops on board the fleet suffered very much; for as they were obliged to go a great way to fetch wood and water, they were surrounded by the enemy's horse, the third part of which were posted at Olympia, to prevent the garrison of Plemmyrium from sallying, and were masters of the field. Advice being brought to Nicias that the Corinthian fleet was advancing, he sent 20 galleys against it; ordering them to observe the enemy towards Locris, Rhegium, and the rest of the avenues of Sicily.

In the mean time Gylippus, employing those very stones which the Athenians had got together for their use, went on with the wall which the Syracusans had begun to carry through Epipolæ; and drew up daily in battle array before it, as did the Athenians. When he saw it was a proper time for engaging, he began the battle in the spot lying between the two walls. The narrowness of it having rendered his cavalry and archers useless, he came off with loss, and the Athenians set up a trophy. Gylippus, to reanimate his soldiers, by doing them justice, had the courage to reproach himself for the ill success they had met with, and to declare publicly, that he, not they, had occasioned the late defeat, because he had made them fight in too narrow a spot of ground. However, he promised soon to give them an opportunity of recovering both their honour and his; and accordingly, the very next day, he led them against the enemy, after having exhorted them, in the strongest terms, to behave in a manner worthy of their ancient glory. Nicias perceiving, that though he should not desire to come to a battle, it would however be absolutely necessary for him to prevent the enemy from extending their line beyond the contravallation, to which they were already very near; because otherwise this would be granting them a certain victory; he therefore marched against the Syracusans. Gylippus brought up his troops beyond that place where the walls terminated on both sides, in order that he might leave the more room to extend his battle; when charging the enemy's left wing with his horse, he put it to flight, and soon after defeated the right. We have here an instance of what the experience and abilities of a great captain are capable of producing: for Gylippus, with the same men, the same arms, the same horses, and the same ground, by only changing his order of battle, defeated the Athenians, and beat them quite to their camp. The following night the victors carried on their wall beyond the contravallation of the Athenians, and thereby deprived them of all hopes of being ever able to surround them.

* After this success, the Syracusans, to whose aid the Corinthian fleet was arrived unperceived by that of the Athenians, resumed courage, armed several galleys, and marching into the plains with their cavalry and other forces, took a great number of prisoners. They sent deputies to Lacedæmonia and Corinth to desire a reinforcement; Gylippus went in person to all the cities in Sicily, to solicit them to join him, and brought over the greatest part of them, who accordingly sent him powerful succours. Nicias, finding his troops lessen, and those of the enemy increase daily, began to be discouraged, and not only sent expresses to the Athenians, to acquaint them with the situation of affairs, but likewise wrote to them in the strongest terms. I repeat his whole letter, both as it gives a clear and exact account of the state of things at that time in Syracuse, and may serve as a model for such kind of relations.

“ Athenians: I have already informed you by several expresses of what passed here: but it is necessary you should know the present situation of affairs, that you may resolve accordingly. After we had been victorious in several engagements, and almost completed our contravallation, Gylippus arrived in Syracuse with a body of Lacedæmonian and Sicilian troops; and having been defeated the first time, he was victorious the second, by means of his cavalry and archers. We are in consequence shut up in our intrenchments, without daring to make any attempt, or complete our works, through the superiority of the enemy’s forces; for part of our soldiers are employed in guarding our forts, and consequently we have not an opportunity of employing all our forces in battle. Besides, as the Syracusans have cut our lines by a wall, in that part where they were not complete, it will no longer be possible for us to invest the city, unless we should force their intrenchments; so that instead of besieging, we ourselves are besieged, and dare not stir out for fear of their horse.

“ Not contented with these advantages, they are bringing new succours from Peloponnesus, and have sent Gylippus to force all the neutral cities of Sicily to declare for them, and the rest to furnish them with men and ships, to attack us both by sea and land. I say by sea, which though very surprising, is however but too true. For our fleet, which before was considerable, from the good condition of the galleys and mariners, is now very deficient in those very circumstances, and prodigiously weakened.

“ Our galleys leak every where; because we cannot draw them on shore to careen them, for fear, lest those of the enemy, which are more numerous, and in better condition than ours, should attack us on a sudden, which they seem to threaten every moment. Besides, we are under a necessity of sending many backwards and forwards to guard the convoys, which we are forced to fetch from a great distance, and bring along in sight of the enemy; so that should we be ever so little negligent in this point, our army would be starved.

“ With regard to the ships’ crews, they decrease sensibly every day; for as great numbers of them disperse to maraud, or to fetch wood and water, they are often cut to pieces by the enemy’s horse. Our slaves, allured by the neighbourhood of the enemy’s camp, desert very fast to it. The foreigners which we forced into the service, diminish daily; and such as have been raised with money, who came for plunder rather than fighting, finding themselves baulked, go over to the enemy, who are so near us, or else hide themselves in Sicily, which they may easily do

* Thucyd. l. vii. p. 490—494. Plut. in Nic. p. 536. Diod. l. xiii. p. 139.

“ in so large an island. A great number of citizens, though long used to, and well skilled in working of ships, by bribing the captains, put others in their room, who are wholly unexperienced, and incapable of serving, and by that means have quite subverted all discipline. I am now writing to men perfectly well versed in naval affairs, and who are very sensible, that when order is neglected, every thing grows worse, and a fleet must inevitably be ruined.

“ But the most unhappy circumstance is, that though I am generalissimo, I cannot put a stop to these disorders. For, Athenians, you are very sensible, that such is your disposition that you do not easily brook restraint; besides, I do not know where to furnish myself with seamen, whilst the enemy get numbers from all quarters. It is not in the power of our Sicilian allies to aid us; and should the cities of Italy, from whence we have our provisions, hearing the extremity to which we are reduced, and your not taking the least care to send us any succour, join the Syracusans, we are undone; and the enemy will have no occasion to fight us.

“ I could write of things which would be more agreeable, but of none that could be more advantageous to you, nor which could give you a more just idea of the subjects on which you are to deliberate. I am sensible that you love to have such advices only sent you as are pleasing; but then I know, on the other side, that when affairs turn out otherwise than you expected and hoped for, you accuse those who deceived you, which induced me to give you a sincere and genuine account of things, without concealing a single circumstance. By the way, I am to inform you, that no complaints can be justly made either against the officers or common soldiers, both having done their duty very well.

“ But now that the Sicilians join all their forces against us, and expect a new army from Peloponnesus, you may lay this down as the foundation for your deliberation, that our present troops are not sufficient; and therefore we either must be recalled, or else a land and naval force equal to the first must be sent us, with money in proportion. You must also think of appointing a person to succeed me, it being impossible for me, through my nephritic disorder, to sustain any longer the weight of the command. I imagine that I deserve this favour at your hands, on account of the services I have done you in the several commands conferred upon me, so long as my health would permit me to act.

“ To conclude, whatever resolution you may come to, the request I have to make is, that you would execute it speedily, and in the very beginning of the spring. The succours which our enemies meet with in Sicily are all ready; but those which they expect from Peloponnesus may be longer in coming. However, fix this in your minds, that if you do not exert yourselves, the Lacedæmonians will not fall, as they have already done, to be beforehand with you.”

The Athenians were strongly affected with this letter, which made as great an impression on them as Nicias expected. However, they did not think proper to appoint him a successor, and only nominated two officers who were under him, viz. Meander, and Euthydemus, to assist him till other generals should be sent. Eurymedon and Demosthenes were chosen to succeed Lamachus and Alcibiades. The former set out immediately with ten galleys and some money,* about the winter solstice, to assure Nicias that a speedy succour should be sent him, during which the latter

* 120 talents.

was raising troops and contributions, in order to set sail early in the spring. * The Lacedæmonians, on the other side, being supported by the Corinthians, were very industrious in preparing reinforcements to send into Sicily, and to enter Attica, in order to keep the Athenian fleet from sailing to that island. Accordingly they entered Attica early, under the command of king Agis, and after having laid waste the country, they fortified Decelia, having divided the work among all the forces, to make the greater dispatch. This post is about 120 furlongs from Athens, that is about 6 French leagues, and the same distance from Bœotia. Alcibiades was perpetually soliciting the Lacedæmonians, and could not be easy till he had prevailed with them to begin that work. This annoyed the Athenians most of all; for hitherto the enemy retiring after they had laid waste the Athenian territories, the latter were unmolested all the rest of the year; but from the fortifying of Decelia, the garrison left in it was continually making incursions and alarming the Athenians, Athens being now become a kind of frontier town; for in the day time a guard was mounted at all the gates, and in the night all the citizens were either on the walls, or under arms. Such vessels as brought provisions from the island of Eubœa, and which before had a much shorter passage by Decelia, were forced to go round about, in order to double the cape of Sunium, by which means provisions as well as goods imported, grew much dearer: To heighten the calamity, upwards of 20,000 slaves, the greatest part of whom were artificers, went over to the enemy, to fly from the extreme misery with which the city was afflicted. The cattle of all kinds died. Most of the horses were lamed, being continually upon guard, or upon parties. Every thing being laid waste in this manner, and the Athenians enjoying no longer the revenues which arose from the produce of their lands, there was a prodigious scarcity of money; so that they were forced to take the twentieth part of all the imports, to supply their usual subsidies.

† In the mean time Gylippus, who had made the tour of Sicily, returned with as many men as he could raise in the whole island, and prevailed with the Syracusans to fit out the strongest fleet in their power, and to hazard a battle at sea, upon the presumption that the success would answer the greatness of the enterprise. This advice was strongly enforced by Hermocrates, who exhorted the Syracusans not to abandon to their enemies the empire of the sea. He observed that the Athenians themselves, had not received it from their ancestors, nor been always possessed of it; that the Persian war had in a manner forced them into the knowledge of naval affairs, notwithstanding two great obstacles, their disposition and the situation of their city, which stood at a considerable distance from the sea; that they had made themselves formidable to other nations, not so much by their real strength, as by their courage and intrepidity; that they ought to copy them; and since they had to do with enemies who were so enterprising, it was fit they should be equally daring.

This advice was approved, and accordingly a large fleet was equipped. Gylippus led out all his land forces in the night time to attack the forts of Plemmyrium. Thirty-five galleys of Syracuse which were in the great harbour, and 45 of the lesser, where was an arsenal for ships, were ordered to advance towards Plemmyrium to amaze the Athenians, who would see themselves attacked both by sea and land at the same time. The Athe-

* A. M. 5591. Ant. J. C. 413. Thucyd. l. vii. p. 494—496, et 502—504. Diod. l. xiii. p. 140.

† Thucyd. l. vii. p. 497—500. Plut. in Nic. p. 586. Diod. l. xiii. p. 140.

nians at this news, went on board also ; and with 25 ships sailed to fight the 35 Syracusan vessels which were sailing out against them from the great harbour ; and opposed 35 more to the 45 of the enemy, which were come out of the little port. A sharp engagement was fought at the mouth of the great harbour ; one party endeavouring to force their way into it, and the other to keep them out.

Those who defended the forts of Plemmyrium, having flocked to the shore to view the battle, Gylippus attacked the forts unexpectedly by day-break, and having carried the greatest of them by storm, the soldiers who defended the other two, were so terrified that they abandoned them in a moment. After this advantage the Syracusans sustained a considerable loss ; for such of their vessels as fought at the entrance of the harbour, after having forced the Athenians, bulged furiously one against the other as they entered it in disorder ; and by this means shifted the victory to their enemies, who were not contented with pursuing them, but also gave chase to those who were victorious in the great harbour. Eleven Syracusan galleys were sunk, and a great number of the sailors in them killed. Three were taken ; but the Athenians likewise lost three, and after towing off those of the enemy, they raised a trophy in a little island lying before Plemmyrium, and retired to the centre of their camp.

The Syracusans also raised three trophies for their taking of the three forts ; and after razing one of the smaller, they repaired the fortifications of the other two, and put garrisons into them. Several Athenians had been either killed or made prisoners there ; and great sums of money were taken, the property of the public, as well as of merchants and captains of galleys, besides a large quantity of ammunition ; this being a kind of magazine for the whole army. They likewise lost the stores and rigging of 40 galleys, with three ships that lay in the dock. But a more considerable circumstance was, Gylippus thereby prevented Nicias from getting provisions and ammunition so easily ; for whilst the latter was possessed of Plemmyrium, they procured these securely and expeditiously ; whereas after their being dispossessed of it, it was equally difficult and hazardous, because they could not bring in any thing without fighting ; the enemy lying at anchor just off their fort. Thus the Athenians could have no provisions but from the points of their swords ; which dispirited the soldiers very much, and threw the whole army into a great consternation.

* There was afterwards a little skirmish in defending a staccado which the inhabitants had made in the sea, at the entrance of the old harbour, to secure the shipping. The Athenians having raised towers and parapets on a large ship, made it advance as near as possible to the staccado, in order that it might serve as a bulwark to some ships that carried military engines, with which they drew up stakes by the help of pulleys and ropes, exclusive of those which the divers sawed in two ; the besieged defending themselves with their harbour, and the enemy with their tower. Such stakes as had been driven in level with the surface of the water, in order to strand those vessels that should come near them, were the hardest to force away. The divers also bribed the enemy, and most of the stakes were torn up ; but then others were immediately driven in their places. The utmost efforts were used on both sides, in the attack as well as the defence.

† One circumstance which the besieged considered of the greatest im-

* Thucyd. l. vii. p. 500, 501.

† *Ibid.* p. 509—513. Plut. in Nic. p. 536. Diod. l. xiii. p. 140, 141.

portance, was to attempt a second engagement both by sea and land, before the fleet and other succours sent by the Athenians should arrive. They had concerted fresh measures for a battle at sea, by improving from the errors they had committed in the last engagement. The change made in the galleys was, their prows were now shorter, and at the same time stronger and more solid than before. For this purpose, they fixed great pieces of timber, projecting forward on each side of the prows; and to these pieces they joined beams by way of prows. These beams extended to the length of six cubits on each side of the vessel, both within and without. By this they hoped to gain the advantage over the galleys of the Athenians, which did not dare, because of the weakness of their prows, to attack an enemy in front, but only in flank; not to mention, that should the battle be fought in the harbour, they would not have room to spread themselves, nor to pass between two galleys, in which lay their greatest art; not to tack about, after they should have been repulsed, in order to return to the charge; whereas the Syracusans, by their being masters of the whole extent of the harbour, would have all these advantages, and might reciprocally assist one another. On these circumstances the latter founded their hopes of victory.

Gylippus therefore first drew all the infantry out of the camp, and advanced towards that part of the contravallation of the Athenians which faced the city; whilst the troops of Olympia marched towards the other, and their galleys set sail.

Nicias did not care to venture a second battle, saying, that as he expected a fresh fleet every moment, and a great reinforcement under Demosthenes, it would betray the greatest want of judgment, should he, as his troops were inferior in number to those of the enemy, and already fatigued, hazard a battle without being forced to it. On the contrary, Menander and Euthydemus, who had just before been appointed to share the command with Nicias till the arrival of Demosthenes, fired with ambition, and jealous of those generals, were eager to perform some great exploit, to bereave the one of his glory, and if possible eclipse that of the other. The pretence they alledged on this occasion was, the fame and reputation of Athens; and they asserted with so much vehemence, that it would be entirely destroyed, should they shun the battle, as the Syracusans offered it them, that they at last forced Nicias to a compliance. The Athenians had 75 galleys, and the Syracusans 80.

The first day the fleets continued in sight of each other, in the great harbour, without engaging; and only a few skirmishes passed, after which both parties retired; and it was just the same with the land forces. The Syracusans did not make the least motion the second day. Nicias taking advantage of this inactivity, caused the transports to draw up in a line, at some distance from one another, in order that his galleys might retire behind them with safety, in case he should be defeated. On the morrow, the Syracusans came up sooner than usual, when a great part of the day was spent in skirmishing, after which they retired. The Athenians did not suppose they would return, but imagined that fear had made them fly; but having refreshed themselves with great diligence, and returning on board their galleys, they attacked the Athenians, who were far from expecting them. The latter being now forced to return immediately on board their ships, they entered them in great disorder, so that they had not time to draw them up in a line of battle, and most of the sailors were fasting. Victory did not long continue in suspense. The Athenians after making a short and slight resistance, retired behind their line of transport

ships. The enemy pursued them thither, and were stopped by the sail-yards of those ships, to which were fixed * dolphins of lead, which being very heavy, had they fallen on the enemy's galleys, would have sunk them at once. The Athenians lost seven galleys in this engagement, and a great number of soldiers were either killed or taken prisoners.

† This loss threw Nicias into the utmost consternation. All the misfortunes he had met with ever since the time he had first enjoyed the supreme command, came into his mind: and he now is involved in a greater than any of them by his complying with the advice of his colleagues. Whilst he was revolving these gloomy ideas, Demosthenes' fleet was seen coming forward in great pomp, and with such an air as should fill the enemy with dread: it was now the day after the battle. This fleet consisted of 73 galleys, on board of which were 5000 fighting men, and about 3000 archers, slingers, and bow-men. All these galleys were richly trimmed; their prows being adorned with shining streamers, manned with stout rowers, commanded by good officers, and echoing with the sound of clarions and trumpets; Demosthenes having affected an air of pomp and triumph purposely to strike terror into the enemy.

This gallant sight alarmed them indeed beyond expression. They did not see any end, or even the least suspension of their calamities: all they had hitherto done or suffered was as nothing, and their work was to begin again. What hopes could they entertain of being able to weary out the patience of the Athenians, since, though they had a camp entrenched in the middle of Attica, they were however able to send a second army into Sicily as considerable as the former; and that their power, as well as their courage, seemed, notwithstanding all their losses, instead of diminishing, to increase daily.

Demosthenes having made an exact enquiry into the state of things, imagined that it would not be proper for him to lose time as Nicias had done; who, having spread an universal terror at his first arrival, became afterwards the object of contempt, for his having wintered in Catania, instead of going directly to Syracuse, and had afterwards given Gylippus an opportunity of throwing troops into it. He flattered himself with the hopes that he should be able to carry the city at the first attack, by taking advantage of the alarm which the news of his arrival would spread in every part of it, and by that means should immediately put an end to the war; otherwise he intended to raise the siege, and no longer harass and lessen the troops by fighting battles never decisive, nor quite exhaust the city of Athens, by employing its treasures in needless expences.

Nicias, terrified by this bold and precipitate resolution of Demosthenes, conjured him not to be so hasty, but to take time to weigh things deliberately, that he might have no cause to repent of what he should do. He observed to him that the enemy would be ruined by delays; that their provisions as well as money were entirely exhausted; that their allies were going to abandon them; that they must soon be reduced to such extremity for want of provisions, as would force them to surrender, as they had before resolved: for there were certain persons in Syracuse who held a secret correspondence with Nicias, and exhorted him not to be impatient, because the Syracusans were tired with the war and with Gylippus; and

* This engine, so violent was its motion, broke through a galley from the deck to the hold.

† Thucyd. l. vii. p. 513—518. Plut. in Nic. p. 537. Diod. l. xiii. p. 141, 142.

tant should the necessity to which they were reduced be ever so little increased, they would surrender at discretion.

As Nicias did not explain himself clearly, and would not declare in express terms, that sure and certain advices were sent him of whatever was transacted in the city, his remonstrances were considered as an effect of the timidity and slowness with which he had always been reproached. "Such," said they, "are his usual protraction, delays, distrust, and fearful precaution, whereby he has deadened all the vivacity, and extinguished all the ardour of the troops, in not marching them immediately against the enemy; but on the contrary, by deferring to attack them till his own forces were weakened and despised." This made the rest of the generals and the officers come over to Demosthenes' opinion, and Nicias himself was at last forced to acquiesce with it.

Demosthenes, after having attacked to no purpose the wall which cut the contravallation of the besiegers, confined himself to the attack of Epipolæ, from a supposition that should he once be master of it, the wall would be quite undefended. He therefore took provisions for five days, with workmen, implements, and every thing necessary for him to defend that post after he should possess himself of it. As there was no going up to it in the day time undiscovered, he marched thither in the night with all his forces, followed by Eurymedon and Meander: Nicias staying behind to guard the camp. They went up by the way of Euryleus as before, unperceived by the centinels; attack the first intrenchment, and storm it, after killing part of those who defended it. Demosthenes, not satisfied with this advantage, to prevent the ardour of his soldiers from cooling, and not delay the execution of his design, marches forward. During this interval, the forces of the city, sustained by Gylippus, march under arms out of the intrenchments. Being seized with astonishment, which the darkness of the night increased, they were immediately repulsed, and put to flight. But as the Athenians advanced in disorder, to force whatever might resist their arms, lest the enemy might rally again, should time be allowed them to breathe and recover from their surprise; they are stopped on a sudden by the Bœotians, who make a vigorous stand, and marching against the Athenians with their pikes presented, they repulse them with great shouts, and make a dreadful slaughter. This spreads an universal terror through the rest of the army. Those who fled, either force along such as were advancing to their assistance, or else mistaking them for enemies, turn their arms against them. They were now all mixed indiscriminately, it being impossible to discover objects in the horrors of a night, which was not so gloomy as entirely to make objects imperceptible, nor yet light enough to distinguish those which were seen. The Athenians sought for one another to no purpose; and from their often asking the word, by which only they were able to know one another, a strange confusion of sounds was heard, which occasioned no little disorder; not to mention that they by this means divulged the word to the enemy, and could not learn theirs; because by their being together and in a body, they had no occasion to repeat it. In the mean time, those who were pursued, threw themselves from the top of the rocks, and many were dashed to pieces by the fall; and as most of those who escaped, straggled from one another up and down the fields and woods, they were cut to pieces the next day by the enemy's horse, who pursued them. Two thousand Athenians were slain in this engagement; and a great number of arms were taken, those who fled having thrown them away, that they might be the better able to escape over the precipices.

SECTION XIV.

THE ATHENIANS AGAIN HAZARD A SEA FIGHT, AND ARE DEFEATED.—NICIAS AND DEMOSTHENES SENTENCED TO DIE, AND EXECUTED.

THE Athenian generals,* after sustaining so great a loss, were in a prodigious dilemma, and did not know how to act in the present discouragement and despair of the troops, who died daily, either by the diseases of the autumn, or by the bad air of the fens, near which they were encamped. Demosthenes was of opinion that it would be proper for them to leave the country immediately, since they had been unsuccessful in so important an enterprise; especially as the season was not too far advanced for sailing, and that they had ships enough to force a passage, in case the enemy should dispute it with them. He declared that it would be of much greater advantage to oblige the enemy to raise their blockade of Athens, than for them to continue that of Syracuse, by which they exhausted themselves to no purpose; that he was certain they would not be reinforced by a new army; and that they could not hope to overcome the enemy with the weak one under their command.

Nicias was sensible that the arguments his colleague used were very just, and he himself was of his opinion: but at the same time he was afraid, lest so public a confession of the weak condition to which they were reduced, and their resolution to leave Sicily, the report of which would certainly reach the enemy, should complete the ruin of their affairs; and perhaps make them unable to execute the resolution when they should attempt it. Besides they had some little hopes left, that the besieged, being themselves reduced to great extremity, by their absolute want of provisions and money, would at last be inclined to surrender upon honourable terms. Thus, although he was in reality uncertain and wavering, he insinuated that he did not care to quit Sicily, till the Athenians should have first sent orders for that purpose; and that otherwise they would be highly displeased; that as those who were to judge them, had not been eye-witnesses of the state of things, they would be of a different opinion; and at the instigation of some orator, certainly condemn them; that most of those men, who now exclaimed with the greatest vehemence against the difficulties they laboured under, would then change their note, and accuse them of having been bribed to raise the siege; that knowing so well as he did, the disposition and character of the Athenians, he chose to die gloriously by the enemy's sword, rather than be ignominiously condemned by his fellow-citizens.

These reasons, though they appeared very strong, were yet not able to convince Demosthenes; and it was still his opinion, that the only good choice they could make would be to retire. However, as he had been unsuccessful in his former opinion, he was afraid of insisting upon this; and he was the more inclined to come into that of Nicias, from imagining, with many others, that this general might have some secret resource, as he was so firmly resolved to stay.

† Gylippus, after having made the tour of Sicily, had brought a great body of troops with him. This new reinforcement terrified the Athenians exceedingly, whose army diminished daily by sickness; and they now began to repent their not having raised the siege, especially as the besieged

* Thucyd. l. vii. p. 511—520. Plut. in Nic. p. 538—542. Diod. l. xiii. p. 142.

† Thucyd. l. vii. p. 421—548. Plut. in Nic. p. 538. Diod. l. xiii. p. 142—161.

were preparing to attack them both by sea and land. Besides, Nicias no longer opposed this resolution, and only desired to have it kept secret. Orders were therefore given, as privately as possible, for the fleet to prepare for setting sail with the utmost expedition.

When all things were ready, the moment they were going to set sail, wholly unsuspected by the enemy, who were far from surmising they would leave Sicily so soon, the moon was suddenly eclipsed in the middle of the night, and lost all its splendour; which terrified Nicias and the whole army, who, from ignorance and superstition, were astonished at so sudden a change, the causes of which they did not know, and therefore dreaded the consequences of it. They then consulted the soothsayers; and who being equally unacquainted with the reasons of this phenomenon, only augmented their consternation. It was the custom after such accidents had happened, to suspend their enterprise but for three days. The soothsayers pronounced that he must not set sail till three times nine days were past, (these are Thucydides' words) which doubtless was a mysterious number in the opinion of the people. Nicias, scrupulous to a fault, and full of a mistaken veneration for these blind interpreters of the will of the gods, declared that he would wait a whole revolution of the moon, and not return till the same day of the next month; as if he had not seen the planet very clearly the instant it had emerged from that part which was darkened by the interposition of the earth's body.

But he was not allowed time for this. The news of the intended departure of the Athenians being soon spread over the city, a resolution was taken to attack the besiegers both by sea and land. The Syracusans began the first day by attacking the intrenchments, and gained a slight advantage over the enemy. On the morrow they made a second attack; and at the same time sailed with 76 galleys against 86 of the Athenians. Eurymedon, who commanded the right of the Athenian fleet, having spread along the shore to surround them, this movement proved fatal to him: for, as he was detached from the body of the fleet, the Syracusans, after forcing the main battle, which was in the centre, attacked him; drove him vigorously into the gulf called Dascon, and there defeated him entirely. Eurymedon lost his life in the engagement. They afterwards gave chase to the rest of the galleys, and run them against the shore. Glylippus, who commanded the land army, seeing the Athenian galleys were forced aground, and not able to return into their staccado, landed with part of his troops, in order to charge the soldiers, in case they should be forced to run ashore; and to give his friends the more room to tow such galleys as they should have taken. However, he was repulsed by the Tyrrhenians, who were posted on that side, and obliged by the Athenians, who flew to sustain them, to retire with some loss as far as the moor called Lysimelia, which lay near it. The latter saved most of their ships, 18 excepted, which were taken by the Syracusans, and their crews cut to pieces by them. After this, resolving to burn the rest, they filled an old vessel with combustible materials; and having set fire to it, they drove it by the help of the wind against the Athenians, who nevertheless extinguished the fire, and drove off that ship.

Each side erected trophies; the Syracusans for the defeat of Eurymedon, and the advantage they had gained the day before; and the Athenians for their having drove part of the enemy into the moor, and put the other part to flight. But the minds of the two nations were very differently disposed. The Syracusans who had been thrown into the utmost consternation at the arrival of Demosthenes with his fleet, seeing them-

selves victorious in a naval engagement, resumed fresh hope, and assured themselves of a complete victory over their enemies. The Athenians on the contrary, frustrated of their only resource, and overcome by sea so contrary to their expectations, entirely lost courage, and had no thoughts but of retiring.

The enemy, to deprive them of all resource, and prevent their escaping, shut the mouth of the great harbour, which was about 500 paces wide, with galleys placed cross-ways, and other vessels fixed with anchors and iron chains; and at the same time made the requisite preparations for the battle, in case they should have the courage to engage again. When the Athenians saw themselves thus hemmed in, the generals and principal officers assembled, in order to deliberate on the present state of affairs. They were in absolute want of provisions, which was owing to their having forbid the people of Catana to bring any, from the hopes they entertained of their being able to retire; and they could not procure any from other places, unless they were masters of the sea. This made them resolve to venture a sea fight. In this view, they were determined to leave their old camp, and their walls, which extended to the temple of Hercules; and to intrench themselves on the shore near their ships in the smallest compass possible. Their design was to leave some forces in that place to guard their baggage and the sick; and to fight with the rest on board all the ships they should have saved. They intended to retire into Catana, in case they should be victorious; otherwise to set fire to their ships, and to march by land to the nearest city belonging to their allies.

This resolution being taken, Nicias immediately filled 110 galleys, the others having lost their oars, with the flower of his infantry; and drew up the rest of the forces, particularly the bowmen, in order of battle on the shore. As the Athenians dreaded very much the beaks of the Syracusan galleys, Nicias had provided harping-irons, to grapple them, in order to break the force of the blow, and to come immediately to close fight as on the shore. But the enemy perceiving this, covered the prows and upper part of their galleys with leather, to prevent their being so easily laid hold of. The commanders on both sides had employed all their rhetoric to animate their men; and none could ever have been prompted from stronger motives; for the battle which was going to be fought, was to determine, not only their lives and liberties, but also the fate of their country.

The battle was very obstinate and bloody. The Athenians being arrived at the mouth of the port, easily took those ships which defended the entrance of it; but when they attempted to break the chain of the rest, to widen the passage, the enemy came up from all quarters. As near 200 galleys came rushing on each side, in the narrow place, there must necessarily be a very great confusion; and the vessels could not easily advance forward or retire, nor turn about to renew the attack. The beaks of the galleys, for this reason, did very little execution; but there were very furious and frequent discharges. The Athenians were overwhelmed with a shower of stones, which always did execution from what place soever they were thrown; whereas they defended themselves only by shooting darts and arrows, which, by the motion of the ships, from the agitation of the sea, did not carry true, and by that means the greatest part of them did little execution. Ariston the pilot had given the Syracusans this counsel. These discharges being over, the soldiers, heavily armed, attempted to enter the enemy's ships, in order to fight hand to hand: and it often happened, that whilst they were climbing up one side, their own ships were entered on the other; and two or three ships would be grappled to one,

which occasioned a great perplexity and confusion. Further, the noise of the ships that dashed one against the other, the different cries of the victors and vanquished, prevented the orders of the officers from being heard. The Athenians wanted to force a passage, whatever might be the consequence, to secure their return into their own country; and this the enemy employed their utmost efforts to prevent, in order that they might gain a more complete and more glorious victory. The two land armies which were drawn up on the highest part of the shore, and the inhabitants of the city who were there, ran to the walls; whilst the rest, kneeling in the temples, were imploring heaven to give success to their citizens; and these saw clearly, because of their little distance from the fleets, every thing that passed, and contemplated the battle as from an amphitheatre, but not without great anxiety and terror. Attentive to, and shuddering at every movement, and the several changes which happened, they discovered the concern they had in the battle, their fears, their hopes, their grief, their joy, by different cries and different gestures; stretching out their hands, sometimes towards the combatants to animate them, and at other times towards heaven, to implore the succour and protection of the gods. At last, the Athenian fleet, after sustaining a long battle and a vigorous resistance, was put to flight, and driven against the shore. The Syracusans, who were spectators of this victory, conveyed to the whole city, by an universal shout, the news of this victory. The victors, now masters of the sea, and sailing with a favourable wind towards Syracuse, erected a trophy; whilst the Athenians, who were quite dejected and overpowered, did not so much as request that their dead soldiers might be delivered to them, in order to pay the last sad duty to their remains.

There now remained but two methods for them to choose; either to attempt the passage a second time, for which they had ships and soldiers sufficient, or to abandon their fleet to the enemy, and retire by land. Demosthenes proposed the former; but the sailors, in the deepest affliction, refused to obey, fully persuaded that it would be impossible for them to sustain a second engagement. The second method was therefore resolved upon, and accordingly they prepared to set out in the night, to conceal the march of their army from the enemy.

But Hermocrates, who suspected their design, was very sensible that it was of the utmost importance not to suffer so great a body of forces to escape; since they otherwise might fortify themselves in some corner of the island, and renew the war. The Syracusans were at that time in the midst of their festivity and rejoicings, and meditated nothing but how they might best divert themselves after the toils they had sustained in fight. They were then solemnizing the festival of Hercules. To desire the Syracusans to take up arms again, in order to pursue the enemy, and to attempt to draw them from their diversions either by force or persuasion, would have been to no purpose; for which reason another expedient was employed. Hermocrates sent out a few horsemen, who were to pass for friends of the Athenians, and ordered them to cry aloud, "Tell Nicias not to retire till day-light; for the Syracusans lie in ambush for him, and have seized on the passes." This false advice stopped Nicias at once; and he did not even set out the next day, in order that the soldiers might have more time to prepare for their departure, and carry off whatever might be necessary for their subsistence, and abandon the rest.

The enemy had time enough for seizing the avenues. The next morning early they possessed themselves of the most difficult passes, fortified those places where the rivers were fordable, broke down the bridges, and

spread detachments of horse up and down the plain ; so that there was not one place through which the Athenians could pass without fighting. They set out upon their march the third day after the battle, with design to retire to Catania. The whole army was in an inexpressible consternation, to see such great numbers of men, either dead or dying, some of whom were left exposed to wild beast, and the rest to the cruelty of the enemy. Those who were sick and wounded, conjured them with tears to take them along with the army, and held by their clothes when they were going ; or else, dragging themselves after them, followed them as far as their strength would permit : and when this failed they had recourse to tears, sighs, imprecations ; and sending up towards heaven plaintive and dying groans, they called upon the gods as well as men to avenge their cruelty, whilst every place echoed with lamentations.

The whole army was in as deplorable a condition. All men were seized with the deepest melancholy. They were inwardly tortured with rage and anguish, when they represented to themselves the greatness from which they were fallen, the extreme misery to which they were reduced, and the still greater evils from which they foresaw it would be impossible for them to escape. They could not bear the comparison for ever present in their thoughts, of the triumphant state in which they had left Athens, in the midst of the good wishes and acclamations of the people ; with the ignominy of their retreat, aggravated by the cries and imprecations of their relations and fellow-citizens.

But the most melancholy part of the spectacle, and that which most deserved compassion was Nicias. Dejected and worn out by a tedious illness, deprived of the most necessary things, at a time when his age and infirmities required them most ; pierced not only with his private grief, but with that of others, all which preyed upon his heart ; this great man, superior to all his evils, thought of nothing but how he might best comfort his soldiers, and revive their courage. He ran up and down in all places, crying aloud, that matters were not yet desperate, and that other armies had escaped from greater dangers ; that they ought not to accuse themselves, or grieve too immoderately, for misfortunes which they had not occasioned ; that if they had offended some god, his vengeance must be satiated by this time ; that fortune, after having so long favoured the enemy, would at last be tired of persecuting them ; that their bravery and numbers made them still formidable, being still near 40,000 strong ; that no city in Sicily would be able to withstand them, nor prevent their settling wherever they might think proper ; that they had no more to do but to take care severally of themselves, and march in good order ; that by a prudent and courageous retreat, which was now become their only resource, they would not only save themselves, but also their country, and enable it to recover its former grandeur.

The army marched in two bodies, both drawn up in the form of a phalanx ; the first being commanded by Nicias, and the second by Demosthenes, with the baggage in the centre. Being come to the river Anapis, they forced the passage, and afterwards were charged by all the enemy's cavalry, as well as archers, who discharged perpetually upon them. They were annoyed in this manner during several days march ; every one of the passes being guarded, and the Athenians being obliged to dispute every inch of their way. The enemy did not care to hazard a battle against an army, which despair alone might render invincible ; and the instant the Athenians presented the Syracuseans battle, the latter retired : but when-

ever the former would proceed in their march, they advanced, and charged them in their retreat.

Demosthenes and Nicias, seeing the miserable condition to which the troops were reduced, being in extreme want of provisions, and great numbers of them wounded, judged it advisable to retire towards the sea, by a quite contrary way from that in which they then marched, and to make directly for Camarina and Gela, instead of proceeding to Catana, as they first intended. They set out in the night, after lighting a great number of fires. The retreat was made in great confusion and disorder, as generally happens to great armies in the gloomy horrors of the night, especially when the enemy is not far off. However, the van guard, commanded by Nicias, came forward in good order; but above half the rear guard, with Demosthenes at their head, separated from the main body, and lost their way. On the next day the Syracusans, who, on the report of their retreat, had marched with the utmost diligence, came up with him about noon; and having surrounded him with their horse, they drove him into a narrow place inclosed with a wall, where his soldiers fought like lions. Perceiving, at the close of the day, that they were oppressed with fatigue, and covered with wounds, they gave the islanders leave to retire, which some of them accepted; and afterwards spared the lives of the rest, who surrendered at discretion with Demosthenes, after having stipulated that they should not be put to death, nor sentenced to perpetual imprisonment. About 6000 soldiers surrendered on these conditions.

Nicias arrived the same evening at the river Erineus, and passing it, encamped on a mountain, where the enemy came up with him the next day, and summoned him to surrender at discretion, as Demosthenes had done. Nicias could not persuade himself at first that what they told him concerning that general was true, and therefore desired leave to send some horse for information. Upon their returning with the news that Demosthenes had really surrendered in that manner, Nicias offered to pay the expences of the war, upon condition that they would permit him to leave the country with his forces, and to give as many Athenians for hostages as they should be obliged to pay talents. But the enemy rejected this proposal with disdain and insolence, and renewed the attack. Nicias, though in absolute want of all things, however, sustained the charge the whole night, and marched towards the river Asinarus. When they were got to the banks of it, the Syracusans advancing up to them, threw most of them into the stream, the rest having already plunged voluntarily into it to quench their thirst. Here the greatest and most bloody havoc was made, the poor wretches being butchered without the least pity as they were drinking. Nicias, finding all lost, and unable to bear this dismal spectacle, surrendered at discretion, upon condition that Gylippus should discontinue the fight, and spare the rest of his army. A great number were killed, and more taken prisoners, so that all Sicily was filled with them. * The Athenians seemed to have been displeased with their general for surrendering in this manner at discretion, and for this reason his name was omitted in a public monument, on which were engraved the names of those commanders who had lost their lives in fighting for their country.

The victors adorned with the arms taken from the prisoners the finest and largest trees they could find on the banks of the rivers, and made a kind of trophies of these trees, when crowning themselves with chaplets of flowers, dressing their horses in the richest caparisons, and cropping those

* Pausan. l. i. p. 56.

of their enemies, they entered triumphantly into Syracuse, after having happily terminated the most considerable war in which they had ever been engaged with the Greeks, and won, by their strength and valour, a most signal and most complete victory. The next day a council was held, to deliberate on what was to be done with the prisoners. Diocles, one of the leaders of the greatest authority among the people, proposed that all the Athenians who were born of free parents, and all such Sicilians as had joined with them, should be imprisoned, and only two measures of flour and one of water given them daily; that the slaves and all the allies should be publicly sold; and that the two Athenian generals should be first scourged with rods and afterwards put to death.

* This last article was exceedingly disliked by all wise and compassionate Syracusans. Hermocrates, who was very famous for his probity and justice, attempted to make some remonstrances to the people, but they would not hear him; and the shouts which echoed on all sides prevented him from continuing his speech. At that instant † an ancient man, venerable for his great age and gravity, who in this war had lost two sons, the only heirs to his name and estate, made his servants carry him to the tribunal for harangues; and the instant he appeared a profound silence was made. "You here behold," says he, "an unfortunate father, who has felt more than any other Syracusan the fatal effects of this war, by the death of two sons, who formed all the consolation, and were the only supports of my old age. I cannot indeed forbear admiring their courage and felicity, in sacrificing to their country's welfare a life of which they would one day have been deprived by the common course of nature; but then I cannot but be strongly affected with the cruel wound which their death has made in my heart, nor forbear hating and detesting the Athenians, the authors of this unhappy war, as the murderers of my children. But; however, I cannot conceal one circumstance, which is, that I am less sensible to my private affliction than to the honour of my country, and I see it exposed to eternal infamy by the barbarous advice which is now given you. The Athenians indeed merit the worst treatment, and every kind of punishment that could be inflicted on them, for so unjustly declaring war against us: but have not the gods, the just avengers of crimes, punished them and revenged us sufficiently? When their generals laid down their arms and surrendered, did they not do this in the hopes of having their lives spared? And if we put them to death, will it be possible for us to avoid the just reproach of our having violated the law of nations, and dishonoured our victory by an unheard-of cruelty? How! Will you suffer your glory to be thus sullied in the face of the whole world, and have it said that a nation, who first dedicated a temple in their city to clemency, had not found any in yours? Surely victories and triumphs do not give immortal glory to a city, but the exercising mercy towards a vanquished enemy, the using moderation in the greatest prosperity, and fearing to offend the gods by a haughty and insolent pride. You doubtless have not forgot that this Nicias, whose fate you are going to pronounce, was the very man who pleaded your cause in the assembly of the Athenians, and employed all his credit, and the whole power of his eloquence, to dissuade his country from embarking in this war. Should you therefore pronounce sentence of death on this worthy general, would it be a just reward for the zeal he showed for your interest? With regard

* Diod. l. xiii. p. 149—161.

† Nicolaus.

"to myself, death would be less grievous to me than the sight of so horrid an injustice committed by my countrymen and fellow-citizens."

The people seemed moved to compassion at this speech, especially as when this venerable old man first ascended, they expected to hear him cry aloud for vengeance on those who had brought all his calamities upon him, instead of suing for their pardon. But the enemies of the Athenians having expiated with vehemence on the unheard-of cruelties which their republic had exercised on several cities belonging to their enemies, and even to their ancient allies; the inveteracy which their commanders had shown against Syracuse, and the evils they would have made it suffer had they been victorious; the afflictions and groans of infinite numbers of Syracusans who bewailed the death of their children and near relations, whose manes could be appeased no other way than by the blood of their murderers. On these representations the people returned to their sanguinary resolution, and followed Diocles' advice in every respect. Gylippus used his utmost endeavours, but in vain, to have Nicias and Demosthenes given up to him, especially as he had taken them, in order for him to carry them to Lacedæmon. But his demand was rejected with a haughty scorn, and the two generals were put to death.

All wise and compassionate men could not forbear shedding tears for the tragical fate of two such illustrious personages, and particularly for Nicias, who of all men of his time seemed least to merit so ignominious and untimely an end. When people recollected the speeches and remonstrances he had made to prevent this war, and on the other side when they considered how high a regard he had always retained for things relating to religion, the greatest part of them were tempted to exclaim against providence, in seeing that a man, who had ever shown the highest reverence for the gods, and had always exerted himself to the utmost for their honour and worship, should be so ill rewarded by them, and meet with no better fate than the most abandoned wretches. But it is no wonder that the calamities of good men should inspire the heathens with such thoughts, and make them murmur and despond, since they did not know the holiness of the Divine Being, nor the corruption of human nature.

The prisoners were shut up in the mines, "prisons of Syracuse," where, crowded one upon the other, they suffered incredible torments for eight months. Here they were for ever exposed to the inclemencies of the weather; scorched in the day time by the burning rays of the sun, or frozen in the night by the colds of autumn; poisoned by the stench of their own excrements, by the carcasses of those who died of their wounds and of sickness; in fine, worn out by hunger and thirst, for the daily allowance to each was but a small measure of water and two of meal. Those who were taken out of this place two months after in order to be sold as slaves (many of them were citizens who had concealed their condition) found a less rigorous fate. Their wisdom, their patience, and a certain air of probity and modesty, were of great advantage to them; for they were soon restored to their liberty, or met with the kindest and most generous treatment from their masters. Several of them even owed the good usage they met with to Euripides, the finest scenes of whose tragedies they repeated to the Sicilians, who were extremely fond of them; so that when they returned to their own country, they went and saluted that poet as their deliverer, and informed him of the admirable effects wrought in their favour by his verses.

* The news of this defeat being carried to Athens, the citizens would not believe it at first, and were so far from giving credit to it, that they sentenced that man to death who had first published it. But when it was confirmed, all the Athenians were seized with the utmost consternation; and as if themselves had not decreed the war, they vented their rage and resentment against the orators who had promoted the enterprise, as well as against the soothsayers, who, by their oracles or supposed prodigies, had flattered them with the hopes of success. They had never been reduced to so deplorable a condition as now, having neither horse, foot, money, galleys, nor mariners; in a word, they were in the deepest despair, expecting every moment that the enemy, elated with so great a victory, and strengthened by the revolt of the allies, would come and invade Athens, both by sea and land, with all the forces of Peloponnesus. Cicero had reason to observe, † speaking of the battles in the harbour of Syracuse, that it was there the troops of Athens as well as their galleys, were ruined and sunk; and that in this harbour the power and glory of the Athenians were miserably shipwrecked.

The Athenians, however, did not suffer themselves to be wholly dejected, but resumed courage. They now resolved to raise money on all sides, and to import timber for building of ships, in order to awe the allies, and particularly the inhabitants of the island of Eubœa. They retrenched all superfluous expences, and established a new council of ancient men, who were to weigh and examine all affairs before they should be proposed to the people. In fine, they omitted nothing which might be of service in the present conjuncture, the alarm in which they were in, and their common danger obliging every individual to be attentive to the necessities of the state, and docile to all advice that might promote its interests.

The defeat of the army under Nicias was followed by the taking of Athens, of which the ancient form of government was entirely changed by Lysander.

CHAPTER II.

THIS chapter is the sequel of the preceding book, and contains the eight last years of the Peloponnesian war, during as many years of the reign of Darius Nothus.

SECTION I.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEFEAT OF THE ATHENIANS IN SICILY, &c. &c.

THE † defeat of the Athenians before Syracuse gave occasion for great movements throughout all Greece. The people, who had not yet joined either side, and waited to be determined by the event, resolved to declare against them. The allies of the Lacedæmonians believed that the time was come to deliver them for ever from the expences of a war which lay

* Thucyd. l. viii. p. 551—553. Plut. de Garrulit. p. 509.

† Hic primum opes illius civitatis victæ, comminutæ, depressæque sunt; in hoc portu Atheniensium nobilitatis, imperii, gloriæ naufragium factum existimatur. Cic. Ver. 7. n. 97.

‡ A. M. 3591. Ant. J. C. 413. Thucyd. l. viii. p. 553.

very heavy upon them, by the speedy and final ruin of Athens. Those of Athens, who followed them only out of constraint, seeing no appearance of any future resource for that republic, after the dreadful blow it had received, thought it best to take the advantage of so favorable a conjuncture for throwing off the yoke of dependence, and resuming their liberty. Dispositions of this kind inspired the Lacedæmonians with great views, which were supported by the hopes they had conceived, that their Sicilian allies would join them in the spring with a naval army, augmented by the ruins of the Athenian fleet.

* In effect, the people of Eubœa, Chio, and Lesbos, with several others, gave the Lacedæmonians to understand that they were ready to quit the party of the Athenians, if they would take them under their protection. At the same time came deputies from Tissaphernes and Pharnabasus. The first was governour of Lydia and Ionia, the other of the Hellespont. These viceroys of Darius wanted neither application nor zeal for the interest of their master. Tissaphernes, promising the Lacedæmonians all the necessary expences for their troops, pressed them to arm directly, and to join him; because the Athenian fleet prevented him from levying the usual contributions in his province, and had put it out of his power to remit those of preceding years to the king. He hoped besides with that powerful aid to get into his hands with more ease a certain nobleman who had revolted, and whom he had the king's orders to send to him dead or alive. This was Armorges the bastard of Pisuthna. Pharnabasus at the same time demanded ships to reduce the cities of the Hellespont from their subjection to the Athenians, who also prevented him from levying the tributes of his government.

The Lacedæmonians thought it proper to begin by satisfying Tissaphernes; and the credit of Alcibiades contributed very much to the taking that resolution. He embarked with Calcidæus for Chio, which took arms upon their arrival, and declared for the Lacedæmonians. Upon the news of this revolt, the Athenians resolved to take the † 1000 talents out of the treasury, which had been deposited there from the beginning of the war, after having repealed the decree which prohibited it. Miletus also revolted soon after. Tissaphernes, having joined his troops with those of Sparta, attacked and took the city of Iasus, in which † Armorges had shut himself up, who was taken alive and sent into Persia. That governour gave a month's pay to the whole army, at a drachm or ten pence a day to each soldier, observing that he had orders to give them only half that sum for the future.

|| Calcidæus then made a treaty with Tissaphernes, in the name of the Lacedæmonians, of which one of the principal articles was, that all the country which had been subject to the king or his predecessors should remain in his hands. It was renewed some time after by Theramenes, another general of the Lacedæmonians, with some small alterations. But when this treaty came to be examined at Sparta, it was found that too great concessions had been made to the king of Persia, in giving up all the places held by himself or his ancestors, which was to make him master of the greatest part of Greece, Thessaly, Locris, and the whole country as far as Bœotia, without mentioning the islands; from whence the Lacedæmonians would appear rather to have enslaved Greece, than re-established its liberty. It was therefore necessary to make farther alterations in it, with

* Thucyd. l. viii. p. 555—558.

† 8,000,000 livres.

‡ Thucyd. l. viii. p. 668.

|| Idem. p. 561—571, 572—578.

which Tissaphernes and the other governours made great difficulties to comply. A new treaty was however concluded, as we shall see in the sequel.

In the mean time, several cities of Ionia declared for Lacedæmon, to which Alcibiades contributed very much. * Agis, who was already his enemy in effect of the injury he had done him, could not suffer the glory he acquired; for nothing was done without the advice of Alcibiades, and it was generally said that the success of all enterprises was owing to him. The most powerful and ambitious of the Spartans, from the same sentiments of jealousy, looked upon him with an evil eye, and at length by their intrigues obliged the principal magistrates to send orders into Ionia for putting him to death. Alcibiades being secretly apprised of this order, did not discontinue his services to the Lacedæmonians, but kept himself so well upon his guard that he avoided all the snares which were laid for him.

† For his better security he threw himself into the protection of Tissaphernes, the great king's governour at Sardis, and was not long without seeing himself in the highest degree of credit and authority in the court of the barbarians; for the Persian who was full of fraud and artifice, a great friend to knaves and bad men, and set no value upon simplicity and integrity, infinitely admired the smooth address of Alcibiades, the ease with which he assumed all kinds of manners and characters, and his great ability in the conduct of affairs; and indeed there was no heart so hard, or temper so untractable, as to hold out against the graces and charms of his conversation and intimacy. Even those who feared and envied him most, enchanted in a manner by his affable air and engaging behaviour, could not dissemble the infinite satisfaction they felt in seeing and conversing with him.

Tissaphernes therefore, though otherwise very haughty and brutal, and who of all the Persians hated the Greeks most, was so much taken with the complacency and insinuation of Alcibiades, that he gave himself wholly up to him, and flattered him more than he was flattered by him; inso-much that he gave the name of Alcibiades to the finest and most delightful of his gardens, as well from the abundance of its fountains and canals, and the verdure of its groves, as the surprising beauty of its retreats and solitudes, which art and nature seemed to vie in embellishing, and wherein a more than royal magnificence was displayed.

Alcibiades, who found there was no longer any safety for him in the party of the Spartans, and who always apprehended the resentment of Agis, began to do them ill offices with Tissaphernes, to prevent his aiding them with all his forces, and ruining the Athenians entirely. He had no difficulty in bringing the Persian into his views, which were conformable to his master's interests, and to the orders he had received from him. For after the famous treaty concluded under Cimon, the kings of Persia not daring to attack the Greeks with open force, took other measures to ruin them. They endeavoured underhand to excite divisions among them, and to foment troubles by considerable sums of money, which they found means to convey sometimes to Athens and sometimes to Sparta. They applied themselves so successfully to keep up a balance of power between these two republics, that the one could never entirely reduce the other. They granted them only slight aids, that could effect nothing decisive, in

* Thucyd. l. viii. p. 577—579. Plut. in Alcib. p. 164, 165.

† A. M. 3593. Ant. J. C. 411.

order to undermine them insensibly, and exhaust both parties gradually, by weakening them upon one another.

It is in this kind of conduct that policy makes the ability of ministers consist, who, from the recess of their cabinets, without noise or emotion, without any great expences, or setting numerous armies on foot, effect the reduction of the states whose power gives them umbrage, either by sowing domestic divisions among them, or by promoting the jealousy of their neighbours, in order to set them at variance with each other.

We must confess, however, that this kind of policy gives us no very favourable idea of the kings of Persia. To reduce themselves, powerful as they were, to such mean, obscure, and indirect measures, was to confess their weakness, and how unable they believed themselves to attack their enemies with open force, and to reduce them by honourable means. Besides, does it consist with justice to employ such methods in regard to people against whom there is no foundation of complaint, who live in peace under the faith of treaties, and whose sole crime is the apprehension of their being one day in a condition to do hurt? And is it lawful, by secret corruptions, to ensnare the fidelity of subjects, and to be the accomplice of their treasons, by putting arms into their hands, against their native country?

What glory and renown would not the kings of Persia have acquired, if content with the vast and rich dominions which providence had given them, they had applied their good offices, power, and even treasures, to conciliate the neighbouring people with each other, to remove their jealousies, to prevent injustice and oppression; and if, feared and honoured by them all, they had made themselves the mediators of their differences, the security of their peace, and the guarantee of their treaties? Can any conquest, however great, be compared with such glory?

Tissaphernes acted upon other principles, and had no thought but of preventing the Greeks from being in a condition to attack the Persians, their common enemy. He entered freely therefore into the views of Alcibiades, and at the same time that he declared himself openly for the Lacedæmonians, did not fail to assist the Athenians underhand, and by a thousand secret methods; deferring the payment of the Lacedæmonian fleet, and retarding the arrival of the Phœnician ships, of which he had long kept them in hopes. He omitted no occasion of giving Alcibiades new marks of his friendship and esteem, which rendered that general equally considerable to both parties. The Athenians, who had sadly experienced the effects of having drawn his anger upon them, were not now to repent their passing sentence of condemnation upon him. Alcibiades also on his side, who was extremely sorry to see the Athenians in so mournful a situation, began to fear, that the city of Athens being entirely ruined, he might fall into the hands of the Spartans who mortally hated him.

SECTION II.

ALCIBIADES RETURNS TO ATHENS.—TISSAPHERNES CONCLUDES A NEW TREATY WITH THE LACEDÆMONIANS.

THE Athenians were intent upon nothing so much as Samos,* where they had all their forces. From thence with their fleet they reduced all the cities that had abandoned them under their obedience, kept the rest in

* Thucyd. l. viii. p. 579—587.

their duty,* and found themselves still in a condition to make head against their enemies over whom they had obtained several advantages. But they were afraid of Tissaphernes, and the 150 Phœnician ships which he hourly expected; and rightly perceived, that if so powerful a fleet should join the enemy, there was no longer any safety for their city. Alcibiades who was well informed of all that passed among the Athenians, sent secretly to the principal of them at Samos, to sound their sentiments, and to let them know that he was not averse to returning to Athens, provided the administration of the republic were put into the hands of the great and powerful and not left to the populace, who had expelled him. Some of the principal officers went from Samos, with design to concert with him the proper measures for the success of that undertaking. He promised to procure the Athenians not only the favour of Tissaphernes, but of the king himself upon condition they would abolish the democracy or popular government; because the king would place more confidence in the engagements of the nobility than upon those of the inconstant and capricious multitude.

The deputies lent a willing ear to these proposals, and conceived great hopes of discharging themselves from part of the public impositions, because, being the richest of the people, the burthen lay heaviest upon them, and of making their country triumph after having possessed themselves of the government. At their return, they began by bringing over such as were most proper to share in their design; after which they caused a report to be spread among the troops that the king was inclined to declare in favour of the Athenians, upon condition that Alcibiades were reinstated, and the popular government abolished. That proposal surprised the soldiers, and was generally rejected at first; but the charm of gain, and the hope of a change to their advantage, soon softened what was harsh and shocking in it, and even made them ardently desire the recal of Alcibiades.

Phrynicus, one of their generals, rightly judging that Alcibiades affected an oligarchy no more than he did the democracy, and that in decrying the people's conduct, he had no other view than to acquire the favour and confidence of the nobility for his own re-establishment, had the boldness to oppose their resolutions, which were about to take place. He represented, that the change they meditated might very probably excite a civil war, to the ruin of the state; that it was very unlikely that the king of Persia would prefer the alliance of the Athenians to that of the Spartans, so much more advantageous to him; that this change would not retain the allies in their duty, nor bring over those who had renounced it, who would persist in preferring their liberty; that the government of a small number of rich and powerful persons would not be more favourable to either the citizens or allies than that of the people, because ambition was the great cause of all misfortunes in a republic, and the rich were the sole prompters of all troubles for the aggrandizement of themselves; that a state suffered more oppressions and violences under the rule of the nobility than that of the people, whose authority kept the former within due bounds, and was the asylum of such as they desired to oppress; that the allies were too well acquainted with these truths from their own experience to want any lessons upon the subject.

These remonstrances, as wise as they were, had no effect. Pisander was sent to Athens with some of the same faction, to propose the return

* Plut. in Alcib. p. 204, 206.

of Alcibiades, the alliance of Tissaphernes, and the abolition of the democracy. They represented, that by changing the government, and recalling Alcibiades, Athens might obtain a powerful aid from the king of Persia, which would be a certain means to triumph over Sparta. Upon this proposal great numbers exclaimed against it, and especially the enemies of Alcibiades. They alledged, amongst other reasons, the imprecations pronounced by the priests, and all the orders of religion, against him, and even against such as should propose to recal him. But Pisander advancing into the midst of the assembly, demanded whether they knew any other means to save the republic in the deplorable condition to which it was reduced ; and as it was admitted there were none, he added, that the preservation of the state was the question, and not the authority of the laws, which might be provided for in the sequel ; but at present there was no other method for the attainment of the king's friendship, and that of Tissaphernes. Though this change was very offensive to the people, they gave their consent to it at length, with the hope of re-establishing the democracy in time, as Pisander had promised ; and they decreed that he should go with ten more deputies to treat with Alcibiades and Tissaphernes, and that in the mean time Phrynicus should be recalled, and another general appointed to command the fleet in his stead.

The deputies did not find Tissaphernes in so good a disposition as they had been made to hope. He was afraid of the Lacedæmonians, but did not care to render the Athenians too powerful. It was his policy, by the advice of Alcibiades, to leave the two parties always at war, in order to weaken and consume them by each other. He therefore made great difficulties. He demanded at first that the Athenians should abandon all Ionia to him, and afterwards insisted upon their adding the neighbouring islands. Those demands being complied with, he further required, in a third interview, permission to fit out a fleet, and to cruise in the Grecian seas, which had been expressly provided against in the celebrated treaty concluded with Artaxerxes. The deputies thereupon broke up the conference with indignation, and perceived that Alcibiades had imposed upon them.

Tissaphernes, without loss of time, concluded a new treaty with the Lacedæmonians, in which what had displeased in the two preceding treaties was retrenched. The article which yielded to Persia the countries in general that had been in the actual possession of the reigning king Darius, or his predecessors, was limited to the provinces of Asia. The king engaged to defray all expences of the Lacedæmonian fleet, upon the foot, and in the condition it then was, till the arrival of that of Persia ; after which they were to support it themselves, unless they should choose that the king should pay it, to be reimbursed after the conclusion of the war. It was further agreed that they should unite their forces, and continue the war, or make peace by common consent. Tissaphernes, to keep his promise, sent for the fleet of Phœnicia. This treaty was made in the 11th year of Darius, and the 20th of the Peloponnesian war.

SECTION III.

ALTERATION IN THE GOVERNMENT OF ATHENS.—ALCIBIADES RECALLED,
AND AFTERWARDS APPOINTED GENERALISSIMO.

PISANDER,* at his return into Athens, found the change he had proposed at his setting out much forwarded, to which he put the last hand soon after. To give a form to this new government, he caused ten commissioners with absolute power to be appointed, who were however at a certain fixed time to give the people an account of what they had done. At the expiration of that term, the general assembly was summoned, wherein the first resolution was, that every one should be admitted to make such proposals as he thought fit, without being liable to any accusation of infringing the law, or consequential penalty. It was afterwards decreed that a new council should be formed, with full power to administer the public affairs, and to elect new magistrates. For this purpose five presidents were established, who nominated 100 persons, including themselves. Each of these chose and associated three more at his own pleasure, which made in all 400, in whom an absolute power was lodged. But to amuse the people, and to console them with a shadow of popular government, whilst they instituted a real oligarchy, it was said that the 400 should call a council of 5000 citizens, to assist them when they should judge it necessary. The council and assemblies of the people were held as usual; nothing was done however but by order of the 400. The people of Athens were deprived in this manner of their liberty, which they had enjoyed almost an hundred years, after having abolished the tyranny of the Pisistratides.

This decree being passed without opposition, after the separation of the assembly, the 400, armed with daggers, and attended by 120 young men, whom they made use of when any execution required it, entered the senate, and compelled the senators to retire, after having paid them the arrears due upon their appointments. They elected new magistrates out of their own body, observing the usual ceremonies upon such occasions. They did not think proper to recal those who were banished, lest they should authorise the return of Alcibiades, whose uncontrolable spirit they apprehended, and who would soon have made himself master of the people. Abusing their power in a tyrannical manner, some they put to death; others they banished, confiscating their estates with impunity. All who ventured to oppose this change, or even to complain of it, were butchered upon false pretexs; and those would have met with a bad reception, who demanded justice of the murderers. The 400, soon after their establishment, sent ten deputies to Samos for the army's concurrence to it.

† All that had passed at Athens was already known there, and the news had enraged the soldiers to the highest degree. They deposed immediately several of their chiefs, whom they suspected, and put others into their places, of whom Thrasyllus and Thrasybulus were the principal, and in the highest credit. Alcibiades was recalled, and chosen generalissimo by the whole army, which desired to sail directly for Pyrræus to attack the tyrants. But he opposed it; representing that it was necessary he should first have an interview with Tissaphernes, and that as they had

* Thucyd. l. viii. p. 590—594 Plut. in Alcib. p. 105.

† Thucyd. l. viii. p. 595—604. Plut. in Alcib. p. 205. Diod. x. iii. p. 165.

chosen him general, they might rely upon him for the care of the war. He set out immediately for Miletus. His principal design was to show himself to that government, with all the power with which he had been invested, and to let him see that he was in a condition to do him much good or much harm. The consequence of which was, that as he had kept the Athenians in awe by Tissaphernes, he now awed Tissaphernes no less by the Athenians: and we shall see in the sequel that this interview was not unnecessary.

Alcibiades, upon his return to Samos, found the army more inflamed than at first. The deputies of the 400 arrived there during his absence, and had endeavoured in vain to justify the alteration made at Athens to the soldiery. Their discourses, which were often interrupted by tumultuous cries, served only to exasperate them more, and they earnestly demanded to be led against the tyrants directly. Alcibiades did not act on this occasion as every body else would have done in consequence of having been raised to so high a dignity by the favour of the people; for he did not think himself obliged to an absolute and implicit compliance with them in every thing, though, from an exile and a fugitive, they had made him general of so great a fleet, and so numerous and formidable an army: but, as a statesman and a great politician, he believed it his duty to oppose the blind fury that hurried them on into evident danger, and to prevent them from committing a fault which must have been attended with their utter ruin. This wise steadiness preserved the city of Athens: for had they sailed thither at first, the enemy had made themselves masters of Ionia, the Hellespont, and all the islands without resistance; whilst the Athenians, by carrying the war into their own city, would have exhausted their whole forces against one another. He prevented the deputies from being ill treated, and dismissed them, saying that he did not object to the 5000 citizens having the supreme authority in the republic, but that it was necessary to depose the 400, and to re-establish the senate.

* Whilst this passed, the Phœnician fleet, which the Lacedæmonians impatiently expected, approached, and news came that it was arrived at † Aspendus. Tissaphernes went to meet it, no body being able to divine the cause of that journey. He had sent for that fleet at first to flatter the Lacedæmonians with the hopes of a powerful aid, and to put a stop to their progress, by making them wait its arrival. It was believed that his journey had the same motive, to prevent their doing any thing in his absence, and that their soldiers and mariners might disband for want of pay. However it was, he did not bring the fleet with him, from the view, no doubt, of keeping the balance equal, which was the king of Persia's interest, and to exhaust both parties by the length of the war. For it had been very easy to have put an end to it by the assistance of this additional fleet, as the Lacedæmonians alone were already as strong at sea as the Athenians. His frivolous excuse, of its not being complete, for not bringing it with him, sufficiently shows that he had other reasons for his conduct.

‡ The return of the deputies without success who had been sent to Samos, and the answer of Alcibiades, excited new troubles in the city, and gave a mortal wound to the authority of the 400. The tumult increased exceedingly, when news was brought that the enemy, after having beat the fleet sent by the 400 to the aid of Eubœa, had made themselves mas-

* Thucyd. l. v. iii. p. 604—606.

† A city of Pamphylia.

‡ Ibid. p. 607—614. Plut. in Alcib. p. 206—210. Diod. l. xiii. p. 171, 172, et 175—177, et 189—192.

ters of the island. Athens was in the highest terror and consternation upon this account; for neither the defeat of Sicily, nor any other preceding it, was so considerable as the loss of this island, from whence the city received considerable supplies, and almost all its provisions. If in the confusion in which Athens was at that time between two factions, the victorious fleet had fallen upon the port, as it might have done, the army of Samos would have been indispensably obliged to have flown to the defence of their country, and then the republic would have had only the city of Athens remaining of all its dominions; for the Hellespont, Ionia, and all the islands, seeing themselves abandoned, would have been reduced to take party, and go over to the Peloponnesians. But the enemy were not capable of such great designs; and this was not the first time the Lacedæmonians had been observed to have lost their advantages by the slowness and protraction natural to them.

Athens without delay deposed the 400, as authors of all the troubles and divisions under which they groaned. Alcibiades was recalled by unanimous consent, and earnestly solicited to make all possible haste to the assistance of the city. But judging if he returned immediately to Athens, he should owe his recall to the compassion and favour of the people, he resolved to render his return glorious and triumphant, and to deserve it by some considerable exploit. * For this purpose, leaving Samos with a small number of ships, he cruised about the islands of Cos and Cnidos; and having learned that Mindarus, the Spartan admiral, was sailed to the Hellespont with his whole fleet, and that the Athenians were in pursuit of him, he steered that way with the utmost diligence to support them, and arrived happily with his 18 vessels at the time the fleets were engaged near Abydos in a battle which lasted till night, without any advantage on either side. His arrival gave the Spartans new courage at first, who believed him still their friend, and dispirited the Athenians. But Alcibiades, hanging out the Athenian flag in the admiral's galley, fell upon the Lacedæmonians, who were stoniest, and were pursuing the Athenians, put them to flight, drove them ashore, and, animated by his success, sunk their vessels, and made a great slaughter of the soldiers, who had thrown themselves into the sea to save themselves by swimming; though Pharnabazus spared no pains to assist them, and had advanced at the head of his troops to the coast, to favour their flight, and to save their ships. The Athenians, after having taken 30 of their galleys, and retaken those they had lost, erected a trophy.

Alcibiades, vain of his success, had the ambition to desire to appear before Tissaphernes in a triumphant equipage, and to make him rich presents, as well in his own as in the name of the people of Athens. He went to him therefore with a magnificent retinue, worthy of the general of Athens. But he did not meet with the favourable reception he expected; for Tissaphernes, who knew he was accused by the Lacedæmonians, and feared that the king would punish him at length for not having executed his orders, found Alcibiades presenting himself very *opportune*, and caused him to be seized and sent prisoner to Sardis, to shelter himself by that injustice against the representations of the Lacedæmonians.

Thirty days after, Alcibiades, having found means to get a horse, escaped from his guards, and fled to Clazomene, where, to revenge himself on Tissaphernes, he gave out that he had set him at liberty. From Clazomene he repaired to the Athenian fleet, where he was joined by Thera-

* A. M. 3595. Ant. J. C. 409.

menes with 20 ships from Macedonia, and by Thrasylbulus with 20 more from Thasos. He sailed from thence to Parium in the Propontis. All those ships to the number of 86, being come thither, he left that place in the night, and arrived the next morning at Proconnesus, a small isle near Cyzicum; he heard there, that Mandarus was at Cyzicum, with Pharnabasus and his land army. He rested that whole day at Proconnesus. On the morrow he harangued his soldiers, and represented to them the necessity there was for attacking the enemy by sea and land, and for making themselves masters of Cyzicum; demonstrating at the same time, that without a complete and absolute victory, they could have neither provisions nor money. He had taken great care that the enemy should not be apprized of his approach. By good fortune for him, a great storm of rain and thunder, followed by a thick gloom, helped him to conceal his enterprise so successfully, that not only the enemy were prevented from perceiving that he advanced, but the Athenians themselves, whom he had caused to embark with precipitation, did not know that he had weighed anchor and put to sea.

When the gloom was dispersed, the Lacedæmonian fleet appeared, exercising at some distance before the port. Alcibiades, who apprehended that the enemy, upon the sight of so great a number of ships, would make the harbour, ordered the captains to keep back a little, and to follow him at a good distance; and taking only 40 vessels, he advanced towards the enemy to offer them battle. The enemy, deceived by this stratagem, and despising his small number, advanced against him, and began the fight. But when they saw the rest of the Athenian fleet come up, they immediately lost courage and fled. Alcibiades, with 20 of his best ships pursued them to the shore, landed, and killed a great number of them in the flight. Mindarus and Pharnabasus opposed his efforts in vain; the first, who fought with astonishing valour, he killed, and put the other to flight.

The Athenians by this victory, which made them masters of the slain, the arms, spoils, and the whole fleet of the enemy, besides the taking of Cyzicum, not only possessed themselves of the Hellespont, but drove the Spartans entirely out of that sea. Letters were intercepted, in which the latter, with a conciseness truly laconic, advised the Ephori of the blow they had received, in terms to this effect: "The flower of your army is cut off; Mindarus is dead; the rest of the troops are dying with hunger; and we neither know what to do, nor what will become of us."

The news of this victory occasioned no less joy to the Athenians than consternation to the Spartans. * They dispatched ambassadors immediately to demand that an end should be put to a war equally destructive to both people, and that a peace should be concluded upon reasonable conditions, for the re-establishment of their ancient concord and amity, of which they had for many years experienced the salutary effects. The wisest and most judicious of the citizens of Athens were unanimously of opinion that it was proper to take the advantage of so favourable a conjuncture for the concluding of a treaty, which might put an end to all jealousies, appease all animosities and remove all distrusts. But those who found their advantage in the troubles of the state, prevented the good effects of that disposition. † Cleophon amongst others, the most reputed orator at that time, animated the people from the tribunal of harangues by a violent and seditious discourse, insinuating that their interests were

* Diocl. l. xiii. p. 177—178.

† Æsch. in Orat. de fals. legat.

betrayed by a secret intelligence with the Lacedæmonians, which aimed at depriving them of all the advantages of the important victory they had gained, and at making them lose for ever the opportunity of being fully avenged for all the wrongs and misfortunes Sparta had caused them to suffer. This Cleophon was an inconsiderable fellow, a musical instrument maker. It was reported also that he had been a slave, and got himself fraudulently enrolled in the register of the citizens. He carried his audacity and fury so far, as to threaten to plunge his dagger into the throat of any one who should talk of peace. The Athenians, puffed up with their present prosperity, forgetting their past misfortunes, and promising themselves all things from the valour and good fortune of Alcibiades, rejected all proposals of accommodation, without reflecting that there is nothing so fluctuating and precarious as the success of war. The ambassadors retired without being able to effect any thing. Such infatuation and irrational pride, are generally the forerunners of some great misfortune.

Alcibiades knew well how to make use of the victory he had gained, and presently after besieged Chalcedonia, which had revolted from the Athenians, and received a Lacedæmonian garrison. During this siege he took another town, called Selymbria. Pharnabazus, terrified by the rapidity of his conquests, made a treaty with the Athenians to this effect: "That Pharnabazus should pay them a certain sum of money; that the Chalcedonians should return to their obedience, depend upon the Athenians, and pay them tribute; that the Athenians should commit no hostilities in the province of Pharnabazus, who engaged for the safe conduct of their ambassadors to the great king." Byzantium and several other cities submitted to the Athenians.

* Alcibiades, who desired with the utmost passion to see his country again, or rather to be seen by his country, after so many victories over their enemies, set out for Athens. The sides of his ships were covered with bucklers and all sorts of spoils, in form of trophies; and causing a great number of vessels to be towed after him by way of triumph, he displayed also the ensigns and ornaments of those he had burned, which were more than the others; the whole amounting to about 200 ships. It is said, that reflecting on what had been done against him, upon approaching the port, he was struck with some terror, and was afraid to quit his vessel till he saw from the deck a great number of his friends and relations, who were come to the shore to receive him, and earnestly entreated him to land.

The people came out of the city in a body to meet him, and at his appearance set up incredible shouts of joy. In the midst of an infinite number of officers and soldiers, all eyes were fixed solely on him, whom they considered as victory itself, descended from the skies; all around him passionately caressing, blessing, and crowning him in emulation of each other. Those who could not approach him were never tired with contemplating him at a distance whilst the old men showed him to their children. They repeated with the highest praises all the great actions he had done for his country; nor could they refuse their admiration even to those he had done against it during his banishment, of which they imputed the fault to themselves alone. This public joy was mingled with tears and regret, from the remembrance of past misfortunes, which they could not avoid comparing with their present felicity. "We could not have failed," said they, "of the conquest of Sicily; our other hopes could never have proved abortive, if we had referred all our affairs and forces to the dispos-

“al of Alcibiades alone. In what a condition was Athens when he took upon him our protection and defence! We had not only almost entirely lost our power at sea, but were scarce possessed of the suburbs of our city, and, to add to our misfortunes, were torn in pieces by a horrid civil war. He, notwithstanding has raised the republic from its ruins; and, not content with having reinstated it in the possession of the sovereignty of the sea, has rendered it universally victorious by land; as if the fate of Athens had been in his hands alone, either to ruin or preserve it, and victory was annexed to his person, and obeyed his orders.”

This favourable reception of Alcibiades did not prevent his demanding an assembly of the people, in order to his justification before them, well knowing how necessary it was for his safety to be absolved in form. He appeared, therefore, and after having deplored his misfortunes, which he imputed very little to the people, and entirely ascribed to his ill fortune, and some dæmon envious of his prosperity, he represented to them the designs of the enemy, and exhorted them not to conceive other than great hopes. The Athenians transported with hearing him speak, decreed him crowns of gold, appointed him general by sea and land with unlimited power, restored him all his fortunes, and ordered the * Eumolpides and Ceryces to absolve him from the curses they had pronounced against him by the order of the people; doing their utmost to make him amends for the injury and shame of his banishment by the glory of his recal, and to efface the remembrance of the anathemas themselves had decreed, by the vows and prayers which they made in his favour. Whilst all the Eumolpides and Ceryces were employed in revoking those imprecations, Theodorus, the principal of them, had the courage to say, “But for me, I have not cursed him, if he has done no evil to his country;” insinuating by that bold expression, that the maledictions, being conditional, could not fall upon the head of the innocent, nor be averted from the guilty.

In the midst of this glory and shining prosperity of Alcibiades, the majority of the people could not help being concerned, when they considered the time of his return; for it happened precisely upon the day when the Athenians celebrated the feast in honour of Minerva, adored under the name of Agraulis. The priests took off all the ornaments from the goddess’ statue to wash it, from whence the feast was called Πλωρητια and afterwards covered it; and that day was accounted one of the most ominous and unfortunate. It was the 25th of the month Thargelion, which answers to the 2nd. of July.* This circumstance displeased that superstitious people, because it seemed to imply, that the goddess, patroness, and protectress of Athens did not receive Alcibiades agreeably, and with a benign aspect, since she covered and concealed herself, as if she would keep him off, and remove him from her.

† All things having however succeeded according to his wish, and the 100 ships he was to command being ready, he deferred his departure out of a laudable ambition to celebrate the great mysteries; for from the time the Lacedæmonians had fortified Decelia, and taken possession of all the ways from Athens to Eleusina, the feast had not been solemnized in all its

* The Eumolpides and Ceryces were two families at Athens who had different functions in the mysteries of Ceres. They took their names from Eumolpus and Ceryx, the first who had exercised those offices. Perhaps the employment of the latter had some relation to that of heralds, Κερυκας.

* N. S.

† Plut. in Alcib. p. 210.

pomp, and the procession had been obliged to go by sea. The particular ceremonies of this solemnity may be seen in book x. chap. iii.

Alcibiades believed it would be a most glorious action, and attract the blessings of the gods and the praises of men, if he restored all its lustre and solemnity to this feast, in making the procession go by land under the convoy of his troops, to defend it against the attacks of the enemy. For either Agis would suffer it to pass quietly, notwithstanding the numerous troops he had at Decelia, which would considerably lessen the reputation of that king, and be a blot in his glory; or, if he should chuse to attack it, and oppose the march, he should then have the satisfaction to fight a sacred battle; a battle grateful to the gods, for the greatest and most venerable of all their mysteries, in the sight of his country and citizens, who would be witnesses of his valour, and regard for religion. It is very likely, that by this public and ostentatious act of piety, which struck the people's view in so sensible a manner, and was so extremely to his taste, Alcibiades' principal design was to efface entirely from their minds the suspicions of impiety, to which the mutilation of statues and profanation of mysteries had given birth.

Having taken that resolution, he gave notice to the Eumolpides and Ceryces to hold themselves in readiness, posted centinels upon the hills, sent out runners at the break of day, and taking with him the priests, the initiated, and the probationers, with those who initiated them, he covered them with his army, and disposed the whole procession with wonderful order and profound silence. Never was show, says Plutarch, more august, nor more worthy the majesty of the gods, than this warlike procession and religious expedition; in which even those who envied the glory of Alcibiades were obliged to own, that he was no less happy in discharging the functions of an high-priest than those of a general. No enemy dared to appear to disturb that pompous march, and Alcibiades re-conducted the sacred troops to Athens with entire safety. This success gave him new courage, and raised the valour and boldness of his army to such a degree, that they looked upon themselves as invincible whilst he commanded them.

He acquired the affection of the poor and the lower sort of people so much, that they most ardently desired to have him for their king. Many of them openly declared themselves to that effect; and there were some who addressed themselves to him, and exhorted him to set himself above envy, and not to trouble himself about laws, decrees, or suffrages; to put down those wordy impertinents that disturbed the state with their vain harangues, to make himself master of affairs, and to govern with entire authority, without fearing accusers. For him, what his thoughts of the tyranny and his designs were, are unknown; but the most powerful citizens, apprehending the breaking out of a fire, of which they already saw the sparks, pressed him to depart without delay, granting whatever he demanded, and giving him for colleagues the generals most agreeable to him. He set sail accordingly with 100 ships, and steered for the island of Andros, which had revolted. His high reputation, and the good fortune which had attended him in all his enterprises, made nothing but what was great and extraordinary to be expected from him.

SECTION IV.

THE LACEDÆMONIANS APPOINT LYSANDER ADMIRAL.—HE BEATS THE ATHENIAN FLEET NEAR EPHEBUS.

LYSANDER IS SUCCEEDED IN THE COMMAND BY CALLICRATIDAS.

THE Lacedæmonians, justly alarmed at the return and success of Alcibiades, * conceived that such an enemy made it necessary to oppose him with an able general, capable of making head against him. For this reason they made choice of Lysander, and gave him the command of the fleet. When he arrived at Ephesus, he found the city very well disposed in his favour, and well affected to Sparta, but otherwise in a very unhappy situation; for it was in danger of becoming barbarous, by assuming the manners and customs of the Persians, who had great commerce with it, as well from the neighbourhood of Lydia, as because the king's generals commonly took up their winter quarters there. An idle and voluptuous life, filled up with luxury and empty show, could not fail of disgusting infinitely a man like Lysander, who had been bred from his birth in the simplicity, poverty, and severe discipline of Sparta. Having brought his army to Ephesus, he gave orders for assembling ships of burden there from all parts, erected an arsenal for building of galleys, made the ports free for merchants, gave the public places to artificers, put all arts in motion, and held them in honour; and by these means filled the city with riches, and laid the foundation of that grandeur and magnificence to which it afterwards attained: so great a change can the application and ability of a single person occasion in a state!

Whilst he was making these dispositions, he received advice that Cyrus, the king's youngest son, was arrived at Sardis. That prince could not be above 16 years old at that time, being born after his father's accession to the crown, in the 17th year of his reign. Parysatis his mother loved him to idolatry, and had the entire ascendant of her husband. It was she that occasioned his having the supreme government of all the provinces of Asia Minor given him; a command that subjected all the provincial governours of the most important part of the empire to his authority. The view of Parysatis was, without doubt, to put the young prince into a condition to dispute the throne with his brother after the king's death, as we shall see he does to some effect. One of the principal instructions given him by his father, upon sending him to his government, was to give effectual aid to the Lacedæmonians against Athens; an order very contrary to the measures observed till then by Tissaphernes, and the other governours of those provinces. It had always been their maxim, sometimes to assist one party, sometimes the other; in order to hold their power in such a balance, that the one might never be able to crush the other entirely; from whence it followed that both parties were kept weak by the war, and neither in condition to form any enterprises against the Persian empire.

Upon Lysander's being apprized therefore of the arrival of Cyrus at Sardis, he set out from Ephesus to make him a visit, and to complain of the delays and breach of faith of Tissaphernes, who, notwithstanding the orders he had received to support the Lacedæmonians, and to drive the Athenians out of the sea, had always covertly favoured the latter, out of regard for Alcibiades, whose measures he entirely gave into, and had been

* Xenoph. ellen. l. xi. p. 440—442. Plut. in Lysand. p. 434, 435 Diod. l. xiii. p. 192—197.

the sole cause of the loss of the fleet, by not supplying it with the necessary quantity of provisions. This discourse pleased Cyrus, who looked upon Tissaphernes as a very bad man, and his particular enemy; and he answered, that the king had given him orders to support the Lacedæmonians powerfully, and that he had received 500 talents* for that purpose; Lysander, contrary to the common character of the Spartans, was submissive and condescending, full of complacency for the grandes, always ready to pay his court to them, and supporting, for the good of the service, all the weight of their haughtiness and vanity with incredible patience; in which behaviour some people make the whole address and merit of a courtier consist.

He did not forget himself on this occasion, and setting at work all that the industry and art of a complete courtier could suggest of flattery and insinuation, he perfectly gained the young prince's favour and good opinion. After having praised his generosity, magnificence, and zeal for the Lacedæmonians, he desired him to give each soldier and mariner a † drachm per day, in order to debauch those of the enemy by that means, and thereby terminate the war the sooner. Cyrus very much approved the project; but said that he could make no change in the king's order, and that the treaty with them expressly settled only half a talent ‡ to be paid monthly for each galley. The prince, however, at the end of a banquet, which he gave him before his departure, drinking to his health, and pressing him to ask something of him, Lysander desired that an || obolus a day might be added to the seamen's pay. This was granted; and he gave them four oboli, instead of three which they received before, and paid them all the arrears due to them, with a month's advance; giving Lysander 10,000 § darics for that purpose; that is, 100,000 livres, or about 5000*l.* sterling.

This largess filled the whole fleet with ardour and alacrity; and almost unmanned the enemy's galleys; the greatest part of the mariners deserting to the party where the pay was best. The Athenians, in despair upon receiving this news, endeavoured to conciliate Cyrus by the interposition of Tissaphernes; but he would not hearken to them, notwithstanding the satrap represented that it was not for the king's interest to aggrandize the Lacedæmonians, but to balance the power of one side with that of the other, in order to perpetuate the war, and to ruin both by their own divisions.

Though Lysander had considerably weakened the enemy by augmenting the mariner's pay, and thereby very much hurt their naval power, he dared not however hazard a battle with them, particularly apprehending Alcibiades, who was a man of execution, had the greater number of ships, and had never been overthrown in any battle either by sea or land. But after Alcibiades had left Samos to go into Phocæa and Ionia to raise money, of which he was in want for the payment of his troops, and had given the command of his fleet to Antiochus, with express order not to fight or attack the enemy in his absence; the new commander, to make show of his courage, and to brave Lysander, entered the port of Ephesus with two galleys, and after having made a great noise, retired with loud laughter, and an air of contempt and insult. Lysander, enraged at that affront, immediately detached some galleys, and went himself in pursuit of him. But as

* 500,000 crowns, about 112,500*l.*

† Ten pence.

‡ 1500 livres, about 112*l.* sterling.

|| The drachm was six oboli, or ten pence French; each obolus being three half pence; so that the four oboli were six pence half penny a day, instead of five pence or three oboli.

§ A daric is about a pistole.

the Athenians advanced to support Antiochus, he ordered other galleys of his side to come on till the whole fleet arrived by little and little, and the engagement became general on both sides. Lysander gained the victory, and having taken 15 of the Athenian galleys, he erected a trophy. Alcibiades, on his return to Samos, sailed even into the port to offer him battle; but Lysander was contented with his victory, and did not think proper to accept it; so that he retired without doing any thing.

* Thrasylulus at the same time, the most dangerous enemy he had in his army, left the camp, and went to Athens to accuse him. To inflame his enemies in the city the more, he told the people in a full assembly, that Alcibiades had entirely ruined their affairs, and the navy, by the licence he had introduced; that he had given himself up to the most † notorious debauchees and drunkards, who from common seamen were the only persons in credit about him; that he abandoned his whole authority to them, to be at leisure to enrich himself in the provinces, and to plunge himself there into intemperance and all other infamous excesses, to the disgrace of Athens, whilst his fleet was left neglected in the face of the enemy's.

Another article of accusation against him was taken from the forts he had built near the city of Byzantium, for an asylum and retreat for him; as neither being able nor willing to return any more to his country. The Athenians, a capricious, inconstant people, gave credit to these impeachments. The loss of the last battle, and his little success since his departure from Athens, instead of the great and wonderful actions expected from him, entirely sunk him in their opinions; and his own glory and reputation may be said to have occasioned his ruin. For he was suspected of not desiring to do what was not done, which they could not believe out of his power, because they were fully persuaded that nothing he desired to do was impossible to him. They made it a crime in Alcibiades, that the rapidity of his conquests did not answer to that of their imaginations; not considering that he made war without money upon a people who had the great king for their treasurer, and that he was often obliged to quit his camp to go in quest of what was necessary for the payment and subsistence of his troops. However it was, Alcibiades was deposed, and ten generals nominated in his stead; of which, when he received advice, he retired in his galley to some castles he had in the Thracian Chersonesus.

‡ About this time died Plistonax, one of the kings of Lacedæmonia, and was succeeded by Pausanias, who reigned 14 years. The latter made a fine answer to one who asked, why it was not permitted to change any thing in the ancient customs of Sparta; “|| Because,” says he, “at Sparta the laws command men, and not men the laws.”

§ Lysander, who intended to establish the government of the nobility in all the cities in the dependance of Sparta, that the governours of his choosing might be always at his disposal, from his having rendered them independent of their people, he caused such persons of the principal cities to come to Ephesus as he knew to be the boldest, and most enterprising and

* A. M. 3538. Ant. J. C. 406.

† Antiochus is pointed at in this place; a mean debauched man, who had acquired the favour of Alcibiades by catching a quail for him which he had let fly.

‡ Diod. l. xiii. p. 196.

|| *Οτι τας νομους των αυδρων, η τας αυδρας των νομων κυριως ειναι δει.* Plut. in Apoph. p. 230.

§ Xenoph. Hellen. l. i. 442—444. Plut. in Lysand. p. 433—436. Diod. l. xii. p. 197, 198.

ambitious. These he placed at the head of affairs, promoted to the greatest honours, and raised to the first employments of the army, thereby rendering himself says Plutarch, the accomplice of all the crimes and oppressions they committed to advance and enrich themselves. For this reason they were always extremely attached to him, and regretted him infinitely, when Callicratidas came to succeed him, and took upon him the command of the fleet. He was not inferior to Lysander either in valour or military knowledge, and was infinitely above him in point of moral virtue. Alike severe to himself and others, inaccessible to flattery and sloth, the declared enemy of luxury, he retained the modesty, temperance, and austerity of the ancient Spartans; virtues that began to distinguish him particularly, as they were not too common in his time. His probity and justice were proof against all things; his simplicity and integrity abhorred all falsehood and fraud, to which were joined a truly Spartan nobleness and grandeur of soul. The great and powerful could not hinder themselves from admiring his virtue; but they were better pleased with the facility and condescension of his predecessor, who was blind to the injustice and violence of their actions.

It was not without mortification and jealousy that Lysander saw him arrive at Ephesus to take upon him the command, and out of a criminal baseness and treachery, not uncommon with those who hearken more to their private ambition, than the good of the public, he did him all the ill ces in his power. Of the 10,000 darics, which Cyrus had given him for the augmentation of the mariners' pay, he returned the remainder to that prince; telling Callicratidas, that he might apply to the king for the money, and that it depended on him to find means for the subsistence of his army. This conduct gave him great trouble, and distressed him exceedingly; for he had brought no money with him from Sparta, and could not resolve to extort any from the citizens, as he found them sufficiently rifled already.

* In this urgent necessity a person having offered him 50 talents, that is to say, 50,000 crowns, to obtain a favour he could not grant with justice, he refused them. Upon which Cleander, one of his officers, said, "I would accept them, were I in your place." "And so would I," replied the general, "were I in your's."

He had no other resource therefore than to go, as Lysander had done, to ask money at the gates of the king's general and lieutenants, for which he was the least proper of all mankind. Nurtured and educated in the love of liberty, full of great and noble sentiments, and infinitely remote from all flattery and baseness, he was convinced at heart, that it was less evil and dishonour for Greeks to be overcome by Greeks, than infamously to make their court, and beg at the gates of barbarians, whose only merit consisted in their gold and silver. The whole nation were indeed disgraced by so mean a prostitution.

Cicero, in his Offices, draws two very different characters of persons employed in the administration of government, and makes the application of them to the two generals of whom we speak. The one, says he, † zealous lovers of truth, and declared enemies of all fraud, pique themselves

* Plut. in Apoph. p. 222.

† Sunt his alii multum dispares, simplices et aperti; qui nihil ex occulto, nihil ex insidiis agendum putant; veritatis cultores, fraudis inimici; itemque alii, qui quidvis perpetiantur, cuius deserviant, dum, quod velint, consequantur. Quo in genere versutissimum et patientissimum Lacedæmonium Lysandrum accepimus contraque Calliocratidam. Offic. l. i. n. 109.

upon their simplicity and candour, and do not believe that it can ever consist with honour to lay snares or use artifice. The others, prepared to do or suffer every thing, are not ashamed of the meanest actions and prostitutions, provided, from those unworthy means, they have reason to expect the success of their designs. Cicero places Callicratidas amongst the former, and Lysander amongst the latter, to whom he gives two epithets not much to his honour, and hardly consistent with the Spartan character, when he calls him "very artful and very patient," or rather "very complaisant."

Callicratidas, however, forced by necessity, went to Lydia, and repaired immediately to the palace of Cyrus, where he desired that prince might be told that the admiral of the Grecian fleet was come to speak with him. He was answered that Cyrus was then at table, engaged in a * party of pleasure; to which he replied with a modest tone and air, that he was in no haste, and would wait till the prince came forth. The guards set up a laugh, wondering at the honest stranger's simplicity, which had so little the air of the world in it, and he was obliged to retire. He came thither a second time, and was again denied admittance. Upon which he returned to Ephesus, loading those with curses and imprecations, who had first made their court to barbarians, and by their flattery and submissions had taught them to make their riches a title and pretence for insulting the rest of mankind. Addressing himself at the same time to those about him, he swore, that as soon as he returned to Sparta, he would use his utmost endeavours to reconcile the Greeks amongst themselves, that for the future they might become formidable to the barbarians, and have no further occasion for their aid to invade and ruin each other. But that generous Spartan, whose thoughts were so noble, and so worthy the Lacedæmonian name, and whose justice, magnanimity, and valour, might rank him with all that Greece had ever produced of the most excellent and most consummate, had not the good fortune to return to his country, nor apply himself to a work so great, and so worthy of him.

SECTION V.

CALLICRATIDAS IS DEFEATED BY THE ATHENIANS—SENTENCE OF DEATH PASSED ON SOME ATHENIAN GENERALS—SOCRATES ALONE OPPOSES THIS SENTENCE.

CALLICRATIDAS, † after having gained several victories over the Athenians, had at last pursued Conon, one of their generals, into the port of Mytilene, where he kept him blocked up. This was in the 26th year of the Peloponnesian war. Conon, seeing himself besieged by sea and land, without hope of aid, and in want of provisions, found means to apprize Athens of the extreme danger he was in. Extraordinary efforts were made to relieve him, and in less than a month's time, a fleet of 110 sail were fitted out, on board of which were embarked all who were capable of bearing arms, as well slaves as freemen, with some horse. At Samos they were joined by the allies with 40 galleys, and steered for the Arginuseæ, islands situated between Cuma and Mitylene. Callicratidas being informed of their course, left Eteonicus to continue the siege with 50 ships, and put to sea with 120 sail, with design to face the enemy, and prevent

* The Greek says literally that he was drinking. *πίνει*. The Persians valued themselves upon drinking a great deal, as an instance of their merit, as we shall see in Cyrus' letter to the Lacedæmonians.

† Xenoph. Hellen. l. i. p. 444—452. Died. l. xiii. p. 217—222.

their relieving Conon. The right wing of the Athenians was commanded by Protomachus and Thrasyllus, who had each 15 galleys. They were supported by a second line with a like number of ships, commanded by Lysias and Aristogenes. The left wing, like the other, drawn up in two lines, was under Aristocrates and Diomedon, supported by Erasinidas and Pericles.* The main body, consisting of near 30 galleys, amongst which were the three Athenian admirals, was disposed in one line. They had strengthened each of their wings with a second line; because their galleys were neither so swift, nor so easy to manage as those of the enemy; so that there was reason to fear their getting between two, and being charged on both sides at the same time. The Lacedæmonians and their allies, who perceived they were inferior in number to the enemy, contented themselves with drawing up in one line, in order to equal their front, and for the greater facility of running between the Athenian galleys, and turning nimbly round them. Callicratidas' pilot, daunted at the inequality, advised him not to hazard the battle, and to retire: but he replied that he could not fly without shame, and that his death was of small importance to the republic. "Sparta," said he, "does not depend upon one man." He commanded the right wing, and Thrasondas the Theban the left.

It was terrible to behold the sea covered with 300 galleys ready to engage. Never had more numerous naval armies of the Greeks joined in battle before. The ability, experience, and valour of the generals who commanded, left nothing to desire; so that there was reason to believe this battle would decide the fate of both people, and put an end to a war that had endured so long. When the signals were given, the two armies raised great shouts, and began the fight. Callicratidas, who from the answer of the augurs, expected to fall in the battle, did amazing actions of valour. He attacked the enemy with incredible courage and boldness, sunk some of their ships, disabled others by breaking their oars, and piercing their sides with the prow or beak of his galley. At length he attacked that of Pericles, and made a thousand holes in it; but the latter having hooked him fast with a grappling iron, he found it impossible to disengage himself, and was surrounded in an instant by several of the Athenian vessels. His own was immediately filled with the enemy, and after a dreadful slaughter he fell dead, rather overwhelmed by their numbers than vanquished. The right wing, which he commanded, having lost its admiral, was put to flight. The left composed of Bœotians, and Eubœans, still made a long and vigorous resistance, from the important concern they were in, lest they should fall into the hands of the Athenians, against whom they had revolted; but they were at length obliged to give way, and retire in disorder. The Athenians erected a trophy in the Arginusæ. They lost 25 galleys in this battle, and the enemy more than 70, of which number were nine of the ten furnished by the Lacedæmonians.

† Plutarch equals Callicratidas, the Lacedæmonian general, for his justice, valour, and magnanimity, with all who had ever rendered themselves most worthy of admiration amongst the Greeks.

‡ He blames him however exceedingly for hazarding the battle at the Arginusæ, and observes, that to avoid the reproach of having retired out of fear, he had, through a mistaken sense of honour, failed in the essential duty of his function. For, says Plutarch, if, to use the comparison

* He was son of the great Pericles,

† Plut. in Lysand. p. 136.

‡ Plut. in Pelop. p. 278.

of * Iphicrates, the light armed infantry resemble the hands, the horse the feet, the main body the breast, and the general the head ; the general, who abandons himself rashly to the impetuosity of his valour, does not so much neglect or expose his own life, as the lives of those whose safety depends upon his. Our Lacedæmonian chief was therefore in the wrong, continues Plutarch, to answer the pilot who advised him to retire, " Sparta does not depend upon one man ;" for though it be true that Callicratidas, fighting under the orders of another by sea or land, " was no more than one man ;" yet, commanding an army, all who obeyed his orders were collected in his person : and he, in whom so many thousands might be lost, " was no longer one man." † Cicero had passed the same judgment upon him before Plutarch. After having said that there were many persons to be found, who were ready to sacrifice their fortunes, and even lives for their country, but who, out of false delicacy in point of glory, would not hazard their reputation for it in the least ; he cites the example of Callicratidas, who answered those who advised him to retreat from the Arginusæ, " That Sparta could fit out another fleet if this were lost ; but " for himself he could not fly before the enemy without shame and infamy."

I return to the sequel of the battle near the Arginusæ. The Athenian generals ordered Theramenes, Thrasybulus, and some other officers to return with about 50 galleys to take up the wrecks and dead bodies, in order to their interment, whilst they rowed on with the rest against Eteonicus, who kept Conon besieged before Mitylene. But a rude tempest came on suddenly and prevented the execution of this order. Eteonicus having received news of the defeat, and fearing it might occasion alarm and terror amongst the troops, sent back those who brought it, with orders to return with wreaths of flowers upon their heads, and to give out that Callicratidas had gained the victory, and destroyed the whole Athenian fleet. Upon their return he offered sacrifices of thanksgiving, and having made his troops take some refreshment, he sent the galleys away directly, the wind being fair, and marched off the land army to Methymna, after having burned the camp. Conon being delivered in this manner from the blockade, joined the victorious fleet, which returned forthwith to Samos. However, when it was known at Athens, that the dead bodies had been left without interment, the people were highly enraged, and laid the whole weight of their resentment upon those they believed guilty of that crime. The ancients held it a great one not to provide sepulture for the dead ; and we may observe, that after all their battles, the first care of the conquered, notwithstanding the sense of their misfortune, and the great affliction for a bloody defeat, was to demand a suspension of arms from the victor, in order to pay their last duties to those who had fallen in battle, upon which they believed their happiness in another life depended. They had little or no idea of the resurrection of the body ; but however the Pagans, in the soul's concern for the body after death, the religious regard

* He was a famous general of the Athenians.

† *Inventi multi sunt, qui non modo pecuniam, sed vitam etiam, profundere pro patria parati essent, iidem gloriæ jacturam ne minimam quidem facere vellent, ne republica quidem postulante ; ut Callicratidas, qui, cum Lacedæmoniorum dux fuisset Peloponnesiaco bello, multaque fecisset egregie, vertit ad extremum omnia, cum consilio non paruit eorum, qui classem ab Arginusis removendam, nec eum Atheniensibus dimicandum putabant. Quibus ille respondit, Lacedæmonios, classe illa amissa, aliam parare posse ; se fugere sine suo dedecore non posse.* *Offic. l. i. n. 48.*

paid to it, and the passion with which they rendered solemn honours to the dead, seem to argue, that they had some confused notions of a resurrection, which subsisted among all nations, and descended from the most ancient tradition, though they could not distinguish clearly upon it.

Hence arose the fury of the people of Athens. They immediately nominated new generals, retaining only Conon of the old ones, to whom they gave Adimantes and Philocles for colleagues, eight days after which two of them withdrew themselves, and only six returned to Athens. Theramenes the tenth general, who returned before the rest of the fleet, accused the other chiefs before the people, making them responsible for not bringing off the dead after the battle, and to clear himself, read the letter they had written to the senate and people, wherein they excused themselves from the violence of the storm, without charging any body. That calumny was detestably vile, as done in abuse of their reserve in not mentioning him in their letter, and in not laying a fault to his charge, of which he might have appeared the most guilty. The generals, at their return, not being able to prevail for the time necessary for making their defence, contented themselves with representing in few words the state of the affair, and appealed for the truth of what they said to the pilots, and all present, when it happened. The people seemed to receive their excuse favourably, and several persons offered themselves for their sureties; but it was thought proper to adjourn the assembly, because of the night; and it being the people's custom to give their suffrages by lifting up of hands, their resolution could not be known; besides which the council were first to give their opinion upon the question to be proposed to the people.

The feast of Apaturia unexpectedly coming on, in which it was the custom to assemble by families, the relations of Theramenes posted several persons in mourning habits, and shaved in proper places, who said they were the kindred of those who had been slain in the battle, and obliged Callixenes to accuse the generals in the senate. It was decreed in consequence, that as the accusation and defence had been heard in the last assembly, the people by their respective tribes should give their voices, and if the accused were found guilty, they should be punished with death, their estates confiscated, and the tenth part consecrated to the goddess.* Some senators opposed this decree as unjust, and contrary to the laws: but as the people, at the instigation of Callixenes, threatened to include the opposers in the same cause and crime with the generals, they were so mean as to desist from their opposition, and to sacrifice the innocent generals to their own safety, by consenting to the decree. Socrates, the celebrated philosopher, was the only one of the senators who stood firm, and persisted obstinately in opposing a decree so notoriously unjust, and so contrary to all laws. The orator, who mounted the tribunal, in defence of the generals, showed, "That they had failed in nothing of their duty, as they had given orders that the dead bodies should be taken up: that if any one were guilty, it was he, who being charged with these orders, had neglected to put them in execution: but that he accused nobody; and that the tempest, which came on unexpectedly at the very instant, was an unanswerable apology, and entirely discharged the accused from all guilt. He demanded that a whole day should be allowed them to make their defence, a favour not denied to the most criminal, and that they should be tried separately. He rep-

* *Mimerva.*

resented that they were not in the least obliged to precipitate a sentence, wherein the lives of the most illustrious of the citizens were concerned; that it was in some measure attacking the gods to make * men responsible for the winds and weather; that they could not, without the most flagrant ingratitude and injustice, put the conquerors to death, to whom they ought to decree crowns and honours, or give up the defenders of their country to the rage of those who envied them; that if they did so, their unjust judgment would be followed with a sudden, but vain repentance, which would leave behind it the sharpest remorse, and cover them with eternal shame and infamy." The people seemed at first to be moved with these reasons; but animated by the accusers, they pronounced sentence of death against eight of their generals; and six of them who were present, were seized, in order to their being carried to execution. One of them, Diomedon, a person of great reputation for his valour and probity, demanded to be heard. "Athenians," said he, "I wish the sentence you have passed upon us may not prove the misfortune of the republic; but I have one favour to ask of you in behalf of my colleagues and myself, which is, to acquit us before the gods of the vows we made to them for you and ourselves, as we are not in a condition to discharge them; for it is to their protection, invoked before the battle, we acknowledge that we are indebted for the victory gained by us over the enemy." There was not one good citizen that did not melt into tears at this discourse, so full of goodness and religion, and admire with surprise the moderation of a person, who seeing himself unjustly condemned, did not however vent the least resentment, or even complaint, against his judges, but was solely intent in favour of an ungrateful country, which had doomed them to perish, upon what it owed the gods in common with them for the victory they had lately obtained.

The six generals were hardly executed, when the people opened their eyes, and perceived all the horrors of that sentence; but their repentance could not restore the dead to life. Callixenes, the orator, was put in prison, and refused to be heard. Having found means to make his escape, he fled to Decelia to the enemy, from whence he returned sometime after to Athens, where he died of hunger universally detested and abhorred by all the world, as all false accusers and slanderers ought to be. Diodorus remarks, that the people themselves were justly punished for their crime by the gods, who abandoned them soon after, not to a single master, but to 30 tyrants, who treated them with the utmost rigour and cruelty.

† The disposition of a people is very naturally imaged in this account; and Plato, upon the same event, draws in few words their character with so much spirit and resemblance. The commonalty, † says he, is an inconstant, ungrateful, cruel, suspicious animal, incapable of submitting to the government of reason, which is no wonder, adds he, as it is commonly composed of the dregs of a city, and is a monstrous assemblage, without form or order, of all that is worst in it.

The same relation shows what effect fear can have upon the minds of men, even upon those who pass for the wisest; and how few there are who are capable of supporting inflexibly the view of present danger

* *Quem adeo iniquum, ut sceleri assignet, quod venti et fluctus deliquerint?*
Tacit. Annal. l. xiv. c. 3.

† Plut. in Axioch. p. 306, 369.

‡ *Διπλὸς ἀψίκορος, ἀχαρίτων, ἄριστος, βασίλειος, ἀπαίδευτος.*

and disgrace. Though the justness of the general's cause was perfectly known in the senate, at least by the major part of it, as soon as the people's rage was mentioned, and the terrible menaces they murmured, those grave senators, most of whom had commanded armies, and who all of them had frequently exposed themselves to the greatest dangers of war, instantly changed sides, and came over to the most notorious calumny, and crying injustice, that ever had being. An evident proof, that there is a courage, though very rare, which infinitely transcends the valour that induces so many thousands of men every day to confront the most terrible dangers in battle.

Among all the judges, only one, truly worthy of his reputation (the great Socrates,) in this general treason and perfidy, stood firm and immovable; and though he knew his suffrage and unaided voice would be of little or no consequence to the accused, he thought them a just homage to oppressed innocence, and that it was * unworthy an honest man to govern himself by the fury of a blind and frantic people. We see in this instance how far the cause of justice may be abandoned. We may conclude it was not better defended before the people. Of more than 3000 citizens who composed the assembly, two only took upon them the defence of their generals, Euriptodemus and Axiochus. Plato has preserved their names and given that of the latter to the dialogue, from whence part of these reflections are taken.

† The same year the battle of the Aginusæ was fought, Dionysius possessed himself of the tyranny in Sicily. I shall defer speaking of him till book xi. in which I shall treat the history of Syracuse at large.

SECTION VI.

LYSANDER COMMANDS THE LACEDÆMONIAN FLEET.—HIS CELEBRATED VICTORY OVER THE ATHENIANS.

AFTER the defeat of the Arginusæ,† the affairs of the Peloponnesians declining, the allies, supported by the credit of Cyrus, sent an embassy to Sparta, to demand that the command of the fleet should again be given to Lysander, with the promise of serving with more affection and courage if their request were granted. As it was contrary to the laws of Sparta that the same person should be twice admiral, the Lacedæmonians, to satisfy the allies, gave the title of admiral to one Aracus, and sent Lysander with him, whom in appearance they commissioned only as vice-admiral, though in effect with all the authority of the supreme command.

All those who had the greatest share in the government of the cities, and were of most authority in them, saw him arrive with extreme joy; promising themselves, from his influence, the final subversion of the democratic power. His character of complacency for his friends, and indulgence to all their faults, suited much better with their ambitious and injurious views, than the austere equity of Callicratidas. For Lysander was a man of the most corrupt heart, and gloried in having no principles in point of virtue or the most sacred duties. He made no scruple to employ artifice and deceit upon all occasions, and esteemed justice only as far as it served

* Οὐ γὰρ εὐραίστο μοι ὄμιλος ἄλλω κλεινοτάτῳ συνηγερχεῖν.

† A. M. 5598. Ant. J. C. 406.

† A. M. 5599. Ant. J. C. 405. Xenophon. Hellen. l. ii. p. 45. Plut. in Lys. l. ix. 456, 457. Diod. l. xiii. p. 223.

his measures. When it did not promote them, he never failed to prefer the useful, which with him was alone laudable and excellent; from a persuasion that truth had in its own nature no advantage over falsehood, and that the value of both one and the other was to be determined by the convenience resulting from them. And for those who represented to him, that it was unworthy the descendants of Hercules to make use of fraud and treachery, he laughed at them: "For," said he, "where the lion's skin "is not long enough, it is necessary to tack the fox's tail to it."

An expression ascribed to him, sufficiently denotes how small an account he made of perjury. He used to say, " *Children are amused with baubles, "and men with oaths;" showing by so professed a want of religion, that the gods were more inconsiderable with him than his enemies; for he who deceives with a false oath, plainly declares in so doing that he fears his enemies, but that he despises God.

† Here ends the 26th year of the Peloponnesian war. In this year, it was, that young Cyrus, dazzled with the unusual splendour of supreme authority, and jealous of the least omission in point of ceremonial homage, discovered by a remarkable action the secret of his heart. Brought up from his infancy in the reigning house, nurtured under the shade of the throne, amidst the submissions and prostrations of the courtiers, entertained long by the discourses of an ambitious mother, who idolized him, in the desire and hope of empire, he began already to affect the rights of sovereignty, and to exact the honours paid to it with surprising haughtiness and rigour. Two Persians of the royal family, his cousins-german, by their mother, his father Darius' sister, had omitted to cover their hands with their sleeves in his presence, according to a ceremonial observed only to the kings of Persia. Cyrus, resenting that neglect as a capital crime, condemned them both to die, and caused them to be executed at Sardis without mercy. Darius, at whose feet their relations threw themselves to demand justice, was very much affected with the tragical end of his two nephews, and looked upon this action of his son's as an attempt upon himself, to whom alone that honour was due. He resolved therefore to take his government from him, and ordered him to court upon the pretext of being sick, and having a desire to see him.

Cyrus, before his departure, sent for Lysander to Sardis, and put into his hands great sums of money for the payment of his fleet, promising him still more for the future; and with the ostentation of a young man, to let him see how much he desired to oblige him, he assured him, that though the king his father should cease to afford him any supplies, he would furnish him the more willingly out of his own coffers, and that, rather than he should want the necessary provisions, he would even cause the throne of massy gold and silver, upon which he sat in judgment, to be melted down. At length when he was upon the point of setting out, he empowered him to receive the tributes and revenues of the cities; confided the government of his provinces to him, and conjured him with embraces not to give battle in his absence, unless superior in force; because the king neither wanted the will nor the power to give him that superiority to the enemy; promising at the same time, with the strongest assurances of affection, to bring him a great number of ships from Phœnicia and Cilicia.

*The Greek text admits of another sense, which is perhaps no less good: children may use art, and cheat one another in their games, and men in their oaths: *Επιλευε τους μεν παιδας αεραγαλοις, τους δαυδρας ορκοις εξαπαταν.*

† Xenoph. Hellen. l. ii. p. 454.

* After that prince's departure, Lysander sailed towards the Hellespont, and laid siege to Lampsacus. Torax having marched thither with his land forces at the same time, assaulted the city on his side. † The place was carried by storm, and abandoned by Lysander to the mercy of the soldiers. The Athenians who followed him close, came to an anchor in the port of Eleontum, in the Chersonesus, with 180 galleys. But upon the news of the taking of Lampsacus, they immediately steered for Sestos, and after having taken in provisions, they stood away from thence, sailing along the coast to a place called ‡ Ægospotamus, where they halted over against the enemy, who were then at anchor before Lampsacus. The Hellespont is not above 2000 paces broad in that place. The two armies, seeing themselves so near each other, expected only to rest that day, and were in hopes of coming to a battle on the next.

But Lysander had another design in view. He commanded the seamen and pilots to go on board their galleys, as if they were in reality to fight the next morning at break of day, to hold themselves in readiness, and to wait his orders with profound silence. He ordered the land army in like manner to draw up in battle upon the coast, and to wait the day without any noise. On the morrow as soon as the sun was risen, the Athenians began to row towards them with their whole fleet in one line, and to bid them defiance. Lysander, though his ships were ranged in order of battle, with their heads towards the enemy, lay still without making any movement. In the evening when the Athenians withdrew he did not suffer his soldiers to go ashore, till two or three galleys, which he had sent out to observe them, were returned with advice that they had seen the enemy land. The next day passed in the same manner, as did the third and fourth. Such a conduct, which argued reserve and apprehension, extremely augmented the security and boldness of the Athenians, and inspired them with an extreme contempt for an army, which fear, in their sense, prevented from showing themselves, and attempting any thing.

Whilst this passed, Alcibiades, who was near the fleet, took horse, and came to the Athenian generals; to whom he represented, that they kept upon a very disadvantageous coast, where there were neither ports nor cities in the neighbourhood; that they were obliged to bring their provisions from Sestos with great danger and difficulty; and that they were very much in the wrong to suffer the soldiers and mariners of the fleet, as soon as they were ashore, to straggle and disperse themselves at their own pleasure, whilst the enemy's fleet faced them in view, accustomed to execute the orders of their general with instant obedience, and upon the slightest signal. He offered also attack the enemy by land with a strong body of Thracian troops, and to force them to a battle. The generals, especially Tydeus and Menander, jealous of their command, did not content themselves with refusing his offers, from the opinion that if the event proved unfortunate, the whole blame would fall on them, and if favourable, that Alcibiades would engross the honour of it, but rejected also with insult his wise and salutary counsel, as if a man in disgrace lost his sense and abilities with the favour of the commonwealth. Alcibiades withdrew.

The fifth day the Athenians presented themselves again, and offered him battle; retiring in the evening according to custom, with more insulting airs than the day before. Lysander, as usual, detached some galleys

* Xenoph. Hellen. l. ii. p. 455—458.

† Plat. in Lys. p. 437. et 440. Idem. in Alcib. p. 212. Diod. l. xiii. p. 225, 226.

‡ The river of the Goat.

to observe them, with orders to return with the utmost diligence, when they saw the Athenians landed, and to put a brazen buckler at each ship's head as soon as they reached the middle of the channel. Himself in the mean time ran through the whole line in his galley, exhorting the pilots and officers to hold the seamen and soldiers in readiness to row and fight on the first signal.

As soon as the bucklers were put in the ship's heads, and the admiral's galley had given the signal by the sound of trumpet, the whole fleet set forward in good order. The land army at the same time made all possible haste to the top of the promontory to see the battle. The strait that separates the two continents in this place, is about 15 stadia,* or three quarters of a league in breadth, which space was presently cleared through the activity and diligence of the rowers. Conon, the Athenian general was the first who perceived from shore the enemy's fleet advance in good order to attack him; upon which he immediately cried out for the troops to embark. In the height of sorrow and perplexity, some he called to by their names, some he conjured, and others he forced to go on board their galleys: but all his endeavours and emotion were ineffectual, the soldiers being dispersed on all sides. For they were no sooner come on shore, than some ran to the sutlers, some to walk in the country, some to sleep in their tents, and others had begun to dress their suppers. This proceeded from the want of vigilance and experience in their generals, who not suspecting the least danger, indulged themselves in taking their repose, and gave their soldiers the same liberty.

The enemy had already fallen on with loud cries and a great noise of their oars, when Conon, disengaging himself with nine galleys, of which number was the sacred ship called the Paralian, stood away for Cyprus, where he took refuge with Evagoras. The Peloponnesians, falling upon the rest of the fleet, took immediately the galleys which were empty, and disabled and destroyed such as began to fill with men. The soldiers, who ran without order or arms to their relief, were either killed in the endeavour to get on board, or flying on shore, were cut to pieces by the enemy who landed in pursuit of them. Lysander took 3000 prisoners, with all the generals, and the whole fleet. After having plundered the camp, and fastened the enemy's galleys to the sterns of his own, he returned to Lampsacus, amidst the sound of flutes and songs of triumph. It was his glory to have achieved one of the greatest military exploits recorded in history with little or no loss, and to have terminated a war in the small space of an hour, which had already lasted 27 years, and which perhaps without him, had been of much longer continuance. Lysander immediately sent dispatches with this agreeable news to Sparta.

The 3000 prisoners taken in this battle, having been condemned to die, Lysander called upon Philocles, one of the Athenian generals, who had caused all the prisoners taken in two galleys, the one of Andros, the other of Corinth, to be thrown from the top of a precipice, and had formerly persuaded the people of Athens to make a decree for cutting off the thumb of the right hand of all the prisoners of war, in order to disable them from handling the pike, and that they might be fit only to serve at the oar. Lysander therefore caused him to be brought forth, and asked him what sentence he would pass upon himself, for having induced his city to pass that cruel decree. Philocles, without departing from his haughtiness in the least, notwithstanding the extreme danger he was in, made answer,

* 1875 paces.

“ Accuse not people of crimes who have no judges ; but as you are victor, use your right, and do by us as we had done by you if we had conquered.” At the same instant he went into a bath, put on afterwards a magnificent robe, and marched foremost to the execution. All the prisoners were put to the sword except Adamantus, who had opposed the decree.

After this expedition, Lysander went with his fleet to all the maritime cities, and gave orders for all Athenians in them to withdraw as soon as possible to Athens, without permitting them to take any other route ; declaring, that after a certain time fixed, all such should be punished with death as should be found out of Athens. This he did as an able politician, to reduce the city by famine the more easily, and to render it incapable of sustaining a long siege. He afterwards applied himself in subverting the democratic and all other forms of government throughout the cities, leaving in each of them a Lacedæmonian governour, called *harmostes*, and ten archons or magistrates, whom he chose out of the societies he had established in them. He thereby in some measure secured to himself universal authority and a kind of sovereignty over all Greece, putting none into power but such as were entirely devoted to his service.

SECTION VII.

LYSANDER BESIEGES ATHENS—FORM OF GOVERNMENT CHANGED—DEATH OF DARIUS NOTHUS.

WHEN the news of the entire defeat of the army came to Athens by a ship * which arrived in the night at the Piræus, the city was in universal consternation. Nothing was heard but cries of sorrow and despair in every part of it. They imagined the enemy already at their gates. They represented to themselves the miseries of a long siege, a cruel famine, the ruin and burning of their city, the insolence of a proud victor, and the shameful slavery they were upon the point of experiencing, more afflict'ng and insupportable to them than the most severe punishments and death itself. The next day the assembly was summoned, wherein it was resolved to shut up all the ports, one only excepted, to repair the breaches in the walls, and mount guard to prepare against a siege.

In effect, Agis and Pausanias, the two kings of Sparta, advanced towards Athens with all their troops. Lysander soon after arrived at the Piræus with 150 sail, and prevented all ships from going in or coming out. The Athenians, besieged by sea and land, without provisions, ships, hope of relief, or any resource, reinstated all persons attainted by any decree, without speaking the least word of a capitulation however, though many already died of famine. But when their corn was entirely consumed, they sent deputies to Agis to propose a treaty with Sparta, upon condition of abandoning all their possessions, the city and port only excepted. He referred the deputies to Lacedæmon, as not being empowered to treat with them. When they arrived at Salasia, upon the frontier of Sparta, and had made known their commission to the Ephori, they were ordered to retire, and to come with other proposals, if they expected peace. The Ephori had demanded that 1200 paces of the wall on each side of the Piræus should be demolished ; but an Athenian, for venturing to advise a compliance, was

* A. M. 3600. Ant. J. C. 404. Xenoph. Hellen. l. ii. p. 458—462. Plut. in Lysand. p. 440, 441.

sent to prison, and prohibition made against proposing any thing of that kind for the future.

In this deplorable condition, Theramenes declared in the assembly, that if he were sent to Lysander, he would know whether the proposal made by the Lacedæmonians for dismantling the city was intended to facilitate its ruin, or to prevent a revolt. The Athenians having deputed him accordingly, he was more than three months absent, no doubt with the view of reducing them by famine to accept any conditions that should be offered. On his return, he told them that Lysander had detained him all that time, and that at last he had been given to understand that he might apply to the Ephori. He was therefore sent back with nine others to Sparta, with full powers to conclude a treaty. When they arrived there, the Ephori gave them audience in the general assembly, where the Corinthians and several other allies, especially the Thebans, insisted that it was absolutely necessary to destroy the city, without hearkening any farther to a treaty. But the Lacedæmonians, preferring the glory and safety of Greece to their own grandeur, made answer, that they would never be reproached with having destroyed a city that had rendered such great services to all Greece, the remembrance of which ought to have much greater weight with the allies than the resentment of private injuries received from it. The peace was therefore concluded under these conditions: "That the fortifications of the Piræus, with the long wall that joined that port to the city, should be demolished; that the Athenians should deliver up all their galleys, 12 only excepted; that they should abandon all the cities they had seized, and content themselves with their own lands and country; that they should recal their exiles, and make a league offensive and defensive with the Lacedæmonians, under whom they should march wherever they thought fit to lead them."

The deputies on their return, were surrounded with an innumerable throng of people, who apprehended that nothing had been concluded; for they were not able to hold out any longer, such multitudes dying every day of famine. The next day they reported the success of their negociation; the treaty was ratified, notwithstanding the opposition of some persons; and Lysander, followed by the exiles, entered the port. It was upon the very day the Athenians had formerly gained the famous naval battle of Salamin. He caused the walls to be demolished to the sound of flutes and trumpets, and with all the exterior marks of triumph and rejoicing, as if all Greece had that day regained its liberty. Thus ended the Peloponnesian war, after having continued during the space of 27 years.

Lysander, without giving the Athenians time to look about them, changed the form of their government entirely, established 30 archons, or rather tyrants, over the city, put a good garrison into the citadel, and left the Spartan Callibius, harmostes, or governour. Agis dismissed his troops. Lysander, before he disbanded his, advanced against Samos, which he pressed so warmly, that it was at last obliged to capitulate. After having established its ancient inhabitants in it, he proposed to return to Sparta with the Lacedæmonian galleys, those of the Piræus, and the beaks of those he had taken.

He had sent Gylippus, who had commanded the army in Sicily, before him, to carry the money and spoils, which were the fruit of his glorious campaigns, to Lacedæmon. The money, without reckoning the innumerable crowns of gold given him by the cities, amounted to 1500 talents, that is to say, 1,500,000 crowns.* Gylippus, who carried this considerable

* About 337,000l. sterling.

sum, could not resist the temptation of converting some part of it to his own use. The bags were sealed up carefully, and did not seem to leave any room for theft. He unsewed them at the bottom, and after having taken out of each of them what money he thought fit, to the amount of 300 talents, he sewed them up again very neatly, and thought himself perfectly safe; but when he arrived at Sparta, the accounts which had been put up in each bag discovered him. To avoid punishment, he banished himself from his country, carrying along with him in all places the disgrace of having sullied, by so base and sordid an avarice, the glory of all his great actions.

From this unhappy example, the wisest and most distinguished of the Spartans, apprehending the all-powerful effects of money, which enslaved not only the vulgar, but even the greatest of men, extremely blamed Lysander for having acted so contradictorily to the fundamental laws of Sparta, and warmly represented to the Ephori, how incumbent it was upon them to banish * all that gold and silver from the republic, and to lay the heaviest curses and imprecations upon it, as the fatal bane of all other states, introduced only to corrupt the wholesome constitution of the Spartan government, which had supported itself for so many ages with vigour and prosperity. The Ephori immediately passed a decree to proscribe that money, and ordained that none should be current, except the usual pieces of iron. But Lysander's friends opposed this decree, and sparing no pains to retain the gold and silver in Sparta, the affair was referred for further deliberation. There naturally seemed only two methods to be considered, which were, either to make the gold and silver species current, or to cry them down and prohibit them absolutely. The men of address and policy found out a third expedient, which in their sense reconciled both the others with great success: this was wisely to choose the mean betwixt the vicious extremes of too much rigour and too much neglect. It was therefore resolved, that the new coin of gold and silver should be solely employed by the public treasury; that it should only pass in the occasions and uses of the state; and that every private person in whose possession it should be found should be immediately put to death.

A strange expedient, says Plutarch! As if Lycurgus had feared the species of gold and silver, and not the avarice they occasion; and avarice, less to be extinguished by prohibiting to particulars the possession of it, than inflamed by permitting the state to amass and make use of it for the service of the public; for it was impossible, whilst that money was in honour and esteem with the public, that it should be despised in private as useless, and that people should look upon that as of no value in their domestic affairs which the city prized, and were so much concerned to have it for its occasions; bad usages, authorized by the practice and example of the public, being a thousand times more dangerous to particulars than the vices of particulars to the public. The Lacedæmonians therefore, continues Plutarch, in punishing those with death who should make use of the new money in private, were so blind and imprudent as to imagine, that the placing of the law and the terror of punishment as a guard at the door, was sufficient to prevent gold and silver from entering the house: they left the hearts of their citizens open to the desire and admiration of riches, and introduced themselves a violent passion for amassing treasure, in causing it to be deemed a great and honourable thing to become rich.

† It was about the end of the Peloponnesian war, that Darius Nothus,

* *Ἀποδοτικῆς ὄντι παντὸ ἀργυρίου, καὶ τὸ χρυσοῦν ὡς περ κέρως ἐπαγνώμιμους.*

† A. M. 3600. Ant. J. C. 404.

king of Persia died, after a reign of 19 years. Cyrus had arrived at the court before his death, and Parysatis his mother, whose idol he was, not contented with having made his peace, notwithstanding the faults he had committed in his government, pressed the old king to declare him his successor also, after the example of Darius the first, who gave Xerxes the preference before all his brothers, because born, as Cyrus was, after his father's accession to the throne. But Darius did not carry his complaisance for her so far. He gave the crown to Arsaces, his eldest son by Parysatis also, whom Plutarch calls Arsicas, and bequeathed only to Cyrus the provinces he had already.

BOOK IX.

THE HISTORY

OF THE

PERSIANS AND GRECIANS;

CONTINUED DURING THE

FIRST FIFTEEN YEARS OF THE REIGN OF ARTAXER-
XES MNEMON.

CHAPTER I.

THIS chapter contains the domestic troubles of the court of Persia; the death of Alcibiades; the re-establishment of the liberty of Athens; and Lysander's secret designs to make himself king.

SECTION I.

CORONATION OF ARTAXERXES MNEMON.—CYRUS ATTEMPTS TO ASSASSINATE HIS BROTHER.—REVENGE OF STATIRA.—DEATH AND CHARACTER OF ALCIBIADES.

ARSACES, upon ascending the throne, assumed the name of Artaxerxes, the same to whom the Greeks gave the surname of * MNEMON, from his prodigious memory. † Being near his father's bed when he was dying, he asked him a few moments before he expired, what had been the rule of his conduct during so long and happy a reign as his, that he might make it his example: "It has been," replied he, "to do always what justice and religion required of me." Words of deep sense, and well worthy of being set up in letters of gold in the palaces of kings, to keep them perpetually in mind of what ought to be the guide and rule of all their actions: It is not uncommon for princes to give excellent instructions to their children on their death-beds which would be more efficacious if preceded by their own example and conduct; without which they are as weak and impotent as the sick man who gives them, and seldom survive him long.

* Which word signifies in the Greek, one of a good memory.

† A. M. 3600. Ant. J. C. 404. Athen. l. xii p. 458.

* Soon after Darius' death, the new king set out from his capital for the city of † Pasargades, in order to his coronation, according to custom, by the priests of Persia. There was in that city a temple of the goddess who presided in war, in which the coronation was solemnized. It was attended with very singular ceremonies, which no doubt had some mysterious sense; though Plutarch does not explain it. The prince at his consecration took off his robe in the temple, and put on that worn by the ancient Cyrus before he came to the throne, which was preserved in that place with great veneration. After that he ate a dry fig, chewed some leaves of the turpentine tree, and drank a draught composed of milk and vinegar. This might signify, that the sweets of sovereign power are mingled with the sours of care and disquiet, and that if the throne be surrounded with pleasures and honours, it is also attended with pains and anxieties. It seems sufficiently evident, that the design in putting the robes of Cyrus upon the new king was to make him understand that he should also clothe his mind with the great qualities and exalted virtues of that prince.

Young Cyrus, whose soul was all ambition, was in despair upon being for ever prevented from ascending a throne his mother had given him, and on seeing the sceptre, which he thought his right, transferred into the hand of his brother. The blackest crimes cost the ambitious nothing. Cyrus resolved to assassinate Artaxerxes in the temple itself, and in the presence of the whole court, just when he took off his own to put on the robe of Cyrus. Artaxerxes was apprized of this design by the priest himself, who had educated his brother, to whom he had imparted it. Cyrus was seized, and condemned to die, when his mother Parysatis, almost out of her senses, flew to the place, clasped him in her arms, tied herself to him with the tresses of her hair, fastened her neck to his, and by her shrieks, and tears, and prayers, prevailed so far as to obtain his pardon, and that he should be sent back to his government of the maritime provinces. He carried thither with him an ambition no less ardent than before, was animated besides with resentment of the check he had received, and the warm desire of revenge, and armed with an almost unbounded power. Artaxerxes upon this occasion acted contrary to the most common rules of policy, which do not admit ‡ the nourishing and enflaming by extraordinary honours the pride and haughtiness of a bold and enterprising young prince like Cyrus, who had carried his personal enmity to his brother so far as to have resolved to assassinate him with his own hand, and whose ambition for empire was so great as to employ the most criminal methods for the attainment of its end.

¶ Artaxerxes had espoused Statira. Scarce had her husband ascended the throne, when she employed the power her beauty gave her over him, to avenge the death of her brother Teriteuchmes. History has not a more tragical scene, nor a more monstrous complication of adultery, incest, and murder; which, after having occasioned great disorders in the royal family, terminated at length in the most fatal manner to all who had any share in it. But it is necessary, for the reader's knowledge of the fact, to trace it from the beginning.

Hidarnes, Statira's father, a Persian of very great quality, was governor of one of the principal provinces of the empire. Statira was a lady

* Plut. in Artax. p. 1012.

† A city of Persia built by Cyrus the Great.

‡ Ne quis mobiles adolescentium animos præmaturis honoribus ad superbiam extolleret. Tacit. Annal. l. iv. c. 17.

¶ Ctes. c. li. lv.

of extraordinary beauty, which induced Artaxerxes to marry her, who was then called Arsaces. At the same time Teriteuchmes, Statira's brother, married Hamestris, Arsaces' sister, one of the daughters of Darius and Parysatis; in favour of which marriage Teriteuchmes, upon his father's death, had his government given him. There was at the same time another sister in this family, no less beautiful than Statira, and who besides excelled in the arts of shooting with the bow, and throwing the dart. Teriteuchmes her brother conceived a criminal passion for her, and to gratify it, resolved to set himself at liberty by killing Hamestris, whom he had espoused. Darius having been informed of this project, by the force of presents and promises engaged Udiastes, Teriteuchmes' intimate friend and confidant, to prevent so black a design by assassinating him. He obeyed, and had for his reward the government of him he had put to death with his own hands.

Amongst Teriteuchmes' guards was a son of Udiastes, called Mithridates, very much attached to his master. The young gentleman, upon hearing that his father had committed this murder in person, uttered all manner of imprecations against him, and, full of horror for so infamous and vile an action, seized on the city of Zaris, and openly revolting, declared for the establishment of Teriteuchmes' son. But that young man could not hold out long against Darius. He was blocked up in the place with the son of Teriteuchmes, whom he had with him; and all the rest of the family of Hidarnes were put in prison and delivered to Parysatis, to do with them as that mother, exasperated to the last excess by the treatment either done or intended against her daughter Hamestris, should think fit. That cruel princess began by causing Roxana, whose beauty had been the occasion of this evil, to be sawed in two, and ordered all the rest to be put to death except Statira, whose life she granted to the tears and the most tender and ardent solicitations of Arsaces, whose love for his wife made him spare no pains for her preservation, though Darius his father believed it necessary, even for his own good, that she should share the same fate with the rest of her family. Such was the state of the affair at the death of Darius.

Statira, as soon as her husband was upon the throne, caused Udiastes to be delivered into her hands. She ordered his tongue to be torn out, and made him die in the most exquisite torments she could invent, to punish the crime which had occasioned the ruin of her family. She gave his government to Mithridates, in recompence for his attachment to the interests of her family. Parysatis on her side took her revenge on the son of Teriteuchmes, whom she caused to be poisoned; and we shall see that Statira's turn was not very remote.

We see here the terrible effects of female revenge, and in general of what excesses they are capable who find themselves above all laws, and have no other rule for their actions than their will and passions.

Cyrus, having resolved to dethrone his brother, employed Clearchus, the Lacedæmonian general, to raise a body of Grecian troops, under pretence of a war which that Spartan was to carry into Thrace. I shall defer speaking of this famous expedition, and also of the death of Socrates, which happened about the same time, intending to treat these two great events in all the extent they deserve. It was without doubt with the same view that Cyrus presented Lysander a galley of two cubits in length, made of ivory and gold, to congratulate him upon his naval victory. That galley was consecrated to Apollo in the temple of Delphos. Lysander went soon after to Sardis, charged with magnificent presents for Cyrus from the allies.

It was upon that occasion Cyrus had the celebrated conversation with

Lysander related by Xenophon, and which Cicero after him has applied so beautifully. That young prince, who piqued himself more upon his integrity and politeness than nobility and grandeur, pleased himself with conducting in person so illustrious a guest through his gardens, and to make him observe the various beauties of them. Lysander, struck with so fine a prospect, admired the manner in which the several parts were laid out; the height and projection of the trees; the neatness and disposition of the walks; the abundance of fruits, planted with an art which had known how to unite the useful with the agreeable; the beauty of the parterres, and the glowing variety of flowers, exhaling odours universally throughout the delightful scene. "Every thing charms and transports me in this place," said Lysander, addressing himself to Cyrus; "but what strikes me most, is the exquisite taste and elegant industry of the person who drew the plan of the several parts of this garden, and gave it the fine order, wonderful disposition, and happiness of symmetry, which I cannot sufficiently admire." Cyrus, infinitely pleased with this discourse, replied, "It was I that drew the plan, and entirely marked it out; and not only that, many of the trees which you see were planted with my own hands." "What," replied Lysander, considering him from head to foot, "is it possible, with these purple robes and splendid vestments, those strings of jewels, and bracelets of gold, those buskins so richly embroidered, that you could play the gardener, and employ your royal hands in planting trees?" "Does that surprise you?" says Cyrus. "I swear by the god * Mithris, that when my health admits, I never sit down to table without having made myself sweat with some fatigue or other, either in military exercise, rural labour, or some other toilsome employment, to which I apply with pleasure, and without sparing myself." Lysander was amazed at his discourse, and pressing him by the hand, † "Cyrus," said he, "you are truly happy, and deserve your high fortune; because you unite it with virtue."

Alcibiades was at no small pains to discover the mystery of the levies made by Cyrus, and went into the province of Pharnabazus, with design to proceed to the court of Persia, and to apprise Artaxerxes of the scheme laid against him. Had he arrived there, a discovery of such importance had infallibly procured him the favour of that prince, and the assistance he wanted for the re-establishment of his country. But the Lacedæmonian partisans at Athens, that is to say, the 30 tyrants, apprehended the intrigues of so superior a genius as his, and represented to their masters that they were inevitably ruined if they did not find means to rid themselves of Alcibiades. The Lacedæmonians thereupon wrote to Pharnabazus, and with an abject meanness not to be excused, and which showed how much Sparta had degenerated from her ancient manners, made pressing instances to him to deliver them at any rate from so formidable an enemy. The satrap complied with their wish. Alcibiades was then in a small town of Phrygia, where he lived with his concubine † Timandra. Those who were sent to kill him, not daring to enter his house, contented themselves with surrounding and setting it on fire. Alcibiades, having quitted it through the flames,

* The Persians adored the sun under that name, who was their principal god.

† Δικαιως, ἢ Κυρε, ευδαιμονις αγαθος, γαρ ου ευδαιμονις. Which Cicero translates: Recte vero te, Cyre, beatum ferunt, quoniam virtuti tuæ fortuna conjuncta est.

‡ It was said that Lais the famous courtesan, called the Corinthian, was the daughter of this Timandra.

sword in hand, the barbarians were afraid to stay to come to blows with him, but flying and retreating as he advanced, they poured their darts and arrows upon him, and he fell dead upon the spot. Timandra took up his body, and having adorned and covered it with the finest robes she had, she made as magnificent a funeral for it as her present condition would admit.

Such was the end of Alcibiades, whose great virtues were stifled and suppressed by still greater vices. * It is not easy to say whether his good or bad qualities were most pernicious to his country; for with one he deceived, and with the other he oppressed it. In him distinguished valour was united with nobility of blood. His person was beautiful and finely made, he was eloquent, of great ability in affairs, insinuating, and formed for charming all mankind. He loved glory, but without prejudice to his inclination for pleasure; nor was he so fond of pleasure, as to neglect his glory for it. He knew how to give into, or abstract himself from it, according to the situation of his affairs. Never was there ductility of genius equal to his. He metamorphosed himself with incredible facility, like a Proteus, into the most contrary forms, and supported them all with as much ease and grace as if each had been natural to him.

This convertibility of character, according to occasions, the customs of countries, and his own interests, discovers an heart void of principles, without either truth or justice. He did not confine himself either to religion, virtue, laws, duties, or his country. His sole rule of action was his private ambition, to which he reduced every thing. His aim was to please, to dazzle, and be beloved; but at the same time to subject those he soothed. He favoured them only as they served his purposes, and made his correspondence and society a means for engrossing every thing to himself.

His life was a perpetual mixture of good and evil. His sallies for virtue were ill sustained, and quickly degenerated into vices and crimes, very little to the honour of the instructions of that great philosopher, who took no small pains to cultivate him into a man of worth. His actions were glorious, but without rule or principle. His character was elevated and grand, but without connection and consistence. He was successively the support and terror of the Lacedæmonians and Persians. He was either the misfortune or refuge of his own country, according to his declaring for or against it. In fine, he was the author of an universal destructive war in Greece, from the sole motive of commanding, by inducing the Athenians to besiege Syracuse, much less from the hope of conquering Sicily, and afterwards Africa, than with the design of keeping Athens in dependance upon himself; convinced, that having to deal with an inconstant, suspicious, ungrateful, jealous people, averse to those that governed, it was necessary to engage them continually in some great affair, in order to make his services always necessary to them, and that they might not be at leisure to examine, censure, and condemn his conduct.

He had the fate generally experienced by persons of his character, and of which they cannot reasonably complain. He never loved any one, himself being his sole motive, nor ever found a friend. He made it his merit and glory to amuse all men, and nobody confided in or adhered to him. His sole view was to live with splendour, and to lord it universally; and he perished miserably, abandoned by the whole world, and obliged at his death to the feeble services and impotent zeal of one only woman for the last honours rendered to his remains.

* Cujus nescio utrum bona an vitæ patriæ perniciosiora fuerint; illis enim cives suos deceptit, his affixit. Val. Max. l. iii. c. 1.

About this time died Democritus the philosopher, of whom more will be said elsewhere.

SECTION II.

THE THIRTY EXERCISE THE MOST HORRID CRUELITIES AT ATHENS—THEY PUT THERAMENES TO DEATH—THERASYBULUS ATTACKS THE TYRANTS, IS MASTER OF ATHENS, AND RESTORES ITS LIBERTY.

THE council of thirty, * established at Athens by Lysander, committed the most execrable cruelties. Upon pretence of restraining the multitude within their duty, and to prevent seditions, they had caused guards to be assigned them, had armed 3000 of their citizens for that service, and at the same time disarmed all the rest. The whole city was in the utmost terror and dismay. Whoever opposed their injustice and violence became the victims of them. Riches were a crime that never failed of drawing sentence upon their owners, always followed with death and the confiscation of estates; which the thirty tyrants divided amongst themselves. They put more people to death, says Xenophon, in eight months of peace, than the enemy had done in a war of 30 years.

The two most considerable persons of the thirty were Critias and Theramenes, who at first lived in great union, and always acted in concert with each other. The latter had some honour, and loved his country. When he saw with what an excess of violence and cruelty his colleagues behaved, he declared openly against them, and thereby drew their resentment upon him. Critias became his most mortal enemy, and acted as informer against him before the senate, accusing him of disturbing the tranquility of the state, and of designing to subvert the present government. As he perceived that the defence of Theramenes was heard with silence and approbation, he was afraid that if the affair was left to the decision of the senate, they would acquit him. Having therefore caused a band of young men, whom he had armed with poniards to advance to the bar, he said that he thought it the duty of a supreme magistrate to prevent justice from being abused, and that he should act conformably upon this occasion. "But," continued he, "as the law does not admit that any of the 3000 should be put to death without the consent of the senate, I exclude Theramenes from that number, and condemn him to die in virtue of my own and my colleagues authority." Theramenes, upon these words, leaped upon the altar: "I demand," said he, "Athenians, that I may be tried according to the laws; which cannot be refused me without manifest injustice. Not that I imagine that the goodness of my cause will avail me any thing, or the sanction of altars protect me, but I would show at least that my enemies respect neither the gods nor men. What most astonishes me is, that persons of your wisdom do not see that your own names may as easily be struck out of the list of the citizens as that of Theramenes." Critias upon this ordered the officers of justice to pull him down from the altar. An universal silence and terror ensued upon the sight of the armed soldiers that surrounded the senate. Of all the senators, only Socrates, whose disciple Theramenes had been, took upon him his defence, and opposed the officers of justice. But his weak endeavours could not save Theramenes, who was led to the place of execution, notwithstanding all

* Xenoph. Hist. l. ii. p. 462. et 479. Diod. l. xiv. p. 235—238. Justin. l. v. c. 8—10.

he could do, through crowds of the citizens, who saw with tears, in the fate of a man equally considerable for his love of liberty and the great services he had done his country, what they had to fear for themselves. When they presented him the hemlock, that is, the poison, which was the manner of putting the citizens of Athens to death, he took it with an intrepid air; and after having drank it, he poured the bottom upon the table, after the usual manner observed in feasts or public rejoicings, saying, "This for the noble Critias." Xenophon relates this circumstance, inconsiderable in itself, to show, says he, the tranquillity of Theramenes in his last moments.

The tyrants, delivered from a colleague whose presence alone was a continual reproach to them, no longer observed any measures. Nothing passed throughout the city but imprisonments and murders. Every body trembled for themselves or their friends. The general desolation had no remedy, nor was there any hope of regaining their liberty. Where had they then as many * Harmodius' as they had tyrants? Terror had taken entire possession of their minds, whilst the whole city deplored in secret their loss of liberty, without having one amongst them generous enough to attempt the breaking of its chains. The Athenian people seemed to have lost that valour which till then had made them awful and terrible to their neighbours and enemies. They seemed to have lost the very use of speech; not daring to vent the least complaint, lest it should be made a capital crime in them. Socrates only continued intrepid. He consoled the afflicted senate, animated the desponding citizens, and set all men an admirable example of courage and resolution; preserving his liberty, and sustaining his port in the midst of 30 tyrants, who made all else tremble, but could never shake the constancy of Socrates with their menaces.† Critias, who had been his pupil, was the first to declare most openly against him, taking offence at the free and bold discourses which he held against the government of the thirty. He went so far as to prohibit his instructing youth; but Socrates, who neither acknowledged his authority nor feared the violent effects of it, paid no regard to so unjust an order.

All the citizens of any consideration in Athens, and who retained the love of liberty, quitted a place reduced to so hard and shameful a slavery, and sought elsewhere an asylum and retreat, where they might live in safety. At the head of these was Thrasybulus, a person of extraordinary merit, who beheld with the most lively affliction the miseries of his country. The Lacedæmonians had the inhumanity to endeavour to deprive those unhappy fugitives of this last resource. They published an edict to prohibit the cities of Greece from giving them refuge: decreed that they should be delivered up to the thirty tyrants, and condemned all such as should contravene the execution of this edict to pay a fine of five talents. Only two cities rejected with disdain so unjust an ordinance, Megara and Thebes; the latter of which made a decree to punish all persons whatsoever who should see an Athenian attacked by his enemies without doing his utmost to assist him. Lysias, an orator of Syracuse, who had been banished by the thirty,‡ raised 500 soldiers at his own expence, and sent them to the aid of the common country of eloquence.

Thrasylbulus lost no time. After having taken Phyla, a small fort in Attica, he marched to the Piræus, of which he made himself master.

* Harmodius formed a conspiracy for the deliverance of Athens from the tyranny of the Pisistratides.

† Xenoph. Memorab. l. i. p. 716, 717.

‡ Quingentos inlites, stipendio suo instructos, in auxilium patriæ communitæ frequentia misit. Justin. l. v. c. 9.

The thirty flew thither with their troops, and a battle sufficiently warm ensued; but as the soldiers on one side fought with valour and vigour for their liberty, and on the other with indolence and neglect for the power of others, the success was not doubtful, but followed the better cause. The tyrants were overthrown. Critias was killed on the spot. And as the rest of the army were taking to flight, Thrasybulus cried out, "Wherefore do you fly from me as from a victor, rather than assist me as the avenger of your liberty? We are not enemies, but fellow-citizens; nor have we declared war against the city, but against the thirty tyrants." He continued with bidding them remember that they had the same origin, country, laws, and religion; he exhorted them to compassionate their exiled brethren; to restore their country to them, and resume their liberty to themselves. This discourse had suitable effects. The army upon their return to Athens, expelled the thirty, and substituted ten persons to govern in their room, whose conduct proved no better than theirs.

It is a matter of surprise, that so sudden, so universal, so tenacious, and so uniform a conspiracy against the public good, should always actuate the several bodies of persons established in the administration of this government. This we have seen in the four hundred formerly chosen by Athens; again in the thirty; and now in the ten. And what augments our wonder, is, that this passion for tyranny should possess so immediately republicans, born in the bosom of liberty, accustomed to an equality of condition on which it is founded, and principled from their earliest infancy in an abhorrence of all subjection and dependency. * There must be on the one side in power and authority, some violent impulse to actuate in this manner so many persons, of whom many, no doubt, were not without sentiments of virtue and honour; and to banish so suddenly the principles and manners natural to them: and on the other an excessive propensity in the mind of man to subject his equals, to rule over them imperiously, and to carry him on to the last extremes of oppression and cruelty, and to make him forget at once all laws, nature and religion.

The thirty being fallen from their power and hopes, sent deputies to Iacedæmon to demand aid. It was not Lysander's fault, who was sent to them with troops, that the tyrants were not re-established. But king Pausanias, moved with compassion for the deplorable condition to which a city, once so flourishing, was reduced, had the generosity to favour the Athenians in secret, and at length obtained a peace for them. It was sealed with the blood of the tyrants, who, having taken arms to reinstate themselves in the government, and being present at a parley for that purpose, were all put to the sword, and left Athens in the full possession of its liberty. All the exiles were recalled. Thrasybulus at that time proposed the celebrated amnesty, by which the citizens engaged upon oath, that all past transactions should be buried in oblivion. The government was re-established upon its ancient footing, the laws restored to their pristine vigour, and magistrates elected with the usual forms.

I cannot forbear observing in this place the wisdom and moderation of Thrasybulus, so salutary and essential after so long a continuance of domestic troubles. This is one of the finest events in ancient history, worthy the Athenian lenity and benevolence, and has served as a model to successive ages in good governments.

Never had tyranny been more cruel and bloody than that the Athenians had lately thrown off. Every house was in mourning; every family be-

* *Vi dominationis convulsis.* Tacit.

wailed the loss of some relation. It had been a series of public robbery and rapine, in which licence and impunity had authorized all manner of crimes. The people seemed to have a right to demand the blood of all accomplices in such notorious malversations, and even the interest of the state to authorise such a claim, that by exemplary severities such enormous crimes might be prevented for the future. But Thraësybulus rising above those sentiments from the superiority of his more extensive genius, and the views of a more discerning and profound policy, foresaw, that by giving in to the punishment of the guilty, eternal seeds of discord and enmity would remain, to weaken the republic by domestic divisions, which it was necessary to unite against the common enemy, and occasion the loss to the state of a great number of citizens, who might render it important services from the view itself of making amends for past misbehaviour.

Such a conduct, after great troubles in a state, has always seemed, with the ablest politicians, the most certain and ready means to restore the public peace and tranquility. Cicero, when Rome was divided into two factions upon the occasion of Cæsar's death, who had been killed by the conspirators, calling to mind this celebrated amnesty, proposed, after the example of the Athenians, to bury all that had passed in eternal oblivion. * Cardinal Mazarin observed to Don Lewis de Haro, prime minister of Spain, that this gentle and humane conduct in France had prevented the troubles and revolts of that kingdom from having any fatal consequences; and "that the king had not lost a foot of land by them to that day;" whereas the inflexible severity of the Spaniards "was the occasion that the subjects of that monarchy, whenever they threw off the mask, never returned to their obedience but by the force of arms; which sufficiently appears," says he, "in the example of the Hollanders, who are in the peaceable possession of many provinces that not an age ago were the patrimony of the king of Spain."

Diodorus Siculus takes occasion, from the thirty tyrants of Athens, whose immoderate ambition induced them to treat their country with the most excessive cruelties, to observe how unfortunate it is for † persons in power to want a sense of honour, and to disregard either the present opinion, or the judgment posterity will form of their conduct: for from the contempt of reputation the transition is too common to that of virtue itself. They may perhaps, by the awe of their power, suppress for some time the public voice, and impose a forced silence upon censure; but the more constraint they lay upon it during their lives, the more liberal will it be after their deaths of complaints and reproaches, and the more infamy and imputation will be affixed to their memories. The power of the thirty was of a very short duration; their guilt immortal, which will be remembered with abhorrence throughout all ages, whilst their names will be recorded in history only to render them odious, and to make their crimes detestable. He applies the same reflection to the Lacedæmonians, who, after having made themselves masters of Greece, by a wise and moderate conduct, fell from that glory through the severity, haughtiness, and injustice

* Letter XV. of Card. Maz.

† Cetera principibus statim adesse: unum insatiabiliter parandum prosperam sui memoriam; nam contempta fama, contemni virtutes.—Quo magis socordii memorum irrideri libet, qui præsentis potentia credunt extingui posse etiam sequentis ævi memoriam—suum cuique decus posteritas rependit. Tacit. Annal. l. iv. c. 80 & 55.

with which they treated their allies. There is doubtless no reader, whom their abject and cruel jealousy, in regard to Athens enslaved and humbled, has not prejudiced against them; nor is there any resemblance in such behaviour of the greatness of mind and noble generosity of ancient Sparta; so much power have the lust of dominion and prosperity over even virtuous men. Diodorus concludes his reflection with a maxim very true, though very little known. "The greatness and majesty of princes," says he, (and the same may be said of all persons in high authority) "can be supported only by humanity and justice with regard to their subjects: as on the contrary, they are ruined and destroyed by a cruel and oppressive government, which never fails to draw upon them the hatred of their people."

SECTION III.

LYSANDER ABUSES HIS POWER IN AN EXTRAORDINARY MANNER.—HE IS RECALLED TO SPARTA.

AS Lysander had the greatest share in the celebrated exploits* which had raised the glory of the Lacedæmonians to so high a pitch, so he had acquired a degree of power and authority, of which there was no example before in Sparta; but he suffered himself to be carried away by a presumption and vanity still greater than his power. He permitted the Grecian kings to dedicate altars to him, as to a god; and to offer sacrifices, and sing hymns and canticles in honour of him. The Samians ordained by a public decree, that the feasts celebrated in honour of Juno, and which bore the name of that goddess, should be called "the feasts of Lysander." He had always a crowd of poets about him (who are often a tribe of venal flatterers,) who emulated each other in singing his great exploits, for which they were magnificently paid. Praise is undoubtedly due to noble deeds, but diminishes their lustre when either forced or excessive.

This sort of vanity and ambition, had he stopt there, would have hurt only himself by exposing him to envy and contempt; but a natural consequence of it was, that through his arrogance and pride, in conjunction with the incessant flatteries of those around him, he carried the spirit of command and authority to an insupportable excess, and observed no longer any measures, either in rewarding or punishing. The absolute government of cities with tyrannic power were the fruits of his friendship, and the ties of hospitality with him; and only the death of those he hated, could put an end to his resentment and displeasure, without its being possible to escape his vengeance. What Sylla caused to be inscribed upon his tomb, might with equal propriety have been engraved upon Lysander's: That no man had ever surpassed him in doing good to his friends, or evil to his enemies.

Treachery and perjury cost him nothing whenever they promoted his designs; nor was he less cruel than revengeful, of which what he did at Miletus is a sufficient proof. Apprehending that those who were at the head of the people would escape him, he swore not to do them any hurt. Those unfortunates gave credit to his oath, and no sooner appeared in public than they were put to the sword with his consent by the nobility, who killed them all, though no less than 800. The number of those in the party of the people, whom he caused to be massacred in other cities.

* Plut. in Lys. p. 443—445.

is incredible ; for he did not only destroy to satiate his own resentments, but to serve in all places the enmity, malice, and avarice of his friends, whom he supported in gratifying their passions by the death of their enemies.

There was no kind of injustice and violence which the people did not suffer under the government of Lysander ; whilst the Lacedæmonians, who were sufficiently informed of his conduct gave themselves no trouble to prevent its effects. It is too common for those in power to be little affected with the vexations and oppressions laid upon persons of low condition and credit, and to be deaf to their just complaints, though authority is principally confided in them for the defence of the weak and poor, who have no other protectors. But if such remonstrances are made by a great or powerful person, from whom they may have any thing to hope or fear, the same authority that was slow and drowsy becomes immediately warm and officious ; a certain proof that it is not the love of justice that actuates it. This appears here in the conduct of the Lacedæmonian magistrates. Pharnabaeus, weary of Lysander's repeated injustices, who ravaged and pillaged the provinces under his command, having sent ambassadors to Sparta, to complain of the wrongs he had received from that general, the Ephori recalled him. Lysander was at that time in the Hellespont. The letter of the Ephori threw him into great consternation. As he principally feared the complaints and accusations of Pharnabaeus, he made all the haste he could to come to an explanation with him, from the hope of softening him, and making his peace. He went for that purpose to him, and desired that he would write another letter to the Ephori, intimating a satisfaction in his conduct. But Lysander, says Plutarch, in such an application to Pharnabaeus, forgot the * proverb, "Set a thief to catch a thief." The satrap promised all he desired, and accordingly wrote such a letter in Lysander's presence as he had asked of him, but prepared another to a quite different effect. When he was to seal it, as both letters were of the same size and form, he dexterously put that he had wrote in secret into the place of the other, without being observed, which he sealed and gave him.

Lysander departed well satisfied, and being arrived at Sparta, alighted at the palace where the senate was assembled, and delivered Pharnabaeus' letter to the Ephori. But he was strangely surprised when he heard the contents, and withdrew in extreme confusion and disorder. Some days after he returned to the senate, and told the Ephori, that he was obliged to go to the temple of Ammon to acquit himself of the sacrifices he had vowed to that god before his battles. That pilgrimage was no more than a pretence to cover the pain it gave him to live as a private person in Sparta, and to submit to the yoke of obeying ; he who till then had always governed. Accustomed long to commanding armies, and to the flattering distinction of a kind of sovereignty exercised by him in Asia, he could not endure the mortifying equality with the multitude, nor restrain himself to the simplicity of a private life. Having obtained permission, not without great difficulties, he embarked.

As soon as he was gone, the kings, reflecting that he held all the cities in his dependance, by the means of their governours and magistrates established by him, to whom they were also indebted for their unlimited authority, and that he was thereby effectually lord and master of all Greece, applied themselves vigorously to restore the government of the

*The Greek proverb is, Cretan against Cretan, from the people of Crete, who passed for the greatest cheats and liars in the world.

people, and to depose all his creatures and friends from any share in it. This alteration occasioned great tumults at first. About the same time Lysander, being apprized of the design of Thrasybulus to re-establish the liberty of his country, returned with the utmost diligence to Sparta, and endeavoured to engage the Lacedæmonians to support the party of the nobility at Athens. We have before observed, that Pausanias, from a more noble spirit of equity and generosity, gave peace to Athens and by that means, says Plutarch, clipped the wings of Lysander's ambition.

CHAPTER II.

YOUNG CYRUS, WITH THE AID OF THE GRECIAN TROOPS, ENDEAVOURS TO DETHRONE HIS BROTHER ARTAXERXES.

HE IS KILLED.—FAMOUS RETREAT OF THE TEN THOUSAND.

ANTIQUITY has few events so memorable as those I am about to relate in this place. We see on one side a young prince, abounding otherwise with excellent qualities, abandoned to his violent ambition, carry the war from far against his brother and sovereign, and go and attack him almost in his own palace, with the view of depriving him at once of his crown and life. We see him I say, fall dead in the battle at the feet of that brother and terminate by so unhappy a fate, an enterprise equally glaring and criminal. On the other hand, the Greeks who follow him,* destitute of all succour after the loss of their chiefs, without allies, provisions, money, horse or archers, reduced to less than 10,000 men, with no resource but in their own persons and valour, supported only by the warm desire of preserving their liberty, and of returning to their native countries; these Greeks with bold and intrepid resolution, make their retreat before a victorious army of 1,000,000 of men, traverse 500 or 600 leagues, notwithstanding vast rivers, and innumerable passes, and arrive at last in their own country through a thousand fierce and barbarous nations, victorious over all obstacles in their way, and over all the dangers which either concealed fraud or open force reduced them to undergo.

This retreat, in the opinion of the best judges and most experienced in the art of war, is the boldest and best conducted exploit to be found in ancient history, and is deemed a perfect model in its kind. Happily for us, it is described to the most minute circumstance by an historian, who was not only eye witness of the facts he relates, but the first mover, the soul of this great enterprise. I shall only abridge it, and abstract its most material circumstances; but I cannot omit advising young persons who make arms their profession, to consult the original, of which there is a good translation extant in French, though far short of the admirable beauties of the text. It is very difficult to meet with a more able master than Xenophon in the art of war, to whom may be well applied here what Homer says of Phœnix the governour of Achilles, "† That he was equally capable of forming his pupil for eloquence or arms."

Μυθόν τε ρητορά τιμῶσαι, ἀρχηγό τε σφύρασι.

* Post mortem Cyri, neque armis a tanto exercitu vinci, neque dolo capi potuerunt; revertentesque inter tot indomitas nationes et barbaras gentes, per tanta itinera spatia, virtute se usque terminos patriæ defenderunt. Justin. l. v. c. 11.

† Iliad. x. ver. 445.

SECTION I.

CYRUS RAISES TROOPS AGAINST HIS BROTHER ARTAXERXES.

WE have already said that young Cyrus,* son of Darius Nothus and Parysatis, saw with pain his elder brother Artaxerxes upon the throne, and that at the very time the latter was taking possession of it, he had attempted to deprive him of his crown and life together. Artaxerxes was not insensible of what he had to fear from a brother of his enterprising and ambitious spirit, but could not refuse pardoning him to the prayers and tears of his mother Parysatis, who doated upon this youngest son. He removed him therefore into Asia to his government, confiding to him, contrary to all the rules of policy, an absolute authority over the provinces left him by the will of the king his father.

As soon as he arrived there, his thoughts were solely intent upon revenging the supposed affront he had received from his brother, and to dethrone him.† He received all that came from the court with great favour and affability, to induce them insensibly to quit the king's party, and adhere to him. He gained also the hearts of the barbarians under his government, familiarizing himself with them, and mingling with the common soldiery, though without forgetting the dignity of their general. These he formed by various exercises for the trade of war. He applied particularly in secret to raise from several parts, and upon different pretexts, a body of Grecian troops, upon whom he relied much more than upon those of the barbarians. Clearchus retired to his court after having been banished from Sparta, and was of great service to him, being an able, experienced, and valiant captain. ‡ At the same time several cities in the province of Tissaphernes, revolted from their obedience in favour of Cyrus. This incident, which was not an effect of chance, but of the secret practices of that prince, gave birth to a war between them. Cyrus, under the pretence of arming against Tissaphernes, assembled troops openly, and to amuse the court the more speciously, sent grievous complaints to the king against that governour, demanding his protection and aid in the most submissive manner. Artaxerxes was deceived by these appearances, and believed that all Cyrus' preparations regarded only Tissaphernes, and continued quiet, from the assurance of having nothing to apprehend for himself.

§ Cyrus well knew how to improve the imprudent security and indolence of his brother, which some people conceived the effect of his goodness and humanity. And indeed in the beginning of his reign he seemed to imitate the virtues of the first Artaxerxes, whose name he bore; for he demeaned himself with great mildness and affability to such as approached him; he honoured and rewarded magnificently all those whose services had merited favour; when he passed sentence to punish, it was without either outrage or insult; and when he made presents it was with a gracious air, and such obliging circumstances as infinitely exalted their value, and implied that he was never better pleased than when he had an opportunity of doing good to his subjects. To all these excellent qualities it had been very necessary for him to have added one no less royal, and which would have put him upon his guard against the enterprises of a brother, whose

* A. M. 3600. Ant. J. C. 404. Diod. l. xiv. p. 245—249, et 252. Justin. l. v. c. 11. Xenophon de Cyri Exped. l. i. p. 243—246.

† A. M. 3601. Ant. J. C. 403.

‡ A. M. 3602. Ant. J. C. 402.

§ Plut in Artax. p. 1014.

character he ought to have known ; I mean a wise foresight, that penetrates the future, and renders a prince attentive to prevent or frustrate whatever may disturb the tranquility of the state.

The emissaries of Cyrus at the court were perpetually dispersing reports and opinions amongst the people, to prepare their minds for the intended change and revolt. They talked that the state wanted a king of Cyrus' character ; a king, magnificent, liberal, who loved war, and showered his favours upon those that served him ; and that it was necessary for the grandeur of the empire to have a prince upon the throne, fired with ambition and valour for the support and augmentation of its glory.

* The young prince had lost no time on his side, and hastened the execution of his great design. He was then 23 years old at most. After the important services he had done the Lacedæmonians, without which they had never obtained the victories that had made them masters of Greece, he thought he might safely open himself to them. He therefore imparted to them the present situation of his affairs, and the end he had in view ; convinced that such a confidence could not but incline them the more in his favour.

In the letter he wrote them, he spoke of himself in very magnificent terms. He told them he had a greater and more royal heart than his brother ; that he was better versed in philosophy and the † knowledge of the Magi, and that he could drink more wine without being disordered in his senses ; a very meritorious quality amongst the barbarians, but not so proper to recommend him to the opinion of those he wrote to. The Lacedæmonians sent orders to their fleet to join that of the prince immediately, and to obey the commands of Tamos his admiral in all things, but without the least mention of Artaxerxes, or seeming in any manner privy to his design. They thought that precaution necessary ‡ for their justification with Artaxerxes, in case affairs should happen to terminate in his favour.

The troops of Cyrus, according to the review afterwards made, consisted of 13,000 Greeks, which were the flower and chief force of his army, and of 100,000 regular men of the barbarous nations. Clearchus, the Lacedæmonian, commanded all the Peloponnesian troops, except the Achæans, who had Socrates of Achaia for their leader. The Bœotians were under Proxenes the Theban, and the Thessalians under Menon. || The barbarians had Persian generals, of whom the chief was Ariæus. The fleet consisted of 35 ships under Pythagoras the Lacedæmonian, and of 25 commanded by Tamos the Ægyptian, admiral of the whole fleet. It followed the land army, coasting along the shore.

Cyrus had opened his design only to Clearchus of all the Greeks, foreseeing aright that the length and boldness of the enterprise could not fail of discouraging and disgusting the officers as well as soldiers. He made it his sole application to gain their affections during the march, by treating them with kindness and humanity, conversing freely with them, and giving effectual orders that they should want for nothing. Proxenes, between whose family and Xenophon's an ancient friendship subsisted, presented that young Athenian to Cyrus, § who received him very favourably, and

* A. M. 3605. Ant. J. C. 401.

† By the knowledge of the Magi, amongst the Persians, was meant the science of religion and government.

‡ Quærentes apud Cyrum gratiam ; et apud Artaxerxem, si vicisset, veniæ patrocina, cum nihil adversus eum aperte decrevisset. Justin. l. v. c. 11.

|| Xenoph. Cyri Exped. l. i. p. 252.

§ Xenoph., l. ii. p. 294.

gave him an employment in his army amongst the Greeks. He set out for Sardis at length, and marched towards the upper provinces of Asia. The troops knew neither the occasion of the war, nor into what countries they were going. Cyrus had only caused it to be given out that he should act against the Pisidians, who had infested his provinces by their incursions.

* Tissaphernes, rightly judging that all these preparations were too great for so small an enterprise as against Pisidia, had set out post from Miletus to give the king an account of them. This news occasioned great trouble at court. Parysatis, the mother of Artaxerxes and Cyrus, was looked upon as the principal cause of this war; and all persons in her service and interest were suspected of holding intelligence with Cyrus. Statira especially, the reigning queen, reproached her incessantly in the most violent terms. "Where is now," said she, to her, "that faith that you have so often engaged for your son's behaviour? Where those ardent prayers you employed to preserve from death that conspirator against his king and brother? It is your unhappy fondness has kindled this war, and plunged us into an abyss of misfortunes." The antipathy and hatred of the two queens for each other was already very great, and much enflamed by such warm reproaches. We shall see what consequences they have. Artaxerxes assembled a numerous army to receive his brother.

† Cyrus advanced continually by great marches. What troubled him most on the way was the pass of Cilicia, which was a narrow defile between very high and steep mountains, that would admit no more than one carriage to pass at a time. Syennesis, king of the country, prepared to dispute this passage with him, and would infallibly have succeeded, but for the diversion made by Tamos with his fleet, in conjunction with that of the Lacedæmonians. To defend the coasts against the insults of the fleet, Syennesis abandoned that important post, which a small body of troops might have made good against the greatest army.

When they arrived at Tarsus, the Greeks refused to march any farther, rightly suspecting that they were intended against the king, and loudly exclaiming that they had not entered into the service upon that condition. Clearchus, who commanded them, had occasion for all his address and ability to stifle this commotion in its birth. At first he made use of authority and force, but with very ill success, and desisted therefore from an open opposition to their sentiments: he even affected to enter into their views, and to support them with his approbation and credit. He declared publicly, that he would not separate himself from them, and advised them to depute persons to the prince, to know from his own mouth against whom they were to be led, that they might follow him voluntarily if they approved his measures: if not, that they might demand his permission to withdraw. By this artful evasion he appeased the tumult, and made them easy, and they chose him and some other officers for their deputies. Cyrus, whom he had secretly apprized of every thing, made answer, that he was going to attack Abrocomas † his enemy, at twelve days march from thence upon the Euphrates. When this answer was repeated to them, though they plainly saw against whom they were going, they resolved to proceed, and only demanded an augmentation of their pay. Cyrus, instead of one daric † a month to each soldier, promised to give them one and a half.

* Plut. in Artax. p. 1044.

† Xenoph. I. i. p. 248—261.

‡ It is not said where he commanded. It appears to be upon the Euphrates. He marched with 300,000 men to join the king's army, but did not arrive till after the battle.

§ The daric was worth ten livres.

Some time after, Cyrus was informed that two of the principal officers, upon account of a private quarrel with Clearchus, had deserted with part of their equipage on board of a merchant ship. Many were of opinion that it was proper to send two galleys after them; which might be done with great ease; and that when they were brought back, they should be made an example, by suffering death in the sight of the whole army. Cyrus, convinced that favour* was the most certain means to the attainment of affection, and that punishments, like violent remedies, ought never to be used but in extreme necessity, declared publicly, that he would not suffer it to be said that he had detained any one in his service by force; and added, that he would send them their wives and children, whom they had left as hostages in his hands. An answer of so much wisdom and generosity had a surprising effect, and made even those his firm adherents who were before inclined to retire. This is an excellent lesson for all who govern. There is in the mind of man a fund of natural generosity, which it is necessary to know and apply. Threats exasperate them, and chastisement makes them revolt, when endeavours are used to force them to do their duty against their will. They desire a certain degree of confidence in their honour, † and that the glory of acquitting themselves of it out of choice be left in their power. To show that you believe men faithful, is often the best means to make them so.

Cyrus soon after declared that he marched against Artaxerxes; upon which some murmuring was heard at first, but it soon gave place to expressions of joy and satisfaction, occasioned by that prince's magnificent promises to the army.

‡ As Cyrus advanced by long marches, he was informed from all parts that the king did not intend to come directly to a battle, but had resolved to wait in the remote parts of Persia till all his forces were assembled; and that to stop his enemies, he had ordered an intrenchment to be thrown up in the plains of Babylonia, with a fosse of five fathoms broad, and three deep, extending the space of twelve ¶ parasangas, or leagues, from the Euphrates to the wall of Media. Between the Euphrates and the fosse a way had been left of 20 feet in breadth, by which Cyrus passed with his whole army, having reviewed it the day before. The king had neglected to dispute this pass with him, and suffered him to continue his march towards Babylon. It was Tiribasus who determined him not to fly in such a manner before an enemy, against whom he had infinite advantages, as well from the number of his troops as the valour of his generals. He resolved therefore to advance against the enemy.

* *Beneficiis potius quam remediis ingenia experiri placuit.* Plin. in Traj.

† *Nescio an plus moribus conferat princeps, qui bonos esse patitur, quam qui cogit.* Plin. *ibid.*

‡ *Plerumque habita fides ipsam obligat fidem.* Liv.

¶ *Plut. in Artax. p. 1014. Xenoph. l. i. p. 261—266.*

¶ The Parasanga is a measure of ways peculiar to the Persians. It was commonly 30 stadia, which make about a league and a half French. Some were from 20 to 60 stadia. In the march of Cyrus' army, I suppose the parasanga only 20 stadia, or one league, for reasons I shall give hereafter.

SECTION II.

THE BATTLE OF CUNAXA.—CYRUS IS KILLED.

THE place where the battle was fought, * was called Cunaxa, about 25 leagues from Babylon. The army of Cyrus consisted of 13,000 Greeks, 100,000 barbarians, and 20 chariots armed with scythes. The enemy in horse and foot might amount to about 1,200,000, under four generals, Tisaphernes, Gobryas, Arbaces, and Abrocomas, without including 6000 chosen horse, that fought where the king was present, and never quitted his person. But Abrocomas, who had the command of 300,000 men, did not arrive till five days after the battle. In the king's army were only 150 chariots armed with scythes.

Cyrus believed, from the enemy's not having defended the pass at the fosse, that there would be no battle; so that the next day the army marched with great negligence. But on the third, Cyrus being in his chariot, with few soldiers in their ranks before him, and the rest marching without any order, or having their arms carried for them, an horseman came in full speed, crying out as he passed, that the enemy approached in order of battle. Upon this great confusion ensued; from the apprehension that they should not have time to draw up the army. Cyrus, leaping from his chariot, put on his arms immediately, and getting on horseback with his javelin in his hand, he gave orders universally to the troops to stand to their arms, and fall into their ranks; which was executed with so much expedition, that the troops had not time to refresh themselves.

Cyrus posted upon his right 1000 Paphlagonian horse, supported by the Euphrates, and the light armed infantry of the Greeks; and next them, Clearchus, Proxenes, and the rest of the general officers, to Mnemon at the head of their several corps. The left wing, composed of Lydians, Phrygians, and other Asiatic nations, were commanded by Arius, who had 1000 horse. Cyrus placed himself in the centre, where the chosen troops of the Persians and other barbarians were posted. He had around him 600 horsemen, armed at all points, as were their horses, with head and breast pieces. The prince's head was uncovered, as were those of all the Persians, whose custom it was to give battle in that manner; the arms of all his people were red, and those of Artaxerxes were white.

A little before the onset, Clearchus advised Cyrus not to charge in person, but to cover himself in the rear of the Grecian battalions. "What is it you say?" replied Cyrus. "At the time I am endeavouring to make myself king, would you have me show myself unworthy of being so?" That wise and generous answer proves that he knew the duty of a general, especially on a day of battle. Had he withdrawn when his presence was most necessary, it would have argued his want of courage and intimidated others. It is necessary, always preserving the due distinction between the leader and the troops, that their danger should be common, and no one exempted from it, lest the latter should be alarmed by a different conduct. Courage in an army depends upon example, upon the desire of being distinguished, the fear of dishonour, the incapacity of doing otherwise than the rest, and the equality of danger. The retiring of Cyrus had either ruined, or greatly weakened all these potent motives, by discouraging as well the officers as soldiers of his army. He thought that being

* Xenoph. in Exped. Cyr. l. i. p. 265—266. Diod. l. xiv. p. 253, 254. Plut. p. 1014—1017.

their general, it was incumbent upon him to discharge all the functions of that office, and to show himself worthy to be the leader and soul of such a number of valiant men, ready to shed their blood for his service.

It was now noon, and the enemy did not yet appear. But about three of the clock, a great dust, like a white cloud, arose, followed soon after with a blackness that overcast the whole plain; after which was seen the glittering of armour, lances, and standards. Tissaphernes commanded the left, which consisted of cavalry armed with white cuirasses, and of light armed infantry; in the centre was the heavy armed foot, a great part of which had bucklers made of wood, which covered the soldiery entirely; these were Egyptians. The rest of the light armed infantry and of the horse formed the right wing. The foot were drawn up by nations, with as much depth as front, and in that order composed square battalions. The king had posted himself in the main body with the flower of the whole army, and had 6000 horse for his guard, commanded by Artagerses. Though he was in the centre, he was beyond the left wing of Cyrus' army, so much did the front of his own exceed that of the enemy in extent. An hundred and fifty chariots armed with scythes were placed in the front of the army at some distance from one another. The scythes were fixed to the axle downwards and aslant, so as to cut down and overthrow all before them.

As Cyrus relied very much upon the valour and experience of the Greeks, he bade Clearchus, as soon as he had beat the enemy in his front, to take care to incline to his left, and fall upon the centre, where the king was posted; the success of the battle depending upon that attack. But Clearchus, finding it very difficult to make his way through so great a body of troops, replied, that he need be in no pain, and that he would take care to do what was necessary.

The enemy in the mean time advanced slowly in good order. Cyrus marched in the space between the two armies, the nearest to his own, and considered both of them with great attention. Xenophon, perceiving him, spurred directly up to him, to know whether he had any further orders to give. He called out to him that the sacrifices were favourable, and that he should tell the troops so. He then hastened through the ranks to give his orders, and showed himself to the soldiers with such a joy and serenity in his countenance, as inspired them with new courage, and at the same time with an air of kindness and familiarity, that excited their zeal and affection. It is not easy to comprehend what great effects a word, a kind air, or a look of a general, will have upon a day of action; and with what ardour a common man will rush into danger, when he believes himself not unknown to his general, and thinks his valour will oblige him.

Artaxerxes moved on continually, though with a slow pace, and without noise and confusion. That good order and exact discipline extremely surprised the Greeks, who expected to see much hurry and tumult in so great a multitude, and to hear confused cries, as Cyrus had foretold them.

The armies were not distant above 400 or 500 paces, when the Greeks began to sing the hymn of battle, and to march on, softly at first, and with silence. When they came near the enemy, they set up great cries, striking their darts upon their shields to frighten the horse, and then moving all together, they sprung forwards upon the barbarians with all their force, who did not wait their charge, but took to their heels, and fled universally, except Tissaphernes, who stood his ground with a small part of his troops.

Cyrus saw with pleasure the enemy routed by the Greeks, and was proclaimed king by those around him. But he did not give himself up to vain joy, nor as yet reckon himself victor. He perceived that Artaxer-

was wheeling his right to attack him in flank, and marched directly against him with his 600 horse. He killed Artageres, who commanded the king's guards of 6000 horse, with his own hand, and put the whole body to flight. Discovering his brother, he cried out, with his eyes sparkling with rage, "I see him," and spurred against him, followed only by his principal officers; for his troops had quitted their ranks to follow the runaways, which was an essential fault.

* The battle then became a single combat, in some measure between Artaxerxes and Cyrus; and the two brothers were seen transported with rage and fury, endeavouring, like Eteocles and Polynices, to plunge their swords into each other's hearts, and to assure themselves of the throne by the death of their rival.

Cyrus having opened his way through those who were drawn up in battle before Artaxerxes, joined him, and killed his horse, that fell with him to the ground. He rose, and was remounted upon another, when Cyrus attacked him again, gave him a second wound, and was preparing to give him a third, in hopes that it would prove his last. The king, like a lion wounded by the hunters, was only the more furious, from the smart, and sprung forwards, impetuously pushing his horse against Cyrus, who, running headlong, and without regard to his person, threw himself into the midst of a flight of darts aimed at him from all sides, and received a wound from the king's javelin, at the instant all the rest discharged upon him. Cyrus fell dead; some say by the wound given him by the king; others affirm, that he was killed by a Carian soldier. Mithridates, a young Persian nobleman, asserted that he had given him the mortal stroke with a javelin, which entered his temple, and pierced his head quite through. The greatest persons of his court, resolving not to survive so good a master, were all killed around his body; a certain proof, says Xenophon, that he well knew how to choose his friends, and that he was truly beloved by them. Ariæus, who ought to have been the firmest of all his adherents, fled with the left wing, as soon as he heard of his death.

Artaxerxes, after having caused the head and right hand of his brother to be cut off by his eunuch Mesabates, pursued the enemy into their camp. Ariæus had not stopped there, but having passed through it, continued his retreat to the place where the army had encamped the day before, which was about four leagues distant.

Tissaphernes, after the defeat of the greatest part of his left wing by the Greeks, led on the rest against them, and by the side of the river passed through the light armed infantry of the Greeks, who opened to give him passage, and made their discharge upon him as he passed without losing a man. They were commanded by Episthenes of Amphipolis, who was esteemed an able captain. Tissaphernes kept on without returning to the charge, because he perceived he was too weak, and went forward to Cyrus' camp, where he found the wing who was plundering it, but had not been able to force the quarter defended by the Greeks left to guard it, who saved their baggage.

The Greeks on their side, and Artaxerxes on his, who did not know what had passed elsewhere, believed each of them, that they had gained the victory; the first, because they had put the enemy to flight, and pursued them; and the king, because he had killed his brother, beat the troops he had fought, and plundered their camp. The event was soon cleared up on both sides. Tissaphernes, upon his arrival at the camp, informed the

* Diod. l. xiv. p. 254.

king that the Greeks had defeated his left wing, and pursued it with great vigour, and the Greeks on their side learned that the king, in pursuing Cyrus' left, had penetrated into the camp. Upon this advice the king rallied his troops, and marched in quest of the enemy; and Clearchus, being returned from pursuing the Persians, advanced to support the camp.

The two armies were soon very near each other, when, by a movement made by the king, he seemed to intend to charge the Greeks by their left, who, fearing to be surrounded on all sides, wheeled about and halted, with the river on their backs, to prevent their being taken in the rear. Upon seeing that, the king changed his form of battle also, drew up his army in front of them, and marched on to the attack. As soon as the Greeks saw him approach, they began to sing the hymn of battle, and advanced against the enemy even with more ardour than in the first action.

The barbarians again took to their heels, ran farther than before, and were pursued to a village at the foot of a hill, upon which their horse halted. The king's standard was observed to be there, which was a golden eagle upon the top of a pike, having its wings displayed. The Greeks preparing to pursue them, they abandoned also the hill, fled precipitately with all their troops, broke, and in the utmost disorder and confusion. Clearchus, having drawn up the Greeks at the bottom of the hill, ordered Lycias the Syracusan and another to go up to it, and observe what passed in the plain. They returned with an account that the enemy fled on all sides, and that their whole army was routed.

As it was almost night, the Greeks laid down their arms to rest themselves, much surprised that neither Cyrus, nor any one from him appeared, and imagining that he was either engaged in the pursuit of the enemy, or was making haste to possess himself of some important place, for they were still ignorant of his death and the defeat of the rest of his army. They determined therefore to return to their camp, and found the greatest part of the baggage taken, with all the provisions, and 400 waggons laden with corn and wine, which Cyrus had expressly caused to be carried along with the army for the Greeks, in case of any pressing necessity. They passed the night in the camp, the greatest part of them without any refreshment, concluding that Cyrus was alive and victorious.

The success of this battle shows the superiority of valour and military knowledge to multitude without them. The small army of the Greeks did not amount to more than 12 or 13,000 men; but they were seasoned and disciplined troops, inured to fatigues, accustomed to confront dangers, sensible to glory, and who, during the long Peloponnesian war, had not wanted either time or means to acquire and complete themselves in the art of war and the methods of battle. Artaxerxes' side was computed at 1,000,000 of men; but they were soldiers only in name, without force, courage, discipline, experience, or any sense of honour. Hence it was, that as soon as the Greeks appeared, terror and disorder ensued among the enemy; and in the second action, Artaxerxes himself did not dare to wait their attack, but shamefully betook himself to flight.

Plutarch here blames Clearchus, the general of the Greeks very much, and imputes to him, as an unpardonable neglect, his not having followed Cyrus' order, who recommended to him above all things, to incline and charge Artaxerxes' person. This reproach seems groundless. It is not easy to conceive how it was possible for that captain, who was posted on the right wing, to attack Artaxerxes immediately, who in the centre of his own army, lay beyond the utmost extent of the enemy's left, as has been said before. It seems that Cyrus, depending as he did with great reason

upon the valour of the Greeks, and desiring they should charge Artaxerxes in his post, ought to have placed them in the left wing, which answered directly to the part where the king was, that is, to the main body, and not in the right, which was very remote from it.

Clearchus may indeed be reproached with having followed the pursuit too warmly and too long. If, after having put the left, which opposed him into disorder, he had charged the rest of the enemy in flank, and had opened his way to the centre, where Artaxerxes was, it is highly probable that he had gained a complete victory, and placed Cyrus upon the throne. The 600 horse of that prince's guard, committed the same fault, and by pursuing the body of troops they had put to flight too eagerly, left their master almost alone, and abandoned to the mercy of the enemy, without considering that they were chosen from the whole army for the immediate guard of his person, and for no other purpose whatsoever. Too much ardour is often prejudicial in a battle, and it is the duty of an able general to know how to restrain and direct it.

Cyrus himself erred highly in this respect, and abandoned himself too much to his blind passion for glory and revenge. In running headlong to attack his brother, he forgot that there is a wide difference between a general and a private soldier. He ought not to have exposed himself, but as it was consistent with a prince; as the head, and not the hand; as the person who was to give orders, and not as those who were to execute them.

I speak in this manner after the judges in the art of war, and would not choose to advance my own opinion upon things out of my sphere.

SECTION III.

EULOGY OF CYRUS.

XENOPHON gives us a magnificent character of Cyrus,* and that not upon the credit of others, but from what he saw and knew of him in his own person. He was, says he, in the opinion of all that were acquainted with him, after Cyrus the Great, a prince the most worthy of the supreme authority, and had the most noble and most truly royal soul. From his infancy he surpassed all of his own age in every exercise, whether it were in managing the horse, drawing the bow, throwing the dart, or in the chase, in which he distinguished himself once by fighting and killing a bear that attacked him. Those advantages were exalted in him by the nobleness of his air, and engaging aspect, and by all the graces of nature that conduce to recommend merit.

When his father had made him satrap of Lydia and the neighbouring † provinces, his chief care was to make the people sensible that he had nothing so much at heart as to keep his word inviolable, not only with regard to public treasures, but the most minute of his promises; a quality very rare among princes, and which however is the basis of all good government, and the source of their own as well as their people's happiness. Not only the places under his authority, but the enemy themselves, reposed an entire confidence in him.

Whether good or ill were done him, he always desired to return it double, and that he might live no longer, as he said himself than whilst he

* De Exped. Cyr. l. i. p. 226, 227.

† Great Phrygia and Cappadocia.

surmounted his friends in benefits, and his enemies in vengeance. (It had been more glorious for him to have overcome the latter by the force of favour and benevolence.) Nor was there ever prince that people were more afraid to offend, nor for whose sake they were more ready to hazard their possessions, lives and fortunes.

Less intent upon being feared than beloved, his study was to make his greatness appear only where it was useful and beneficial, and to extinguish all other sentiments but those which flow from gratitude and affection. He was industrious to do good upon all occasions, to confer his favours with judgment and in season, and to show that he thought himself rich, powerful and happy, only as he made others sensible of his being so by his benevolence and liberality. But he took care not to exhaust the means by an imprudent profusion. He did not lavish * but distribute his favours. He chose rather to make his liberalities the rewards of merit, than mere donations, and that they should be subservient in promoting virtue, and not in supporting the soft and abject sloth of vice.

He was particularly pleased with conferring his favours upon valiant men; and governments and rewards were only bestowed on those who had distinguished themselves by their actions. He never granted any honour or dignity to favour, intrigue, or faction, but to merit only; upon which depends not only the glory but the prosperity of governments. By these means he soon made virtue estimable, and the pursuit of men, and rendered vice contemptible and horrid. The provinces, animated with a noble emulation to deserve, furnished him in a very short time with a considerable number of excellent subjects of every kind; who under a different government would have remained unknown, obscure and useless.

Never did any one know how to oblige with a better grace, or to win the hearts of those who could serve him with more engaging behaviour. As he was fully sensible that he stood in need of the assistance of others for the execution of his designs, he thought justice and gratitude required that he should render his adherents all the services in his power. All the presents made him, whether of splendid arms, or rich apparel, he distributed among his friends, according to their several tastes or occasions; and used to say, that the brightest ornament, and most exalted riches of a prince, consisted in adorning and enriching those who served him well. In effect, says Xenophon, to do good to one's friends, and to excel them in liberality, does not seem so admirable in so high a fortune; but to transcend them in goodness of heart and sentiments of friendship and affection, and to take more pleasure in conferring than receiving obligations; in this I find Cyrus truly worthy of esteem and admiration. The first of these advantages he derives from his rank; the other from himself and his intrinsic merit.

By these extraordinary qualities he acquired the universal esteem and affection as well of the Greeks as the barbarians. A great proof of what Xenophon here says, is, that none ever quitted the service of Cyrus for the king's; whereas great numbers went over every day to him from the king's party after the war was declared, and even of such as had most credit at the court; because they were all convinced that Cyrus knew best how to distinguish and reward their services.

It is most certain that young Cyrus did not want great virtues, and a su-

* *Habitum sinum facilem, non perforatum: ex quo multa exant, nihil excidat.* Senec. de vit. beat. c. 25.

perior merit ; but I am surprized that Xenophon, in drawing his character, has described only the most beautiful features, and such as are proper to excite out admiration of him, without saying the least word of his defects, and especially of that immoderate ambition, that was the soul of all his actions, and which at length put arms into his hands against his elder brother and king. Is it allowable in an historian, whose chief duty it is to paint virtue and vice in their proper colours, to relate at large an enterprise of such a nature, without intimating the least dislike or imputation against it ? But with the Pagans, ambition was so far from being considered as a vice, that it often passed for a virtue.

SECTION IV.

THE KING IS FOR COMPELLING THE GREEKS TO DELIVER UP THEIR ARMS.

THE Greeks * having learned, the day after the battle, that Cyrus was dead, sent deputies to Ariæus, the general of the barbarians, who had retired with his troops to the place from whence they had marched the day before the action, to offer him, as victors, the crown of Persia in the room of Cyrus. At the same time arrived Persian heralds at arms from the king, to summon them to deliver up their arms ; to whom they answered, with a haughty air, that they talked a strange language to conquerors ; that if the king would have their arms, he might come and take them if he could ; but that they would die before they would part with them ; that if he would receive them into the number of his allies, they would serve him with fidelity and valour ; † but if he imagined to reduce them into slavery as conquered, he might know they had wherewithal to defend themselves, and were determined to lose their lives and liberty together. The heralds added, that they had orders to tell them, that if they continued in the place where they were, they would be allowed a suspension of arms ; but if they advanced or retired, that they would be treated as enemies. The Greeks agreed, and were asked by the heralds what answer they should report. Peace in continuing here, or war in marching, replied Clearchus, without explaining himself further ; from the view of keeping the king always in suspense and uncertainty.

The answer of Ariæus to the Grecian deputies was, that there were many Persians more considerable than himself, who would not suffer him upon the throne, and that he should set out early the next day to return into Ionia ; that if they would march thither with him, they might join him in the night. Clearchus, with the advice of the officers, prepared to depart. He commanded from thenceforth, as being the sole person of sufficient capacity ; for he had not been actually elected general in chief.

The same night, Milthocytes, the Thracian, who commanded 40 horse, and about 300 foot of his country, went and surrendered himself to the king. The rest of the Greeks began their march under the conduct of Clearchus, and arrived about midnight at the camp of Ariæus. After they had drawn up in battle, the principal officers went to wait on him in his tent, where they swore alliance with him ; and the barbarian engaged to conduct the army without fraud. In confirmation of the treaty, they sa-

* Xenoph. in exped. Cyr. l. ii. p. 272—292. Diod. l. xiv. p. 255—257.

† Sin ut victis servitium indiceretur esse sibi ferrum et juventutem, et promptum libertati aut ad mortem animum. Tacit. annal. l. iv. c. 46.

crificed a wolf, a ram, a boar, and a bull; the Greeks dipped their swords, and the barbarians the points of their javelins, in the blood of the victims.

Artabanes did not think it proper to return by the same route they came, because having found nothing for their subsistence the last 17 days of their march, they must have suffered much more, had they taken the same way back again. He therefore took another; exhorting them only to make long marches at first, in order to evade the king's pursuit; which they could not effect. Towards the evening, when they were not far from some villages where they proposed to halt, the scouts came in with advice, that they had seen several equipages and convoys, which made it reasonable to judge that the enemy were not far off. Upon which they stood their ground, and waited their coming up; and the next day before sun-rising, drew up in the same order as in the preceding battle. So bold an appearance terrified the king, who sent heralds, not to demand, as before, the surrender of their arms, but to propose peace and a treaty. Clearchus, who was informed of their arrival, whilst he was busy in drawing up his troops, gave orders to bid them wait, and to tell them that he was not yet at leisure to hear them. He assumed purposely an air of haughtiness and grandeur, to denote his intrepidity, and at the same time to show the fine appearance and good condition of his phalanx. When he advanced with the most showy of his officers, expressly chosen for the occasion, and heard what the heralds had to propose, he made answer, that they must begin with giving battle, because the army, being in want of provisions, had no time to lose. The heralds having carried back his answer to their master, returned immediately; which showed that the king, or whoever spoke in his name, was not very distant. They said they had orders to conduct them to villages where they would find provisions in abundance, and conducted them thither accordingly.

The army staid there three days, during which Tissaphernes arrived from the king, with the queen's brother and three other Persian grandees, attended by a great number of officers and domestics. After having saluted the generals, who advanced to receive him, he told them by his interpreter, that being a neighbour of Greece, and seeing them engaged in dangers out of which it would be difficult to extricate themselves, he had used his good offices with the king to obtain permission to reconduct them into their own country; being convinced that neither themselves nor their cities would ever be unmindful of that favour; that the king, without having declared himself positively upon that head, had commanded him to come to them, to know for what cause they had taken arms against him; and he advised them to make the king such an answer as might not give any offence, and might enable him to do them service. "We call the gods to witness," replied Clearchus, "that we did not list ourselves to make war with the king, or to march against him. Cyrus, concealing his true motives under different pretexts, brought us almost hither without explaining himself, the better to surprise you; and when we saw him surrounded with dangers, we thought it infamous to abandon him, after the favours we had received from him. But as he is dead, we are released from our engagement, and neither desire to contest the crown with Artaxerxes, nor to ravage his country; provided he does not oppose our return. However, if we are attacked, we shall endeavour, with the assistance of the gods, to make a good defence: and shall not be ungrateful in regard to those who render us any service." Tissaphernes replied, that he would let the king know what they said, and return with his answer. But his not coming the next day, gave the Greeks some anx-

ity : he however arrived on the third, and told them, that after much controversy, he had at length obtained the king's grace for them : for that it had been represented to the king, that he ought not to suffer people to return with impunity into their country, who had been so insolent as to come thither to make war upon him. "In fine," said he, "you may now assure yourselves of not finding any obstacle to your return, and of being supplied with provisions, or suffered to buy them ; and you may judge that you are to pass without committing any disorders in your march, and that you are to take only what is necessary ; provided you are not furnished with it." These conditions were sworn to on both sides. Tissaphernes and the queen's brother gave their hands to the colonels and captains in token of amity. After which Tissaphernes withdrew to dispose his affairs ; promising to return as soon as they would admit, in order to go back with them into his government.

The Greeks waited for him above 20 days, continuing encamped near Ariæus, who received frequent visits from his brothers and other relations ; as did the officers of his army from the Persians of the different party ; who assured them from the king of an entire oblivion of the past ; so that the friendship of Ariæus for the Greeks appeared to cool every day more and more. This change gave them cause of uneasiness. Several of the officers went to Clearchus and the other generals, and said to them, "What do we here any longer ? Are we not sensible that the king desires to see us all perish, that others may be terrified by our example ? Perhaps he keeps us waiting here till he re-assembles his dispersed troops, or sends to seize the passes in our way ; for he will never suffer us to return into Greece to divulge our own glory and his shame." Clearchus made answer to this discourse, that to depart without consulting the king, was to break with him, and to declare war by violating the treaty ; that they should remain without a conductor in a country where nobody would supply them with provisions ; that Ariæus would abandon them ; and that even their friends would become their enemies ; that he did not know but there might be other rivers to pass, and that though the Euphrates were the only one, they could not get over it, were the passage ever so little disputed ; that if it were necessary to come to a battle, they should find themselves without cavalry, against an enemy that had a very numerous and excellent body of horse ; so that if they gained the victory, they could make no great advantage of it, and if they were overcome, they were utterly and irretrievably lost. "Besides, why should the king, who has so many other means to destroy us, engage his word only to violate it, and thereby render himself execrable in the sight of gods and men."

Tissaphernes however arrived with his troops, in order to return to his government, and they set forward altogether under the conduct of that satrap, who supplied them with provisions. Ariæus with his troops encamped with the barbarians, and the Greeks separately at some distance, which kept up a continual distrust among them : besides which there happened frequent quarrels for wood or forage, that augmented their aversion for each other. After three days march, they arrived at the wall of Media, which is 100 feet high, 20 broad, and 20 leagues * in extent, all built of bricks, cemented with bitumen, like the walls of Babylon, from which it was not very distant at one of its extremities. When they had passed it, they marched eight leagues in two days, and came to the river Tygris, si-

* 20 Parasangs.

ter having crossed two of its canals, cut expressly for watering the country. * They then passed the Tygris upon a bridge of 27 boats near Sitarum, a very great and populous city. After four days march, they arrived at another city very powerful also, called Opis. They found there a bastard brother of Artaxerxes with a very considerable body of troops, which he was bringing from Susa and Ecbatana to his aid. He admired the fine order of the Greeks. From thence, having passed the deserts of Media, they came after a march of six days, to a place called the lands of Parysatis; the revenues of which appertained to that princess. Tissaphernes, to insult the memory of her son Cyrus, so dearly beloved by her, gave the villages to be plundered by the Greeks. Continuing their march through the desert, on the side of the Tygris, which they had on their left, they arrived at Cænæ, a very great and rich city, and from thence at the river Zabates.

The occasions of distrust increased every day between the Greeks and barbarians. Clearchus thought it incumbent on him to come to an explanation once for all with Tissaphernes. He began with observing upon the sacred and inviolable nature of the treaties subsisting between them. "Can a man," said he, "conscious of the guilt of perjury, be capable of living at ease? How would he shun the wrath of the gods, the witnesses of treaties, and escape their vengeance, whose power is universal?" He added afterwards many things to prove that the Greeks were obliged by their own interest, to continue faithful to him; and that by renouncing his alliance, they must first inevitably renounce not only all religion, but reason and common sense. Tissaphernes seemed to relish this discourse, and spoke to him with all the appearance of the most perfect sincerity; insinuating at the same time that some persons had done him bad offices with him. "If you will bring your officers hither," said he, "I will show you those who have wronged you in their representations." He kept him to supper, and professed more friendship for him than ever.

The next day Clearchus proposed in the assembly to go with the several commanders of the troops to Tissaphernes. He suspected Menon in particular, whom he knew to have had a secret conference with the satrap in the presence of Ariæus; besides which they had already differed several times with each other. Some objected that it was not proper that all the generals should go to Tissaphernes, and that it did not consist with prudence to rely implicitly upon the professions of a barbarian. But Clearchus continued to insist upon what he had moved, till it was agreed that the four other commanders, with 20 captains, and about 200 soldiers, under the pretext of buying provisions in the Persian camp, where there was a market, should be sent along with him. When they came to the tent of Tissaphernes, the five commanders, Clearchus, Menon, Proxenes, Agias, and Socrates, were suffered to enter, but the captains remained without at the door. Immediately, on a certain signal before agreed on, those within were seized, and the others put to the sword. Some Persian horse afterwards scoured the country, and killed all the Greeks they met, whether freemen or slaves. Clearchus, with the other generals, was sent to the king, who ordered their heads to be struck off. Xenophon describes with sufficient extent the characters of those officers.

* The march of the Greeks and the rest of the army, from the day after the battle till the passing of the Tygris, abounds in the text of Xenophon with very great obscurities, to explain which fully requires a long dissertation. My plan does not admit me to enter into such discussions, which I must therefore refer to those who are more able than myself.

Clearchus was valiant, bold, intrepid, and of a capacity for forming great enterprises. His courage was not rash, but directed by prudence, and he retained all the coolness of his temper and presence of mind in the midst of the greatest dangers. He loved the troops, and let them want for nothing. He knew how to make them obey him; but out of fear. His mien was awful and severe; his language rough; his punishments instant and rigorous: he gave way sometimes to passion, but presently came to himself, and always chastised with justice. His great maxim was, that nothing could be done in an army without a severe discipline; and from him came the saying, that a soldier ought to fear his general more than the enemy. His troops * esteemed his valour, and did justice to his merit; but they were afraid of his humour, and did not love to serve under him. In a word, says Xenophon, the soldiers feared him as scholars do a severe pedagogue. We may say of him with Tacitus, that by an excess of severity he made what had otherwise been well done by him, unamiable; "† *Cupidine severitatis in his etiam, quæ rite faceret, acerbus.*"

Proxenes was at Bœotia. From his infancy he aspired at great things, and was industrious to make himself capable of them. He spared no means for the attainment of instruction, and was the disciple of Gorgias the Leontine, a celebrated rhetorician, who sold his lectures at a very high price. When he found himself capable of commanding, and of doing good to his friends, as well as of being served by them, he entered into Cyrus' service with the view of advancing himself. He did not want ambition, but would take no other path to glory than that of virtue. He had been a perfect captain, had he had to do with none but brave disciplined men, and it had been only necessary to be beloved. He was more apprehensive of being in his soldiers displeasure, than his soldiers in his. He thought it sufficient for a commander to praise good actions, without punishing bad ones; for which reason he was beloved by the worthy; but those of different character abused his facility. He died at 30 years of age.

‡ Could the two great persons we have here drawn after Xenophon have been moulded into one, something perfect might have been made of them, retrenching their several defects, and retaining only their virtues; but it rarely happens that the same man,|| as Tacitus says of Agricola, behaves according to the exigency of times and circumstances, sometimes with gentleness, and sometimes with severity, without lessening his authority by the former, or the people's affection by the latter.

Menon was a Thessalian, avaricious and ambitious, but ambitious only from the motive of avarice, pursuing honour and estimation for the mere lucre of money. He courted the friendship of the great, and of persons in authority, that he might have it in his power to commit injustice and oppression with impunity. To obtain his ends, all means with him were virtue; falsehood, fraud, perjury; whilst sincerity, and integrity of heart, stood in his scheme for weakness and stupidity. He loved nobody; and if he professed friendship, it was only to deceive. As others made their glory consist in religion, probity and honour, he valued himself upon in-

* *Manebat admiratio viri et fama; sed oderunt.* Tacit. Hist. l. ii. c. 68.

† Tacit. Annal. c. lxxv.

‡ *Egregium principatus temperamentum, si, demptis utriusque vitiiis, solæ virtutes miscerentur.* Tacit. histor. l. ii. c. 5.

|| *Pro variis temporibus ac negotiis severus et comis—nec illi, quod est rarissimum, aut facilitas auctoritatem, aut severitas amorem, diminuit.* Tacit. id Agriç. c. ix.

justice, deceit, and treachery. He gained the favour of the great by false reports, whispering, and calumny; and that of the soldiery by license and impunity. In fine, he endeavoured to render himself terrible by the mischief it was in his power to do, and imagined he favoured those to whom he did none.

It was in my thoughts to have retrenched these characters, which interrupt the thread of the history; but as they are a lively image of the manners of men, which in all times are the same, I thought retaining them would neither be useless nor disagreeable to the reader.

SECTION V.

RETREAT OF THE TEN THOUSAND GREEKS FROM THE PROVINCE OF BABELON TO TREBISOND.

THE generals of the Greeks having been seized,* and the officers who attended them massacred, the troops were in the highest consternation. They were 500 or 600 leagues from Greece, surrounded with great rivers, and enemy-nations, without any supplies of provisions. In this state of general dejection, they could not think of taking either nourishment or repose. In the middle of the night, Xenophon, a young Athenian, but of prudence and capacity superior to his years, went to some of the officers, and represented to them, that they had no time to lose; that it was of the last importance to prevent the bad designs of the enemy; that however small their number, they would render themselves formidable, if they behaved with boldness and resolution; that valour and not multitude determines the success of arms: and that it was necessary above all things, to nominate generals immediately; because an army without commanders is like a body without a soul. A council was immediately held at which 100 officers were present, and Xenophon being desired to speak, deduced the reasons at large he had at first but lightly touched upon; and by his advice commanders were appointed. They were Timasion for Clearchus, Xanthicles for Socrates, Cleanor for Agias, Philceius for Menon, and Xenophon for Proxenes.

Before the break of day they assembled the army. The generals made speeches to animate the troops, and Xenophon among the rest. "Fellow soldiers," said he, "the loss of so many brave men by vile treachery, and the being abandoned by our friends, is very deplorable; but we must not sink under our misfortunes; and if we cannot conquer, let us choose rather to perish gloriously, than to fall into the hands of barbarians, who would inflict upon us, the greatest miseries. Let us call to mind the glorious battles of Plataea, Thermopylae, Salamin, and the many others wherein our ancestors, though with a small number, have fought and defeated the innumerable armies of the Persians, and thereby rendered the name alone of Greek for ever formidable. It is to their invincible valour we owe the honour we possess, of acknowledging no masters upon earth but the gods, nor any happiness but what consists with liberty. Those gods, the avengers of perjury, and witnesses of the enemy's treason, will be favourable to us; and as they are attacked in the violation of treaties, and take pleasure in humbling the proud, and exalting the low, they will also follow us to battle, and combat for us. For the rest, fellow soldiers, as we have no refuge but in victory, which must be

* Xenoph. in exped. Cyr. l. iii. et iv.

“our hope, and will make us ample amends for whatever it costs to attain it; I should believe if it were your opinion, that for the making a more ready and less difficult retreat, it would be very proper to rid ourselves of all the useless baggage, and to keep only what is absolutely necessary in our march.” All the soldiers that moment lifted up their hands to signify their approbation and consent to all that had been said, and without loss of time set fire to their tents and carriages; such of them as had too much equipage giving it to others who had too little, and destroying the rest.

It was resolved to march the army without tumult or violence, if their return was not opposed; but otherwise to open themselves a passage sword in hand through the enemy. They began their march in the form of a great hollow square, with the baggage in the centre. Chrisophus, the Lacedæmonian, had the van-guard; two of the oldest captains the right and left; and Timasion with Xenophon were posted in the rear, as the youngest officers. The first day was rude; because having neither horse nor slingers, they were extremely harassed by a detachment sent against them: but they provided against that inconvenience by following Xenophon's advice. They chose 200 men out of the Rhodians in the army, whom they armed with slings, and augmented their pay for their encouragement. They could throw as far again as the Persians, because they discharged balls of lead, and the others made use of large flints. They mounted also a squadron of 50 men upon the horses intended for the baggage and supplied their places with other beasts of burden. By the means of this supply, a second detachment of the enemy were very severely handled.

After some days march, Tissaphernes appeared with all his forces. He contented himself with harassing the Greeks who moved on continually. The latter observing the difficulty of retreating in an hollow square in the face of the enemy, from the unevenness of ground, hedges, and other obstacles, which might oblige them to break it, changed their order of battle, and marched in two columns, with the little baggage they had in the space between them. They formed a body of reserve of 600 chosen men, whom they divided into six companies, and subdivided by fifties and tens, to facilitate their motions according to occasion. When the columns came close to each other, they either remained in the rear, or filed off upon the flanks on both sides, to avoid disorder; and when they opened they fell into the void space in the rear between the two columns. Upon any occasion of attack, they immediately ran where it was necessary. The Greeks stood several charges, but they were neither considerable, nor attended with much loss.

They arrived at the river Tygris. As its depth would not admit them to repass it without boats, they were obliged to cross the Carducian mountains; because there was no other way, and the prisoners reported, that from thence they would enter Armenia, where they might pass the Tygris at its source, and afterwards the Euphrates, not very distant from it. To gain those defiles before the enemy could seize them, it was thought proper to set forwards in the night, in order to arrive at the foot of the mountains by the break of day; which was done accordingly. Chrisophus continued at the head of the advanced guard, with the troops armed with missile weapons, besides his ordinary corps; and Xenophon in the rear, with only the heavy armed soldiers, because at that time there was nothing to fear on that side. The inhabitants of the country had taken possession of several of the heights, from whence it was necessary to drive them, which could not be done without great danger and difficulty.

The officers having held a council of war, were of opinion, that it was proper to leave behind them all the beasts of burden not absolutely necessary, with all the slaves lately taken; because both the one and the other would retard their march too much in the great defiles they had to pass; besides which, it required a greater quantity of provisions to support them, and those who had the care of the beasts were useless in fight. That regulation was executed without delay; and they continued their march, sometimes fighting, and sometimes halting. The passing of the mountains, which took up seven days, fatigued the troops exceedingly, and occasioned some loss; but at length they arrived at villages, where they found provisions in abundance, and rested some days, to recover the severe fatigues the army had suffered, in comparison with which, all they had undergone in Persia was trivial.

They found themselves soon after exposed to new danger. Almost at the foot of the mountains they came to a river, 200 feet in breadth, called Centrites, which stopped their march. They had to defend themselves against the enemy, who pursued them in the rear, and the Armenians, the soldiers of the country who defended the opposite side of the river. They attempted in vain to pass it in a place where the water came up to their armpits, and were carried away by the rapidity of the current, against which the weight of their arms made them unable to resist. By good fortune they discovered another place not so deep, where the soldiers had seen the people of the country pass. It required abundance of address, diligence and valour, to keep off the enemy on both sides of them. The army however passed the river at length without much loss.

They marched afterwards with less interruption; passed the source of the Tygris, and arrived at the little river Teleboa, which is very beautiful, and has many villages on its banks. Here began the western Armenia; which was governed by Tiribasus, a satrap much beloved by the king and who had the honour to help him to * mount on horseback when at the court: he offered to let the army pass, and to suffer the soldiers to take all they wanted, upon condition, that they should commit no ravages in their march; which proposal was accepted and ratified on each side. Tiribasus kept always a flying camp at a small distance from the army. There fell a great quantity of snow, which gave the troops some inconvenience; and they learned from a prisoner, that Tiribasus had a design to attack the Greeks at a pass of the mountains, in a defile, through which they must necessarily march. They prevented him by seizing that post, after having put the enemy to flight. After some days march through deserts, they passed the Euphrates near its source, not having the water above their middles.

They suffered exceedingly afterwards from a north wind, which blew in their faces, and prevented respiration; so that it was thought necessary to sacrifice to the wind, upon which it seemed to abate. They marched on in snow five or six feet deep, which killed several servants and beasts of burden, besides 30 soldiers. They made fires during the night, for they found plenty of wood. All the next day, they continued their march through the snow: when many of them, from the excess of hunger, followed with languor or fainting, continued lying upon the ground through weakness and want of spirits. When something had been given them to eat, they found themselves relieved, and continued their march.

* The French translator of Xenophon says, "he held the king's stirrup when he got on horseback," without considering that the ancients used none.

The enemy still pursued them ; of whom many, overtaken by the night, remained on the way without fire or provisions, so that several died of their hardships, and the enemy who followed them took some baggage. Some soldiers were also left behind, that had lost their sight, and others their toes, by the snow. Against the first evil, it was good to wear something black before the eyes ; and against the other, to keep the legs always in motion, and to bare the feet at night. Arriving in a more commodious place, they dispersed themselves into the neighbouring villages, to recover and repose after their fatigues. The houses were built under ground, with an opening at top, like a well, through which the descent was by a ladder ; but there was another entrance for cattle. They found there sheep, cows, goats, poultry ; with wheat, barley, and pulse ; and for drink, there was beer, which was very strong, when not mingled with water, but was agreeable to those who were used to it. They drank this with a reed out of the vessels that held the beer, upon which they saw the barley swim. The master of the house where Xenophon lay, received him very kindly, and even showed him where he had concealed some wine ; besides which he made him a present of several horses. He taught him also to fasten a kind of hurdles to their feet, and to do the same to the other beasts of burden, to prevent their sinking in the snow ; without which they would have been up to the girth in it at every step. The army, after having rested seven days in these villages, resumed their route.

After a march of seven days, they arrived at the river Araxes, called also the Phasus, which is about 100 feet in breadth. Two days after, they discovered the Phasians, the Chalybes, and the Taochians, who kept the pass of the mountains, to prevent their descending into the plain. They saw it was impossible to avoid coming to a battle with them, and resolved to give it the same day. Xenophon, who had observed that the enemy defended only the ordinary passage, and that the mountain was three leagues in extent, proposed the sending of a detachment to take possession of the heights that commanded the enemy ; which would not be difficult, as they might prevent all suspicion of their design by a march in the night, and by making a false attack by the main road, to amuse the barbarians. This was accordingly executed, the enemy put to flight, and the pass cleared.

They cross the country of the Chalybes, who are the most violent of all the barbarians in those parts. When they killed an enemy, they cut off his head, and carried it about in triumph, singing and dancing. They kept themselves close shut up in their cities, and when the army marched, fell suddenly upon the rear, after having carried every thing of value in the country into places of safety. After 12 or 16 days march, they arrived at a very high mountain, called Tecqua, from whence they descried the sea. The first who perceived it, raised great shouts of joy for a considerable time ; which made Xenophon imagine, that the van-guard was attacked, and go with all haste to support it. As he approached nearer, the cry of "the sea ! the sea !" was heard distinctly, and the alarm changed into joy and gaiety ; and when they came to the top, nothing was heard but a confused noise of the whole army, crying out together, "the sea ! the sea !" whilst they could not refrain from tears, nor from embracing their generals and officers. And then, without waiting for orders, they heaped up a pile of stones, and erected a trophy with broken bucklers and other arms.

From thence they advanced to the mountains of Colebis, one of which was higher than the rest, and of that the people of the country had possessed themselves. The Greeks drew up in battle at the bottom of it to ascend, for the access was not impracticable. Xenophon did not judge it

proper to march in line of battle, but by files; because the soldiers could not keep their ranks, from the inequality of the ground, that in some places was easy, and others difficult to climb, which might discourage them. That advice was approved, and the army formed according to it. The heavy armed troops amounted to 80 files, each consisting of about 100 men, with 1800 light armed soldiers, divided into three batties, one of which was posted on the right, another on the left, and a third in the centre. After having encouraged his troops, by representing to them that this was the last obstacle they had to surmount, and implored the assistance of the gods, the army began to ascend the hill. The enemy were not able to support their charge, and dispersed. They passed the mountain, and encamped in villages, where they found provisions in abundance.

A very strange accident happened there to the army, which put them into great consternation. For the soldiers, finding abundance of bee-hives in that place, and eating the honey, they were taken with violent vomiting and fluxes, attended with raving fits; so that those who were least ill, seemed like drunken men, and the rest, either furiously mad or dying. The earth was strewed with their bodies as after a defeat; however, none of them died, and the distemper ceased the next day about the same hour it had taken them. The third or fourth day the soldiers got up, but in the condition people are after having taken a violent medicine.

Two days after, the army arrived near Trebisond, a Greek colony of Sinopians, situated upon the Euxine or Black sea, in the province of Colchis. Here they lay encamped for thirty days, and acquitted themselves of the vows they had made to Jupiter, Hercules, and the other deities, to obtain an happy return into their own country. They also celebrated the games of the horse and foot races, wrestling, boxing, the pancratium: the whole attended with the greatest joy and solemnity.

SECTION VI.

THE GREEKS ARRIVE UPON THE SEA COAST OPPOSITE TO BYZANTIUM.—
XENOPHON JOINS THIMBRON.

AFTER having offered sacrifices to the several divinities, and celebrated the games, they deliberated upon the proper measures for their return into Greece.* They concluded upon going thither by sea; and for that purpose Chrisophus offered to go to Anaxibus, the admiral of Sparta, who was his friend, to obtain ships of him. He set out directly, and Xenophon regulated the order it was necessary to observe, and the precautions to be taken for the security of the camp, provisions, and forage. He believed it also proper to make sure of some vessels, besides those that were expected, and made some expeditions against the neighbouring people.

As Chrisophus did not return so soon as was expected, and provisions began to be wanting, it was resolved to proceed by land: because there was not a sufficient number of ships to transport the whole army, and those which the precaution of Xenophon had procured, were allotted to carry the women, the old and sick men, with all the unnecessary baggage. The army continued its march, and lay 10 days at † Cerasus, where there was a general review of the troops, who were found to amount to 8600 men, out

* Xenoph. I. iii.

† The city of Cerasus became famous for the cherry trees which Lucullus first brought into Italy, and which from thence have been dispersed all over the western world.

of about 10,000; the rest having died in the retreat, of their wounds, fatigues, or diseases.

In the small time the Greeks continued in these parts, several divisions arose as well with the inhabitants of the country, as with some of the officers, who were jealous of Xenophon's authority, and endeavoured to render him odious to the army: but his wisdom and moderation put a stop to those disorders; having made the soldiers sensible that their safety depended upon preserving union and a good understanding among themselves, and obedience to their generals.

From Cerasus they went to Cotyora, which is not very remote from it. They there deliberated again upon the proper measures for their return. The inhabitants of the country represented the almost insuperable difficulties of going by land, from the defiles and rivers they had to pass, and offered to supply the Greeks with ships. This seemed the best expedient, and the army embarked accordingly. They arrived the next day at Sinope, a city of Paphlagonia, and a colony of the Milesians. Chirisophus repaired thither with galleys, but without money, though the troops expected to receive some. He assured them that the army should be paid, as soon as they were out of the Euxine sea, and that their retreat was universally celebrated, and the subject of the discourse and admiration of all Greece.

The soldiers, finding themselves near enough to Greece, desired to make some booty before they arrived there, and with that view resolved to nominate a general with full authority; whereas till then, all affairs were determined in the council of war by the plurality of voices. They cast their eyes upon Xenophon, and caused him to be desired to accept that office. He was not insensible of the honour of commanding in chief; but he foresaw the consequences, and desired time to consider. After having expressed the highest sense of gratitude for an offer so much to his honour, he represented, that to avoid jealousy and division, the success of affairs, and the interest of the army, seemed to require that they should choose a Lacedæmonian for their general; the Spartan state at that time actually ruling Greece, and, in consideration of that choice, would be disposed to support them. This reason was not relished, and they objected to it, that they were far from intending a servile dependance upon Sparta or to submit to regulate their enterprises by the pleasure or dislike of that state; and pressed him again to accept the command. He was then obliged to explain himself sincerely, and without evasion; and declared, that having consulted the gods by sacrifice, upon the offer they made him, that they had manifested their will by evident signs, from whence it appeared, that they did not approve their choice. It was surprising to see the impression which the sole mention of the gods made upon the soldiers, otherwise very warm and tenacious, and who besides are commonly little affected with the motives of religion. Their great ardour abated immediately, and without making any reply, they proceeded to elect Chirisophus, though a Lacedæmonian, for their general.

His authority was of no long continuance. Discord, as Xenophon had foreseen, arose among the troops, who were angry that their general prevented their plundering the Grecian cities by which they passed. This disturbance was principally excited by the Peloponnesians, who composed one half of the army, and could not see Xenophon an Athenian in authority without pain. Different measures were proposed; but nothing being concluded, the troops divided themselves into three bodies of which the Achæans and Arcadians, that is the Peloponnesians, were the principal, amounting to 4500 heavy armed foot, with Lycon and Callimachus for their

generals. Chirisophus commanded another party of about 1400 men, besides 700 light armed infantry. Xenophon had the third, almost the same in number, in which 300 were light armed soldiers, with about 40 horse, which were all the cavalry of the army. The first having obtained ships from the people of Heraclea, * to whom they sent to demand them, set out before the rest to make some booty, and make a descent in the port of Calpe. Chirisophus, who was sick, marched by land; but without quitting the coast. Xenophon landed at Heraclea, and entered into the heart of the country.

New divisions arose. The imprudence of the troops and their leaders had involved them in ill measures, not without loss, from whence the address of Xenophon extricated them more than once. Being all re-united again, after various success, they arrived by land at Chrysopolis in Caledonia facing Byzantium, whither they repaired some days after, having passed the small arm of the sea which separates the two continents. They were upon the point of plundering that rich and powerful city, to revenge a fraud and injury which had been done them, and from the hope of enriching themselves once for all, when Xenophon made all possible haste thither. He admitted the justness of their revenge, but he made them sensible of the fatal consequences which would attend it: "After your plundering this city, and destroying the Lacedæmonians established in it, you will be deemed the mortal enemies of their republic, and of all their allies. Athens, my country, that had 400 galleys at sea and in the arsenals, when it took up arms against them, great sums of money in its treasury, a revenue of 1000 talents, and was in possession of all the isles of Greece, and of many cities in Europe and Asia, of which this was one, has nevertheless been reduced to yield to their power, and submit to their sway. And do you hope, who are but a handful of men, without generals, provisions, allies, or any resource, either from Tissaphernes, who has betrayed you, or the king of Persia, whom you have attempted to de-throne; can you hope, I say, in such a condition, to make head against the Lacedæmonians? Let us demand satisfaction from the Byzantines, and not avenge their fault by a much greater of our own, which must draw upon us inevitable ruin." He was believed, and the affair accommodated.

† From thence he led them to Salmydessa, to serve Seuthes prince of Thrace, who had before solicited him by his envoys to bring troops to his aid, in order to his re-establishment in his father's dominions, of which his enemies had deprived him. He made Xenophon great promises for himself and his troops; but when they had done him the service he wanted, he was so far from keeping his word, that he did not give them the pay agreed upon. Xenophon reproached him exceedingly with this breach of faith; imputing his perfidy to his minister Heraclides, who thought to make his court to his master, by saving him a sum of money at the expence of justice, faith, and honesty; qualities which ought to be dearer than all others to a prince, as they contribute the most to his reputation, as well as to the success of affairs and the security of a state. But that treacherous minister, who looked upon honour, probity, and justice, as mere chimeras, and that there was nothing real but the possession of much money, had no thoughts, in consequence, but of enriching himself by any means whatsoever, and robbed his master first with impunity, and all his subjects along with him. "However," continued Xenophon, "every wise man, especial-

* A city of Pontus.

† Xenoph. l. vii.

“ly in authority and command, ought to regard justice, probity, and the faith of engagements, as the most precious treasure he can possess; and as an assured resource, and an infallible support in all the events that can happen.” Heraclides was the more in the wrong for acting in this manner with regard to the troops, as he was a native of Greece, and not a Thracian; but avarice had extinguished all sense of honour in him.

Whilst the dispute between Seuthes and Xenophon was warmest, Charminus and Polynices arrived, as ambassadors from Lacedæmon, and brought advice, that the republic had declared war against Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus; that Thimbron had already embarked with the troops, and promised a daric a month to every soldier, two to each officer, and four to the colonels, who should engage in the service. Xenophon accepted the offer, and having obtained from Seuthes, by the mediation of the ambassadors, part of the pay due to him, he went by sea to Lampascus with the army, which amounted at that time to almost 6000 men. From thence he advanced to Pergamos, a city in the province of Troas. Having met near Parthenia, where ended the expedition of the Greeks, a great nobleman returning into Persia, he took him, his wife, and children, with all his equipage, and by that means found himself in a condition to bestow great liberalities among the soldiers, and to make them satisfactory amends for all the losses they had sustained. Thimbron at length arrived, who took upon him the command of the troops, and having joined them with his own marched against Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus.

* Such was the event of Cyrus' expedition. Xenophon reckons from the first setting out of that prince's army from the city of Ephesus to their arrival, where the battle was fought, 530 parasangas or leagues, and 93 days march; † and in their return from the place of battle to Cotyora, a city upon the coast of the Euxine or Black Sea, 620 parasangas or leagues, and 120 days march; and adding both together, he says, the way, going and coming, was 1155 † parasangas or leagues, ‡ and 215 days march; and that the whole time the army took to perform that journey, including the days of rest, was 15 months.

It appears by this calculation, that the army of Cyrus marched daily, one day with another, almost six parasangas § or leagues in going, and only five in their return. It was natural, that Cyrus who desired to surprise his brother, should use all possible diligence for that purpose.

This retreat of the 10,000 Greeks has always passed amongst the judges of the art of war, as I have already observed, for a perfect model in its

* Xenoph. de exped. Cyr. l. ii. p. 276.

† Ibid. l. iii. p. 335.

‡ I add five, which are left out in the text, to make the total agree with the two parts.

§ Xenoph. de exped. Cyr. l. vii. p. 427.

¶ The parasanga is a measure of ways peculiar to the Persians, and consists of three stadia. The stadium is the same with the Greeks, and contains, according to the most received opinion, 125 geometrical paces; 20 of which in consequence are required to the common French league. And this has been my rule hitherto, according to which, the parasanga is a league and a half.

I observe here a great difficulty. In this calculation we find the ordinary days marches of Cyrus, with an army of more than 100,000 men, would have been, one day with another, nine leagues, during so long a time; which according to the judges in military affairs, is absolutely impossible. This is what has determined me to compute the parasanga at no more than a league. Several authors have remarked, and indeed it is not to be doubted, that the stadium, and all the other measures of ways of the ancients, have differed widely, according to times and places, as they still do amongst us.

kind, and never had a parallel. Indeed no enterprise could be formed with more valour and bravery, nor conducted with more prudence, nor executed with more success : 10,000 men, 500 or 600 leagues from their own country, who had lost their generals and best officers, and find themselves in the heart of the enemy's vast empire, undertake, in the sight of a victorious and numerous army, with the king at the head of them, to retire through the seat of his empire, and in a manner from the gates of his palace, and to traverse a vast extent of unknown countries, almost all in arms against them, without being dismayed by the prospect of the innumerable obstacles and dangers, to which they were every moment exposed ; passes of rivers, of mountains and defiles ; open attacks ; secret ambuscades from the people upon their route ; famine, almost inevitable in vast and desert regions ; and above all, the treachery they had to fear from the troops, who seemed to be employed in escorting them, but in reality had orders to destroy them. For Artaxerxes, who was sensible how much the return of those Greeks into their country would cover him with disgrace, and decry the majesty of the empire in the sense of all nations, had left nothing undone to prevent it ; and he desired their destruction, says Plutarch, more passionately, than to conquer Cyrus himself, or to preserve the sovereignty of his estates. Those 10,000 men, however, notwithstanding so many obstacles, carried their point, and arrived, through a thousand dangers, victorious and triumphant in their own country. * Antony long after, when pursued by the Parthians almost in the same country, finding himself in like danger, cried out in admiration of their invincible valour, " Oh the retreat of the ten thousand !"

And it was the good success of this famous retreat, which filled the people of Greece with contempt for Artaxerxes, by demonstrating to them, that gold, silver, luxury, voluptuousness, and a numerous seraglio of women, were the sole merit of the grand monarch ; but that, as to the rest, his opulence and all his boasted power were only pride and vain ostentation. It was this prejudice, more universal than ever in Greece after this celebrated expedition, that gave birth to those bold enterprises of the Greeks, of which we shall soon treat, that made Artaxerxes tremble upon his throne, and brought the Persian empire to the very brink of destruction,

SECTION VI.

CONSEQUENCES OF CYRUS' DEATH.—PARTISATIS' CRUELTY.—STATIRA POISONED.

I RETURN to what passed after the battle of Cunaxa in the court of Artaxerxes. † As he believed that he killed Cyrus with his own hand, and looked upon that action as the most glorious of his life, he desired that all the world should think the same ; and it was wounding him in the most tender part, to dispute that honour, or endeavour to divide it with him. The Carian soldier whom we mentioned before, not contented with the great presents the king had made him upon a different pretext, perpetually declared to all that would hear him, that none but himself had killed Cyrus, and that the king did him great injustice in depriving him of the glory due to him. The prince, upon being informed of that insolence, conceived a jealousy equally base and cruel, and had the weakness to cause

* Plut. in Anton. p. 937. Ω μτρηη.

† Plut. in Artax. p. 1018—1021.

him to be delivered to Parysatis, who had sworn the destruction of all those who had any share in the death of her son. Animated by her barbarous revenge, she commanded the executioners to take that unfortunate wretch, and to make him suffer the most exquisite tortures during ten days; then, after they had torn out his eyes, to pour melted brass into his ears, till he expired in that cruel misery; which was accordingly executed.

Mithridates also, having boasted in an entertainment where he had heated his brain with wine, that it was he gave Cyrus his mortal wound; paid very dear for that sottish and imprudent vanity. He was condemned to suffer the punishment of the troughs, one of the most cruel that was ever invented, and after having languished in torment during 17 days, died at last slowly in exquisite misery.

There only remained for the final execution of her project, and fully to satiate her vengeance, the punishment of the king's eunuch Mesabates, who by his master's order had cut off the head and hand of Cyrus. But as there was nothing to take hold of his conduct, Parysatis laid this snare for him. She was a woman of great address, had abundance of wit, and excelled in playing at a certain game with dice. After the war, she had been reconciled with the king, played often with him, was of all his parties, had an unbounded complaisance for him, and far from contradicting him in any thing, prevented his desires, did not blush at indulging his passions, and even at supplying him with the means of gratifying them. But she took a special care never to lose sight of him, and to leave Statira as little alone with him as she could, desiring to gain an absolute ascendant over her son.

One day seeing the king entirely unemployed, and with no thoughts but of diverting himself, she proposed playing at dice for 1000 darics,* to which he readily consented. She suffered him to win, and paid down the money. But affecting regret and vexation, she pressed him to begin again, and to play with her for an eunuch. The king, who suspected nothing, complied, and they agreed to except five of the favourite eunuchs on each side, that the winner should take their choice out of the rest, and the loser be bound to deliver him. Having made these conditions, they sat down to play. The queen was all attention to the game, and made use of all her skill and address in it; besides which the dice favoured her. She won, and chose Mesabates, for he was not one of the excepted. As soon as she got him into her hands, before the king could have the least suspicion of the revenge she meditated, she delivered him to the executioners, and commanded them to flea him alive, to lay him afterwards upon three cross bars,† and to stretch his skin at large before his eyes upon two stakes prepared for that purpose; which was performed accordingly. When the king knew this, he was very sorry for it, and violently angry with his mother. But without giving herself any farther trouble about it, she told him with a smile and in a jesting way, "Really, you are a great loser, and must be highly in the right, to be so much out of humour for a decrepit wretch of an eunuch, when I, who lost 1000 good darics, and paid them down upon the spot, do not say a word, and am satisfied."

All these cruelties seem to have been only essays and preparations for a greater crime Parysatis meditated. She had retained at heart a violent hatred for queen Statira, which she had suffered to escape her upon many op-

* The daric was worth ten livres.

† Plutarch explains this circumstance no farther.

casions. She perceived plainly, that her credit with the king her son was only the effect of his respect and consideration for her as his mother; whereas that for Statira was founded in love and confidence, the best security of credit with him. Of what is not the jealousy of an ambitious woman capable! She resolved to rid herself, whatever it cost her, of so formidable a rival.

For the more certain attainment of her ends, she feigned a reconciliation with her daughter in law, and treated her with all the exterior marks of sincere friendship and real confidence. The two queens appearing therefore to have forgot their former suspicions and differences, lived well together, saw one another as before, and ate at each other's apartments. But as both of them knew how much the friendships and caresses of the court were to be relied upon, especially amongst the women, they were neither of them deceived in the other; and the same fears always subsisting, they kept upon their guard, and never ate but of the same dishes and pieces. Could one believe it possible to deceive so attentive and cautious a vigilance? Parysatis one day, when her daughter in law was at table with her, took an extremely exquisite bird, that had been served up, cut it in two parts, gave the one half to Statira, and ate the other herself. Statira soon after was seized with sharp pains, and having quitted the table, died in the most horrible convulsions, not without inspiring the king with the most violent suspicions of his mother, of whose cruelty, and implacable and revengeful spirit, he was sufficiently sensible before. He made the strictest inquiry into the crime. All his mother's officers and domestics were seized and put to the question; when Gygis, one of Parysatis' women and confidants, confessed the whole. She caused one side of a knife to be rubbed with poison, so that Parysatis, having cut the bird in two, put the sound part into her own mouth directly, and gave Statira the other that was poisoned. Gygis was put to death after the manner the Persians punished prisoners, which is thus: they lay their heads upon a great and very broad stone, and beat upon it with another till they are entirely crushed, and have no remains of their former figure. As for Parysatis, the king contented himself with confining her to Babylon, where she demanded to retire, and told her that he would never set his foot within it while she was there.

CHAPTER III.

THE principal contents of this chapter are, the enterprises of the Lacedæmonians in Asia Minor, their defeat at Cnidos, the re-establishment of the walls and power of Athens, the famous peace of Antalcides, prescribed the Greeks by Artaxerxes Mnemon, the wars of that prince against Evagoras king of Cyprus, and the Cadusians. The persons who are most conspicuous in this interval, are Lysander and Agesilaus, on the side of the Lacedæmonians, and Conon on that of the Athenians.

SECTION I.

GRECIAN CITIES OF IONIA IMPLORE AID OF THE LACEDÆMONIANS.—AGE-SILAUS ELECTED KING.—HIS CHARACTER.

THE cities of Ionia,* that had taken part with Cyrus, apprehending the resentment of Tissaphernes, had applied to the Lacedæmonians, as the deliverers of Greece, for their support in the possession of the liberty they enjoyed, and to prevent their country from being ravaged. We have already said that Thimbron was sent thither, to whose troops Xenophon had joined his, after their return from Persia. † Thimbron was soon recalled upon some discontent, and had for his successor Dercyllidas, surnamed Sisyphus, from his industry in finding resources, and his capacity in inventing machines of war. He took upon him the command of the army at Ephesus. When he arrived there, he was apprised that there was a difference between the two satraps who commanded in the country.

The provinces of the Persian monarchy, of which several, situated at the extremity of the empire, required too much application to be governed immediately by the prince, were confided to the care of the great lords, commonly called satraps. They had each of them in their government an almost sovereign authority, and were, properly speaking, not unlike the viceroys we see in our days in some neighbouring states. They were supplied with a number of troops sufficient for the defence of the country. They appointed all officers, disposed of the governments of cities, and were charged with levying and remitting the tributes to the prince. They had power to raise troops, to treat with neighbouring states, and even with the generals of the enemy; in a word to do every thing necessary to the good order and tranquility of their governments. They were independent of one another; and though they served the same master, and it was their duty to concur to the same ends, nevertheless, each being more affected with the particular advantage of his own province than the general good of the empire; they often differed among themselves, formed opposite designs, refused aid to their colleagues in necessity, and sometimes even acted entirely against them. The remoteness of the court, and the absence of the prince, gave room for these dissensions, and perhaps a secret policy contributed to keep them up, to elude or prevent conspiracies, which too good an understanding among the governours might have excited.

Dercyllidas having heard, therefore, that Tissaphernes and Pharnabasis were at variance, made a truce with the former, that he might not have them both upon his hands at the same time, entered Pharnabasis' province and advanced as far as Æolia.

Zenis the Dardanian, had governed that province under the satrap's authority; and as after his death it was to have been given to another, Mania, his widow, went to Pharnabasis with troops and presents, and told him that having been the wife of a man who had rendered him great services, she desired him not to deprive her of her husband's reward; that she would serve him with the same zeal and fidelity: and that, if she failed in either, he was always at liberty to take her government from her. She was continued in it by this means, and acquitted herself with all the judgment and ability that could have been expected from the most consummate person in the arts of ruling. To the ordinary tributes which her

* Xenoph. Hist. Græc. l. iii. p. 479—487.

† A. M. 3605. Ant. J. C. 898.

husband had paid, she added presents of an extraordinary magnificence; and when Pharnabasis came into her province she entertained him more splendidly than any of the other governours. She was not contented with the conservation of the cities committed to her care; she made new conquests, and took Larissa, Amaxita, and Colona.*

Hence we may observe, that prudence, good sense and courage, are of all sexes. She was present in all expeditions in a chariot; and, in person, decreed rewards and punishments. None of the neighbouring provinces had a finer army than her's, in which she had a great number of Greek soldiers in her pay. She even attended Pharnabasis in all his enterprises, and was of no common support to him; so that the satrap, who knew all the value of so extraordinary a merit, did more honour to this lady than to all the other governours. He even admitted her into his council, and treated her with such a distinction as might have excited jealousy, if the modesty and affability of that lady had not prevented bad effects, by throwing, in a manner, a veil over all her perfections, which softened their lustre, and let them only appear to be the objects of admiration.

She had no enemies but in her own family. Midias, her son in law, stung with the reproach of suffering a woman to command in his place, and abusing the entire confidence she reposed in him, which gave him access to her at all times, strangled her with her son. After her death he seized two fortresses, wherein she had secured her treasures; the other cities declared against him. He did not long enjoy the fruits of his crime. Dercyllidas happily arrived at this juncture. All the fortresses of *Æolia*, either voluntarily or by force, surrendered to him, and Midias was deprived of the possessions he had so unjustly acquired. The Lacedæmonian general having granted Pharnabasis a truce, took up his winter quarters in Bithynia, to avoid being chargeable to his allies.

‡ The next year, being continued in the command, he marched into Thrace and arrived at the Chersonesus. He knew that the deputies of the country had been at Sparta to represent the necessity of fortifying the isthmus with a good wall, against the frequent incursions of the barbarians, which prevented the cultivation of their lands. Having measured the space, which is more than a league in breadth, he distributed the work among the soldiers, and the wall was finished in the autumn of the same year. Within this space were enclosed eleven cities, several ports, a great number of arable lands, and plantations, with pasture of all kinds. The work being finished, he returned into Asia, after having reviewed the cities, and found them all in good condition.

‡ Conon, the Athenian, after losing the battle of *Ægospotamos*, having condemned himself to a voluntary banishment, continued in the isle of Cyprus with king *Evagoras*, not only for the safety of his person, but in expectation of a change in affairs; like one, says *Plutarch*, who waits the return of the tide before he embarks. He had always in view the re-establishment of the Athenian power, to which his defeat had given a mortal wound; and, full of fidelity and zeal for his country, though little favourable to him, perpetually meditated the means to raise it from its ruins, and restore it to its ancient splendour.

The Athenian general, knowing the success of his views had occasion for a powerful support, wrote to *Artaxerxes* to explain his projects to him,

* From the Lydians and Pisidians.

† A. M. 3606. Ant. J. C. 398. Xenoph. p. 487, 488.

‡ Plut. in Artax. p. 1031.

and ordered the person who carried his letter, to apply himself to Ctesias, who would give it to the king. It was accordingly delivered to that physician, who, it is said, though he did not approve the contents of it, added to what Conon had wrote, "that he desired the king would send Ctesias to him, being a person very capable of his service, especially in maritime affairs." * Pharnabaeus, in concert with Conon, was gone to court to complain against the conduct of Tissaphernes, as too much in favour of the Lacedæmonians. Upon the warm instances of Pharnabaeus, the king ordered 500 talents† to be paid him for the equipment of a fleet, with instructions to give Conon the command of it. He sent Ctesias into Greece, who, after having visited Onidos, his native country, went to Sparta.

‡ This Ctesias was at first in the service of Cyrus, whom he had followed in his expedition. He was taken prisoner in the battle wherein Cyrus was killed, and was made use of to dress the wounds Artaxerxes had received, of which he acquitted himself so well, that the king retained him in his service, and made him his first physician. He passed several years in his service in that quality. Whilst he was there, the Greeks upon all their occasions at the court, applied themselves to him; as Conon did on this. His long residence in Persia, and at the court, had given him the necessary time and means for his information in the history of the country, which he wrote in 23 books. The first contained the history of the Assyrians and Babylonians from Ninus and Semiramis, down to Cyrus. The other 17 treated of the Persian affairs from the beginning of Cyrus' reign to the third year of the 95th Olympiad, which agrees with the 398th before Jesus Christ. He wrote also an history of India. Photius has given us several extracts of both these histories, which are all that remain of Ctesias. He often contradicts Herodotus, and differs sometimes also from Xenophon. He was in no great estimation with the ancients, who speak of him as a very vain man, whose veracity is not to be relied on, and who has inserted fables, and sometimes even lies in his history.

§ Tissaphernes and Pharnabaeus, though secretly each other's enemies, had upon the king's orders united their troops to oppose the enterprises of Dercyllidas, who had marched into Caria. They had reduced him to post himself so disadvantageously, that he must inevitably have perished, had they charged him immediately, without giving him time to look about him. Pharnabaeus was of this opinion: but Tissaphernes, apprehending the valour of the Greeks, who had been of Cyrus' army, which he had experienced, and to whom he conceived all others resembled, proposed an interview, which was accepted. Dercyllidas having demanded that the Grecian cities should continue free, and Tissaphernes, that the army and generals of Lacedæmon should retire; they made a truce, till the answers of their respective masters could be known.

¶ Whilst these things passed in Asia, the Lacedæmonians resolved to chastise the insolence of the people of Elis, who, not content with having entered into an alliance with their enemies in the Peloponnesian war, prevented their disputing the prizes in the Olympic games. Upon pre-

* Diod. l. xiv. p. 267. Justin. l. vi. c. 1.

† 500,000 crowns, or about 112,000l. sterling.

‡ Strab. l. xiv. p. 656. Plut. in Artax. p. 1014—1017—1020. Diod. l. xiv. p. 275. Arist. de hist. anim. l. viii. c. 28. Phot. Cod. lxii.

§ A. M. 3607. Ant. J. C. 379. Xenoph. Hist. Græc. l. iii. p. 439, 490. Diod. l. xiv. p. 267.

¶ Ibid. p. 292.

tence of the non-payment of a fine by Sparta, they had insulted their citizens during the games, and hindered Agis from sacrificing in the temple of Jupiter Olympius. That king was charged with this expedition, which did not terminate till the third year after. He could have taken their city Olympia, which had no works; but contented himself with plundering the suburbs, and the places for the exercises, which were very fine. They demanded peace, which was granted, and were suffered to retain the superintendency of the temple of Jupiter Olympius, to which they had not much right, but were more worthy of that honour than those who disputed it with them.

* Agis in his return fell sick, and died upon arriving at Sparta. Almost divine honours were paid to his memory; and, after the expiration of some days, according to custom, Leotychides and Agesilaus, the one son, and the other brother of the deceased, disputed the crown. The latter maintained that his competitor was not the son of Agis; and supported his assertion by the confession of the queen herself, who knew best, and who had often as well as her husband, acknowledged as much. In effect there was a current report that she had him by Alcibiades,† as has been related in its place, and that the Athenian general had corrupted her by a present of 1000‡ darics. Agis protested the contrary at his death. Leotychides having thrown himself at his feet all bathed in tears, he could not refuse the grace he implored of him, and owned him for his son before all that were present.

Most of the Spartans, charmed with the virtue and great merit of Agesilaus, and deeming it an extraordinary advantage to have a person for their king, who had been educated amongst them, and passed like them through all the rigour of the Spartan education, supported him with their whole power. An ancient oracle, that advised Sparta to beware of a "lame reign," was urged against him. Lysander only made a jest of it, and turned its sense against Leotychides himself; endeavouring to prove, that as a bastard, he was the lame king the oracle intended to caution them against. Agesilaus, as well by his own great qualities, as the powerful support of Lysander, carried it against his nephew, and was declared king.

As by the laws the kingdom had devolved to Agis, his brother Agesilaus, who seemed to be destined to pass his life as a private person, was educated like other children in the Spartan discipline, which was a very rough manner of life, and full of laborious exercise, but || taught youth obedience perfectly well. The law dispensed with this education only to such children as were designed for the throne. Agesilaus therefore had this in peculiar, that he did not arrive at commanding till he had first learned perfectly well how to obey. From thence it was, that of all the kings of Sparta he best knew how to make his subjects love and esteem him, because that prince, to the great qualities with which nature had endowed

* Xenoph. l. iii. p. 493. Plut. in Lys. p. 445. In Agesil. p. 597.

† Athen. l. xii. p. 384.

‡ 1000 pistoles.

|| Hence it was, that the poet Simonides called Sparta, "the tamer of men," *δαμνασμβροτον*, as that of the Grecian cities, which rendered its inhabitants by good habits the most active and vigorous, and at the same time the most obedient to the laws of all mankind, *ως μαλιστα δια των ιδων της πολιτας τοις νομοις πειθεραντας και χειρονηδεις αιουσαν.*

(Τα Φυσει ηγεμονικη και βασιλικη προσκτησαντες απο της αυγαρης το δημοτικου και φιλαθραπον.

him for commanding and the sovereignty, had united by his education the advantage of being humane and popular.

It is surprising that Sparta, a city so renowned in point of education and policy, should conceive it proper to abate any thing of its severity and discipline in favour of the princes who were to reign; they having most need of being early habituated to the yoke of obedience, in order to their being the better qualified to command.

* Plutarch observes, that from his infancy, Agesilaus was remarkable for uniting qualities in himself which are generally incompatible; a vivacity of spirit, a vehemence, an invincible resolution in appearance, an ardent passion for being first and surpassing all others, with a gentleness, submission, and docility, that complied at a single word, and made him infinitely sensible of the slightest reprimand, so that every thing might be obtained of him from the motives of honour, but nothing by fear or violence.

He was lame; but that defect was covered by the gracefulness of his person, and still more by the gaiety with which he supported and rallied it first himself. It may even be said that the infirmity of his body set his valour and passion for glory in a stronger light; there being no labour nor enterprise however difficult, that he would refuse upon account of that inconvenience.

† Praise, without an air of truth and sincerity, was so far from giving him pleasure, that it offended him, and was never received by him as such, but when it came from the mouths of those who upon other occasions had represented his failings to him with freedom. He would never suffer during his life that his picture should be drawn, and even in dying, expressly forbade any image to be made of him, either in colours or relieve. † His reason was, that his great actions, if he had done any, would supply the place of monuments, without which all the statues in the world would do him no manner of honour. We only know that he was of small stature, which the Spartans did not affect in their kings; and Theophrastus affirms that the Ephori laid a fine upon their king Archidamus, the father of him we speak of, for having espoused a very little woman: "For," said they, "she will give us puppets instead of kings."

‡ It has been remarked that Agesilaus, in his way of living with the Spartans, behaved better with regard to his enemies than his friends; for he never did the least wrong to the former, and often violated justice in favour of the latter. He would have been ashamed not to have honoured and rewarded his enemies, when their actions deserved it; and was not able to reprove his friends, when they committed faults. He would even support them when they were in the wrong,§ and upon such occasions looked upon the zeal for justice as a vain pretence to cover the refusal of serving them. And in proof of this, a short letter is cited, written by him to a judge in recommendation of a friend; the words are: "If Nicias be not guilty, acquit him for his innocence; if he be, acquit him for my sake; but, however it be, acquit him."

It is understanding the rights and privileges of friendship very ill, to be capable of rendering it in this manner the accomplice of crimes, and the protectress of bad actions. It is the fundamental law of friendship, says

* In Agesil. p. 596.

† Plut. in moral. p. 55.

‡ Ibid. 191.

‡ Phut. in Agesil. p. 598.

§ Ibid. p. 603.

Cicero,* never to ask of, or grant any thing to friends, that does not consist with justice and honour: *Hæc prima lex in amicitia sancitur, ut neque rogemus res turpes, nec faciamus rogati.*

Agesilaus was not so delicate in this point, at least in the beginning, and omitted no occasion of gratifying his friends, and even his enemies. By this officious and obliging conduct, supported by his extraordinary merit, he acquired great credit, and almost absolute power in the city, which ran so high as to render him suspected by his country. The Ephori, to prevent its effects, and give a check to his ambition, laid a fine upon him; alleging as their sole reason,† that he attached the hearts of the citizens to himself alone, which were the right of the republic, and ought not to be possessed but in common.

When he was declared king, he was put into possession of the whole estate of his brother Agis, of which Leotyichides was deprived as a bastard. But seeing the relations of that prince, on the side of his mother Lampito, were all very poor, he divided the whole inheritance with them, and by that act of generosity acquired great reputation, and the good will of all the world, instead of the envy and hatred he might have drawn upon himself by the inheritance. These kinds of sacrifices are glorious, though rare, and can never be sufficiently esteemed.

Never was a king of Sparta so powerful as Agesilaus, and it was only, as Xenophon says, by obeying his country in every thing, that he acquired so great an authority; which seems a kind of paradox, thus explained by Plutarch. The greatest power was vested at that time in the Ephori and senate. The office of the Ephori subsisted only one year; they were instituted to limit the too great power of the kings, and to serve as a barrier against it, as we have observed elsewhere. For this reason the kings of Sparta, from their establishment, had always retained a kind of hereditary aversion for them, and continually opposed their measures. Agesilaus took a quite contrary method. Instead of being perpetually at war with them, and clashing upon all occasions with their measures, he made it his business to cultivate their good opinion, treated them always with the utmost deference and regard, never entered upon the least enterprise, without having first communicated it to them, and upon their summons quitted every thing, and repaired to the senate with the utmost promptitude and resignation. Whenever he sat upon his throne to administer justice, if the Ephori entered, he never failed to rise up to do them honour. By all these instances of respect, he seemed to add new dignity to their office, whilst in reality he augmented his own power, without its being observed, and added to the sovereignty a grandeur the more solid and permanent, as it was the effect of the people's good will and esteem for him. The greatest of the Roman Emperors, as Augustus, Trajan, and Marcus Antoninus, were convinced that the utmost a prince could do to honour and exalt the principal magistrates, was only adding to his own power, and strengthening his authority, which neither should, nor can be founded in any thing but justice.

Such was Agesilaus, of whom much will be said hereafter, and with whose character it was therefore necessary to begin.

* De amicit. n. 40.

† *Ὅτι τοὺς κοινούς πολιτάς, ἰδίους κτεταί.*

SECTION II.

AGESILAUS GOES TO ASIA.—LYSANDER FALLS OUT WITH HIM.

AGESILAUS had scarce ascended the throne,* when accounts came from Asia, that the king of Persia was fitting out a great fleet with intent to deprive the Lacedæmonians of their empire at sea. Conon's letters, seconded by the remonstrances of Pharnabazus, who had in concert represented to Artaxerxes the power of Sparta as formidable, had made a strong impression upon that prince. From that time he had it seriously in his thoughts to humble that proud republic, by raising up its rival, and by that means re-establishing the ancient balance between them, which could alone assure his safety, by keeping them perpetually employed against each other, and thereby prevented from uniting their forces against him.

Lysander, who desired to be sent into Asia, in order to re-establish his creatures and friends in the government of the cities, from which Sparta had removed them, strongly disposed Agesilaus to take upon himself the charge of the war, and to prevent the barbarian king, by attacking him remote from Greece, before he should have finished his preparations. The republic having made this proposal to him, he could not refuse it, and charged himself with the expedition against Artaxerxes, upon condition that 30 Spartan captains should be granted him, to assist him and compose his counsel, with 2000 new citizens to be chosen out of the helots who had been lately made freemen, and 6000 troops of the allies, which was immediately resolved. Lysander was placed at the head of the thirty Spartans, not only upon account of his great reputation, and the authority he had acquired, but for the particular friendship between him and Agesilaus, who was indebted to him for the throne, as well as the honour which had been lately conferred upon him of being elected generalissimo.

The glorious return of the Greeks who had followed Cyrus, and whom the whole power of Persia was not able to prevent from retreating into their own country, had inspired all Greece with a wonderful confidence in their forces, and a supreme contempt for the barbarians. In this disposition of the people, the Lacedæmonians conceived it would reproach them, to neglect so favourable a conjuncture for delivering the Greeks in Asia from their subjection to those barbarians, and for putting an end to the outrages and violences with which they were continually oppressing them. They had already attempted this by their generals Thimbron and Dercyllidas; but all their endeavours having hitherto proved ineffectual, they referred the conduct of this war to the care of Agesilaus. He promised them either to conclude a glorious peace with the Persians, or to employ them so effectually, as should leave them neither leisure nor inclination to carry the war into Greece. The king had great views, and thought of nothing less than attacking Artaxerxes in Persia itself.

When he arrived at Ephesus, Tissaphernes sent to demand what reason had induced his coming into Asia, and why he had taken up arms. He replied, that he came to aid the Greeks who inhabited there, and to re-establish them in their ancient liberty. † The satrap, who was not yet prepared, preferred art to force, and assured him that his master would give the Grecian cities of Asia their liberty, provided he committed no acts of hostility

* A. M. 3608. Ant. J. C. 396. Xenoph. Hist. Græc. l. iii. p. 495, 496. Ibid. de Agesil. p. 652. Plut. in Agesil. p. 588. In Lysand. p. 446.

† Xenoph. l. iii. p. 496. et 652.

till the return of the couriers. Agesilaus agreed, and the truce was sworn on both sides. Tissaphernes, who laid no great stress upon an oath, took the advantage of this delay to assemble troops on all sides. The Lacedæmonian general was apprized of it, but however kept his word; being convinced, that in affairs of state, the breach of faith can have but a very short and precarious success; whereas a reputation established upon inviolable fidelity in the observance of engagements, which the perfidy itself of other contracting parties has not power to alter, will establish a credit and confidence equally useful and glorious. In effect, Xenophon remarks that this religious observation of treaties gained him the universal esteem and opinion of the cities, whilst the different conduct of Tissaphernes entirely lost him their favour.

Agesilaus made use of this interval in acquiring an * exact knowledge of the state of the cities, and in making suitable regulations. He found great disorder every where, their government being neither democratical, as under the Athenians, nor aristocratical, as Lysander had established it. † The people of the country had no communication with Agesilaus, nor had ever known him; for which reason they made no court to him, conceiving that he had the title of general for form's sake only, and that the whole power was really vested in Lysander. As no governour had ever done so much good to his friends, or hurt to his enemies, it is not wonderful that he was so much beloved by the one and feared by the other. All therefore were eager to pay their homage to him, were every day in crowds at his door, and made his train very numerous when he went abroad; whilst Agesilaus remained almost alone. Such a conduct could not fail of offending a general and king, extremely sensible and delicate in what regarded his authority; though otherwise not jealous of any one's merit, but, on the contrary, much inclined to distinguish it with his favour. He did not dissemble his disgust. He paid no regard to Lysander's recommendations, and ceased to employ him himself. Lysander presently perceived this alteration in regard to him. He discontinued his applications for his friends to the king, desired them not to visit him any more, nor attach themselves to him, but to address themselves directly to the king, and to cultivate the favour of those who in the present times had power to serve and advance their creatures. The greatest part of them gave over importuning him with their affairs, but did not cease to pay their court to him. On the contrary, they were only more assiduous than ever about his person, attended him in throngs when he took the air abroad, and regularly assisted at all his exercises. Lysander, naturally vain, and long accustomed to the homage and submission that attended absolute power, did not take sufficient care to remove the busy crowd from his person, that continually made their addresses to him with more application than ever.

This ridiculous affectation of authority and grandeur grew still more and more offensive to Agesilaus, and seemed as if intended to insult him. He resented it so highly, that, having given the most considerable commands and best governments to private officers, he appointed Lysander commissary of the stores, and distributor of provisions; and afterwards to insult and deride the Ionians, he told them, "that they might now go and consult " this master butcher."

Lysander thought it then incumbent upon him to speak, and to come to an explanation with him. Their conversation was brief and laconic. "Cer-

* A. M. 3609. Ant. J. C. 595.

† Plut. in Agesil. p. 599, 600. In Lysand. p. 446, 447.

“tainly, my lord,” said Lysander, “you very well know how to depress your friends.”—“Yes, when they would set themselves above me; but when they are studious of my dignity, I know also how to let them share in it.”—“But, perhaps, my lord,” replied Lysander, “I have been injured by false reports, and things I never did have been imputed to me. I must beg, therefore, if it be only upon account of the strangers, who have all of them their eyes upon us, that you would give me an employment in your army, wherein you shall think me least capable of displeasing, and most of serving you effectually.”

The effect of this conversation was the lieutenantancy of the Hellespont, which Agesilaus gave him. In this employment he retained all his resentment, without however neglecting any part of his duty, or of what conduced to the success of affairs. Some small time after, he returned to Sparta, without any marks of honour and distinction, extremely incensed against Agesilaus, and with the hope of making him perfectly sensible of it.

It must be allowed, that Lysander’s conduct, as we have here represented it, denotes a vanity and narrowness of mind on his side, much unworthy of his reputation. Perhaps Agesilaus carried too far his sensibility and delicacy in point of honour, and that he was a little too severe upon a friend and benefactor, whom secret animadversions, attended with openness of heart and expressions of kindness, might have reclaimed to his duty. But as shining as Lysander’s merit, and as considerable as the services he had rendered Agesilaus might be, they could not all of them give him a right, not only to an equality with his king and general, but to the superiority he affected, which in some measure tended to making the other insignificant. He ought to have remembered, that it is never allowable for an inferior to forget himself, and so exceed the bounds of a just subordination.

* Upon his return to Sparta, he had it seriously in his thoughts to execute a project which he had many years revolved in his mind. At Sparta there were only two families, or rather branches of the posterity of Hercules, who had a right to the throne. When Lysander had attained to that high degree of power which his great actions had acquired him, he began to see with pain a city whose glory had been so much augmented by his exploits, under the government of princes to whom he gave place neither in valour nor birth; for he was descended, as well as themselves, from Hercules. He therefore sought means to deprive those two houses of the sole succession to the crown, and to extend that right to all the other branches of the Heraclides, and even, according to some, to all the natives of Sparta; flattering himself, that if his design took effect, no Spartan could be capable of disputing that honour with him, and that he should have the preference to all others.

This ambitious project of Lysander shows that the greatest captains are often those from whom a republic has most to apprehend. Those haughty valiant spirits, accustomed to absolute power in armies, bring back with victory a daring loftiness of mind always to be dreaded in a free state. Sparta, in giving Lysander unlimited power, and leaving it for so many years in his hands, did not sufficiently consider, that nothing is more dangerous than to confide to persons of superior merit and abilities, employments of supreme authority, which naturally expose them to the temptation of rendering themselves independent, and absolute masters of power. Lysander was not proof against it, and practised secretly to open himself a way to the throne.

* Plut in Lysand. p. 447, 448. Diod. l. xiv. p. 244, 245.

The undertaking was bold, and required long preparations. He thought it impossible to succeed without first making use of the fear of the divinity, and the terrors of superstition, to amaze and subdue the citizens into a more easy disposition to receive what he wanted to have them understand; for he knew that in Sparta, as well as throughout all Greece, nothing of the least importance was determined without the oracle's being previously consulted. He tempted with great presents the priests and priestesses of Delphos, Dodona, and Ammon, though ineffectually at that time; and the latter even sent ambassadors to Sparta, to accuse him of impiety and sacrilege; but he extricated himself from that bad affair by his credit and address.

It was necessary to set other engines at work. A woman in the kingdom of Pontus, affirming that she was with child by Apollo, had been delivered some years before of a son, to whom the name of Silenus was given, and the greatest persons of that nation had disputed the honour of nursing and educating him. Lysander, taking this wondrous birth for the commencement, and in a manner the foundation of the piece he meditated, supplied the rest himself, by employing a good number of persons, and those not inconsiderable, to disperse, by way of prologue to the performance, the miraculous birth of this infant; whereby, no affectation appearing in them, people were disposed to believe it. This being done, they brought certain discourses from Delphos to Sparta, which were industriously spread abroad every where, that the priests of the temple had in their custody some books of very ancient oracles, which they kept concealed from all the world, and of which it was not permitted, either for them or any other persons whatsoever, to have any knowledge: and that only a son of Apollo, who was to come in process of time, and having given undoubted proofs of his birth to those who had the books in their keeping, was to take and carry them away.

All this being well premised, Silenus was to present himself to the priests, and demand those oracles as the son of Apollo; and the priests, who were in the secret, as actors well prepared and fully instructed in their parts, were on their side to make the most exact and circumstantial inquiry into every thing not without affecting great difficulty, and asking endless questions for the full proof of his birth. At length, as absolutely convinced that this Silenus was the real son of Apollo, they were to produce the books, and deliver them to him; after which, this son of Apollo was to read the prophecies contained in them, in the presence of all the world; and particularly that for which the whole contrivance had been cooked up. The sense of this was, "that it was more expedient and advantageous for the Spartans to elect no king for the future, but the most worthy of their citizens." Lysander in consequence was to mount the tribunal, to harangue the citizens, and induce them to make this alteration. Cleon of Halicarnassus, a celebrated rhetorician, had composed a very eloquent discourse for him upon this subject, which he had got by heart.

Silenus grew up, and repaired to Greece in order to play his part, when Lysander had the mortification to see his piece miscarry, by the timidity and desertion of one of his principal actors, who broke his word, and disappeared at the very instant it was to have been performed. Though this intrigue had been carried on a great while, it was transacted with so much secrecy to the time it was to have made its appearance, that nothing of it was known during the life of Lysander. How it came to light after his death we shall soon relate, but must at present return to Tissaphernes.

SECTION III.

EXPEDITION OF AGESILAUS INTO ASIA.

WHEN Tissaphernes had received the troops assigned him by the king,* and drawn together all his forces, he sent to command Agesilaus to retire out of Asia, and declared war against him in case of refusal. His officers were all alarmed, not believing him in a condition to oppose the great army of the Persian king. For himself he heard Tissaphernes' heralds with a gay and easy countenance, and bade them tell their master, that he was under a very great obligation to him, "for having made the gods, by his perjury, the enemies of Persia, and the friends of Greece." He promised himself great things from this expedition, and would have thought it an exceeding disgrace for him, that 10,000 Greeks, under the command of Xenophon, should have passed through the heart of Asia to the Grecian sea, and beat the king of Persia as often as he appeared against them; and that he, who commanded the Lacedæmonians, whose empire extended all over Greece by sea and land, should not execute some exploit worthy of glory and remembrance.

At first, therefore, to revenge the perfidy of Tissaphernes by a just and allowable deceit, he made a feint of marching his army into Caria, the residence of that satrap; and as soon as the barbarian had caused his troops to march that way he turned short, and fell upon Phrygia, where he took many towns, and amassed immense treasures, which he distributed amongst the officers and soldiers: letting his friends see, says Plutarch, that to break a treaty, and violate an oath, is to despise the gods themselves; and that, on the contrary, to deceive an enemy by the stratagems of war, is not only just and glorious, but a sensible delight attended with the greatest advantages.

The spring being come, he assembled all his forces at Ephesus; and to exercise his soldiers, he proposed prizes both for the horse and foot. This small inducement set every thing in motion. The place for exercises was perpetually full of all kinds of troops, and the city of Ephesus seemed only a palæstra, and a school of war. The whole market-place was filled with horses and arms, and the shops with different kinds of military equipage. Agesilaus was seen returning from the exercises, followed by a crowd of officers and soldiers, all of them crowned with wreaths, which they were going to deposit in the temple of Diana, to the great admiration and delight of all the world: for, says Xenophon, where piety and discipline are seen to flourish, the best hopes must be conceived.

To give his soldiers new valour from the contempt of their enemies, he made use of this contrivance. He ordered the commissaries, who had charge of the booty, to strip the prisoners, and expose them to sale. There were abundance of buyers for their habits: but for themselves, their bodies were so soft, white, and delicate, having been nurtured and brought up in the shade, that they laughed at them, as neither of service nor value. Agesilaus took this occasion to approach and say to his soldiers, pointing to the men, "See there against whom ye fight;" and showing them their rich spoils, "and there for what you fight."

When the season for taking the field returned, Agesilaus gave out that he would march into Lydia. Tissaphernes; who had not forgot the first

* Xenoph. Hist. Græc. l. iii. p. 497—502. Idem. de Agesil. p. 652—656. Plut. in Agesil. p. 600.

stratagem he had used in regard to him, and was not willing to be deceived a second time, made his troops march directly for Caria, not doubting but at this time Agesilaus would turn his arms that way; the rather, because it was natural for him as he wanted cavalry, to endeavour to make a rough and difficult country the seat of action, which might render the horse of an enemy useless and unserviceable. But he deceived himself; Agesilaus entered Lydia, and approached Sardis. Tissaphernes hastened thither with his horse, with intent to relieve the place. Agesilaus, knowing that his infantry had not had time to arrive, thought proper to take the advantage of so favourable an opportunity to give him battle, before he had re-assembled all his troops. He drew up his army in two lines: the first he formed of his squadrons, whose intervals he filled up with platoons of the light armed foot, and ordered them to begin the charge, whilst he followed with the second line, composed of his heavy armed infantry. The barbarians did not sustain the first shock, but took to their heels immediately. The Greeks pursued them, and forced their camp, where they made a great slaughter, and a still greater booty.

* After this battle the troops of Agesilaus were at entire liberty to plunder and ravage the whole country of the Persians, and at the same time had the satisfaction to see that prince inflict an exemplary punishment upon Tissaphernes, who was a very wicked man and a most dangerous enemy of the Greeks.

† The king had already received abundance of complaints against his conduct. Upon this occasion he was accused of treason, as not having done his duty in the battle. Queen Parysatis, always actuated by her hatred and revenge against those who had any share in the death of her son Cyrus, did not a little contribute to the death of Tissaphernes, by aggravating with all her power the charges against him; for she had been entirely restored to favour by the king her son.

As Tissaphernes had a great authority in Asia, the king was afraid to attack him openly, but thought it necessary to take suitable precautions in seizing so powerful an officer, who might have proved a dangerous enemy. He charged Tithraustes with that important commission, and gave him two letters at the same time. The first was for Tissaphernes, and contained the king's orders in regard to the war with the Greeks, with full power to act as was requisite. The second was addressed to Ariæus, governor of Larissa: by which the king commanded him to assist Tithraustes with his counsel, and all his forces, in seizing Tissaphernes. He lost no time, and sent to desire Tissaphernes would come to him, that they might confer together upon the operations of the ensuing campaign. Tissaphernes, who suspected nothing, went to him with only a guard of 300 men. Whilst he was in a bath, without sabre or other arms, he was seized and put into the hands of Tithraustes, who caused his head to be immediately struck off, and sent it immediately to Persia. The king gave it to Parysatis; an agreeable present to a princess of her violent and vindictive temper. Though this conduct of Artaxerxes seems little worthy of a king, nobody lamented the death of that satrap, who had no veneration for the gods, nor any regard for men; who looked upon probity and honour as empty names; who made a jest of the most sacred oaths, and believed the whole ability and policy of a statesman consisted in knowing how to deceive others by hypocrisis, fraud, perfidy, and perjury.

* Xenoph. p. 501. et. 657. Plut. in Artax. p. 1022. et in Agesil. p. 604.

† Diod. l. xiv. p. 299. Polyæn. Stratag. l. vii

Tithraustes had a third writing from the king, whereby he was appointed to command the armies in the room of Tissaphernes. * After having executed his commission, he sent great presents to Agesilaus, to induce him to enter more readily into his views and interest; and ordered him to be told that the cause of the war being removed, and the author of all differences put to death, nothing opposed an accommodation; that the king of Persia consented that the cities of Asia should enjoy their liberty, paying him the customary tribute, provided he would withdraw his troops and return into Greece. Agesilaus replied that he could conclude nothing without the orders of Sparta, upon whom alone depended the peace; that as for him, he was better pleased with enriching his soldiers than himself; that the Greeks, besides, thought it more glorious and honourable to take spoils from their enemies, than to accept their presents. However, as he was not unwilling to give Tithraustes the satisfaction of removing out of his province, and of expressing his gratitude to him for having punished the common enemy of the Greeks, he marched into Phrygia, which was the province of Pharnabasus. Tithraustes had himself proposed that expedition to him, and paid him 30 talents for the charges of his journey.

Upon his march, he received a letter from the magistrates of Sparta, with orders to take upon him the command of the naval army, and power to depute whom he thought fit in his stead. By these new powers he saw himself absolute commander of all the troops of that state in Asia both by sea and land. This resolution was taken, in order that all operations being directed by one and the same head, and the two armies acting in concert, the plans for the service might be executed with more uniformity, and every thing conspire to the same end. Sparta till then had never done the honour to any of their generals to confide to him at the same time the command of the armies by sea and land: so that all the world agreed that he was the greatest personage of his time, and best sustained the high reputation he enjoyed. But he was a man, and had his failings.

The first thing he did was to establish Pisander his lieutenant in the fleet; in which he seemed to have committed a considerable fault; because having about him many older and more experienced captains, without regard to the service of the public, to do honour to an ally, and to please his wife, who was Pisander's sister, he intrusted him with the command of the fleet; that employment being much above his abilities, though he was not without his merit.

This is the common temptation of persons in power, who believe they possess it only for themselves and their families; as if the advantage of relation to them was a sufficient title and qualification for posts which require great abilities. They do not reflect that they not only expose the affairs of a state to ruin by their private views, but sacrifice, besides, the interests of their own glory, which cannot be maintained but by successes it were inconsistent to expect from instruments so ill chosen.

† Agesilaus continued with his army in Phrygia, upon the lands of Pharnabasus' government, where he lived in the abundance of all things, and amassed great sums of money. From thence advancing as far as Paphlagonia, he made an alliance with king Cotis, who passionately desired his amity, from the sense of his faith in the observance of treaties, and his other virtues. The same motive had already induced Spithridates, one of the king's principal officers, to quit the service of Pharnabasus, and go over

* Xenoph. Hist. Græc. l. iii. p. 501. Plut. in. Agesil. p. 601.

† A. M. 3610. Ant. J. C. 391. Xenoph. Hist. Græc. l. iv. p. 507 -510.

to Agesilaus, to whom from his revolt he had rendered great services; for he had a great body of troops, and was very brave. This officer, having entered Phrygia, had laid waste the whole country under Pharnabasis, who never dared to appear in the field against him, nor even to rely upon his fortresses; but carrying away whatever was most valuable and dear to him, he kept flying continually before him, and retired from one place to another, changing his camp every day. Spithridates at length, taking with him some Spartan troops, with Herippidas, the chief of the council of thirty sent by the republic to Agesilaus the second year, watched him one day so closely, and attacked him so successfully, that he made himself master of his camp, and of all the rich spoils with which it abounded. But Herippidas, injudiciously setting himself up as an inexorable comptroller, was for bringing the booty that had been sunk to an account; forced even the soldiers of Spithridates to restore what they had taken, and by visiting their tents, and searching them with an unseasonable exactitude and severity, affronted Spithridates to such a degree that he withdrew directly to Sardis with his Paphlagonians.

It is said, that in this whole expedition nothing so sensibly affected Agesilaus as the retreat of Spithridates: for, besides his being very sorry for the loss of so good an officer, and so good troops, he apprehended being reproached with mean and sordid avarice; a vice equally dishonourable to himself and his country, and of which he had taken pains to avoid the slightest suspicion during his whole life. He did not think it consistent with the duty of his office, to shut his eyes, through slothful ease and indolence, against all the malversations that were committed under him; but he knew at the same time, that there is an exactitude and severity, that, by being carried too far, degenerate into minuteness and petulancy, and which, through an extreme affectation of virtue, become a real and dangerous vice.

* Some time after, Pharnabasis, who saw his country ravaged, demanded an interview with Agesilaus, which was negotiated by a common friend of them both. Agesilaus arrived first with his friends at the place agreed on, and sat down, in expectation of Pharnabasis, upon the turf under the shade of a tree. When Pharnabasis arrived, his people spread skins upon the ground of exceeding softness, from the length of their hair, with rich carpets of various colours, and magnificent cushions. But when he saw Agesilaus sitting simply upon the ground, without any preparation, he was ashamed of his effeminacy, and sat down also upon the grass. On this occasion the Persian pride was seen to pay homage to the Spartan modesty and simplicity.

After reciprocal salutations, Pharnabasis spoke to this effect: That he had served the Lacedæmonians in the Peloponnesian war to the utmost of his power, fought several battles for them, and supported their naval army, without giving any room to reproach him with fraud or treachery, as Tissaphernes had done: that he was surprised at their coming to attack him in his government: burning the towns, cutting down the trees, and laying waste the whole country: that if it was the custom with the Greeks, who made a profession of honour and virtue, to treat their friends and benefactors in such a manner, he did not know what they might mean by just and equitable. These complaints were not entirely without foundation, and were uttered with a modest, but pathetic air and tone of voice. The Spartans, who attended Agesilaus, not seeing how they could be answered cast

* Xenoph. Hist. Græc. l. iv. p. 510—512. Plut. in Agesil. p. 602.

down their eyes, and kept a profound silence. Agesilaus, who observed it, replied almost in these terms: "Lord Pharnabasus, you are not ignorant that war often arms the best friends against each other for the defence of their country. Whilst we were such to the king your master, we treated him as a friend; but as we are become his enemies, we make open war against him, as it is just we should, and endeavour to hurt him by what we act against you. However, from the instant you shall think fit to throw off the yoke of bondage, and prefer being called the friend and ally of the Greeks, before the name of the king of Persia's slave, you may reckon that all the troops you see before your eyes, our arms, our ships, our persons, to the last man of us, are only here to defend your possessions, and secure your liberty, which of all blessings is the most precious and desirable."

Pharnabasus answered, that if the king sent another general in his place, and subjected him to the new comer, he should very willingly accept his offer; that otherwise he would not depart from the faith he had sworn to him, nor quit his service. Agesilaus then taking him by the hand, and rising with him, replied, "That it were the pleasure of the gods, lord Pharnabasus, with such noble sentiments, that you were rather our friend than our enemy!" He promised to withdraw from his government, and never return into it, whilst he could subsist elsewhere.

SECTION IV.

AGESILAUS RECALLED BY THE EPHORI TO DEFEND HIS COUNTRY.

AGESILAUS had been two years at the head of the army,* and had already made the most remote provinces of Asia tremble at his name, and resound with the fame of his great wisdom, disinterestedness, moderation, intrepid valour in the greatest dangers, and invincible patience in supporting the rudest fatigues. Of so many thousand soldiers under his command, not one was worse provided, or lay harder than himself. He was so indifferent as to heat or cold, that he seemed formed only to support the most rigorous seasons, and such as it pleased God to send: which are Plutarch's express words.

The most agreeable of all sights to the Greeks settled in Asia, was to see the lieutenants of the great king, his satraps, and other great lords, who were formerly so haughty and untractable, soften their note in the presence of a man meanly clad, and at his single word, however short and laconic, change their language and conduct, and in a manner transform themselves into different creatures. Deputies from all parts were sent by the people to form alliances with him, and his army increased every day by the troops of the barbarians that came to join him.

All Asia was already in motion, and most of the provinces ready to revolt. Agesilaus had already restored order and tranquility in all the cities, had reinstated them in the possession of their liberty under reasonable modifications, not only without shedding of blood, but even without banishing a single person. Not content with such a progress, he had formed the design of attacking the king of Persia in the heart of his dominions, to put him in fear of his own person, and the tranquility he enjoyed in

* A. M. 3610. Ant. J. C. 394. Plut. in Agesil. p. 603, 694. Xen. in Agesil. p. 657.

† Ωςπερ μοις ασι χρονοισι ταυσι υπο θεω κατασκευασται ομοις περιουσι.

Ecbatana and Susa, and to find him so much business as should make it impracticable for him to embroil all Greece from his cabinet, by corrupting the orators and persons of greatest authority in its cities with his presents.

* Tithraustes, who commanded for the king in Asia, seeing the tendency of Agesilaus' designs, and desiring to prevent their effects, had sent Timocrates of Rhodes into Greece, with great sums of money to corrupt the principal persons in the cities, and by their means occasion defections against Sparta. He knew that the haughtiness of the Lacedæmonians, (for all their generals did not resemble Agesilaus) and the imperious manner with which they treated their neighbours and allies, especially since they considered themselves as the masters of Greece, had universally disgusted the people, and excited a jealousy that waited only an occasion to break out against them. This severity of governing had a natural cause in their education. Accustomed from their infancy to obey without delay or reply, first to their tutors, and afterwards to their magistrates, they exacted a like submission from the cities in their dependance, were easily incensed by the least opposition, and by this excessive severity rendered themselves insupportable.

Tithraustes therefore did not find it difficult to draw off the allies from their party. Thebes, Argos, Corinth, entered into his measures: the deputy did not go to Athens. These three cities, influenced by those that governed them, made a league against the Lacedæmonians, who on their side prepared vigorously for the war. The Thebans at the same time sent deputies to the Athenians, to implore their aid, and that they would enter into the alliance. The deputies, after having slightly passed over their ancient divisions, insisted strongly upon the considerable service they had rendered Athens, in refusing to join its enemies when they endeavoured its final destruction. They represented to them the favourable opportunity that offered for reinstating themselves in their ancient power, and to deprive the Lacedæmonians of the empire of Greece: that all the allies of Sparta, either without or within Greece, were weary of their severe and unjust sway, and waited only the signal to revolt: that the moment the Athenians should declare themselves, all the cities would rouse up at the sound of their arms, and that the king of Persia, who had sworn the ruin of Sparta, would aid them with his forces both by sea and land.

Thrasylulus, whom the Thebans had supplied with arms and money, when he undertook the re-establishment of the Athenian liberty, seconded their demand with great vigour, and the aid was unanimously resolved. The Lacedæmonians on their side took the field without loss of time, and entered Phocis. Lysander wrote to Pausanias, who commanded one of the two armies, to give him notice to march early the next day to Haliartus, which he designed to besiege, and that he should be there himself by sun-rise. The letter was intercepted. Lysander, after having waited his coming up a great while, was obliged to engage, and was killed in the battle. Pausanias received this bad news on his way; but however continued his march to Haliartus, and called a council of war to consider upon a second battle. He did not think it consistent with prudence to hazard it, and contented himself with making a truce to remove the bodies of those who had fallen in the former fight. Upon his return to Sparta, he was cited to give an account of his conduct, and refusing to appear, was condemned to die. But he avoided the execution of that sentence by flight,

* Xenoph. Hist. Græc. l. iii. p. 502—507. Plut. in Lysand. p. 449—451.

and retired to Tegæum, where he passed the remainder of his life under the shelter and protection of Minerva, to whom he had rendered himself a suppliant, and died of disease.

Lysander's poverty having been discovered after his death, did great honour to his memory; when it was known, that of all the gold and riches which had passed through his hands, of a power so extensive as his had been, of so many cities under his government, and which made their court to him, in a word, of that kind of dominion and sovereignty always exercised by him, he had made no manner of advantage for the advancement and enriching of his house.

Some days before his death, two of the principal citizens of Sparta had contracted themselves to his two daughters; but when they knew in what condition he had left his affairs, they refused to marry them. The republic did not suffer so sordid a baseness to go unpunished, nor Lysander's poverty, which was the strongest proof of his justice and virtue, to be treated as an obstacle to allying into his family. They were fined in a great sum, publicly disgraced, and exposed to the contempt of all persons of honour: for at Sparta there were penalties established, not only for such as refused to marry, or married too late, but also for those who married amiss; and those especially were reckoned of this number, who instead of allying into houses of virtue, and with their own relations, had no other motive but wealth and lucre in marriage. An admirable law, and highly tending to perpetuate probity and honour in families, which an impure mixture of blood "and manners," seldom fails to alter and efface!

It must be owned that a generous disinterestedness in the midst of all that could inflame and gratify the lust of gain, is very rare, and well worthy of admiration: but in Lysander, it was attended with great defects which entirely obscure its lustre. Without speaking of his imprudence in introducing gold and silver into Sparta, which he despised himself, though he rendered it estimable to his country, and thereby occasioned its ruin, what opinion can we have of a man, brave indeed, well read in men, skilful in affairs, and of great ability in the arts of government, and what is commonly called policy, but who regards probity and justice as nothing; to whom falsehood, fraud, and perfidy, appear legal methods for the attainment of his ends; who does not fear for the advancement of his friends, and the augmenting of his creatures, to commit the most flagrant injustice and oppressions, and is not ashamed to profane whatever is most sacred in religion, even to the corrupting of priests, and forging of oracles, to satiate the empty ambition of being equal to a king, and of ascending the throne?

* When Agesilaus was upon the point of leading his troops into Persia, the Spartan Epicydidas arrived to let him know that Sparta was threatened with a furious war; that the Ephori recalled him, and ordered him to return immediately for the defence of his country. Agesilaus did not deliberate a moment, but returned this answer immediately to the Ephori, which Plutarch has transmitted to us. "† Agesilaus to the Ephori, greeting.—We have reduced part of Asia, put the barbarians to flight, and made great preparations for war in Ionia: but as you order me to return, I am not far behind this letter, and should prevent it if possible. I received the command, not for myself, but my country and its allies. I

* Xenoph. hist. Græc. l. iv. p. 513. Idem in Agesil. p. 657. Plut. in Agesil. p. 803, 804.

† Plut. in Apoph. Laconic. p. 211.

“ know that a general does not deserve, or possess that name really, but as he submits to the laws and the Ephori, and obeys the magistrates.”

This ready obedience of Agesilaus has been much admired and applauded, and not without reason. Hannibal, though depressed with misfortunes, and driven almost entirely out of Italy, obeyed the citizens with great reluctance, when they recalled him to deliver Carthage from the dangers that threatened it. Here a victorious prince, ready to enter the enemy's country, and to attack the king of Persia even upon his throne, almost assured of the success of his arms, on the first order of the Ephori, renounces the most soothing hopes, and the most exalted expectations. He demonstrates the truth of what was said, “ That at Sparta the laws ruled men, and not men the laws.”

On his departure he said, “ That 30,000 of the king's archers drove him out of Asia ;” alluding in these words to a species of Persian coin, which had on one side the figure of an archer, 30,000 of which pieces of money had been dispersed in Greece to corrupt the orators and persons of greatest power in the cities.

* Agesilaus in quitting Asia, where he was regretted as the common father of the people, appointed Euxenes his lieutenant, and gave him 4000 men for the defence of the country. Xenophon went with him. He left at Ephesus, with Megabysus the guardian of Diana's temple, half the gold he had brought with him from his expedition into Persia with Cyrus, to keep it for him in trust, and in case of death, to consecrate it to the goddess.

† In the mean time the Lacedæmonians had raised an army, and given the command of it to Aristodemus, tutor to king Agesipolis, then an infant. Their enemies assembled to concert the operations of the war. Timolaus of Corinth said, the Lacedæmonians were like a river that grew larger as it removed from its source; or to a swarm of bees, which it is easy to burn in their hive, but disperse themselves a great way when they fly abroad, and become formidable by their stings. He was therefore of opinion, that it was proper to attack them in their capital; which was approved and resolved. But the Lacedæmonians did not give them time. They took the field and found the enemy near Nemæa, a city not very remote from Corinth, where a rude battle ensued. The Lacedæmonians had the advantage, which was very considerable. Agesilaus having received this news at Amphipolis, as he was hastening to the relief of his country, sent it directly to the cities of Asia for their encouragement, and to give them hopes of his speedy return, if the success of affairs would admit it.

‡ When the approach of Agesilaus was known at Sparta, the Lacedæmonians who remained in the city, to do him honour for the ready obedience he had paid to their orders, caused proclamations to be made by sound of trumpet, that all young persons who were willing to aid their king might come and list themselves for that purpose. Not one of them failed to enter himself immediately with the utmost joy. But the Ephori chose only 50 of the bravest and most robust, whom they sent to him, and desired that he would enter Bœotia with the utmost expedition; which he accordingly did.

|| About the same time the two fleets came up with each other near Cni-

* Xenoph. hist. Græc. l. iv. p. 513. Xenoph. de exped. Cyr. l. v. p. 350.

† Xenoph. p. 514—517.

‡ Plut. in Agesil. p. 605.

|| Xenoph. Hist. Græc. l. iv. p. 518. Diocl. l. xiv. p. 502. Justin. l. vi. c. 2. et 5.

dos, a city of Caria. That of the Lacedæmonians was commanded by Pisander, Agesilaus' brother in law, and that of the Persians by Pharnabazus and Conon the Athenian. The latter observing that the king of Persia's supplies came slowly, and occasioned the loss of many opportunities, had resolved to go in person to the court, to solicit the king's assistance. As he would not prostrate himself before him, according to the Persian custom, he could not explain himself but by the intervention of others. He represented to him, with a force and spirit seldom pardoned in those who treat with princes, that it was equally shameful and astonishing, that his ministers, contrary to his intention, should suffer his affairs to be disconcerted and ruined for want of the necessary expences; that the richest king in the world should give place to his enemies in the very point he was so infinitely superior to them, that is in riches; and that for want of remitting the sums his service required to his generals, all their designs were rendered abortive. These remonstrances were free, but just and solid. The king received them perfectly well, and showed, by his example, that truth may often be spoken to princes with success, if courage were not wanting. Conon obtained all he demanded, and the king made him admiral of his fleet.

It was composed of more than 90 galleys, to which the enemy's was somewhat inferior in number. They came in view of each other near Cnidus, a maritime city of Asia Minor. Conon, who had in some measure occasioned the taking of Athens by the loss of the sea fight near Ægospotamos, used extraordinary efforts in this to retrieve his misfortune, and to obliterate by a glorious victory the disgrace of his former defeat. * He had this advantage, that in the battle he was going to give, the Persians would be at the whole expence, and bear all the loss themselves; whereas the entire fruits of the victory would redound to the Athenians, without hazarding any thing of their own. Pisander had also strong motives to show his valour upon this occasion, that he might not degenerate from the glory of his brother in law, and to justify the choice he had made in appointing him admiral. In effect, he behaved with extreme valour, and had at first some advantage; but the battle growing warm, and the allies of Sparta betaking themselves to flight, he could not resolve to follow them, and died sword in hand. Conon took 50 galleys, and the rest escaped to Cnidus. The consequence of this victory was the revolt of almost all the allies of Sparta, several of whom declared for the Athenians, and the rest resumed their ancient liberty. After this battle the affairs of the Lacedæmonians daily declined. All their actions in Asia were no more than the feeble efforts of an expiring power, till the defeats of Leuctra and Mantinea completed their downfall.

† Isocrates makes a very just reflection upon the revolutions of Sparta and Athens, which had always their source and origin in the insolent prosperity of both those republics. The Lacedæmonians, who were at first acknowledged masters of Greece, without opposition, fell from their authority only by their enormous abuse of it. The Athenians succeeded them in power, and at the same time in pride; and we have seen into what an abyss of misfortunes it precipitated them. Sparta having gained the superiority by the defeat of the Athenians in Sicily, and the taking of their city, might have improved in their measures from the double expe-

* *Eo speciosius quod ne ipsorum quidem Atheniensium, sed alieni imperii viribus dimicet, pugnaturus periculo regis, victurus præmio patriæ.* Justin.

† *Isoc. in Orat. Areop. p. 278—280.*

rience of the past ; as well in regard to what had befallen themselves, as from the recent example of their rival ; but the most affecting examples and events seldom or ever occasion a people to change their conduct. Sparta became as haughty and untractable as before ; and so experienced the same destiny again.

To warn the Athenians against this misfortune, Isocrates puts them in mind of the past, and of the times wherein they were successful in every thing. " You imagine," says he, " that provided with a numerous fleet, absolute masters at sea, and supported by powerful allies always ready to give you aid, you have nothing to fear, and may enjoy in repose and tranquility, the fruits of your victories : for my part (indulge me to speak with truth and freedom,) I think quite otherwise. The cause of my apprehension is, my having observed that the decline of the greatest republics has always been at the time they believed themselves most powerful, and that their very security has prepared the precipice from which they have fallen. The reason of this is evident. Prosperity and adversity never come alone, but have each their train of very different effects. The first is attended with vain glory, pride and insolence, which dazzle the mind, and inspire rash and extravagant measures ; on the contrary, the companions of adversity, are modesty, self-diffidence, and circumspection, which naturally render men prudent, and apt to amend from their own failings. So that it is hard to judge which of the two conditions we ought to desire for a city ; as that which appears unhappy is an almost certain path to prosperity ; and the other so flattering and splendid, generally leads on to the greatest misfortunes." The blow which the Lacedæmonians received at the battle of Cnidos, is a mournful proof of what he says.

* Agesilaus was in Bœotia, and upon the point of giving battle, when this bad news was brought him. Apprehending that it might discourage and deter his troops, he caused it to be reported in the army, that the Lacedæmonians had gained a considerable victory at sea ; and appearing in public with a wreath of flowers upon his head, he offered a sacrifice of thanksgiving for the good news, and sent part of it in presents to his officers. † The two armies, almost equal in strength, were in view of each other upon the plains of Coronæa, when they drew up in battle. Agesilaus gave the left wing to the Orchomenians, and took the right himself. On the other side the Thebans were upon the right, and the Argives on the left. Xenophon says, that this was the most furious battle in his time, and may be believed, as he was present in it, and fought near the person of Agesilaus, with whom he had returned from Asia.

The first charge was not very obstinate, nor of long continuance. The Thebans soon put the Orchomenians to flight, and Agesilaus overthrew and routed the Argives. But both parties having learned that their left wing had been very severely handled and fled, returned immediately ; Agesilaus to oppose the Thebans, and to wrest the victory out of their hands, and the Thebans to follow their left wing, which was retired to Helicon. Agesilaus at that moment might have assured himself of a complete victory, if he would have let the Thebans pass on, and had charged them after in the rear ; but carried away with the ardour of his courage, he resolved to stop them with an attack in front, and to beat them by pure force : in which says Xenophon, he showed more valour than prudence.

* Plut. in Agesil. p. 605.

† Ibid. Xenoph. hist. Græc. p. 518—520. et in Agesil. p. 659, 660.

The Thebans, seeing Agesilaus advance against them, drew all their foot immediately into one body, formed a hollow square, and waited his coming up in good order. The engagement was sharp and bloody on all sides, but particularly where Agesilaus fought at the head of the 50 young Spartans, sent him by the city. The valour and emulation of those young men were of great service to Agesilaus, and may be said to have saved his life; for they fought around him with exceeding ardour, and exposed themselves foremost in all dangers for the safety of his person. They could not, however, prevent his receiving several wounds through his armour from pikes and swords. Notwithstanding, after an exceeding warm dispute, they brought him off alive from the enemy, and making their bodies a rampart for him, sacrificed a great number of Thebans to his defence; many of those young men were also left upon the field. At length, finding it too difficult to break the Thebans in front, they were forced to have recourse to what they had at first rejected. They opened their phalanx to let them pass; which when they had done, as they marched afterwards in more disorder, they charged them again upon the flanks and rear. They could, however, neither break them, nor put them to flight. Those brave Thebans made their retreat, continually fighting, and gained Helicon, elate with the success of the battle, wherein on their side they had always remained invincible.

Agesilaus, though very much weakened by the great number of his wounds, and the quantity of blood he had lost, would not retire to his tent till he had been carried to the place where his phalanx was drawn up, and had seen all the dead bodies removed even upon their own arms. He was informed there, that many of the enemy had taken refuge in the temple of Minerva Itoniensis, which was not very distant from the field of battle, and asked what he would have done with them. As he was full of veneration for the gods, he gave orders to let them go, and even sent them a guard to escort them in safety wherever they thought fit.

The next morning, Agesilaus, to try whether the Thebans would have the courage to renew the battle, commanded his troops to crown themselves with flowers, and the music of the army to play, whilst a trophy was erected and adorned in honour of his victory. At the same instant the enemy sent heralds to demand his permission to bury their dead: which he granted, with a truce; and having confirmed his victory by that act of a conqueror, he caused himself to be carried to Delphos, where the Pythian games were then celebrated. He made there a solemn procession, which was followed by a sacrifice, and consecrated the tenth part of the booty taken in Asia, to the god, which amounted to 100 talents.* These great men, no less religious than brave, never failed to express by presents their gratitude to the gods for their successes in arms; declaring by that public homage, that they believed themselves indebted for their victories to their protection.

SECTION V.

AGESILAUS RETURNS VICTORIOUS TO SPARTA.—A PEACE SHAMEFUL TO THE GREEKS CONCLUDED.

AFTER the festival,† Agesilaus returned to Sparta. His citizens received him with all the marks of the most real joy, and beheld him with

* 100,000 crowns, about 22,500*l*.

† Plut. in Agesil. p. 606.

admiration, when they observed the simplicity of his manners, and the constant frugality and temperance of his life. At his return from foreign countries, where pomp, luxury, sloth, and the love of pleasure entirely prevailed, he was not infected with the manners of the barbarians, as most of the other generals had been: he made no alteration in his diet, baths, equipage of his wife, ornaments of his arms, or furniture of his house. In the midst of so shining a reputation, and the universal applause, always the same, or rather more modest than before, he distinguished himself from the rest of the citizens, only by a greater submission to the laws, and a more inviolable attachment to the customs of his country; convinced that he was only king, to be the brighter example of those virtues to others.

* He made greatness consist in virtue only. Hearing the great king (so the kings of Persia used to call themselves) spoken of in magnificent terms, and his power extremely extolled; "† I cannot conceive," said he, "wherein he is greater than me, unless he be more virtuous."

There were at Sparta some citizens, who, vitiated by the prevailing taste of Greece, made their merit and glory consist in keeping a great number of horses for the race. He persuaded his sister Cynisca, to dispute the prize in the Olympic games, in order to show the Greeks, that those victories, on which they set so high a value, were not the effects of valour and bravery, but of riches and expence. She was the first of her sex who shared in this honour. He had not the same opinion of the exercises which contributed to render the body more robust, and inure it to labour and fatigue; and to place them in greater estimation, would often honour them with his presence.

Some time after Lysander's death, he discovered the conspiracy formed by that captain against the two kings, which till then had not been heard of, and came to light by a kind of accident, in the following manner: † Upon some affairs which related to the government, it was necessary to consult Lysander's papers, and Agesilaus went to his house for that purpose. In running them over, he fell upon the sheets which contained at large the harangue of Cleon, for the new method of proceeding in the election of kings. Surprised at perusing it, he gave over his search, and went away abruptly, to communicate that oration to the citizens, and to let them see what manner of man Lysander was, and how much they had been deceived in regard to him. But Lacratidas, a wise and prudent person, and president of the Ephori, interposed by telling him, that it was highly improper to raise Lysander from the dead; on the contrary, that it was necessary to bury his harangue in the same grave with him, as of dangerous tendency, from the great art with which it was composed, and the force of persuasion that universally prevailed in it, against which it might prove no easy matter to resist. Agesilaus was of the same opinion, and the piece was consigned to silence and oblivion, as the best use that could be made of it.

As his credit was very high in the city, he caused Teleutias, his brother by the mother's side, to be declared admiral of the fleet. It were to be wished, that history, to justify this choice, had mentioned any other qualities in that commander, than his nearness of blood to the king. Agesilaus soon after set out with his land army to besiege Corinth, and took the long walls, as they were called, whilst his brother Teleutias attacked it by sea.

* Pl. ut. de sui laud p. 555.

† Τι δὲ εἶπε γὰρ μετὰ τὸν ἐπιτιμῶν, ἢ μετὰ καὶ δικαιοσύνης.

‡ Plut. in. Agesil. p. 608.

He did several other exploits against the people of Greece at war with Sparta, which always argue indeed the valour and experience of the general, but are neither very important nor decisive, and which we thought for that reason might be omitted.

* At the same time Pharnabasus and Conon, having made themselves masters at sea, ravaged the whole coast of Laconia. That satrap returning to his government of Phrygia, left Conon the command of the naval army, with very considerable sums for the re-establishment of Athens. Conon, victorious and crowned with glory, repaired thither, where he was received with universal applause. The sad prospect of a city formerly so flourishing, and at that time reduced to so melancholy a condition, gave him more grief than he felt joy in seeing his beloved country again, after so many years absence. He lost no time, but fell immediately to work, employing, besides masons and the usual artisans, the soldiers, mariners, citizens, allies, in a word, all who were well inclined to Athens; providence decreeing, that this city, formerly destroyed by the Persians, should be rebuilt by their own hands, and that having been dismantled and demolished by the Lacedæmonians, it should be reinstated at their own cost, and by the spoils taken from them. What a vicissitude and alteration was this! Athens at this time had those for its allies, which had formerly been its most violent enemies, and for enemies, those with whom before it had contracted the most strict and most confirmed union. Conon, seconded by the zeal of the Thebans, soon rebuilt the walls of Athens, restored the city to its ancient splendour, and rendered it more formidable than ever to its enemies. † After having offered to the gods a whole hecatomb, that is to say, a sacrifice of 100 oxen, as a thanksgiving for the happy re-establishment of Athens, he made a feast, to which all the citizens without exception were invited.

‡ Sparta could not see without extreme affliction so glorious a revolution. It looked upon the grandeur and power of a city, its ancient rival and almost continual enemy, as its own ruin; which made the Lacedæmonians take the mean resolution of avenging themselves at once upon Athens, and Conon its restorer, by making peace with the king of Persia. With this view they dispatched Antalcides to Tiribasus. His commission consisted of two principal articles. The first was, to accuse Conon to that satrap of having defrauded the king of the money which he had employed in the re-establishment of Athens; and of having formed the design of depriving the Persians of Æolia and Ionia, and to subject them anew to the republic of Athens, upon which they had formerly depended. By the second, he had orders to make the most advantageous proposals to Tiribasus his master could desire. Without giving himself any manner of trouble in regard to Asia, he stipulated only, that all the islands and other cities should enjoy their laws and liberty. The Lacedæmonians thus gave up to the king, with the greatest injustice and the utmost baseness, all the Greeks settled in Asia, for whose liberty Agesilaus had so long fought. It is true he had no share in this most infamous negotiation, the whole reproach of which ought to fall on Antalcides, who, being the sworn enemy of the king of Sparta, hastened the peace by all manner of means, because the war augmented the authority, glory, and reputation of Agesilaus.

* A. M. 3611. Ant. J. C. 363. Xenoph. hist. Græc. l. iv. p. 534—537. Diod. l. xiv. p. 305. Justin. l. vi. c. 5.

† Athen. l. i. p. 3.

‡ Xenoph. hist. Græc. l. iv. p. 537, 538. Plut. in Agesil. p. 606.

The most considerable cities of Greece had sent deputies at the same time to Tiribasus, and Conon was at the head of those from Athens. All of them were unanimous in rejecting such proposals. Without speaking of the interests of the Greeks of Asia, with which they were extremely affected, they saw themselves exposed by this treaty; the Athenians to the loss of the isles of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros; the Thebans to abandon the cities of Bœotia, of which they were in possession, and which would thereby regain their independence; and the Argives to renounce Corinth, with the loss of which Argos itself would soon in all probability be attended. The deputies therefore withdrew without concluding any thing.

Tiribasus seized Conon, and put him in prison. Not daring to declare openly for the Lacedæmonians, without an express order to that purpose, he contented himself with supplying them underhand with considerable sums of money for fitting out a fleet, in order that the other cities of Greece might not be in a condition to oppose them. After having taken these precautions, he set out directly for the court, to give the king an account of the state of his negotiation. That prince was well satisfied with it, and directed him in the strongest terms to put the last hand to it. Tiribasus also laid before him the Lacedæmonians' accusation of Conon. Some authors, according to Cornelius Nepos, have written that he was carried to Susa, and there executed by the king's order. The silence of Xenophon, who was his contemporary, in regard to his death makes it doubtful whether he did not escape from prison, or suffer as has been said.

Whilst this treaty was negotiating, several inconsiderable actions passed between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians. It was also at the same time that Evagoras extended his conquests in the island of Cyprus, of which we shall soon treat.

* Tiribasus at length, upon his return, summoned the deputies of the Grecian cities to be present at the reading of the treaty. It imported, that all the Grecian cities of Asia should remain dependant on the king, and that the rest, as well small as great, should have full possession of their liberty. The king further reserved to himself the isles of Cyprus and Clazomena, and left those of Scyros, Lemnos, and Imbros, to the Athenians, to whom they had long appertained. By the same treaty he engaged to join with such people as came into it, in order to make war by sea and land against all who should refuse to agree to it. We have already said it was Sparta itself proposed these conditions.

All the other cities of Greece, or at least the greatest part of them, rejected so infamous a treaty with horror. However, as they were weakened and exhausted by domestic divisions, and not in a condition to support a war against so powerful a prince, who threatened to fall with all his forces upon those who should refuse to come into this peace, they were obliged against their will to comply with it, except the Thebans, who had the courage to oppose it openly at first, but were at length reduced to accept it with the others, by whom they found themselves universally abandoned.

Such was the fruit of the jealousy and divisions which armed the Grecian cities against each other, and was the end proposed by the policy of Artaxerxes, in distributing sums of money amongst the several states; invincible in arms, and to the sword, but not to the gold and presents of the Persians; so remote were they in this respect from the character of the ancient Greeks their forefathers.

To comprehend aright how much Sparta and Athens differed from what

* A. M. 3617. Ant J. C. 387. Xenoph. l. v. p. 548—551.

they had been in former times, we have only to compare the two treaties concluded between the Greeks and Persians; the former by Cimon the Athenian * under Artaxerxes Longimanus above 60 years before, and the latter by Antalcides the Lacedæmonian under Artaxerxes Mnemon. In the first, Greece, victorious and triumphant, assures the liberty of the Asiatic Greeks, gives the law to the Persians, imposes what conditions it pleases, and prescribes bounds and limits, by prohibiting them to approach nearer to the sea with their troops than the distance of three days march; or to appear with long vessels in any of the seas between the Cyææan and Chalidonian islands, that is to say, from the Euxine to the coasts of Pamphylia. In the second, on the contrary, Persia, grown haughty and imperious, takes pleasure in humbling its conquerors, in depriving them, with the single stroke of a pen, of their empire in Asia Minor, in compelling them to abandon basely all the Greeks established in those rich provinces, to subscribe to their own subjection, and to confine themselves, in their turn, within the narrow bounds of Greece.

From whence can so strange an alteration arise? Are there not on both sides the same cities, the same people, the same forces, and the same interest? No doubt there are: but they are not the same men, or rather, they have no longer the same principles of policy. Let us recal those happy times of Greece, so glorious for Athens and Sparta, when Persia came pouring like a deluge upon this little country with all the forces of the east. What was it that rendered the two cities invincible and superior to such numerous and formidable armies? Their union and good understanding. No dissension between the two states, no jealousy of command, no private view of interest; in fine, no other contests between them but of honour, glory, and the love of their country.

To so laudable an union may be added an irreconcilable hatred for the Persians, which became a kind of nature in the Greeks, and was the most distinguishing character of that nation. † It was a capital crime, and punished with death, only to mention peace, or propose any accommodation with them; and an Athenian mother was seen to throw the first stone at her son, who had dared to make such a motion, and to set others the example of stoning him.

This strict union of the two states, and declared abhorrence of the common enemy, were a long time the potent barriers of their security, rendered them invincible, and may be said to have been the source and principle of all the glorious successes which raised the reputation of Greece to so high a pitch. But by a misfortune common to the most flourishing states, those very successes became the cause of its ruin, and prepared the way for the disgraces it experienced in the sequel.

‡ These two states, which might have carried their victorious arms into the heart of Persia, and have attacked in their turn the great king upon the throne itself; instead of forming in concert such an enterprise, which would at once have crowned them with glory, and laden them with riches, have the folly to leave their common enemy at repose, to embroil themselves with each other upon trivial points of honour, and interests of little importance, and to exhaust the forces ineffectually against themselves, which ought to have been employed solely against the barbarians, who could not have resisted them; for it is remarkable, that the Persians never had any advantage over the Athenians or Lacedæmonians whilst they were

* Diod. l. xii. p. 74, 75.

† Isoc. in. Panegy. p. 143.

‡ Isoc. in Panegy. p. 132—137. In Parath. p. 524, 525.

united with each other, and that it was their own divisions only which supplied them with the means to conquer both alternately, and always the one by the other.

These divisions induced them to take such measures, as neither Sparta nor Athens would ever have otherwise been capable of. We see both the one and the other dishonour themselves by their mean and abject flatteries, not only of the king of Persia, but even of his satraps; pay their court to them, earnestly solicit their favour, cringe to them, and even suffer their ill humour; and all this to obtain some aid of troops or money, forgetting that the Persians, haughty and insolent to such as seemed afraid of them, became timorous and little to those who had the courage to despise them. But in fine, what did they gain by all these mean condescensions? The treaty which gave occasion for these reflections, and will for ever be the reproach of Sparta and Athens.

SECTION VI.

WAR OF AETAXERXES AGAINST EVAGORAS.

WHAT I have said upon the facility with which the Greeks might have rendered themselves formidable to their enemies, will be more evident if we consider, on one side, the diversity of people, and extent of country, which composed the vast empire of the Persians, and, on the other, the weakness of the government, incapable of animating so great a mass, and of supporting the weight of so much business and application. At the court every thing was determined by the intrigues of women, and the cabals of favourites, whose whole merit often consisted in flattering their prince, and soothing his passions. It was upon their credit officers were chosen, and the first dignities disposed of; by their opinion the services of the generals of armies were judged, and their rewards decided. The sequel will show, that from the same source arose the insurrection of provinces, the distrust of the greatest part of the governours, the discontent and consequential revolt of the best officers, and the ill success of almost all the enterprises that were formed.

Artaxerxes having got rid of the care and perplexity which the war with the Greeks had occasioned, applied himself to the terminating that of Cyprus, which had lasted several years, but had been carried on with little vigour, and turned the greatest part of his forces that way.

* Evagoras reigned at that time in Salamin, the capital city of the isle of Cyprus. He was descended from Teucer of Salamin, † who at his return from Troy built this city, and gave it the name of his country. His descendants had reigned there from that time: but a stranger of Phœnicia, having dispossessed the lawful king, had taken his place, and to maintain himself in the usurpation, had filled the city with barbarians, and subjected the whole island to the king of Persia.

Under this tyrant Evagoras was born, of whose education great care was taken. He was distinguished among the youth by the beauty of his aspect, the vigour of his body, and more by the modesty and innocence of his manners, ‡ which are the greatest ornaments of that age. As he advanced

* Isocrat. in Evag. p. 560.

† This Teucer was of Salamin, a little island near Athens, celebrated for the famous battle under Xerxes.

‡ Et qui ornat ætatem pudor. Cic.

in years, the greatest virtues, valour, wisdom, and justice, were observed to brighten in him. He afterwards carried these virtues to so conspicuous a height as to give jealousy to those that governed; who perceived justly that so shining a merit could not continue in the obscurity of a private condition; but his modesty, probity, and integrity, reassured them, and they reposed an entire confidence in him, to which he always answered by an inviolable fidelity, without ever meditating their expulsion from the throne by violence or treachery.

A more justifiable means conducted him to it; divine providence, as Isocrates says, preparing the way for him. One of the principal citizens murdered the person upon the throne, and had contrived to seize Evagoras, and to rid himself of him, in order to secure the crown to himself; but that prince escaping his pursuit, retired to Soloa, a city of Cilicia. His banishment was so far from abating his courage, that it gave him new vigour. Attended only with 50 followers, determined like himself to conquer or die, he returned to Salamin, and expelled the usurper, though supported by the credit and protection of the king of Persia. Having re-established himself in Salamin, he soon rendered his little kingdom most flourishing, by his application to the relief of his subjects, and by protecting them in all things; by governing them with justice and benevolence; by making them active and laborious; by inspiring them with a taste for the cultivation of lands, the breeding of cattle, commerce, and navigation. He formed them also for war, and made them excellent soldiers.

He was already very powerful, and had acquired great reputation, when Conon, the Athenian general, after his defeat at Egospotamos, took refuge with him; * not thinking it possible to find a safer asylum for himself, nor a more powerful support of his country. The resemblance of their manners and sentiments soon made them contract a strict amity with each other, which continued ever after, and proved equally advantageous to both. † Conon was in great credit at the king of Persia's court, which he employed with that prince, by the means of Ctesias, the physician, to accommodate his differences with his host Evagoras, and happily effected it.

Evagoras and Conon, with the great design of subverting, or at least of reducing, the great power of Sparta, which had rendered itself formidable to all Greece, concerted together the means for the attainment of that end. They were both citizens of Athens; the latter by birth, and the other by right of adoption, which his great services and zeal for that republic had deserved. ‡ The satraps of Asia saw with pain their country ravaged by the Lacedæmonians, and found themselves in great difficulties, from not being in a condition to make head against them. Evagoras remonstrated to them, that it was necessary to attack the enemy as well by sea as land; and he did not contribute a little by his credit with the king of Persia, to Conon's being appointed general of his fleet. || The celebrated victory over the Lacedæmonians at Cnidus was the consequence, and gave the mortal wound to that republic.

§ The Athenians, in acknowledgment of the important services Evagoras and Conon had rendered them with Artaxerxes, erected statues in honour of them:

* A. M. 3599. Ant. J. C. 405. Isocrat. in Evag. p. 393—395.

† A. M. 3605. Ant. J. C. 399.

‡ A. M. 3606. Ant. J. C. 398.

|| A. M. 3610. Ant. J. C. 394.

§ Pausan. l. i. p. 5.

* Evagoras, on his side, extending his conquests from city to city, endeavoured to make himself master of the whole island. The Cypriots had recourse to the king of Persia. That prince, alarmed by the rapid progress of Evagoras, of which he apprehended the effects, and conscious of what importance it was to him to prevent an island's falling into the hands of an enemy so favourably situated for holding Asia Minor in awe, promised them an immediate and powerful support, without declaring openly, however, against Evagoras.

† Being employed elsewhere by more important affairs, he could not keep his word with them so soon as he expected, and had engaged. That war of Cyprus continued six years; and the success with which Evagoras supported it against the great king, ought to have banished from the Greeks all terror of the Persian name, and united them against the common enemy. It is true the succours sent by Artaxerxes till then were inconceivable, as they also were the two following years. During all that time, it was less a real war, than a preparation for † war; but when he had disengaged himself from the Greeks, he applied to it vigorously, and attacked Evagoras with all his forces.

The army by land, commanded by Orontes his son-in-law, consisted of 300,000 men, and the fleet of 300 galleys; of which Tyribasus, a Persian of the highest rank and greatest reputation, was admiral. Gaos his son-in-law commanded under him. Evagoras, on his side, assembled as many troops and ships as he could: but they were an handful in comparison with the formidable preparation of the Persians. He had a fleet of only 90 galleys, and his army scarce amounted to 20,000 men. As he had abundance of light vessels, he laid snares for those that carried the provisions of the enemy, of which he sunk a great number, took many, and prevented the rest from arriving; which occasioned a famine among the Persians, attended with violent seditions, which could only be appeased by the coming of fresh convoys from Cilicia. Evagoras strengthened his fleet with 60 galleys, which he caused to be built, and 50 sent him by Achoris, king of Egypt, with all the money and corn he could have occasion for.

Evagoras, with his land forces, attacked immediately a part of the enemy's army, which was separate from the rest, and entirely routed it. This first action was soon followed by another at sea, in which the Persians were worsted for some time, till, animated by the warm reproaches and remonstrances of their admiral, they resumed courage, and obtained a complete victory. Salamin was besieged by sea and land. Evagoras, leaving the defence of the city to his son Pythagoras, quitted it in the night with ten galleys, and sailed for Egypt, to engage the king to support him vigorously against the common enemy. He did not obtain from him all the aid he expected. At his return he found the city in exceeding distress; and finding himself without resource or hope, he was obliged to capitulate. The proposals made to him were, that he should abandon all the cities of Cyprus, except Salamin, where he should content himself to reign: that he should pay an annual tribute to the king, and remain in obedience to him as a servant to a master. The extremity to which he was reduced obliged him to accept the other conditions, hard as they were; but he could never resolve to comply with the last; and persisted always in declaring, that he

* Diod. l. xiv. p. 311.

† A. M. 3614. Ant. J. C. 398. Isocrat. in. Paneg. p. 135, 136.

† A. M. 3618. Ant. J. C. 386. Diod. l. xv. p. 326—333.

could only treat as a king with a king. Tiribasus, who commanded the siege, would abate nothing of his pretensions.

Orontes, the other general, jealous of his colleague's glory, had wrote secretly to court against him, accusing him, amongst other things, of forming designs against the king; and strengthened his accusation, from his continuing to hold a secret intelligence with the Lacedæmonians, and his manifest endeavours to make the chiefs of the army his creatures, by the force of presents, promises, and a complacency of manners not natural to him. Artaxerxes, upon these letters, believed he had no time to lose, and that it was necessary to prevent a conspiracy ready to break out. He dispatched orders immediately to Orontes to seize Tiribasus, and send him to court in chains; which was instantly put in execution. Tiribasus, upon his arrival, demanded to be brought to a trial in form; that the heads of the accusation should be communicated to him, and the proofs and witnesses produced. The king, employed in other cares, had no leisure at that time to take cognisance of the affair.

Orontes, in the mean time, seeing that the besieged made a vigorous defence, and that the soldiers of the army, discontented with the removal of Tiribasus, quitted the service, and refused to obey him, was afraid affairs would take a bad turn with regard to him. * He therefore caused Evagoras to be spoke to underhand: the negotiation was resumed, the offers made at first by the latter were accepted, and the mortifying article which had prevented the conclusion of the treaty, retrenched. The siege was raised in consequence. Evagoras continued king of Salamin only, and engaged to pay an annual tribute.

It appears that this prince lived 12 or 13 years after the conclusion of the treaty; for his death is dated in the year of the world 3632. His old age was attended with a happiness and tranquility never interrupted with sickness or disease, the usual effect of a sober and temperate life. Nicocles his eldest son succeeded him, and inherited his virtues as well as his throne. He celebrated his funeral with the utmost magnificence. The discourse, entitled Evagoras, composed by Isocrates, to inspire the young king with the desire of treading in the steps of his father, and from which I have extracted the subsequent eulogium, served for his funeral oration. He also addressed another tract to Nicocles, which bears his name, wherein he gives him admirable precepts for governing well. I shall, perhaps, have occasion to speak farther of them in the ensuing volume.

EULOGY AND CHARACTER OF EVAGORAS.

† Though Evagoras was only king of a little state, Isocrates, who was well able to judge of virtue and merit, compares him with the most powerful monarchs, and proposes him as the perfect model of a good king, convinced, that not the extent of provinces, but extent of mind and greatness of soul, constitute great princes. He does in effect point out to us many qualities truly royal in him, and which ought to give us a very high idea of his merit.

Evagoras was not of the number of those princes, who believe, that to reign, it is sufficient to be of the blood-royal; and that the birth which gives a right to the crown gives also the merit and qualities necessary for wearing it with honour. He did not fancy that it could be supposed, as every other condition and station of life made a kind of apprenticeship neces-

* A. M. 3619. Ant. J. C. 335.

† Isocrat. in Evag.

sary to its success, the art of reigning, the most difficult and important of all, should require no pains or preparation for its attainment. He came into the world with the most happy dispositions; a great fund of genius, an easy conception, a lively and instant penetration which nothing escaped, a solidity of judgment, that immediately resolved what it was necessary to act; qualities which might seem to dispense with all study and application; and yet, as if he had been born without talents, and found himself obliged to supply by study what he might want by nature, he neglected no means for the embellishment of his mind, and devoted a considerable part of his time in instructing himself, * in reflecting, meditating, and consulting the judgment and merit of others.

When he ascended the throne, his greatest care and application was to know mankind, in which the ability of a prince, and of those who are at the head of affairs principally consists. He had no doubt prepared himself for that science by the study of history, which gives a kind of anticipation of it, supplies the place of experience, and teaches us what the men are with whom we live, by what they have been in other ages. But we study men quite differently in themselves; by their manners, characters, conduct, and actions. The love of the commonwealth rendered him attentive to all persons who were capable of serving or hurting it. He applied himself to the discovery of their most secret inclinations and principles of action, and to the knowledge of their different talents and degrees of capacity, in order to assign each his proper post, to bestow authority according to merit, and to make the private and public good promote each other. He neither rewarded nor punished his subjects, says Isocrates, from the report of others, but solely upon his own knowledge and experience of them; and neither the virtues of the good, nor the vices of the bad, escaped his inquiry and penetration.

He had one quality very seldom found in those who possess the first rank in authority, especially when they believe themselves capable of governing alone: I mean a wonderful docility and attention to the sense of others, which arose from a diffidence in his own abilities. With his great qualities, he did not seem to have occasion for recourse to the counsel of others, and nevertheless made no resolution, and formed no enterprise, without having first consulted the wise persons he had placed about him in his court; instead of which, pride and presumption, the latent poisons of sovereign power, incline the greatest part of those who arrive at thrones, either to ask no counsel at all, or not to follow it when they do.

Intent upon discovering the excellent in every form of government and private condition of life, he proposed the uniting of all their high qualities and great advantages in himself; affable and popular as in a republican state; grave and serious as in the counsels of the aged and the senate; steady and decisive as monarchy after mature deliberation; a profound politician by the extent and rectitude of his views; an accomplished warrior, from intrepid valour in battle, directed by a wise moderation; a good father, a good relation, a good friend; and what crowns all his praise, † in every circumstance of his character, always great, and always himself.

He supported his dignity and rank, not with an air of pride and haughtiness, but by a serenity of aspect, and a mild and easy majesty, resulting from innate virtue, and the evidence of a good conscience. He won the

* *Εν τῷ ζῆτει, καὶ φροντίζειν, καὶ βουλευσθαι, τοὺς πλείους χρόνον διατρέβει.*

† *Τυραννικὸς δὲ τῷ πασι ταῦτοις διαφέρειν.*

hearts of his friends by his liberality, and conquered others by a greatness of soul, to which they could not refuse their esteem and admiration.

But what was most royal in him, and attracted the entire confidence of his subjects, neighbours, and even enemies, was his sincerity, faith, and regard to all his engagements; and his hatred, or rather detestation, for all disguises, falsehood, and fraud. A single word on his side had as much regard paid to it as the most sacred oath; and it was universally known, that nothing was capable of inducing him to violate it in the least circumstance whatsoever.

It was by all these excellent qualities that he effectually reformed the city of Salamin, and entirely changed the face of its affairs in a very short time. He found it gross, savage, and barbarous, without any taste either for learning, commerce or arms. What cannot a prince do who loves his people, and is beloved by them; who believes himself great and powerful only to render them happy? and knows how to set a just value upon, and do honour to, their labours, industry, and merit of every kind? He had not been many years upon the throne, before arts, sciences, commerce, navigation, and military discipline were seen to flourish at Salamin; insomuch that that city did not give place to the most opulent of Greece.

Isocrates often repeats, that in the praises he gives Evagoras, of which I have only extracted a part, far from exaggerating any thing, he always falls short of truth. To what can we attribute a reign so wise, so just, so moderate, so constantly employed in rendering his subjects happy, and in promoting the public good? The condition of Evagoras, before he came to govern, seems to me to have contributed very much to it. The being born a prince, and the having never experienced any other condition but that of master and sovereign, are, in my opinion, great obstacles to the knowledge and practice of the duties of that high station. Evagoras, who came into the world under a tyrant, had long obeyed before he commanded. He had borne in a private and dependant life the yoke of an absolute and despotic power. He had seen himself exposed to envy and calumny, and had been in danger for his merit and virtue. Such a prince had only to be told, upon his ascending the throne, what was said to a great emperor;* “† You have not always been what you now are. Adversity has prepared you to make a good use of power. You have lived long amongst us, and like us. You have been in danger under bad princes. You have trembled for yourself, and known by experience, how virtue and innocence have been treated.” What he had personally suffered, what he had feared for himself or others, what he had seen unjust and unreasonable in the conduct of his predecessors, had opened his eyes and taught him all his duty. It sufficed to tell him, what the emperor Galba told Piso, when he adopted him as his associate in the empire: “† Remember what you condemned or applauded in princes, when you were a private man. You have only to consult the judgment you then passed upon them, and to act conformably to it for your instruction in the art of reigning well.”

* Trajan.

† Quam utile est ad usum secundorum per adversa venisse! Vixisti nobiscum, periclitatus es, timuisti. Quæ tunc erat innocentium vita scis, et expertus es. Plin. in Panegy.

‡ Utillissimus quidem ac brevissimus bonarum malarumque rerum delectus, cogitare quid aut nolueris sub alio principe, aut volueris. Tacit.

TRIAL OF TIRIBASUS.

We have already said, that Tiribasus, having been accused by Orontes of forming a conspiracy against the king, had been sent to court in chains. Gaos, admiral of the fleet, who had married his daughter, apprehending that Artaxerxes would involve him in the affair with his father in law, and cause him to be put to death upon mere suspicion, conceived he had no other means for his security than an open revolt. He was very well beloved by the soldiers, and all the officers of the fleet were particularly at his devotion. Without loss of time he sent deputies to Achoris king of Egypt, and concluded a league with him against the king of Persia. On another side, he solicited the Lacedæmonians warmly to come into that league, with assurances of making them masters of all Greece, and of establishing universally their form of government, to which they had long seemed to aspire. They hearkened favourably to these proposals, and embraced with joy this occasion of taking arms against Artaxerxes; the rather, because the peace they had concluded with him, by which they had given up the Greeks of Asia, had covered them with shame, and filled them with remorse.

As soon as Artaxerxes had put an end to the war of Cyprus,* he thought of concluding also the affair of Tiribasus. He was so just as to appoint for that purpose three commissioners, who were great lords of Persia, of distinguished probity, and of the highest reputation in his court. The affair came to an examination, and an hearing on both sides. For so considerable a crime as that of having conspired against the king's person, no other proofs were produced than the letter of Orontes; that is to say, of a declared enemy, studious to supplant his rival. Orontes was in hopes, from his credit at court, that the affair would not have been discussed in the usual forms, and that upon the memorial sent by him, the accused would have been condemned without further examination. But that was not the custom with the Persians. By an anciently established regulation, to which among other privileges, they had a right by birth, no person was ever to be condemned, without being first heard and confronted with his accusers. This was granted to Tiribasus, who answered to all the articles of the letter. As to his connivance with Evagoras, the treaty itself concluded by Orontes, was his apology; as it was absolutely the same that prince had proposed to him, except a condition which would have done honour to his master. As to his intelligence with the Lacedæmonians, the glorious treaty he had made them sign, sufficiently explained whether his own or the king's interests were his motives for it. He did not deny his credit in the army; but apprehended it had not been long a crime to be beloved by the officers and soldiers; and concluded his defence, by representing the long services he had rendered the king with inviolable fidelity; and especially his good fortune in having formerly saved his life, when he was hunting and in great danger of being devoured by two lions. The three commissioners were unanimous in declaring Tiribasus innocent. The king restored him to his former favour; and, justly enraged at the black design of Orontes, let the whole weight of his indignation fall upon him. A single example of this kind against informers convicted of falsehood, would for ever shut the door against calumny. How many innocents have been destroyed for want of observing this rule, which even the pagans

* Diodorus refers the decision of this affair till after the war with the Cadusians, of which we shall soon speak: this seems very improbable.

considered as the basis of all justice, and the guardian of the public tranquillity !

SECTION VII.

THE EXPEDITION OF ARTAXERXES AGAINST THE CADUSIANS.—HISTORY OF DATAMES THE CARIAN.

WHEN Artaxerxes had terminated the Cyprian war,* he entered upon another against the Cadusians, who it is probable had revolted, and refused to pay the customary tribute ; for authors say nothing as to the occasion of this war. Those people inhabited part of the mountains situated between the Euxine and Caspian seas in the north of Media. The soil is there so ungrateful, and so little proper for cultivation, that no corn is sowed upon it. The people subsist almost entirely upon apples, pears, and other fruits of that kind. Inured from their infancy to a hard and laborious life, they looked upon danger and fatigues as nothing, and for that reason made excellent soldiers. The king marched against them in person at the head of an army of 300,000 foot, and 10,000 horse. Tiribasis was with him in this expedition.

Artaxerxes had not advanced far into the country, when his army suffered extremely by famine. The troops could find nothing to subsist upon, and it was impossible to bring provisions from other places, the ways being difficult and impracticable. The whole camp were reduced to eat their carriage beasts ; which soon became so scarce that an ass' head was valued at 60 drachms,† and was very hard to be got at that price. The king's table itself began to fall short, and only a few horses remained, the rest having been entirely consumed.

In this melancholy conjuncture, Tiribasis contrived a stratagem which saved the king and army. The Cadusians had two kings, who were encamped separately with their troops. Tiribasis, who took care to be informed of all that passed, had been apprised that there was some misunderstanding between them, and that their jealousy of each other prevented their acting in concert, as they ought to have done. After having communicated his design to Artaxerxes, he went himself to one of the kings and dispatched his son to the other. They each of them informed the king to whom they applied, that the other had sent ambassadors to treat with Artaxerxes privately, and advised him to lose no time, but to make his peace directly, in order that the conditions of it might be the more advantageous ; promising to assist them with their whole credit. The fraud succeeded. The † pagans thought it no crime to use it with enemies. Ambassadors set out from both princes with Tiribasis and his son in the company.

As this double negotiation lasted some time, Artaxerxes began to suspect Tiribasis ; and his enemies taking that opportunity, forgot nothing to his prejudice that might ruin him in the king's opinion. That prince already repented the confidence he had reposed in him, and thereby gave room for those who envied him, to vent their calumnies and invectives. Upon what does the fortune of the most faithful subjects depend with a credulous and suspicious prince ! Whilst this passed, arrived Tiribasis of his side, and his son on the other, each with ambassadors from the Cadusians. The treaty being concluded with both parties, and the peace made, Tiribasis

* Plut. in Artax. p. 1023, 1031.

† 50 livres.

‡ *Dolus, an virtus, quis in hoste requirat ? Virgil.*

became more powerful than ever in his master's favour, and returned with him.

The king's behaviour in this march was much admired. Neither the gold with which he was covered, his purple robes, and the jewels that glittered all over him, and were worth 36,000,000 of livres,* prevented his having an equal share in the whole fatigue with the meanest soldier. He was seen with his quiver at his back, and his shield on his arm, to dismount from his horse, and march foremost in those rugged and difficult countries. The soldiers observing his patience and fortitude, and animated by his example, became so light, that they seemed rather to fly than to walk. At length he arrived at one of his palaces, where the gardens were in admirable order, and there was a park of great extent and well planted, which was the more surprising, as the whole country round about it was entirely naked, and bore no kind of trees. As it was the depth of winter, and excessively cold, he gave the soldiers permission to cut down the wood in this park, without excepting the finest trees, either pines or cypresses. But the soldiers not being able to resolve to fell timber of such exceeding beauty and stateliness, the king took an axe, and began by cutting the finest and largest tree himself: after which the troops spared none, cut down all the wood they wanted, and kindled as many fires as were necessary to their passing the night without any inconvenience. When we reflect how much value great persons generally set upon their gardens and houses of pleasure, we must confess Artaxerxes' generosity in making this sacrifice, which argued a very laudable goodness of heart, and a sensibility for the distress and sufferings of his soldiers. But he did not always support that character.

The king had lost in this enterprise a great number of his best troops, and almost all his horses: and as he imagined that he was despised upon that account, and the ill success of his expedition, he became very much out of humour with the grantees of his court, and put to death a great number of them in the emotions of his wrath, and more out of distrust, and the fear of their attempting something against him: for fear in a suspicious prince is a very destructive and bloody passion; whereas true courage is gentle, humane, and averse to all jealousy and suspicion.

† One of the principal officers that perished in this expedition against the Cadusians, was Camisares, by nation a Carian, and governor of Leuco-Syria, a province inclosed between Cilicia and Cappadocia. His son Datames succeeded him in that government, which was given him in consideration of the good services he had also rendered the king in the same expedition. He was the greatest captain of his time; and Cornelius Nepos, who has given us his life, does not prefer Amilcar and Hannibal to him among the barbarians. It appears from his history of it, that no one ever excelled him in boldness, valour, and ability in inventing schemes and stratagems, in activity in the execution of his designs, in presence of mind to resolve in the heat of action, and to find resources upon the most desperate occasions; in a word, in every thing that regards military knowledge. It seems that nothing was wanting to his having acquired a more illustrious name, than a noble theatre, and more exalted occasions; and perhaps an historian to have given a more extensive narration of his exploits. For Cornelius Nepos, according to his general plan, could not relate them but in a very succinct manner.

* 12,000 talents.

† Cor. Nep. in vit. Datamis.

He began to distinguish himself particularly by the execution of a commission that was given him to reduce Thyus, a very powerful prince, and governour of Paphlagonia, who had revolted against the king. As he was his near relation, he thought it incumbent upon him at first to try the methods of lenity and reconciliation, which almost cost him his life, through the treachery of Thyus, by the ambuscades he laid for him. Having escaped so great a danger, he attacked him with open force, though he saw himself abandoned by Ariobarzanes, satrap of Lydia, Ionia, and all Phrygia, whom jealousy prevented from giving him aid. He took his enemy prisoner, with his wife and children; and knowing with what joy the king would receive the news, he endeavoured to make it the more sensible by the pleasure of a surprise. He set out with his illustrious prisoner, without giving the court any advice, and made great marches, to prevent its being known from rumour before his arrival. When he came to Susa, he equipped Thyus in a very singular manner. He was a man of very tall stature, of an haggard and terrible aspect, a black complexion, with the hair of his head and beard very long. He dressed him in a magnificent habit, put a collar and bracelets of gold about his neck and arms, and added to this equipage all the ornaments of a king, as he was in effect. For himself, in the gross habit of a peasant, and clad like a hunter, he led Thyus upon the left in a leash, like a wild beast that had been taken in the toils. The novelty of the sight drew the whole city after it: but nobody was so much surprised and pleased as the king, when he saw them approach in that pleasant masquerade. The rebellion of a prince, very powerful in his country, had given Artaxerxes great and just alarm, and he did not expect to have seen him so soon in his hands. So sudden and successful an execution gave him an higher opinion than ever of the merit of Datames.

To express his sense of it, he gave him an equal share in the command of the army designed against Egypt, with Pharnabazus and Tithraustes, the two principal persons in the state, and even appointed him general in chief, when he recalled Pharnabazus.

When he was upon the point of setting out for that expedition, Artaxerxes ordered him to march directly against Aspis, who had made the country revolt which he commanded in the neighbourhood of Cappadocia. The commission was little important for an officer who had been appointed general, and besides very dangerous, because it was necessary to go in quest of the enemy into a very remote country. The king soon perceived his error, and countermanded him: but Datames had set out directly with an handful of men, and marched night and day; judging that diligence, without a great number of troops, was all that was necessary to surprise and vanquish the enemy. It happened according to his expectation, and the couriers dispatched by the king met Aspis in chains upon the road to Susa.

Nothing was talked of at the court but Datames. It was not known which to admire most, his ready obedience, his wise and enterprising bravery, or his extraordinary success. So glorious a reputation gave offence to the courtiers in power. Enemies in secret to each other, and divided by a contrariety of interests, and a competition in their pretensions, they united together against a superior merit, which reproached their defects, and was therefore a crime in their acceptation. They conspired to ruin him in the king's opinion, and succeeded but too well. As they besieged him perpetually, and he was not upon his guard against persons

who appeared so well affected to his service, they inspired him with jealousy and suspicion to the prejudice of the most zealous and faithful of his officers.

An intimate friend of Datames, who held one of the highest posts at the court, apprised him of what passed, and of the conspiracy which had been formed against him, and had already sunk his credit considerably with the king. * He represented to him, that if the Egyptian expedition, with which he was charged, should take a bad turn, he would find himself exposed to great dangers: that it was the custom with kings to attribute good successes to themselves and their auspicious fortune only, and to impute the bad to the faults of their generals, for which they were responsible at the peril of their heads: that he ran the greater risk, as all that were about the king's person, and had any ascendancy over him, were his declared enemies, and had sworn his destruction.

Upon this advice, Datames resolved to quit the king's service, though without doing any thing hitherto contrary to the fidelity he owed him. He left the command of the army to Mandrocles of Magnesia, departed with his own troops for Cappadocia, seized Paphlagonia which joined it, allied himself secretly with Ariorbarzanes, raised troops, took possession of fortresses, and put good garrisons in them. He received advice that the Pisidians were arming against him. He did not wait their coming on, but made his army march thither under the command of his youngest son, who had the misfortune to be killed in a battle. However lively his affliction might be upon that occasion, he concealed his death, lest the bad news should discourage his troops. When he approached near the enemy, his first care was to take possession of an advantageous post. † Mithrobarzanes, his father-in-law, who commanded the horse, believing his son entirely ruined, determined to go over to the enemy. Datames without concern or emotion, caused a rumour to be spread throughout the army, that it was only a feint concerted between him and his father-in-law, and followed him close, as if he designed to put his troops into a disposition for charging the enemy in two different attacks. The stratagem had all the success he expected from it. When they joined battle, Mithrobarzanes was treated as an enemy on both sides, and cut to pieces with his troops. The army of the Pisidians was put to flight, and left Datames master of the field, and of all the rich booty found in the camp of the conquered.

Datames had not till then declared openly against the king, the actions we have related being only against governours, with whom he might have particular differences, which we have observed before was common enough. His own eldest son, called Scismas, made himself his accuser, and discovered his whole designs to the king. Artaxerxes was highly apprehensive of the consequence. He knew all the merit of this new enemy, and that he did not engage in any enterprise without having maturely considered all its consequences, and taken the necessary measures to secure its success; and that hitherto the execution had always answer-

* Docet eum magno fore in periculo, siquid, illo imperante, in Ægypto adversi accidisset. Namque eam esse consuetudinem regum, ut casus adversos hominibus tribuant, secundos fortunæ suæ; quo facile fieri, ut impellantur ad eorum perniciem, quorum ductu res male gestæ nancientur. Illum hoc majore fore in discrimine, quod, quibus rex maxime obediat, eos habeat inimicissimos. Cor. Nep

† Diocl. l. xv. p. 399.

ed the wisdom of his projects. He sent an army against him into Cappadocia, of almost 200,000 men, of which 20,000 were horse, all commanded by Autophradates. The troops of Datames did not amount to the twentieth part of the king's; so that he had no resource but in himself, the valour of his soldiers, and the happy situation of the post he had chosen. For in that consisted his chief excellence; never captain having better known how to take his advantages and choose his ground, when he was to draw up an army in battle.

His post, as I have observed, was infinitely superior to that of the enemy. He had pitched upon a situation where they could not surround him; where, upon the least movement they made, he could come to blows with them with very considerable advantage; and where, had they resolved to fight, their odds in number would have been absolutely useless to them. Autophradates well knew, that according to all the rules of war, he ought not to hazard a battle in such a conjuncture; but he observed at the same time, that it was much to his dishonour, with so numerous an army, to make choice of a retreat, or to continue any longer in inaction before an handful of enemies. He therefore gave the signal. The first attack was rude, but the troops of Autophradates soon gave way, and were entirely routed. The victor pursued them for some time with great slaughter. There were only 1000 men killed on the side of Datames.

Several battles, or rather skirmishes, were fought afterwards, in which the latter was always victorious; because, perfectly knowing the country, and succeeding especially in the stratagems of war, he always posted himself advantageously, and engaged the enemy in difficult ground, from whence they could not extricate themselves without loss. Autophradates seeing all his endeavours ineffectual, and his supplies entirely exhausted, and despairing of ever being able to subject by force so artful and valiant an enemy, entreated an accommodation, and proposed to him the being restored to the king's favour upon honourable conditions. Datames was not ignorant that there was little security for him in such a choice, because princes are seldom reconciled in earnest with a subject who has failed in his obedience, and to whom they see themselves in some sort obliged to submit. However, as only despair had hurried him into the revolt, and he had always retained at heart the sentiments of zeal and affection for his prince, he accepted the offers with joy, which would put an end to the violent condition his misfortune had engaged him in, and afford him the means of returning to his duty, and of employing his talents for the service of the prince to whom they were due. He promised to send deputies to the king; upon which ensued a cessation of arms, and Autophradates retired into Phrygia, which was his government.

Datames was not deceived. Artaxerxes, furiously enraged against him, had changed the esteem and affection he formerly possessed for him, into an implacable hatred. Finding himself incapable of conquering him by force of arms, he was not ashamed to employ artifice and treachery: means unworthy every man of honour, and how much more so of a prince! He hired several murderers to assassinate him; but Datames was so happy as to escape their ambuscades. At length Mithridates, the son of Ariobarzanes, to whom the king had made magnificent promises, if he could deliver him from so formidable an enemy, having insinuated himself into his friendship, and having long treated him with all the marks of the most entire fidelity to acquire his confidence, took the advantage of a favourable opportunity when he was alone, and stabbed him with his sword, before he was in a condition to defend himself.

Thus * fell this great captain in the snares of a pretended friendship, who had always thought it his honour to observe the most inviolable fidelity in regard to those with whom he had any engagements. Happy, had he always piqued himself also upon being as faithful a subject as he was a true friend; and if he had not in the latter part of his life sullied the lustre of his heroic qualities, by the ill use he made of them; which neither the fear of disgrace, the injustice of those who envied him, the ingratitude of his master for the services he had rendered him, nor any other pretext, could sufficiently authorise.

I am surprised that, comparable as he was to the greatest persons of antiquity, he has remained in a manner buried in silence and oblivion. His great actions and exploits are however worthy of being preserved in history. For it is in such small bodies of troops as those of Datames that the whole soul is exerted, in which the highest prudence is shown, in which chance has no share, and the abilities of a general appear in their full light.

CHAPTER IV.

HISTORY OF SOCRATES ABRIDGED.

AS the death of Socrates is one of the most considerable events of antiquity, I thought it incumbent on me to treat that subject with all the extent it deserves. In this view I shall premise some things which are necessary to the reader's having a just idea of this prince of the philosophers.

Two authors will supply me principally with what I have to say upon this subject, Plato and Xenophon, both disciples of Socrates. It is to them posterity is indebted for many of his discourses († that philosopher having left nothing in writing,) and for an ample account of all the circumstances of his condemnation and death. Plato was an eye witness of the whole, and relates, in his *Apology*, the manner of Socrates' accusation and defence; in his *Criton*, his refusal to make his escape out of prison; in his *Phædon*, his admirable discourse upon the immortality of the soul, which was immediately followed by his death. Xenophon was absent at that time, and upon his return after the expedition of young Cyrus against his brother Artaxerxes: so that he wrote his apology of Socrates only upon the report of others; but his actions and discourses, in his four books of memorable things, he repeats from his own knowledge. Diogenes Laertius, has given us the life of Socrates, but in a very dry and abridged manner.

* *Ita vir, qui multos consilio, neminem perfidia ceperat, simulata captus est amicitia.* Cor. Nep.

† Socrates, cujus ingenium variosque sermones immortalitati scriptis suis Plato tradidit, literam nullam reliquit. Cic. de orat. l. iii. n. 57.

SECTION I.

BIRTH AND EDUCATION OF SOCRATES.

SOCRATES was born at Athens in the fourth year of the 77th Olympiad.* His father Sophroniscus was a sculptor, and his mother Phanarete a midwife. Hence we may observe, that meanness of birth is no obstacle to true merit, in which alone solid glory and real nobility consist. It appears from the comparisons Socrates often used in his discourses, that he was neither ashamed of his father's nor mother's profession. † He was surprised that a sculptor should employ his whole attention to mould an insensible stone into the likeness of a man, and that a man should take so little pains not to resemble an insensible stone. † He would often say that he exercised the function of a midwife with regard to the mind, in making it bring forth all its thoughts, which was indeed the peculiar talent of Socrates. He treated subjects in so simple, natural, and pure an order, that he made those with whom he disputed say what he would, and find an answer themselves to all the questions he proposed to them. He at first learned his father's trade, in which he made himself very expert. † In the time of Pausanias there was a Mercury and the Graces to be seen at Athens of his workmanship; and it is to be presumed, these statues would not have found place amongst those of the greatest masters in the art, if they had not been thought worthy of it.

‡ Criton is reported to have taken him out of his father's shop, from the admiration of his fine genius, and the opinion that it was inconsistent for a young man, capable of the greatest things, to continue perpetually employed upon stone with a chisel in his hand. He was the disciple of Archelaus, who conceived a great affection for him. Archelaus had been pupil to Anaxagoras, a very celebrated philosopher. His first study was physics, the works of nature, and the movement of the heavens, stars, and planets; according to the custom of those times, wherein only that part of philosophy was known, and Xenophon † assures us of his being very learned in it. But ** after having found by his own experience, how difficult, abstruse, intricate, and at the same time how little useful that kind of learning was to the generality of mankind, he was the first, according to Cicero, who conceived the thought of bringing down philosophy from heaven, to place it in cities, and introduce it into private houses; humanizing it, to use that expression, and rendering it more familiar, more useful in common life, mere within the reach of man's capacity, and applying it solely to what might make them more rational, just, and virtuous. †† He found there was a kind of folly in devoting the whole vivacity of his mind, and employing all his

* A. M. 5593. Ant. J. C. 471. Diog. Laert. in Socrat. p. 100.

† Ibid. p. 110.

‡ Plat. in Theatet. p. 149, &c.

§ Paus. l. ix. p. 596.

¶ Diog. p. 101.

† Lib. iv. Mem. p. 710.

** Socrates primus philosophiam devocavit e cœlo, et in urbibus collocavit, et in domos etiam introduxit, et coegit de vita et moribus, rebusque bonis et malis quærere. Cic. Tus. quæst. l. v. n. 10.

Socrates mihi videtur, id quod constat inter omnes, primus a rebus occultis, et ab ipsa natura involutis, in quibus omnes ante eum philosophi occupati fuerunt, avocavisse philosophiam, et ad vitam communem adduxisse; ut de virtutibus et vitiis, omninoque de bonis rebus et malis quæreret; cœlestia autem vel procul esse nostra cognitione censeret, vel si maxime cognita essent, nihil tamen ad bene vivendum conferre. Cic. acad. quæst. l. i. n. 15.

†† Xenoph. Memorab. l. i. p. 710.

time, in inquiries merely curious, involved in impenetrable darkness, and absolutely incapable of contributing to human happiness; whilst he neglected to inform himself in the ordinary duties of life, and in learning what is conformable, or opposite to piety, justice, and probity; in what fortitude, temperance, and wisdom consist; and what is the end of all government, and what the rules of it, and what qualities are necessary for commanding and ruling well. We shall see in the sequel the use he made of this study.

It was so far from preventing him to discharge the duties of a good citizen, that it was the means of making him the more observant of them. He bore arms, as did all the people of Athens; but with more pure and elevated motives. He made many campaigns, was present in many actions, and always distinguished himself by his valour and fortitude. He was seen, towards the end of his life, giving in the senate, of which he was a member, the most shining proofs of his zeal for justice, without being intimidated by the greatest present dangers.

He had accustomed himself early to a sober, severe, laborious life; without which it seldom happens that men are capable of discharging the greatest part of the duties of good citizens. It is difficult to carry the contempt of riches and the love of poverty farther than he did. * He looked upon it as a divine perfection to be in want of nothing; and believed the less we are contented with, the nearer we approach to the divinity. † Seeing the pomp and show displayed by luxury in certain ceremonies, and the infinite quantity of gold and silver employed in them. "How many things," said he, congratulating himself on his condition, "do I not want!" *Quantis non egeo!*

‡ His father left him 80 minæ, that is to say, 4000 livres, which he lent to one of his friends who had occasion for that sum. But the affairs of that friend having taken an ill turn, he lost the whole, and suffered that misfortune with such indifference and tranquility, that he did not so much as complain of it. ¶ We find in Xenophon's *Œconomics* that his whole estate amounted to no more than five minæ, or 250 livres. The richest persons of Athens were his friends, who could never prevail upon him to accept any share of their wealth. When he was in want of any thing, he was not ashamed to declare it: "If I had money," said he one day in an assembly of his friends, "I should buy me a cloak." He did not address himself to any body in particular, but contented himself with that general information. His disciples contended for the honour of making him this small present; which was being too slow, says Seneca; their own observation ought to have prevented both the want and the demand.

He generously refused the offers and presents of Archelaus king of Macedonia, who was desirous of having him at his court; adding, "that he could not go to a man who could give him more than it was in his power to return." Another philosopher does not approve this answer. "Was it making a prince a small return," says Seneca, "to undeceive him in his false ideas of grandeur and magnificence; to inspire him with a contempt for riches; to show him the right use of them; to instruct him in the great art of reigning: in a word, to teach him how to live and how to die?"

* Xenoph. *Memorab.* l. i. p. 731.

† Socrates in pompa, cum magna vis auri argenticque ferretur. Quam multa non desidero! inquit. Cic. *Tusc. Quæst.* l. 5.

‡ Liban. in *Apolog. Socrat.* p. 640.

¶ Xenoph. *Œcon.* p. 822.

§ Socrates, amicis auditibus: Emissum, inquit, pallium, si nummos haberem. Neminem poposcit, omnes admonuit. A quo acciperet, ambitus fuit. Post hoc quisquis properaverit, sero dat; jam Socrati deficit. Senec. de *benef.* l. viii. c. 24

"But," continues Seneca, "the true reason which prevented his going to the court of that prince was, that he did not think it consistent for him to seek a voluntary servitude, whose liberty a free city could not suffer him to enjoy." *Noluit ire ad voluntariam servitutem is cujus libertatem civitas libera ferre non potuit.**

† The peculiar austerity of his life did not render him gloomy and morose, as was common enough with the philosophers of those times. † In company and conversation he was always gay and facetious, and the sole joy and spirit of the entertainment. Though he was very poor, he piqued himself upon the neatness of his person and house, and could not suffer the ridiculous affectation of Antisthenes, who always wore dirty and ragged clothes. He told him once, that through the holes in his cloak, and the rest of his tatters, abundance of vanity might be discerned.

One of the most distinguishing qualities of Socrates was a tranquility of soul, that no accident, no loss, no injury, no ill treatment, could ever alter. Some have believed, that he was by nature hasty and passionate, and that the moderation to which he had attained, was the effect of his reflections and endeavours to subdue and correct himself; which would still add to his merit. || Seneca tells us, that he had desired his friends to apprise him whenever they saw him ready to fall into a passion, and that he had given them that privilege over him which he took himself with them. § Indeed the best time to call in aid against rage and anger, that have so violent and sudden a power over us, is when we are yet ourselves, and in cool blood. At the first signal, the least animadversion, he either softened his tone or was silent. Finding himself in great emotion against a slave; "I would beat you," says he, "if I were not angry." ¶ *Caderem te, nisi irascerer.* Having received a box on the ear, he contented himself with only saying with a smile, ** 'Tis a misfortune not to know when to put on a helmet.

Without going out of his own house, he found enough to exercise his patience in all its extent. Xantippe his wife put it to the severest proofs by her capricious, passionate, violent disposition. It seems, before he took her for his companion, that he was not ignorant of her character; and he says himself in †† Xenophon, that he had expressly chosen her, from the conviction, that if he should be capable of bearing her insults, there would be nobody, though ever so difficult to endure, with whom he could not live. Never was a woman of so violent and fantastical a spirit, and so bad a temper. There was no kind of abuse or injurious treatment which he had not to experience from her. She would sometimes be transported with such an excess of rage, as to tear off his cloak in the open street; and even †† one day after having vented all the reproaches her fury could suggest, she emptied a pot upon his head; at which he only laughed, and said, "That so much thunder must needs produce a shower."

|| Some ancient authors write, that Socrates married a second wife, named Myrto, who was the grand-daughter of Aristides the Just, and that he suffered exceedingly from them both, who were continually quarrelling

* Senec. de benef. l. v. c. 6.

† Xenoph. in conviv.

‡ Ælian. l. iv. c. 11. et l. ix. c. 35.

§ Senec. de Ira. l. iii. c. 15.

¶ Contra potens malum et apud nos gratiosum, dum conspicimus, et nostri sumus, advocemus.

¶ Senec. de Ira. l. i. c. 15.

** Xenoph. in conviv. p. 876.

†† Ibid. l. iii. c. 11.

‡† Diog. in Socrat. p. 118.

|| Plut. in Aristid. p. 365. Athen. l. xiii. p. 555. Diog. Laert. in Socrat. p. 118.

with each other, and never agreed, but in loading him with reproaches, and doing him all the offence they could invent. They pretend, that during the Peloponnesian war, after the pestilence had swept off great part of the Athenians, a decree was made, whereby to retrieve the sooner the ruins of the republic, each citizen was permitted to have two wives at the same time, and that Socrates took the benefit of this new law. Those authors found this circumstance solely upon a passage in a treatise on nobility, ascribed to Aristotle. But besides that, according to Plutarch himself, Panetius, a very grave author, has fully refuted this opinion; neither Plato nor Xenophon, who were well acquainted with all that related to their master, say any thing of this second marriage of Socrates; and on another side, Thucydides, Xenophon, and Diodorus Siculus, who have treated at large all the particulars of the Peloponnesian war, are alike silent in regard to the pretended decree of Athens which permitted bigamy. We may see in the first volume of the memoirs of the Academy of Belles Lettres, a dissertation of Monsieur Hardion's upon this subject, wherein he demonstrates, that the second marriage of Socrates, and the decree upon bigamy, are supposititious facts.

SECTION II.

OF THE DÆMON, OR FAMILIAR SPIRIT OF SOCRATES.

OUR knowledge of Socrates would be defective, if we knew nothing of the genius, which, he said, had assisted him with its council and protection in the greatest part of his actions. It is not agreed among authors what this genius was, commonly called "The Dæmon of Socrates," from the Greek word *Δαίμων*, that signifies something of a divine nature, conceived as a secret voice, a sign, or such an inspiration as diviners are supposed to have had. This genius diverted him from the execution of his designs when they would have been prejudicial to him, without ever inducing him to act any thing: **Esse divinum quoddam, quod Socrates dæmonium appellat, cui semper ipse paruerit, nunquam impellenti, sæpe revocanti.* Plutarch, in his treatise intitled, "Of the genius of Socrates," repeats the different sentiments of the ancients upon the existence and nature of this genius. † I shall confine myself to that of them which seems the most natural and reasonable, though he does not lay much stress upon it.

We know that the divinity has a clear and unerring knowledge of futurity; that man cannot penetrate into its darkness but by uncertain and confused conjectures; that those who succeed best in that research, are such as, by a more exact and studied comparison of the different causes capable of influencing future events, distinguish, with greater force and perspicuity, what will be the result and issue of the conflict of those different causes in conducing to the success or miscarriage of an effect or enterprise. This foresight and discernment has something of divine in it, exalts us above the rest of mankind, approaches us to the Divinity, and makes us participate in some measure in his councils and designs, by giving us an insight and prescience to a certain degree, of what he has ordained concerning the future. Socrates had a just and piercing judgment, joined with the most exquisite prudence. He might call this judgment and prudence, *Δαίμων*, "something divine," being indeed a kind of equivocality in the expression, without attributing to himself, however, the merit of his wisdom in conjecturing upon the future. The Abbe Fraguier comes very near the same

* Cic. de Divin. l. i. n. 122.

† Page 580.

opinion in the dissertation he has left us upon this subject in the Memoirs of the Academy of Belles-Lettres.*

† The effect, or rather function of this genius, was to stop and prevent his acting, without ever inducing him to act. He received also the same impulse, when his friends were going to engage in any bad affair, and communicated it to them; and several instances are related, wherein they found themselves very unfortunate from not having believed him. Now what other signification can be given to this, than that it implies, under mysterious terms, a mind which, by its own lights, and the knowledge of mankind, has attained a sort of insight into futurity? And if Socrates had not intended to lessen in his own person the merit of an unerring judgment, by attributing to a kind of instinct; if at bottom he had desired any thing to be understood besides the general aid of the divine wisdom, which speaks in every man by the voice of reason; would he have escaped, says Xenophon, ‡ the censure of arrogance and falsehood?

§ God has always prevented me from speaking to you, says he to Alcibiades, whilst the weakness of your age would have rendered my discourses ineffectual to you. But I conceive I may now enter into dispute with you, as an ambitious young man, for whom the laws open a way to the dignities of the republic. Is it not visible here, that prudence prevented Socrates from treating Alcibiades seriously, at a time when grave and severe conversation would have given him a disgust, of which perhaps he might never have got the better? ¶ And when in his dialogue upon the commonwealth, Socrates ascribes his avoiding public business to inspiration from above, does he mean any thing more than what he says in his Apology, that a just and good man, who intermeddles with the government in a corrupt state, is not long without perishing? If, † when he appears before the judges who were to condemn him, that divine voice is not heard to prevent him, as it was upon dangerous occasions, the reason is, that he did not deem it a misfortune for him to die, especially at his age, and in his circumstances. Every body knows what his prognostication had been long before, upon the unfortunate expedition of Sicily. He attributed it to his dæmon, and declared it to be the inspiration of that spirit. A wise man, who sees an affair ill-concerted, and conducted with passion, may easily prophesy upon the event of it, without the aid of a dæmon's inspiration.

It must be allowed, however, that the opinion which gives men genii and angels to direct and guard them, was not unknown even to the pagans.

** Plutarch cites the verses of Menander, in which that poet expressly says, "That every man at his birth has a good genius given him, which attends him during the whole course of his life as a guide and director."

Πάντι δαίμονι ἀνδρὶ συμπαραστάτι
 Εὐδὸς γενόμενι, μετὰ γὰρος τῆ βίῃ
 Ἀγαθός.

It may be believed with probability enough, that the dæmon of Socrates, which has been so differently spoken of, and thereby made it a question whether it was a good or bad angel, was no more than the force and recti-

* Tom. iv. p. 363.

† Plat. in Theag. p. 126.

‡ Memorab. l. i. p. 703.

§ Plat. in Alcib. p. 150.

¶ Plat. de Rep. l. vi. p. 498. Apolog. Soc. p. 91, 92.

† Apolog. Soc. p. 40.

** De anim. tranquill. p. 574.

tude of his judgment, which, acting according to the rules of prudence, and with the aid of a long experience, supported by wise reflections, made him foresee the events of those things upon which he was either consulted or deliberated himself.

I conceive at the same time, that he was not sorry the people should believe him inspired, or that he knew futurity by any effect of the divinity whatsoever. That opinion might exalt him very much in the sense of the Athenians, and give him an authority, of which the greatest persons of the pagan world were very fond, * and which they endeavoured to acquire by secret communications, and pretended conferences with some divinity: but it drew the jealousy of many of the citizens upon him.

SECTION III.

SOCRATES DECLARED THE WISEST OF MANKIND BY THE ORACLE.

THIS declaration of the oracle, † so advantageous in appearance for Socrates, did not a little contribute to the inflaming envy, and stirring up of enemies against him, as he tells us himself in his Apology, wherein he recounts the occasion, and true sense of that oracle.

Chærephon, a zealous disciple of Socrates, happening to be at Delphos, demanded of the oracle, whether there was a wiser man than Socrates in the world: the priestess replied there was none. This answer puzzled Socrates extremely, who could scarce comprehend the sense of it: for on the one side, he well knew, says he of himself, that there was neither much nor little wisdom in him; and, on the other, he could not suspect the oracle of falsehood, the divinity being incapable of telling a lie. He therefore considered it attentively, and took great pains to penetrate the sense of it. At first he applied himself to a powerful citizen, a statesman, and a great politician, who passed for one of the wisest men of the city, and who was himself as much convinced of his own merit as any body. He found by his conversation that he knew nothing, and insinuated as much to himself in terms sufficiently intelligible; which made him extremely odious to that citizen, and all who were present. He did the same by several others of the same profession; and all the fruit of his inquiry was, to draw upon himself a greater number of enemies. From the statesmen he addressed himself to the poets, whom he found still fuller of self-esteem, but really more void of knowledge and wisdom. He pursued his inquiries to the artisans, and could not meet with one, who, because he succeeded in his own art, did not believe himself very capable, and fully informed in all that was great besides; which presumption was the almost universal failing of the Athenians. As they had naturally abundance of wit, they pretended to be knowing in every thing, and believed themselves capable of pronouncing upon all things. His inquiries amongst strangers were not more successful.

Socrates afterwards entering into, and comparing himself with all those he had questioned, † discovered, that the difference between him and them

* Lycurgus and Solon had recourse to the authority of oracles to advance their credit. Zeluclus pretended that his laws had been dictated to him by Minerva. Numa Pompilius boasted his conferences with the goddess Egeria. The first Scipio Africanus made the people believe that the gods gave him secret counsels. Even Sertorius' hind had something divine in it.

† Plut. in. Apolog. p. 21, 22.

‡ Socrates in omnibus fere sermonibus sic disputat, ut nihil affirmet ipse, re-

was, that they all believed they knew what they did not know, and that, for his part, he sincerely professed his ignorance. From thence he concluded, that only God is truly wise, and that the true meaning of his oracle was to signify, that all human wisdom was no great matter, or, to speak more properly, was nothing at all; and as to the oracle's naming me, it no doubt did so, says he, by way of setting me up for an example, as if it intended to declare to all men, The wisest among you is he, who knows, like Socrates, that there is no real wisdom in him.

SECTION IV.

SOCRATES DEVOTES HIMSELF ENTIRELY TO THE INSTRUCTION OF THE YOUTH OF ATHENS.

AFTER having related some particularities in the life of Socrates, it is time to proceed to that in which his character principally and peculiarly consisted; I mean the pains he took to instruct mankind, and particularly in forming the youth of Athens.

* He seemed, says Libanius, the common father of the republic, so attentive was he to the happiness and advantage of his whole country. But as it was very difficult to correct the aged, and to make people change principles who revere the errors in which they have grown grey, he devoted his labours principally to the instruction of youth, in order to sow the seeds of virtue in a soil more fit to produce the fruits of it.

† He had no open school like the rest of the philosophers, nor set times for his lessons. He had no benches prepared, nor ever mounted a professor's chair. He was the philosopher of all times and seasons. He taught in all places, and upon all occasions; in walking, conversation, at meals, in the army, and in the midst of the camp, in the public assemblies of the senate or people, in prison itself; and when he drank the poison, he philosophised, says Plutarch, and instructed mankind. And from thence the same judicious author takes occasion to establish a great principle in point of government, which Seneca † before him had placed in all its light. To be a public man, says he, it is not necessary to be actually in office, to wear the robe of judge or magistrate, and to sit in the highest tribunals for the administration of justice. Many do this, who, though honoured with the fine names of orators, prætors, and senators, if they want the merit of those characters, ought to be regarded as private persons, and often confounded with the lowest and vilest of the populace. But whoever knows

fellat alios; nihil se scire dicat, nisi id ipsum, eoque præstare cæteris, quod illi, quæ nesciant, scire se putent; ipse se nihil scire id unum sciat, ob eamque rem se arbitrari ab Apolline omnium sapientissimum esse dictum, quod hæc esset una omnis sapientia, non arbitrari se scire quod nesciat. Cic. acad. quæst. l. i. n. 15. 16.

* In Apol. Soerat. p. 641.

† Plut. an seni sit. ger. resp. p. 796.

† Habet ubi se etiam in privato late explicet magnus animus.—Ita delituerit (vir ille) ut ubicunque otium suum absconderit, prodesse velit et singulis et universis, ingenio, voce, consilio. Nec enim is solus reip. prodest, qui candidatus extrahit, et tuetur reos, et de pace belloque censet, sed qui juventutem exhortatur, qui in tanta bonorum præceptorum inopia virtute instruit animos, qui ad pecuniam luxuriamque cursu ruentes prensat ac retrahit, et si nihil aliud certe moratur, in privato publicum negotium agit. An ille plus præstat, qui inter peregrinos et cives, aut urbanos prætor ademptibus adessoris verba pronunciat; quam qui docet, quid sit justitia quid patientia, quid fortitudo, quid mortis contemptus, quid deorum intellectus, quam gratuitum bonum sit conscientia? Senec. de tranquill. an. c. iii.

to give wise counsels to those who consult him, to animate the citizens to virtue, and to inspire them with sentiments of probity, equity, generosity, and love of their country; this is, says Plutarch, the true magistrate and ruler, in whatsoever condition or place he be.

Such was Socrates. The services he did the state, by the instructions he gave their youth and the disciples he formed, are inexpressibly great. Never had master a greater number, or so illustrious. Plato, though alone, were worth a multitude. * Upon the point of death he blessed and thanked God for three things; that he had endued him with a rational soul, that he was born a Greek, and not a barbarian, and that he had placed his birth in the lifetime of Socrates. † Xenophon had the same advantage. It is said, that one day Socrates met him in the street, and stopping him with his staff, asked him whether he knew where provisions were sold? It was not difficult to answer this question. But Socrates having demanded in what place men learned virtue, and seeing this second question put him to a stand: "If you desire to know it," continued the philosopher, "follow me, and you shall be informed." Which he did immediately, and was afterwards the first who collected and published his master's discourses.

‡ Aristippus, upon a conversation with Ischomachus, in which he had introduced some strokes of Socrates' doctrine, conceived so ardent a passion to become his disciple, that he grew lean and wan in effect of it, till he could go to the fountain head, and imbibe his fill of a philosophy that taught the knowledge and cure of evil.

What is reported of Euclid the Megarian, explains still better how high the passion of Socrates' disciples ran, to receive the benefit of his instructions. || There was at that time an open war between Athens and Megara, which was carried on with so much animosity, that the Athenians obliged their generals to take an oath to lay waste the territory of Megara twice a year, and prohibited the Megarians to set foot in Attica, upon pain of death. This decree could not extinguish nor suspend the zeal of Euclid. ¶ He left his city in the evening in the disguise of a woman, with a veil upon his head, and came to the house of Socrates in the night, where he continued till the approach of day, when he returned in the same manner he came.

The ardour of the young Athenians to follow him was incredible. They left father and mother, and renounced all parties of pleasure, to attach themselves to him, and to hear his discourses. We may judge of this in the example of Alcibiades, the most ardent and fiery of all the Athenians. The philosopher, however, never spared him, and was always ready to calm the sallies of his passions, and to rebuke his pride, which was his great disease. I have before related some instances of this temper of his. ¶ One day when Alcibiades was boasting of his wealth, and the great estates in his possession, which generally blow up the pride of young people of quality, he carried him to a geographical map, and asked him to find Attica. It was so small it could scarce be discerned upon that draught; he found it, however, though with some difficulty: but upon being desired to point out his own estate there, "It is too small," says he, "to be distinguished in so little a space." "See then," replied Socrates, "how much you are affected about an imperceptible point of land?" This reasoning might have been urged much further still. For what was Attica compar-

* Plut. in Mario. p. 433.

† Plut. de curios. p. 516.

‡ Aul. Gel. Noct. Att. l. vi. c. 10.

¶ Diog. in Xenoph. p. 120.

|| Plut. in Pericl. p. 108.

¶ Ælian. l. iii. c. 28.

ed to all Greece, Greece to Europe, Europe to the whole world, and the world itself to the vast extent of the infinite orbs which surround it? What an insect, what a nothing, is the most powerful prince of the earth in the midst of this abyss of bodies and immense spaces, and how little of it does he occupy!

The young people of Athens, dazzled with the glory of Themistocles, Cimon, and Pericles, and full of a wild ambition, after having received for some time the lessons of the sophists, who promised to make them very great politicians, conceived themselves capable of every thing, and aspired at the highest employments. One of these, named Glauco, had taken it so strongly into his head to enter upon the administration of the public affairs, though not 20 years old, that none of his family or friends were able to divert him from a design so little consistent with his age and capacity. Socrates, who had an affection for him upon account of Plato his brother, was the only person that could prevail upon him to change his resolution.

Meeting him one day, he accosted him so happily with discourse, that he engaged him to give him the hearing. "You are desirous then to govern the republic," said he to him. "True," replied Glauco. "You cannot have a more noble design," answered Socrates: "for if you succeed, you will have it in your power to serve your friends effectually, to aggrandize your family, and to extend the confines of your country. You will make yourself known not only to Athens, but throughout all Greece, and perhaps your renown like that of Themistocles, may spread amongst the barbarous nations. In short, wherever you are, you will attract the respect and admiration of the whole world."

So smooth and insinuating a prelude was extremely pleasing to the young man, who was taken by his blind side. He staid willingly, gave no occasion to press him on that account, and the conversation continued. "Since you desire to be esteemed and honoured, no doubt your view is to be useful to the public?" "Certainly." "Tell me then, I beg you, in the name of the gods, what is the first service you propose to render to the state?" As Glauco seemed at a loss, and meditated upon what he should answer: "I presume," continues Socrates, "it is to enrich it, that is to say, to augment its revenues." "My very thought." "You are well versed then undoubtedly in the revenues of the state, and know perfectly to what they may amount: you have not failed to make them your particular study, in order that if a fund should happen to fail by an unforeseen accident you might be able to supply the deficiency by another." "I protest," replied Glauco, "that never entered into my thoughts." "At least you will tell me to what the expences of the public amount: for you must know the importance of retrenching such as are superfluous." "I own I am as little informed in this point as the other." "You must therefore refer your design of enriching the state till another time; for it is impossible you should do it, whilst you are unacquainted with its revenues and expences."

"But," said Glauco, "there is still another means which you have not mentioned. A state may be enriched by the ruin of its enemies." "You are in the right," replied Socrates. "But that depends upon its being the strongest; otherwise it incurs the danger of losing what it has. For which reason, he who talks of engaging in a war, ought to know the forces on both sides; that if he finds his own party strongest he may boldly advise the war, and, if weakest, dissuade the people from under-

"taking it. Now do you know the strength of our republic, and that of our enemies, by sea and land? Have you a state of them in writing? Be so kind to let me see it." "I have it not at present," said Glauco. "I see then," said Socrates, "that we shall not presently enter into a war, if you are charged with the government; for you have abundance of enquiries to make, and much pains to go through, before you will resolve upon it."

He ran over in this manner several other articles no less important, with which Glauco appeared equally unacquainted; till he brought him to confess how ridiculous those people were, who have the rashness to intrude into government without any other preparation for the service of the public, than that of an high esteem for themselves, and an immoderate ambition of rising to the first places and dignities. "Have a care, dear Glauco," said he to him, "lest a too warm desire of honours should deceive you into pursuits, that may cover you with shame, by setting your incapacity and slender abilities in full light."

Glauco improved from the wise admonitions of Socrates, and took time to inform himself in private, before he ventured to appear in public. This is a lesson for all ages, and may be very useful to persons in all stations and conditions of life.

* Socrates did not urge his friends to enter early upon public employments; but first to take pains for the attainment of the knowledge necessary to their success in them. "† A man must be very simple," said he, "to believe that the mechanic arts are to be acquired without the help of proper masters, and that the knowledge requisite in governing states, which is the highest degree of human prudence, demands no previous labour and application." His great care in regard to those who aspired at public employments, was to form their manners upon the solid principles of probity and justice; and especially to inspire them with a sincere love of their country, with the most ardent passion for the public good, and an high idea of the power and goodness of the gods: because, without these qualities, all other abilities serve only to render men more wicked, and more capable of doing evil. Xenophon has transmitted to us a conversation of Socrates with Euthydemus, upon providence, which is one of the finest passages to be found in the writings of the ancients.

"Did you never reflect within yourself," says Socrates to Euthydemus, "how much care the gods have taken to bestow upon man all that is necessary to his nature?" "Never, I assure you," replied he. "You see," continued Socrates, "how necessary light is, and how precious that gift of the gods ought to appear to us." "Without it," added Euthydemus, "we should be like the blind, and all nature as if it were not, or were dead: but because we have occasion for suspense and relaxation, they have also given us the night for our repose." "You are in the right, and for this we ought to render them continual praises and thanksgiving. They have ordained that the sun, that bright and luminous star, should preside over the day, to distinguish its different parts, and that its light should not only serve to discover the wonders of nature, but to dispense universal life and heat; and at the same time they have commanded the moon and stars to illuminate the night, of itself dark and obscure. Is there any thing more admirable than this variety and vicissitude of day and night, of light and darkness, of labour and rest: and all this for the convenience and good of man?" Socrates pau-

* Xenoph. Memorab. l. iv p. 800.

† Ibid. p. 792.

merates in like manner the infinite advantages we receive from fire and water, in the occasions of life ; and continuing to observe upon the wonderful attention of providence in all that regards us, " What say you, pursued he, upon the sun's return after winter to revisit us, and that as the fruits of one season wither and decay, he ripens new ones to succeed them ? That having rendered man this service, he retires, lest he should incommode him by excess of heat ; and then after having removed to a certain point, which he could not pass, without putting us in danger of perishing with cold, that he returns in the same track to resume his place in those parts of the heavens where his presence is most beneficial to us ? And because we could support neither the cold nor heat, if we were to pass in an instant from the one to the other, do you not admire, that whilst this star approaches and removes so slowly, the two extremities arrive by almost insensible degrees ? *Is it possible not to discover, in this disposition of the seasons of the year, a providence and goodness, not only attentive to our necessities, but even our delights and enjoyments."

" All these things," said Euthydemus, make me doubt whether the gods have any other employment than to shower down their gifts and graces upon mankind. There is one point, however, that puts me to a stand, which is, that the brute animals partake of all these blessings as well as ourselves." " Yes," replied Socrates : " but you do but observe, that all these animals subsist only for man's service ? The strongest and most vigorous of them he subjects at his will, he makes them tame and gentle, and uses them successfully in his wars, his labours, and the other occasions of life."

" What if we consider man in himself ?" Here Socrates examines the diversity of the senses, by the ministry of which man enjoys all that is best and most excellent in nature ; the vivacity of his wit, and the force of his reason, which exalt him infinitely above all other animals ; the wonderful gift of speech, by the means of which we communicate our thoughts reciprocally, publish our laws, and govern states.

" From all this," says Socrates, " it is easy to discern that there are gods, and that they have man in their particular care, though he cannot discover them by his senses. Do we perceive the thunder, whilst it strikes through all things which oppose it ? Do we distinguish the winds, whilst they are tearing up all before them in our view ? Our soul itself, with which we are so intimate, which moves and acts us, is it visible ? Can we behold it ? It is the same with regard to the gods, of whom none are visible in the distribution of their favours. The GREAT GOD himself," (these words are remarkable, and demonstrate that Socrates acknowledged one supreme God, the author of all being, and superior to all others, who were only the ministers of his will,) " this great god, who has formed the universe, and supports the stupendous work, whose every part is finished with the utmost goodness and harmony ; he who preserves them: perpetually in immortal vigour, and causes them to obey him with a never failing punctuality, and a rapidity not to be followed by our imagination ; this God makes him sufficiently visible by the endless wonders of which he is author ; but continues always invisible in himself. Let us not then refuse to believe even what we do not see, and let us supply the defect of our corporeal eyes, by using those of the soul ; but espe-

* Ωρας ἀρμολίτσας πρὸς τὴν παρεχὴν, αἱ ἡμῖν οὐ μόνον ἀν' ἰδεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ παντοῖα παρασκευάζουσι, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱς εὐχρησιμοποιεῖται.

cially let us learn to render the just homage of respect and veneration to the divinity, whose will it seems to be, that we should have no other perception of him than by his effects in our favour. Now this adoration of this homage, consists in pleasing him, and we can only please him in doing his will.

* In this manner Socrates instructed youth; these are the principles and sentiments he inspired into them; on the one side, a perfect submission to the laws and magistrates, in which he made justice consist; on the other, a profound regard for the Divinity, which constitutes religion. In things surpassing our understanding, he advises us to consult the gods; and as they impart themselves only to those that please them, he recommends above all things the making of them propitious by a wise regularity of conduct. "† The gods are wise," says he, "and it depends upon them either to grant what we ask, or to give us the directly reverse of it." He cites an excellent prayer from an anonymous poet: "Great God, give us, we beseech thee, those good things of which we stand in need, whether we crave them or not; and remove from us all those which may be hurtful to us, though we implore them of you." The vulgar imagined that there are things which the gods observe, and others of which they take no notice: but Socrates taught, that the gods observe all our actions and words; that they penetrate into our most secret thoughts, are present in all our deliberations; and that they inspire us in all our actions.

SECTION V.

SOCRATES APPLIES HIMSELF TO DISCREDIT THE SOPHISTS IN THE OPINION OF THE YOUNG ATHENIANS.

SOCRATES found it necessary to prejudice the young people against a bad taste, which had prevailed for some time in Greece. A sect of assuming men arose, who, ranking themselves as the first sages of Greece, were entirely the reverse in their conduct; for, instead of being infinitely remote from all avarice and ambition, like Pittacus, Bias, Thales, and the others who made the study of wisdom their principal occupation, these men were ambitious and covetous, entered into the intrigues and affairs of the world, and made a trade of their pretended knowledge.‡ They were called sophists, and wandered from city to city. They caused themselves to be cried up as oracles, and walked about attended by crowds of their disciples, who, through a kind of enchantment, abandoned the embraces of their parents, to follow these proud teachers, to whom they paid a great price for their instruction.

There was nothing these masters did not profess: theology, physics, ethics, arithmetic, astronomy, grammar, music, poetry, rhetoric, and history. They knew every thing, and could teach every thing. Their greatest supposed skill lay in philosophy and eloquence. Most of them, like Gorgias, valued themselves upon giving immediate answers to all questions that could be proposed to them. Their young disciples acquired nothing from their precepts, but a silly esteem for themselves, and an universal

* Xenoph. Memorab. l. iv. p. 808, et 805.

† *Ἐπι θεοῖς εἶναι, οἷμαι, ὡσεὶ καὶ διδόναι αὐτῶν ἂν τις εὐχόμενος τυγχάνῃ, καὶ τὰ πάντῃα τῆσσι.*
Plut. in Alcib. l. ii. p. 148.

‡ Sic enim appellantur hi, qui ostentationis aut quæstus causa philosophantur.
Cic. in Lucul. n. 129.

‡ Plat. in Apolog. p. 19, 20.

contempt for every body else ; so that not a scholar quitted these schools, but was more impertinent than when he first entered them.

It was necessary to decry the false eloquence and bad logic of these proud teachers in the sense of the young Athenians. To attack them in front, and dispute with them in a direct manner by a continued discourse, was what Socrates could well have done, for he possessed in a supreme degree the talents of speaking and reasoning ; but this was no means to succeed against great haranguers, whose sole aim was to dazzle their auditors with a vain glitter and rapid flow of words. He therefore took another course ; and employing * the turns and address of irony, which he knew how to apply with wonderful art and delicacy, he chose to conceal, under the appearance of simplicity and the affectation of ignorance, all the beauty and great force of his genius. Nature, which had given him so fine a soul, seemed to have formed his outside expressly for supporting the ironic character. He was very ugly, and, besides that, † had something very blockish and stupid in his physiognomy. The whole air of his person, which had nothing but what was very common and very poor in it, perfectly corresponded with that of his countenance.

When ‡ he happened to be in the company of some one of the sophists, he proposed his doubts with a diffident and modest air, asked simple questions in a plain manner, and, as if he had been incapable of expressing himself otherwise, made use of trivial comparisons, and allusions taken from the meanest employments. The sophist heard him with a scornful attention, and instead of giving him a precise answer, fell into his common place, and talked a great deal without saying any thing to the purpose. Socrates, after having praised (not to enrage) his adversary, entreated him to adapt himself to his weakness, and to descend so low as him, by satisfying his questions in a few words ; because neither his wit nor memory were capable of comprehending or retaining so many fine and exalted notions, and that all his knowledge was confined to question and answer.

This passed in a numerous assembly, and the scientific person could not recede. When Socrates had once got him out of his intrenchment, by obliging him to answer his questions succinctly, he carried him on from one to another to the most absurd consequences ; and after having reduced him either to contradict himself, or be silent, he complained that the learned man would not vouchsafe to instruct him. The young people however perceived the incapacity of their master, and changed their admiration for him into contempt. Thus the name of sophist became odious and ridiculous.

It is easy to judge, that men of the sophist's character, of which I have now spoke, who were in high credit with the great, who lorded it among the youth of Athens, and had been long celebrated for their wit and learn-

* Socrates in ironia dissimulantiaque longe omnibus lepore atque humanitate præstitit. Cic. l. ii. de orat. n. 270.

† Zopyrus physiognomon—stupidum esse Socratem dixit, et bardum. Cic. de Fat. n. 10.

‡ Socrates de se ipse detrahens in disputatione, plus tribuebat iis, quos volebat refellere. Ira, cum aliud diceret atque sentiret, libenter uti solitus est illa dissimulatione, quam Græci *εἰρωνία* vocant. Cic. Acad. Quæst. l. iv. n. 15.

Sed et illum quem nominavi (Gorgiam) et cæteros sophistas, ut e Platone intelligi potest, lusus videmus a Socrate. Is enim percontando atque interrogando elicere solebat eorum opiniones quibuscum diserebat, ut ad ea, quæ ille respondissent, si quid videretur, diceret. Cic. de Finib. l. ii. n. 2.

ing, could not be attacked with impunity; and the rather, because they had been taken in the two most sensible points, their fame and their interest. * Socrates, for having endeavoured to unmask their vices, and discredit their false eloquence, experienced, from these corrupt and haughty men, all that could be feared or expected from the most malignant envy, and the most envenomed hatred; to which it is now time to proceed.

SECTION VI.

SOCRATES IS ACCUSED OF HOLDING BAD OPINIONS IN REGARD TO THE GODS.—HE IS CONDEMNED TO DIE.

SOCRATES was accused a little before the first year of the 95th Olympiad, soon after the expulsion of the thirty tyrants out of Athens, in the † 69th year of his life; but the prosecution had been projected long before. The oracle of Delphos, which had declared him the wisest of mankind; the contempt into which he had brought the doctrine and morals of the sophists of his time, who were then in high reputation; the liberty with which he attacked all vice; the singular attachment of his disciples for his person and maxims had all concurred in alienating people against him, and had drawn abundance of envy upon him.

‡ His enemies having sworn his destruction, and perceiving the difficulty of the attempt, prepared the way for it at a distance, and at first attacked him in the dark, and by obscure and secret methods. It is said, that to sound the people's disposition in regard to Socrates, and to try whether it would ever be safe to cite him before the judges, they engaged Aristophanes to bring him into the theatre in a comedy, wherein the first seeds of the accusation meditated against him were sown. It is not certain whether Aristophanes was suborned by Anytus, and the rest of Socrates' enemies, to compose that satirical piece against him. It is very likely, that the declared contempt of Socrates for all comedies in general, and for those of Aristophanes in particular, whilst he professed an extraordinary esteem for the tragedies of Euripides, might be the poet's true motive for taking this revenge of the philosopher. However it were, Aristophanes to the disgrace of poetry, lent his pen to the malice of Socrates' enemies, or his own resentment, and employed his whole genius and capacity to depreciate the best and most excellent man that ever the pagan world produced.

He composed a piece called "The Clouds," wherein he introduced the philosopher, perched in a basket, and hoisted up amidst the air and clouds, from whence he vents maxims, or rather the most ridiculous subtleties. A very aged debtor, who desires to escape the close pursuits of his creditors, comes to him to be taught the art of tricking them at law; to prove by unanswerable reasons that he owes them nothing; and, in a word, of a very bad, to make a very good cause. But finding himself incapable of any improvements from the sublime lessons of his new master, he brings his son to him in his stead. This young man soon after quits this learned school so well instructed, that at their first meeting he beats his father, and proves to him by subtle, but invincible arguments, that he has reason for treating him in that manner. In every scene where Socrates appears, the poet makes him utter a thousand impertinences, and as many impieties against the gods, and in particular against Jupiter. He makes him talk like a man of the greatest vanity and opinion of himself, with an equal contempt

* Plat. in Apol. p. 23.

† A. M. 3602. Ant. J. C. 402.

‡ Elian. l. ii. c. 13. Plut. in Apolog. Socrat. p. 19.

for all others, who out of a criminal curiosity is for penetrating what passes in the heavens, and for diving into the abysses of the earth; who boasts of having always the means to make injustice triumph; and who is not contented with keeping those secrets for his own use, but teaches them to others, and thereby corrupts youth. All this is attended with a refined railery, and a salt, which could not fail of pleasing a people of so quick and delicate a taste as the Athenians, who were besides naturally invidious to all transcendent merit. They were so much charmed with it, that without waiting the conclusion of the representation, they ordered the name of Aristophanes to be set down above those of all his competitors.

Socrates, who had been informed that he was to be acted in the theatre, went thither upon the day to see the comedy, contrary to his custom; for it was not common for him to go to those assemblies, unless when some new tragedy of Euripides was to be performed, who was his intimate friend, and whose pieces he esteemed, on account of the solid principles of morality he took care to intersperse in them. It was however observed, that he had not patience to wait the conclusion of one of them, wherein the actor had begun with a dangerous maxim, and went out immediately, without considering the injury his withdrawing might do his friend's reputation. He never went to comedies, unless when Alcibiades and Critias forced him thither against his will, offended at the unbounded licence which reigned in them, and incapable of seeing the reputation of his fellow-citizens publicly torn in pieces. He was present at this without the least emotion, and without expressing any discontent; and some strangers being in pain to know who the Socrates* intended by the play was, he rose up from his seat, and showed himself during the whole representation. He told those who were near him, and were amazed at his indifference and patience, that he imagined himself at a great entertainment, where he was agreeably laughed at, and that it was necessary to let railery pass.

There is no appearance, as I have already observed, that Aristophanes, though he was not Socrates' friend, had entered into the black conspiracy of his enemies, and had any thought of occasioning his destruction. It is more probable, that a poet, who diverted the public at the expence of the principal magistrates and most celebrated generals was also willing to make them laugh at the expence of a philosopher. All the guilt was on the side of those who envied him, and his enemies, who were in hopes of making great use of the representation of this comedy against him. The artifice was indeed profound, and conceived with skill. In acting a man upon the stage, he is only represented on his bad, weak, or ambiguous sides. That view of him is followed with ridicule: ridicule accustoms people to the contempt of his person; and contempt proceeds to injustice: for the world are naturally bold in insulting, abusing, and injuring a man, when once he becomes the object of their general contempt.

These were the first blows struck at him, and served as an essay and trial of the great affair meditated against him. It lay dormant a long while, and did not break out till 20 years afterwards. The troubles of the republic might well occasion that long delay: for it was in that interval the enterprise against Sicily happened, the event of which was so unfortunate that Athens was besieged and taken by Lysander, who changed its form of government, and established the thirty tyrants, who were not expelled till a very small time before the affair we speak of.

* Melitus then appeared as accuser, and entered a process in form against Socrates. His accusation consisted of two heads. The first was, that he did not admit the gods acknowledged by the republic, and introduced new divinities: the second, that he corrupted the youth of Athens; and concluded with inferring, that sentence of death ought to pass against him.

Never had accusation so little probability, pretext, or foundation as this. It was now 40 years that Socrates had made it his profession to instruct the Athenian youth. He had advanced no opinions in secret, and in the dark. His lessons were given publicly, and in the view of great numbers of auditors. He had always observed the same conduct, and taught the same principles. What then could be Melitus' motive for this accusation, after such a length of time? How came his zeal for the public good, after having been languid and drowsy for so many years, to awake on a sudden, and become so violent? Is it pardonable for so warm and worthy a citizen as Melitus would appear, to have continued mute and inactive, whilst any one corrupted the whole youth of the city, by instilling seditious maxims into them, and by inspiring them with a disgust and contempt for the established government? For he who does not prevent an evil when it is in his power, is equally criminal with him that commits it. † Libanus speaks thus in a declamation of his, called the Apology of Socrates. But, continues he, though Melitus, whether out of distraction, indifference, or real avocation of his affairs, never thought for so many years of entering an accusation against Socrates, how came it to pass, that in a city like Athens, which abounded with wise magistrates, and, what is more, with bold informers, so public a conspiracy as that imputed to Socrates should escape the eyes of those whom either the love of their country, or invidious malignity, render so vigilant and attentive? Nothing was ever less feasible, or more void of all probability.

‡ As soon as the conspiracy broke out, the friends of Socrates prepared for his defence. Lysias, the most able orator of his time, brought him an elaborate discourse of his composing, wherein he had set forth the reasons and measures of Socrates in all their light, and interspersed the whole with tender and pathetic strokes,|| capable of moving the most obdurate hearts. Socrates read it with pleasure, and approved it very much; but as it was more conformable to the rules of rhetoric than the sentiments and fortitude of a philosopher, he told him frankly that it did not suit him. Upon which Lysias, having asked how it was possible to be well done, and at the same time not suit him; in the same manner, said he, using, according to his custom, a vulgar comparison, that an excellent workman might bring me magnificent apparel, or shoes embroidered with gold, to which nothing would be wanting on his part, but which however would not fit me. He persisted therefore inflexibly in the resolution, not to demean himself by begging suffrages in the low abject manner common at that time. He employed neither artifice nor the glitter of eloquence. He had no recourse either to solicitation or entreaty. He brought neither his wife nor children to incline the judges in his favour by their sighs and tears. § Nevertheless,

* A. M. 3604. Ant. J. C. 401.

† Liban. in Apolog. Socrat. p. 645—648.

‡ Cicer. l. i. de orat. n. 231, 233.

|| Quint. l. xi. c. i.

§ His et talibus adductus Socrates, nec patronum quesivit ad iudicium capiti-
neq; iudicibus supplex fuit: adhibuitque liberam contumaciam a magnitudi-
ne animi ductam, non a superbia. Cic. Tusc. Quæst. lib. 1.

though he firmly refused to make use of any voice but his own in his defence, and to appear before his judges in the submissive posture of a suppliant, he did not behave in that manner out of pride, or contempt of the tribunal. It was from a noble and intrepid assurance, resulting from greatness of soul, and the consciousness of truth and his innocence; so that his defence had nothing timorous or weak in it. His discourse was bold, manly, generous, without passion, without emotion, full of the noble liberty of a philosopher, with no other ornament but that of truth, and brightened universally with the character and language of innocence. Plato, who was present, transcribed it afterwards, and without any additions composed from it the work which he calls the Apology of Socrates, one of the most consummate masterpieces of antiquity. I shall here make an extract from it.

* Upon the day assigned, the proceedings commenced in the usual forms; the parties appeared before the judges, and Melitus spoke. The worse his cause, and the less provided it was with proofs, the more occasion he had for address and art to cover its weakness. He omitted nothing that might render the adverse party odious; and instead of reasons, which could not but fail him, he substituted the delusive shine of a lively and pompous eloquence. Socrates, in observing that he could not tell what impression the discourse of his accusers might make upon the judges, owns, that for his part he scarce knew himself, they had given such artful colouring and likelihood to their arguments, though there was not the least word of truth in all they had advanced.

† I have already said, that their accusation consisted of two heads. The first regards religion. Socrates enquires out of an impious curiosity into what passes in the heavens, and in the bowels of the earth. He denies the gods adored by his country. He endeavours to introduce a new worship; and, if he may be believed, an unknown god inspires him in all his actions. To make short, he believes there are no gods.

The second head relates to the interest and government of the state. Socrates corrupts the youth, by instilling bad sentiments concerning the Divinity into them; by teaching them a contempt of the laws, and the order established in the republic; by declaring openly against the choice of the magistrates by lot; by exclaiming against the public assemblies, where he is never seen to appear; by teaching the art of making the worst of causes good; by attaching the youth to himself out of a spirit of pride and ambition, under the pretence of instructing them; and by proving to children, that they may abuse their parents with impunity. He glories in a pretended oracle, and believes himself the wisest of mankind. He taxes all others with folly, and condemns without reserve all their maxims and actions; constituting himself by his own authority the general censor and reformer of the state. Notwithstanding which, the effects of his lessons may be seen in the persons of Critias and Alcibiades, his most intimate friends, who have done great mischiefs to their country, and have been the most wicked of citizens, and the most abandoned of men.

This concluded with recommending to the judges to be very much upon

* Plat. in Apolog. Socrat. Xenoph. in Apolog. Socrat. et in Memor.

† Plat. in Apolog. p. 24.

‡ Socrates in reality did not approve this manner of electing the magistrates. He observed, that when a pilot, a musician, or an architect is wanted, nobody is willing to take him at venture; though the faults of these people are far from being of the great importance of those errors which are committed in the administration of the republic. Xenoph. Memorab. 1.

their guard against the dazzling eloquence of Socrates, and to suspect extremely the insinuating and artificial turns of address which he would employ to deceive them.

* Socrates began his discourse with this point, and declared that he would speak to the judges as it was his custom to talk in his common conversation, that is to say, with much simplicity and no art.

† He then proceeds to particulars. Upon what foundation can it be alleged that he does not acknowledge the gods of the republic; he who has been often seen to sacrifice in his own house, and in the temples? Can it be doubted whether he uses divination or not, whilst it is made a crime in him to report that he received counsels from a certain divinity, and thence concluded that he aims at introducing new deities? But in this he innovates nothing more than others, who, putting their faith in divination, observe the flight of birds, consult the entrails of victims, and remark even words and accidental encounters: different means which the gods employ to give mankind a foreknowledge of the future. Old or new, it is still evident that Socrates acknowledges divinities, by the confession of even Melitus himself, who, in his information, avers that he believes dæmons, that is to say, subaltern spirits, the offspring of the gods. Now every man who believes the offspring of the gods, believes the gods.

‡ As to what relates to the impious inquiries into natural things imputed to him; without despising or condemning those who apply themselves to the study of physics, he declares, that as for him, he had entirely devoted himself to what concerns moral virtue, the conduct of life, and the rules of government, as to a knowledge infinitely more useful than any other; and he calls upon all those who have been his hearers, to come forth and belie him if he does not say what is true.

“ I am accused of corrupting the youth, and of instilling dangerous maxims into them, as well in regard to the worship of the gods, as to the rules of government. You know, Athenians, that I never made it my profession to teach; nor can envy, however violent against me, reproach me with having ever sold my instructions. I have an undeniable evidence for me in this respect, which is my poverty. Always equally ready to communicate my thoughts either to the rich or poor, and to give them entire leisure to question or answer me, I lend myself to every one who is desirous of becoming virtuous; and if amongst those who hear me, there are any who prove either good or bad, neither the virtues of the one, nor the vices of the other, to which I have not contributed, are to be ascribed to me. My whole employment is to persuade the young and old against too much love for the body, for riches and all other precarious things of whatsoever nature they be, and against too little regard for the soul, which ought to be the object of their affection: for I incessantly urge to you, that virtue does not proceed from riches, but on the contrary, riches from virtue; and that all the other goods of human life, as well public as private, have their source in the same principle.

“ If to speak in this manner be to corrupt youth, I confess, Athenians, that I am guilty, and deserve to be punished. If what I say be not true, it is most easy to convict me of my falsehood. I see here a great number of my disciples; they have only to appear. But perhaps the reserve and consideration for a master who has instructed them, will prevent them from declaring against me: at least their fathers, brothers,

* Plat. p. 17.

† Plat. p. 27. Xenoph. p. 703.

‡ Ibid. p. 710

“ and uncles, cannot, as good relations and good citizens, dispense with
 “ their not standing forth to demand vengeance against the corrupter of
 “ their sons, brothers and nephews. But these are the persons who take
 “ upon them my defence, and interest themselves in the success of my
 “ cause.

“ * Pass on me what sentence you please, Athenians ; but I can nei-
 “ ther repent nor change my conduct. I must not abandon or suspend a
 “ function, which God himself has imposed on me. Now he has charged
 “ me with the care of instructing my fellow-citizens. If after having faith-
 “ fully kept all the posts wherein I was placed by our generals at Potidaea,
 “ Amphipolis, and Delium, the fear of death should at this time make me
 “ abandon that in which the Divine Providence has placed me, by com-
 “ manding me to pass my life in the study of philosophy, for the instruc-
 “ tion of myself and others ; this would be a most criminal desertion in-
 “ deed, and make me highly worthy of being cited before this tribunal, as
 “ an impious man who does not believe the gods. Should you resolve to
 “ acquit me for the future, I should not hesitate to make answer, Athenians,
 “ I honour and love you, but I shall choose rather to obey † God than you,
 “ and to my latest breath shall never renounce my philosophy, nor cease
 “ to exhort and reprove you according to my custom, by telling each of
 “ you when you come in my way, ‘ My † good friend and citizen, of the
 “ most famous city in the world for wisdom and valour, are you not asham-
 “ ed to have no other thoughts than that of amassing wealth, and of ac-
 “ quiring glory, credit, and dignities, whilst you neglect the treasures of
 “ prudence, truth, and wisdom, and take no pains in rendering your soul
 “ as good and perfect as it is capable of being ?’

“ † I am reproached with abject fear and meanness of spirit, for being so
 “ busy in imparting my advice to every one in private, and for having al-
 “ ways avoided to be present in your assemblies, to give my counsels to
 “ my country. I think I have sufficiently proved my courage and fortitude
 “ both in the field, where I have borne arms with you, and in the senate,
 “ when I alone opposed the unjust sentence you pronounced against the
 “ ten captains who had not taken up and interred the bodies of those who
 “ were killed or drowned in the sea fight near the island Arginusee ; and
 “ when, upon more than one occasion, I opposed the violent and cruel or-
 “ ders of the thirty tyrants. What is it then that has prevented me from
 “ appearing in your assemblies ? It is that dæmon, that voice divine,
 “ which you have so often heard me mention, and Melitus has taken so
 “ much pains to ridicule. That spirit has attached itself to me from my
 “ infancy : it is a voice which I never hear but when it would prevent me
 “ from persisting in something I have resolved, for it never exhorts me to
 “ undertake any thing. It is the same being that has always opposed me,
 “ when I would have intermeddled in the affairs of the republic ; and that
 “ with the greatest reason ; for I should have been amongst the dead long
 “ ago, had I been concerned in the measures of the state, without effect-
 “ ing any thing to the advantage of myself, or our country. Do not take
 “ it ill I beseech you, if I speak my thoughts without disguise, and with
 “ truth and freedom. Every man who would generously oppose a whole

* Plat. p. 28, 29.

† Πεισομαι τω θεω πολλον η υμιν.

‡ The Greek signifies, O best of men. ω αγατε ανδραν, which was an obliging manner of addressing.

§ Plat. p. 31.

“ people, either amongst us or elsewhere, and who inflexibly applies himself to prevent the violation of the laws, and the practice of iniquity in a government, will never do so long with impunity. It is absolutely necessary for him who would contend for justice, if he has any thoughts of living, to remain in a private station, and never to have any share in public affairs.

“ * For the rest, Athenians, if in the extreme danger I now am, I do not imitate the behaviour of those who upon less emergencies have implored and supplicated their judges with tears, and have brought forth their children, relations, and friends, it is not through pride and obstinacy, or any contempt for you, but solely for your honour, and for that of the whole city. You should know that there are amongst our citizens, those who do not regard death as an evil, and who give that name only to injustice and infamy. At my age, and with the reputation true or false which I have, would it be consistent for me, after all the lessons I have given upon the contempt of death, to be afraid of it myself and to believe in my last action all the principles and sentiments of my past life?

“ But without speaking of my fame, which I should extremely injure by such a conduct, I do not think it allowable to entreat a judge, nor to be absolved by supplications; he ought to be persuaded and convinced. The judge does not sit upon the bench to show favour by violating the laws, but to do justice in conforming to them. He does not swear to discharge with impunity whom he pleases, but to do justice where it is due. We ought not therefore to accustom you to perjury, nor you to suffer yourselves to be accustomed to it; for in so doing, both the one and the other of us equally injure justice and religion, and both are criminals.

“ Do not therefore expect from me, Athenians, that I should have recourse amongst you to means which I believe neither honest nor lawful; especially upon this occasion, wherein I am accused of impiety by Melitus. For if I should influence you by my prayers, and thereby induce you to violate your oaths, it would be undeniably evident, that I should teach you not to believe in the gods; and even in defending and justifying myself, should furnish my adversaries with arms against me, and prove that I believe no divinity. But I am very far from such bad thoughts. I am more convinced of the existence of God than my accusers, and so convinced, that I abandon myself to God and you, that you may judge of me as you shall deem best for yourselves and me.”

Socrates † pronounced this discourse with a firm and intrepid tone. His air, his action, his visage, expressed nothing of the accused: he seemed the master of his judges, from the assurance and greatness of soul with which he spoke, without however losing any thing of the modesty natural to him. So noble and majestic a deportment displeased and gave offence. It is common for ‡ judges, who look upon themselves as the absolute dispensers of life or death to such as are before them, to expect out of a secret tendency of mind, that they should appear in their presence with humble submission and respectful awe; an homage which they think due to their supreme authority.

This was what happened now. Melitus however had not at first the fifth

* Plat. p. 84, 85.

† Socrates ita in judicio capitis pro se ipse dixit, ut non supplex aut reus, sed magister aut dominus videretur esse judicum. Cic. l. i. de orat. n. 231.

‡ Odit judex fere litigantis securitatem; cumque jus suum intelligat, tacitas reverentiam postulat. Quint. l. iv. c. i.

part of the voices. We have reason to suppose that the judges assembled upon this occasion, might amount to 500, without reckoning the president. The law condemned the accuser to pay a fine of 1000 drachms,* if he had not the fifth part of the suffrages. This law had been wisely established to check the boldness and impudence of calumniators. Melitus had been obliged to pay this fine, if Anytus and Lycon had not joined him, and presented themselves also as the accusers of Socrates. Their credit drew over a great number of voices, and there were 280 against Socrates, and in consequence only 220 for him. He wanted no more than 31 † to have been acquitted; for he would then have had 251, which would have been the majority.

By this first sentence, the judges only declared Socrates guilty, without decreeing him any † penalty. For when the law did not determine the punishment, and when a crime against the state was not in question, in which manner I conceive Cicero's terms, *fraus capitalis*, may be understood, the person found guilty had a right to choose the penalty he thought he deserved. Upon his answer the judges deliberated a second time, and afterwards passed their final sentence. Socrates was informed that he might demand an abatement of the penalty, and change the condemnation of death into banishment, imprisonment, or a fine. He replied generously, that he would choose neither of those punishments, because that would be to acknowledge himself guilty. "Athenians," said he, "to keep you no longer in suspense, as you oblige me to sentence myself according to what I deserve, I condemn myself for having passed my life in instructing yourselves and your children; for having neglected with that view my domestic affairs, and all public employments, and dignities; for having devoted myself entirely to the service of my country, in labouring incessantly to render my fellow citizens virtuous; I condemn myself, I say, to be maintained in the prytaneum at the expence of the republic for the rest of my life." || This last answer so much offended the judges, † that they condemned him to drink the hemlock, a punishment very much in use amongst them.

¶ This sentence did not shake the constancy of Socrates in the least. "I am going," said he, addressing himself to his judges with a noble tranquillity, "to suffer death by your order, to which nature had condemned me from the first moment of my birth; but my accusers will suffer no less from infamy and injustice by the decrees of truth. Did you expect from me, that to extricate myself out of your hands, I should

* 500 livres.

† The text varies in Plato; it says, 33, or 30; whence it is probably defective.

‡ *Præmissis sententiis statuebant tantum judices damnarent an absolvent. Erat autem Athenis, reo damnato, si fraus capitalis non esset, quasi pœnæ æstimatio. Ex sententiâ, cum judicibus daretur, interrogabatur reus, quam quasi æstimationem commiserisset se maxime confiteretur. Cic. l. i. de orat. n. 231. 232.*

|| It appears in Plato, that after this discourse, Socrates, without doubt to remove from him all imputation of pride and contumacy, modestly offered to pay a fine proportionate to his indigence; that is to say, one mina (fifty livres;) and that at the instances of his friends, who had bound themselves for him, he rose in his offer to 30 minæ. Plat. in Apolog. Socrat. p. 38. But Xenophon positively asserts the contrary, p. 705. This difference may be reconciled perhaps, by supposing that Socrates refused at first to make any offer, and that he suffered himself at length to be overcome by the earnest solicitations of his friends.

‡ Cujus responso sic judices exarserunt, ut capitis hominem innocentissimum condemnarent. Cic. l. i. de orat. n. 233.

¶ Plat. p. 39.

" have employed, according to the custom, flattery and pathetic expressions, and the timorous and creeping behaviour of a suppliant? But in trials, as well as war, an honest man ought not to use all sorts of means for the preservation of his life. It is equally dishonourable both in the one and the other, to ransom it only by prayers and tears, and all those other abject methods you see every day practised by people in my present condition."

Apollodorus, who was one of his friends and disciples, having advanced to him to express his grief for his dying innocent; "What," replied he with a smile, "would you have had me die guilty."

* Plutarch, to show that only our weakest part, the body, is in the power of man, but that there is another infinitely more noble part of us entirely superior to their threats, and inaccessible to their insinuations, cites these admirable words of Socrates, which are more applicable to his judges than his accusers: "Anytus and Melitus may kill me, but they cannot hurt me:"—as if he had said (in the language of the pagans,) Fortune may deprive me of my goods, my health, and my life; but I have a treasure within me of which no violence can deprive me; I mean virtue, innocence, fortitude and greatness of mind.

This great man, † fully convinced of the principle he had so often inculcated to his disciples, that guilt is the only evil a wise man ought to fear, chose rather to be deprived of some years which he might have to live, than to forfeit in an instant the glory of his whole past life, in dishonouring himself for ever by the shameful behaviour he was advised to observe with his judges. Seeing that his own times had but a slight knowledge of him, he referred himself from it to the judgment of posterity, and by the generous sacrifice of a very advanced life, acquired and assured to himself the esteem and admiration of all succeeding ages.

SECTION VII.

SOCRATES REFUSES TO ESCAPE OUT OF PRISON.—HE DRINKS THE POISON.

AFTER the sentence had been passed upon him, ‡ Socrates, with the same intrepid aspect with which he had held the tyrants in awe, went forward towards the prison, which lost that name, says Seneca, when he entered it, and became the residence of virtue and probity. His friends followed him thither, and continued to visit him during 30 days, which passed between his condemnation and death. The cause of that long delay was this: The Athenians sent every year a ship to the isle of Delos, to offer certain sacrifices; and it was prohibited to put any person to death in the city, from the time the priest of Apollo had crowned the poop of this vessel as a signal of its departure, till the same vessel should return: so that sentence having been passed upon Socrates the day after that cere-

* De anim. tranquil. p. 475.

† Maluit vir sapientissimus quod superesset ex vita sibi perire, quam quod præterisset: et quando ab hominibus sui temporis parum intelligebatur, posterorum se iudiciis reservavit, brevi detrimento jam ultimæ senectutis ævum seculorum omnium consecutis. Quint. l. i. c. 1.

‡ Socrates eodem illo vultu, quo aliquando solus triginta tyrannos in ordinem redegerat, carcerem intravit, ignominiam ipsi loco detracturus. Neque enim poterat carcer videri, in quo Socrates erat. Senec. in consol. ad Helvet. c. xiii.

Socrates carcerem intrando purgavit, omnique honestiorem curia credit. Id. de vit. beat. c. xxvii.

mony began, it was necessary to defer the execution of it for 30 days, during the continuance of this voyage.

In this long interval, death had sufficient opportunity to present itself before his eyes in all its terrors, and to put his constancy to the proof, not only by the severe rigour of a dungeon, and the irons upon his legs, but by the continual prospect and cruel expectation of an event, of which nature is always abhorrent.* In this sad condition he did not cease to enjoy that profound tranquillity of mind which his friends had always admired in him. He entertained them with the same temper he had always expressed; and Crito observes, that the evening before his death, he slept as peaceably as at any other time. He composed also an hymn in honour of Apollo and Diana, and turned one of Æsop's fables into verse.

The day before, or the same day that the ship was to arrive from Delos, the return of which was to be followed by the death of Socrates, Crito, his intimate friend, came to him early in the morning, to let him know that bad news, and at the same time that it depended only upon himself to quit the prison; that the jailor was gained; that he would find the doors open, and offered him a safe retreat in Thessaly. Socrates laughed at this proposal, and asked him "whether he knew any place in Attica where people did not die?" Crito urged the thing very seriously, and pressed him to take the advantage of so precious an opportunity, adding arguments upon arguments to induce his consent, and to engage him to resolve upon his escape. Without mentioning the inconsolable grief he should suffer for the death of such a friend, how should he support the reproaches of an infinity of people, who would believe that it was in his power to have saved him, but that he would not sacrifice a small part of his wealth for that purpose? Can the people ever be persuaded that so wise a man as Socrates would not quit his prison, when he might do it with all possible security? Perhaps he might fear to expose his friends, or to occasion the loss of their fortunes, or even of their lives or liberty. Ought there to be any thing more dear and precious to them than the preservation of Socrates? Even strangers themselves dispute that honour with them; many of whom have come expressly with considerable sums of money to purchase his escape; and declare, that they should think themselves highly honoured to receive him amongst them, and to supply him abundantly with all he should have occasion for. Ought he to abandon himself to enemies, who have occasioned his being condemned unjustly, and can he think it allowable to betray his own cause? Is it not essential to his goodness and justice, to spare his fellow citizens the guilt of innocent blood? But if all these motives cannot alter him, and he is not concerned in regard to himself, can he be insensible to the interests of his children? In what a condition does he leave them? And can he forget the father, to remember only the philosopher?

Socrates, after having heard him with attention, praised his zeal, and expressed his gratitude; but before he could give into his opinion, was for examining whether it was just for him to depart out of prison without the consent of the Athenians. The question therefore here is, to know whether a man condemned to die, though unjustly, can without a crime, escape from justice and the laws. I do not know whether, even amongst us, there are not many persons to be found who believe that this may be made a question.

Socrates begins with removing every thing foreign to the subject, and

* Plat. in Criton.

“ comes immediately to the bottom of the affair. “ I should certainly rejoice extremely, most dear Crito, that you could persuade me to quit this place, but cannot resolve to do so, without being first persuaded. “ We ought not to be in pain upon what the people say, but for what the sole judge of all that is just or unjust shall pronounce upon us, and that alone is truth. All the considerations you have alledged as to money, reputation, family, prove nothing, unless you show me that what you propose is just and lawful. It is a received and constant principle with us, that all injustice is shameful, and fatal to him who commits it, whatever men may say, or whatever good or evil may be consequential of it. We have always reasoned from this principle even to our latest days, and have never departed in the least from it. Would it be possible, dear Crito, that at our age, our most serious discourses should resemble those of infants, who say yes and no almost in the same breath, and have nothing of fixed and determinate ?” At each proposition he waited Crito’s answer and assent.

“ Let us therefore resume our principles, and endeavour to make use of them at this time. It has always been a maxim with us, that it is never allowable, upon any pretence whatsoever, to commit injustice, not even in regard to those who injure us, nor to return evil for evil, and that when we have once engaged our word, we are bound to keep it inviolably ; no interest being capable to dispense with it. Now if at the time I should be ready to make my escape, the laws and republic should present themselves in a body before me, what could I answer to the following questions which they might put to me ? What are you going to do, Socrates ? To fly from justice in this manner, is it aught else but ruining entirely the laws and the republic ? Do you believe, that a state subsists, after justice is not only no longer in force in it, but is even corrupted, subverted, and trod under foot by particulars ? But say I, the republic has done me injustice and has sentenced me wrongfully. Have you forgot, the laws would reply, that you are under an agreement with us to submit your private judgment to the republic ? You were at liberty, if our government and constitutions did not suit you, to retire and settle yourself elsewhere. But a residence of 70 years in our city sufficiently denotes that our plan has not displeased you, and that you have complied with it from an entire knowledge and experience of it, and out of choice. In effect, you owe all you are, and all you possess to it : birth, nurture, education, and establishment ; for all these proceed from the tuition and protection of the republic. Do you believe yourself free to break through engagements with her, which you have confirmed by more than one oath ? Though she should intend to destroy you, can you render her evil for evil, and injury for injury ? Have you a right to act in that manner with your father and mother ; and do you not know that your country is more considerable, and more worthy of respect before God and man, than either father or mother, or all the relations in the world together ; that your country is to be honoured and revered, to be complied with in her excesses, and to be treated with tenderness and kindness, even in her most violent proceedings ? In a word, that she is either to be reclaimed by wise counsels and respectful remonstrances, or to be obeyed in her commands, and suffered without murmuring in all she shall decree ? As for your children, Socrates, your friends will render them all the services in their power ; at least the Divine Providence will not be wanting to them. Resign yourself therefore to our reasons, and take the counsel of those who have given you birth, nurture and ed-

"ceation. Set not so high a value upon your children, your life, or any thing in the world, as justice; so shall it come to pass, that when you appear before the tribunal of Pluto, you will not be at a loss to defend yourself in the presence of your judges. But if you demean yourself otherwise, we shall continue your enemies as long as you live, without ever affording you relaxation or repose; and when you are dead, our sisters, the laws in the regions below, will be as little favourable to you; knowing that you have been guilty of using your utmost endeavours to destroy us."

Socrates observed to Crito, that he seemed to have a perfect sense of all he had said, and that the force of his reasons had made so strong and irresistible an impression upon his mind, that they entirely engrossed him, and left him neither thoughts nor words to object. Crito agreeing in effect that he had nothing to reply, continued silent, and withdrew from his friend.

* At length the fatal ship returned to Athens, which was in a manner the signal for the death of Socrates. The next day, all his friends, except Plato, who was sick, repaired to the prison early in the morning. The jailor desired them to wait a little, because the eleven magistrates, who had the direction of the prisons, were at that time signifying to the prisoner that he was to die the same day. Presently after, they entered, and found Socrates, whose † chains had been taken off, sitting by Xantippe his wife, who held one of his children in her arms. As soon as she perceived them, setting up great cries, sobbing, and tearing her face and hair, she made the prison resound with her complaints, "Oh, my dear Socrates, your friends are come to see you this day for the last time!" He desired that she might be taken away, and she was immediately carried home.

Socrates passed the rest of the day with his friends, and discoursed with them with his usual cheerfulness and tranquility. The subject of conversation was the most important and best adapted to the present conjuncture, that is to say the immortality of the soul. What gave occasion to this discourse, was a question introduced in a manner by chance, whether a true philosopher ought not to desire and take pains to die? This proposition, taken too literally, implied an opinion, that a philosopher might kill himself. Socrates shows that nothing is more unjust than this notion, and that man, appertaining to God, who formed and placed him with his own hand in the post he possesses, cannot abandon it without his permission, nor depart from life without his order. What is it then that can induce a philosopher to entertain this love for death? It can be only the hope of that happiness, which he expects in another life; and that hope can be founded only upon the opinion of the soul's immortality.

Socrates employed the last day of his life in entertaining his friends upon this great and important subject, from which conversation Plato's admirable dialogue, intitled the "Phædon," is wholly taken. He explains to his friends all the arguments for believing the soul immortal, and refutes all the objections against it, which are very near the same as are made at this day. This treatise is too long for me to attempt an abstract of it.

‡ Before he answers any of these objections, he deploras a misfortune

* Plat. in Phæd. p. 53, &c.

† At Athens, as soon as sentence was pronounced upon a criminal, he was unbound, and considered as the victim of death, whom it was no longer lawful to keep in chains.

‡ Plat. p. 90, 91.

common enough amongst men, who, in consequence of hearing ignorant persons, who contradict and doubt every thing, dispute, believe there is nothing certain. "Is it not a great misfortune, dear Phædon, that having reasons which are true, certain, and very easy to be understood, there should, however, be those in the world, who are not at all affected with them, from their having heard these frivolous disputes, wherein all things appear sometimes true and sometimes false? These unjust and unreasonable men, instead of blaming themselves for these doubts, or charging the narrowness of their sense with them, from ascribing the defect to the reasons themselves, proceed at length to a detestation of them; and believe themselves more knowing and judicious than all others, because they imagine they are the only persons who comprehend that there is nothing true or certain in the nature of things."

Socrates demonstrates the injustice of this proceeding. He observes, that of two things equally uncertain, it consists with wisdom to choose that which is most advantageous with least hazard. "If what I advance," says he, "upon the immortality of the soul, proves true, it is good to believe it; and if after my death it proves false, I shall always have the advantage from it, to have been less sensible here of the evils which generally attend human life." This reasoning of Socrates, * which, we are to suppose, can be only real and true in the mouth of a Christian, is very remarkable. If what I say is true, I gain all things, whilst I hazard very little; and if false, I lose nothing; on the contrary, I am still a great gainer.

Socrates does not confine himself to the mere speculation of this great truth, that the soul is immortal; he draws useful and necessary conclusions from it for the conduct of life; in explaining what the hope of an happy eternity demands from man, that it be not frustrated, and that, instead of attaining the rewards prepared for the good, they do not experience the punishments allotted for the wicked. The philosopher here sets forth these great truths, which a constant tradition, though very much obscured by fiction and fable, had always preserved amongst the pagans: the last judgment of the righteous and wicked; the eternal punishments to which great criminals are condemned; a place of peace and joy without end for the souls that retain their purity and innocence, or which, during this life, have expiated their offences by repentance and satisfaction; and an intermediate state, in which they purify themselves, for a certain time, from less considerable crimes, that have not been atoned for during this life.

"† My friends, there is still one thing, which it is very just to believe; if the soul be immortal, it requires to be cultivated with attention, not only for what we call the time of life, but for that which is to follow, I mean eternity; and the least neglect in this point may be attended with endless consequences. If death were the final dissolution of being, the wicked would be great gainers in it, by being delivered at once from their bodies, their souls, and their vices: but as the soul is immortal, it has no other means of being freed from its evils, nor any safety for it, but in becoming very good and very wise; for it carries nothing away with it, but its good or bad deeds, its virtues or vices, which are commonly the consequences of the education it has received, and the causes of eternal happiness or misery.

* Monsieur Pascal has expatiated upon this reasoning in his seventh article, and deduced from it a demonstration of infinite force.

† Plat. p. 107.

" * When the dead are arrived at the fatal rendezvous of departed souls, whither their † dæmon conducts them, they are all judged. Those, who have passed their lives in a manner neither entirely criminal nor absolutely innocent, are sent into a place where they suffer pains proportioned to their faults, till being purged and cleansed of their guilt, and afterwards restored to liberty, they receive the reward of the good actions they have done in the body. Those who are judged to be incurable upon account of the greatness of their crimes, who deliberately have committed sacrileges and murders, and other such great offences, the fatal destiny that passes judgment upon them, hurls them into Tartarus, from whence they never depart. But those who are found guilty of crimes, great indeed, but worthy of pardon; who have committed violences in the transports of rage against their father or mother, or have killed some one in a like emotion, and afterwards repented, these suffer the same punishment, and in the same place with the last; but for a time only, till by their prayers and supplications they have obtained pardon from those they have injured.

" But for those who have passed through life with peculiar sanctity of manners, delivered from their base earthly abodes as from a prison, they are received on high in a pure region, which they inhabit; and as philosophy has sufficiently purified them, they live ‡ without their bodies through all eternity, in a series of joys and delights it is not easy to describe, and which the shortness of my time will not permit me to explain more at large.

" What I have said will suffice, I conceive, to prove that we ought to endeavour strenuously, throughout our whole lives, to acquire virtue and wisdom; for you see, how great a reward, and how high a hope is proposed to us. And though the immortality of the soul were dubious, instead of appearing a certainty as it does, every wise man ought to assure himself, that it is well worth his trouble to risk his belief of it in this manner. And indeed can there be a more glorious hazard? We ought to enchant ourselves with this blessed hope; for which reason I have lengthened this discourse so much."

Cicero expresses these noble sentiments of Socrates with his usual delicacy. ¶ Almost at the very moment that he held the deadly draught in his hand, he talked in such a manner, as showed that he looked upon death not as a violence done to him, but as a means bestowed upon him of ascending to heaven. He declared, that, upon departing out of this life two ways are open to us; the one leads to the place of eternal misery such souls as have sullied themselves here below in shameful pleasures and criminal actions; the other conducts those to the happy mansions of the

* Plat. p. 113, 114.

† Dæmon is a Greek word, which signifies spirit, genius, and with us, angel.

‡ The resurrection of the body was unknown to the pagans.

¶ Cum pene in manu jam mortiferum illud teneret poculum, locutus ita est, ut non ad mortem tradi, verum in cælum videretur ascendere. Ita enim censebat, itaque disseruit; duas esse vias duplicesque cursus animorum e corpore excedentium. Nam, qui se humanis vitiis contaminassent, et se totos libidinibus neddissent, quibus coarctati velut domesticis vitiis atque flagitiis se inquinassent, iis devium quoddam iter esse, seclusum a consilio deorum; qui autem se integros castosque servassent, quibusque fuisset minima cum corporibus contagio, seseque ab his semper sevocassent, essentque in corporibus humanis vitam imitati deorum, his ad illos, a quibus essent profecti, reditum facilem patere. Cic. Tusc. Quest. l. i. n. 71, 72.

gods, who have retained their purity upon earth, and have led in human bodies a life almost divine.

* When Socrates had done speaking, Crito desired him to give him and the rest of his friends his last instructions in regard to his children, and other affairs, that, by executing them, they might have the consolation of doing him some pleasure, "I shall recommend nothing to you this day," replied Socrates, "more than I have always done, which is to take care of yourselves. You cannot do yourselves a greater service, nor do me and my family a greater pleasure." Crito having asked him afterwards, in what manner he thought fit to be buried: "As you please," said Socrates, "if you can lay hold of me, and I not escape out of your hands." At the same time looking upon his friends with a smile: "I can never persuade Crito, that Socrates is he who converses with you, and disposes the several parts of his discourse; for he always imagines, that I am what he is going to see dead in a little while. He confounds me with my carcase, and therefore asks me how I would be interred." In finishing these words, he rose up, and went to bathe himself in a chamber adjoining. After he came out of the bath, his children were brought to him, for he had three, two very little, and the other grown up. He spoke to them for some time, gave his orders to the woman who took care of them, and then dismissed them. Being returned into his chamber, he laid him down upon his bed.

The servant of the eleven entered at the same instant, and having informed him, that the time for drinking the hemlock was come, which was at sun-set, the servant was so much affected with sorrow, that he turned his back, and fell a weeping. "See," said Socrates, "the good heart of this man! Since my imprisonment he has often come to see me, and to converse with me. He is more worthy than all his fellows. How heartily the poor man weeps for me!" This is a remarkable example, and might teach those in an office of this kind how they ought to behave to all prisoners, but more especially to persons of merit, when they are so unhappy as to fall into their hands. The fatal cup was brought. Socrates asked what it was necessary for him to do. "Nothing more," replied the servant, "than as soon as you have drunk off the draught, to walk about till you find your legs grow weary, and afterwards lie down upon your bed." He took the cup without any emotion or change in his colour or countenance, and regarding the man with a steady and assured look, "Well," said he, "what say you of this drink; may one make a libation out of it?" Upon being told there was only enough for one dose: "At least," continued he, "we may say our prayers to the gods, as it is our duty; and implore them to make our exit from this world, and our last stage happy; which is what I most ardently beg of them." After having spoke these words, he kept silence for some time, and drank off the whole draught with amazing tranquillity, and a serenity of aspect not to be expressed or conceived.

Till then his friends, with great violence to themselves, had refrained from tears; but after he had drank the potion, they were no longer their own masters, and wept abundantly. Apollodorus, who had been in tears during almost the whole conversation, began then to raise great cries, and to lament with such excessive grief, as pierced the hearts of all who were present. Socrates alone remained unmoved, and even reproved his friends, though with his usual mildness and good nature. "What are you doing?"

* Plat. p. 115—118.

said he to them, "I admire at you. Ah! what has become of your virtue? Was it not for this I sent away the women, that they might not fall into these weaknesses? For I have always heard say, that we ought to die peaceably, and blessing the gods. Be at ease, I beg you, and show more constancy and resolution." These words filled them with confusion, and obliged them to restrain their tears.

In the mean time he kept walking to and fro, and when he found his legs grow weary, he laid down upon his bed, as he had been directed.

The poison then operated more and more. When Socrates found it began to gain upon the heart, uncovering his face, which had been covered, without doubt to prevent any thing from disturbing him in his last moments, "Crito," said he, which were his last words, "We owe a cock to Æsculapius; discharge that vow for me, and pray do not forget it;" soon after which he breathed his last. Crito went to his body, and closed his mouth and eyes. Such was the end of Socrates; in the first year of the 95th Olympiad, and the 70th of his age. Cicero * says, he could never read the description of his death in Plato without tears.

Plato, and the rest of Socrates' disciples, apprehending the rage of his accusers was not satiated by that victim, retired to Megara, to the house of Euclid; where they staid till the storm blew over. Euripides, however, to reproach the Athenians with the horrible crime they had committed, in condemning the best of men to die upon such slight grounds, composed his tragedy called Palamedes, in which, under the name of that hero, who was also destroyed by a black calumny, he deplored the misfortune of his friend. When the actor came to repeat this verse,

"You doom the justest of the Greeks to perish,"

the whole theatre, remembering Socrates in so distinct an image of him, melted into tears, and a decree passed to prohibit speaking any more of of him in public. Some believe Euripides was dead before Socrates, and reject this circumstance.

However it were, the people of Athens did not open their eyes till some time after the death of Socrates. Their hatred being satisfied, their prejudices expired, and time having given them an opportunity for reflection, the notorious injustice of the sentence appeared in all its horrors. Nothing was heard throughout the city but discourses in favour of Socrates. The academy, the Lycæum, private houses, public walks, and market-places, seemed still to re-echo the sound of his loved voice. Here, said they, he formed our youth, and taught our children to love their country, and to honour their parents. In this place, he gave us his admirable lessons, and sometimes made us seasonable reproaches, to engage us more warmly in the pursuit of virtue. Alas! how have we rewarded him for such important services! Athens was in universal mourning and consternation. The schools were shut up, and all exercises suspended. The accusers were called to account for the innocent blood they had caused to be shed. Melitus was condemned to die, and the rest banished. Plutarch observes, that all those who had any share in this black calumny, were in such abomination among the citizens, that no one would give them fire, answer them any question, nor go into the same bath with them, and had the place cleansed where they had bathed, lest they should be polluted by

* Quid dicam de Socrate, cujus morti illacrymari soleo Platone[m] legens? De nat. deor. lib. iii. n. 82.

touching it; which drove them into such despair, that many of them killed themselves.

* The Athenians, not contented with having punished his accusers, caused a statue of brass to be erected to him, of the workmanship of the celebrated Lysippus, and placed it in one of the most conspicuous parts of the city. Their respect and gratitude rose even to a religious veneration; they dedicated a chapel to him, as to a hero and a demi-god, which they called *Σωκρατεῖον*, that is to say, "the chapel of Socrates."

SECTION VIII.

REFLECTIONS UPON SOCRATES, AND THE SENTENCE PASSED UPON HIM BY THE ATHENIANS.

WE must be very much surprised, when on the one side we consider the extreme delicacy of the people of Athens, as to what regards the worship of the gods, which ran so high as to occasion their condemning the most eminent persons upon the simple suspicion of their failing in respect for them; and on the other, when we see the exceeding toleration (to call it no worse) with which the same people hear comedies every day, in which all the gods are turned into ridicule in a manner capable of inspiring the highest contempt for them. All Aristophanes' pieces abound with pleasantries, or rather buffooneries of this kind; and if it is true, that this poet did not know what it was to spare the greatest men of the republic, it may be said also as justly, he was still less favourable to the gods.

Such were the daily entertainments in the theatre, which the people of Athens not only heard without pain, but with such joy, pleasure, and applause, that they rewarded the poet with public honours, who diverted them so agreeably. What was there in Socrates, that came near this excessive licence? Never did any person of the pagan world speak of the Divinity, or of the adoration due to him, in so pure, so noble, and so respectful a manner. He did not declare against the gods publicly received and honoured by a religion more ancient than the city: he only avoided imputing to them the crimes and infamous actions, which the popular credulity ascribed to them, and which were only proper to depreciate and decry them in the sense of the people. He did not blame the sacrifices, festivals, nor the other ceremonies of religion; he only taught, that all that pomp and outward show could not be agreeable to the gods without uprightness of intention and purity of heart.

This wise, this illuminated, this religious man, however, with all his veneration and noble sentiments in regard to the Divinity, is condemned as an impious person by the suffrages of almost an whole people, without his accusers being able to instance one single avowed fact, or to produce any proof with the least appearance of probability.

From whence could so evident, so universal, and so determinate a contradiction arise among the Athenians? A people, abounding in other respects with wit, taste, and knowledge, must without doubt have had their reasons, at least in appearance, for a conduct so different, and sentiments so opposite to their general character. May we not say, that the Athenians considered their gods in a double light? They confined their real religion to the public, solemn, and hereditary worship, as they had received it from their ancestors, as it was established by the laws of the state, and

been practised from immemorial time, and especially confirmed by the oracles, augurs, offerings, and sacrifices. It is by this standard they regulated their piety; against which they could not suffer the least attempt whatsoever: it was of this worship alone they were jealous; it was for these ancient ceremonies they were such ardent zealots; and they believed, though without foundation, that Socrates was an enemy to them. But there was another kind of religion, founded upon fable, poetical fictions, popular opinions, and foreign customs; for this they were little concerned, and abandoned it entirely to the poets, to the representations of the theatre, and common conversation.

* What grossness did they not attribute to Juno and Venus? No citizen would have been satisfied that his wife or daughters should have resembled these goddesses. Timotheus, the famous musician, having represented Diana upon the stage of Athens, transported with folly, fury, and rage, one of the spectators conceived he could not make a greater imprecation against him, than to wish his daughter might become the likeness of that divinity. It is better, says Plutarch, to believe there are no gods, than to imagine them of this kind, open and declared impiety being less profane, if we may be allowed to say so, than so gross and absurd a superstition.

However it be, the sentence of which we have related the circumstances, will, through all ages, cover Athens with infamy and reproach, that all the splendour of its glorious actions, for which it is otherwise so justly renowned, can never obliterate; and it shows at the same time, what is to be expected from a people, gentle, humane, and beneficent at bottom (for such the Athenians really were,) but warm, proud, haughty, inconstant, wavering with every wind, and every impression. It is therefore with reason, that their assemblies have been compared to a tempestuous sea; as that element, like the people, though calm and peaceable of itself, is subject to be frequently agitated by a violence not its own.

As to Socrates, it must be allowed that the pagan world never produced any thing so great and perfect. When we observe to what an height he carries the sublimity of his sentiments, not only in respect to moral virtue, temperance, sobriety, patience in adversity, the love of poverty, and the forgiveness of wrongs; but what is far more considerable, in regard to the Divinity, his unity, omnipotence, creation of the world, and providence in the government of it; the immortality of the soul, its ultimate end and eternal destiny; the rewards of the good, and the punishment of the wicked; when we consider this train of sublime knowledge, we ask our reason whether it is a pagan who thinks and speaks in this manner, and can scarce persuade ourselves, that from so dark and obscure a fund as paganism, should shine forth such living and glorious rays of light.

It is true, his reputation was not without alloy, and it has been affirmed, that the purity of his manners did not answer those of his sentiments. † This question has been discussed among the learned, but my plan will not permit me to treat it in its extent. The reader may see Abbe Fraguier's dissertation in defence of Socrates against the reproaches made him on account of his conduct: The negative argument he makes use of in his justification, seems a very strong one. He observes, that neither Aristophanes in his comedy of the Clouds, which is entirely against Socrates, nor his vile accusers in his trial, have advanced one word that tends to impeach the purity of his manners: and it is not probable, that such violent

* Plat. de superst. p. 170.

† Memoires de l'Academie des Inscript. tom. iv. p. 372.

enemies as these would have neglected one of the most likely methods to discredit him in the opinion of his judges, if there had been any foundation or appearance for the use of it.

I confess, however, that certain principles of Plato his disciple, held by him in common with his master, upon the nudity of the combatants in the public games, from which at the same time he did not exclude the fair sex, and the behaviour of Socrates himself, who wrestled naked man to man with Alcibiades, gives us no great idea of that philosopher's delicacy in point of modesty and bashfulness. * What shall we say of his visit to Theodota, a woman of Athens of indifferent reputation, only to assure himself with his own eyes of her extraordinary beauty, which was much talked of, and of the precepts he gave her for the attraction of admirers, and the retaining them in her snares? Do such lessons consist much with a philosopher? I pass over many other things in silence.

I am the less surprised, after this, that several of the fathers have censured him in regard to purity of manners, and that they have thought fit to apply to him, as well as to his disciple Plato, what St. Paul † says of the philosophers; that God by a just judgment has abandoned them to a reprobate sense, and to the most shameful lusts for their punishment; in that, having clearly known there was but one true God, they had not honoured him as they ought, by publicly avowing their belief, and were not ashamed to associate him with an innumerable multitude of divinities, ridiculous and infamous even in their own opinions.

And in this, properly speaking, consists the crime of Socrates, who was not guilty in the eyes of the Athenians, but gave occasion for his being justly condemned by the eternal Truth. It had illuminated his soul with the most pure and sublime lights, of which the pagan world was capable; for we are not ignorant, that all knowledge of God, even natural, cannot come but from himself alone. He held admirable principles with relation to the Divinity. He agreeably rallied the fables upon which the ridiculous mysteries of his age were founded. He often spoke, and in the most exalted terms, of the existence of one only God, eternal, invisible, creator of the universe, supreme director and arbiter of all events, avenger of crimes, and rewarder of virtues: but he did † not dare to give a public testimony of these great truths. He perfectly discerned the false and the ridiculous of the pagan system, and nevertheless, as Seneca says of the wise man, and acted himself, he observed exactly all the customs and ceremonies, not as agreeable to the gods, but as enjoined by the laws. He † acknowledged at bottom one only divinity, and worshipped with the people that multitude of infamous idols, which ancient superstition had heaped up during a long succession of ages. He held peculiar opinions in the schools, but followed the multitude in the temples. As a philosopher, he despised and detested the idols in secret; as a citizen of Athens and a senator, he

* Xenoph. Memor. l. iii. p. 783—786.

† Rom. c. i. v. 17—32.

‡ Quæ omnia (ait Seneca) sapiens servavit tanquam legibus jussa, non tanquam diis grata—Omnem istam ignobilem deorum turbam, quam longo ævo longa superstitiõ conguessit, sic, inquit, adorabimus, ut meminimus cultum ejus magis ad morem, ad rem, pertinere.—Sed iste, quem philosophia quasi liberum fecerat, tamen, quia illustris senator erat, colebat quod reprehendebat, agebat quod arguebat, quod culpabat adorabat—eo damnabilis, quo illa, quæ mendaciter agebat, sic ageret, et cum populus veraciter agere existimaret. St. August. de civit. Dei. l. vi. c. 10.


§ Eorum sapientes, quos philosophos vocant, scholas habebant dissentientes, et templa communia. Id. lib. de ver. rel. c. 1.

paid them in public the same adoration with others; by so much the more to be condemned, says St. Augustin, as that worship, which was only external and dissembled, seemed to the people to be the effect of sincerity and conviction.

And it cannot be said that Socrates altered his conduct at the end of his life, or that he then expressed a greater zeal for truth. In his defence before the people, he declared that he had always received and honoured the same gods as the Athenians; and the last order he gave before he expired, was to sacrifice in his name a cock to *Æsculapius*. Behold then this prince of the philosophers, declared by the Delphic oracle the wisest of mankind, who, notwithstanding his internal conviction of one only divinity, dies in the bosom of idolatry, and with the profession of adoring all the gods of the pagan theology. Socrates is the more inexcusable in this, that declaring himself a man expressly appointed by heaven to bear witness to the truth, he fails in the most essential duty of the glorious commission he ascribes to himself: for if there be any truth in religion that we ought more particularly to avow, it is that which regards the unity of the Godhead, and the vanity of idol worship. In this his courage had been well placed, nor would it have been any great difficulty to Socrates, determined besides as he was to die. But, says St. Augustin,* these philosophers were not designed by God to enlighten the world, nor to bring men over from the impious worship of false deities to the holy religion of the true God.

We cannot deny Socrates to have been the hero of the pagan world in regard to moral virtues. But to judge rightly of him, let us draw a parallel between this supposed hero and the martyrs of Christianity, who often were young children and tender virgins, and yet were not afraid to shed the last drop of their blood, to defend and confirm the same truths, which Socrates knew, without daring to assert in public; I mean the unity of God, and the vanity of idols. Let us also compare the so much boasted death of this prince of philosophers, with that of our holy bishops, who have done the Christian religion so much honour, by their sublimity of genius, the extent of their knowledge, and the beauty and excellence of their writings; a St. Cyprian, a St. Augustine, and so many others as were all seen to die in the bosom of humility, fully convinced of their unworthiness and nothingness, penetrated with a lively fear of the judgments of God, and expecting their salvation from his sole goodness and condescending mercy. Philosophy inspires no such sentiments; they could proceed only from the grace of the Mediator, which, "we are taught to believe," Socrates did not deserve to know.

* Non sic isti nati erant, ut populorum suorum opinionem ad verum cultum veri Dei a simulacrorum superstitione, atque ab hujus mundi vanitate, converterent. St. August. lib. de ver. rel. c. 2.



BOOK X.

THE
HISTORY
OF THE
PERSIANS AND GRECIANS,
CONTAINING THE
MANNERS AND CUSTOMS OF THE GREEKS.

MANNERS AND CUSTOMS OF THE GREEKS.

THE most essential part of history, and which it concerns the reader most to know, is that which explains the character and manners as well of the people in general, as of the great persons in particular of whom it treats; and this may be said to be in some sort the soul of history, of which the facts are only the body. I have endeavoured, as occasion offered, to paint in their true colours the most illustrious personages of Greece; it remains for me to show the genius and character of the people themselves. I shall confine myself to those of Lacedæmon and Athens, who always held the first rank among the Greeks, and shall reduce what I have to say upon this subject to three heads; their political government, war, and religion.

Sigonius, Meursius, Potter, and several others, who have written upon the Grecian antiquities supply me with great lights, and are of equal use to me in the matters it remains for me to treat.

CHAPTER I:

OF POLITICAL GOVERNMENT.

THERE are three principal forms of government: monarchy, in which a single person reigns; aristocracy in which the eldest and wisest govern; and democracy in which the supreme authority is lodged in the hands of the people. The most celebrated writers of antiquity, as Plato, Aristotle, Polybius, and Plutarch, give the preference to the first kind as including the most advantages with the fewest inconveniences. But all agree, and it cannot be too often inculcated, that the end of all government, and the duty of every one in authority, in whatsoever manner it be, is to use his

utmost endeavours to render those under his command happy and just, by obtaining for them on the one side safety and tranquility, with the advantages and conveniences of life, and on the other all the means and helps that may contribute to making them virtuous. As the pilot's end, says Cicero,* is to steer his vessel happily into its port, the physician's to preserve or restore health, the general's of an army to obtain victory; so a prince, and every man who governs others, ought to make the utility of the governed his view and motive, and to remember, that the supreme rule of all just government is the good of the public,† *Salus populi suprema lex esto*. He adds, that the greatest and most noble function in the world is to be the author of the happiness of mankind.

Plato in an hundred places, esteems as nothing the most shining qualities and actions of those who govern, if they do not tend to promote the two great ends I have mentioned, the virtue and happiness of the people; and he refutes at large in the first‡ book of his Republic, one Thrasymachus, who advanced, that subjects were born for the prince, and not the prince for his subjects; and that whatever promoted the interest of the prince and commonwealth ought to be deemed just and lawful.

In the distinctions which have been made upon the several forms of government, it has been agreed, that that would be the most perfect which should unite in itself, by an happy mixture of institutions, all the advantages, and exclude all the inconveniences of the rest; and almost all the ancients have believed|| that the Lacedæmonian government came nearest to this idea of perfection.

ARTICLE I.

OF THE GOVERNMENT OF SPARTA.

FROM the time that Heraclides had re-entered Peloponnesus, Sparta was governed by two kings, who were always of the same two families, descended from Hercules by two different branches, as I have observed elsewhere. Whether from pride, or the abuse of despotic power on the one side of the kings, or the desire of independence, and an immoderate love of liberty on that of the people, Sparta, in its beginnings, was always involved in commotions and revolts, which would infallibly have occasioned its ruin, as had happened to Argos and Messene, two neighbouring cities equally powerful with itself, if the wise foresight of Lycurgus had not prevented fatal consequences by the reformation he made in the state. I have related it at large in the life of that legislator,§ and shall only touch here upon what regards the government.

* *Tenesne igitur, moderatorem illum reip. quo referre velimus omnia? Ut gubernatori cursus secundus, medico salus, imperatori victoria, sic huic moderatori reip. beata civium vita proposita est, ut opibus firma, copiis locuples, gloria ampla, virtute honesta sit. Hujus enim operis maximi inter homines atque optimi illum esse perfectorem volo.* Ad. Attic. l. viii. epist. 10.

† Cic. de leg. l. iii. n. 8.

‡ Page 368—345.

|| Polyb. l. vi. p. 458, 459.

§ Book v. Art. vii.

SECTION I.

IDEA OF THE SPARTAN GOVERNMENT.

LYCURGUS restored order and peace in Sparta, by the establishment of the senate. It consisted of 28 senators, and the two kings presided in it. This august council, formed out of the wisest and most experienced men in the nation, served as a counterpoise to the two other authorities, that of the kings and that of the people; and whenever the one was for overbearing the other, the senate interposed, by joining the weakest, and thereby held the balance between both. At length, to prevent this body itself from abusing its power, which was very great, a kind of curb was annexed to it, by the nomination of five Ephori, who were elected out of the people, whose office lasted only one year, and who had authority not only over the senators, but the kings themselves.

The power of the kings was extremely limited, especially in the city, and in time of peace. In war they had the command of the fleets and armies, and at that time greater authority. * However, they had even then a kind of inspectors and commissioners assigned them, who served as a necessary council, and were generally chosen for that office, from their being out of favour with them, in order that there should be no connivance on their side, and the republic be the better served. There was almost continually some secret misunderstanding between the two kings; whether it proceeded from a natural jealousy between the two branches, or was the effect of the Spartan policy, to which their too great union might have given umbrage.

The Ephori had a greater authority at Sparta than the tribunes of the Roman people. They presided in the election of the magistrates, and could call them to an account for their administration. Their power extended even to the persons of their kings, and of the princes of the blood royal, whom they had a right to imprison, which they actually used in regard to Pausanias. When they sat upon their seats in the tribunal, they did not rise up when the kings entered, which was a mark of respect paid them by all the other magistrates, and seemed to imply a kind of superiority in the Ephori, from their representing the people; and it is observed of † Agesilaus, that when he was seated upon his throne to dispense justice, and the Ephori came in, he never failed to rise up to do them honour. It is very probable, that before him, it was not usual for the kings to behave in that manner, Plutarch relating this behaviour of Agesilaus as peculiar to him.

All public business was proposed and examined in the senate, and resolutions passed accordingly in the same place. But the decrees of the senate were not of force, unless ratified by the people.

There must have been exceeding wisdom in the laws established by Lycurgus, for the government of Sparta, because, as long as they were exactly observed, no commotions or seditions of the people were ever known in the city, no change in the form of government was ever proposed, no private person usurped authority by violence, or made himself tyrant; the people never thought of depriving the two families, in which it had always been, of the sovereignty, nor did any of the kings ever attempt to assume more power than the laws admitted. This reflection, ‡ which both

* Arist. de rep. l. ii. p. 331.

† Plat. in Agesil. p. 597.

‡ Xenoph. in Agesil. p. 631. Polyb. l. vi. p. 456.

Xenophon and Polybius make, shows the idea they had of the wisdom of Lycurgus, in point of his policy, and the opinion we ought to have of it. In effect, no other city of Greece had this advantage, and all of them experienced many changes and vicissitudes for want of the like laws to perpetuate their form of government.

The reason of this constancy and stability of the Lacedæmonians in their government and conduct is, that in Sparta the laws governed absolutely, and with sovereign authority; whereas the greatest part of the other Grecian cities, abandoned to the caprice of private men, to despotic power, to an arbitrary and irregular sway, experienced the truth of Plato's saying,* that that city is miserable, where the magistrates command the laws, and not the laws the magistrates.

The example of Argos and Messene, which I have already related, would alone suffice to show how just and true that reflection is. † After their return from the Trojan war, the Greeks, distinguished by the name of Dorians, established themselves in three cities of Peloponnesus, Lacedæmon, Argos, and Messene, and swore alliance and protection of each other. These three cities, governed alike by monarchical power, had the same advantages, except in the fertility of the lands where they were situated, in which the two latter carried it extremely. Argos and Messene however did not long preserve their superiority. The haughtiness of the kings, and the disobedience of the people, occasioned their fall from the flourishing condition in which they had been at first; and their example proved, says Plutarch after Plato, that it was the peculiar favour of the gods which gave the Spartans such a man as Lycurgus, capable of prescribing so wise and reasonable a plan of government.

To support it without change, particular care was taken to educate the youth according to the laws and manners of the country, in order that they might become a second nature in them, by being early ingrafted into them, and confirmed by long habitude. The hard and sober manner in which they were brought up, inspired them during the rest of their lives with a natural taste for frugality and temperance, that distinguished them from all other people, and wonderfully adapted them to support the fatigues of war. ‡ Plato observes, that this salutary custom had banished from Sparta, and all the territory in its dependance, drunkenness, debauchery, and all their consequential disorders; insomuch that it was a crime punishable by law to drink wine to excess even in the Bacchannalia, which every where else were days of licence, wherein whole cities gave themselves up to the last excesses.

They also accustomed the children from their earliest infancy to an entire submission to the laws, magistrates, and all in authority; and †† their education, properly speaking, was no more than an apprenticeship of obedience. It was for this reason Agesilaus advised Xenophon to send his children to Sparta, as to an excellent school, ††† where they might learn the greatest and most noble of all sciences, "to obey and to command," for the one naturally leads on to the other. It was not only the mean, the poor, and the ordinary citizens, who were subjected in this

* Plat. l. iv. de leg. p. 715.

† Plat. l. iii. de leg. p. 688—685. Plut. in Lycurg. p. 43.

‡ Plat. l. i. de leg. p. 687.

†† *Ὡς τε τῆ παιδείαν εἶναι μελέτην ὑπειθείας.* Plut. in Lycurg. p. 58.

††† *Ὁ Μαθητορικὸς τῶν μαθημάτων τὸ καλλίστον, ἀρχιεῖναι καὶ ἀρχεῖν.* Plut. in Agesil. p. 606.

manner to the laws ; but the rich, the powerful, the magistrates, and even kings ; and they did not distinguish themselves from the others in any thing but more exact obedience ; convinced that such behaviour was the surest means to their being obeyed and respected themselves by their inferiors.

* Hence came the so much celebrated answers of Demaratus. Xerxes could not comprehend how the Lacedæmonians, who had no master to controul them, should be capable to confront dangers and death. " They are free and independent of all men," replied Demaratus, " but the law is above them, and commands them : and that law ordains that they must conquer or die." † Upon another occasion, when somebody expressed their surprise, that being king he should suffer himself to be banished ; " it is," said he, " because at Sparta the laws are stronger than the kings."

‡ This appears evidently in the ready obedience of Agesilaus to the orders of the Ephori, when recalled by them to the support of his country ; a delicate occasion for a king and conqueror ; but to him it seemed more glorious to obey his country and the laws, than to command numerous armies, or even to conquer Asia.

SECTION II.

LOVE OF POVERTY INSTITUTED AT SPARTA.

TO this entire submission to the laws of the state, Lycurgus added another principle of government no less admirable, which was to remove from Sparta all luxury, profusion, and magnificence : to decry riches absolutely, to make poverty honourable, and at the same time necessary, by substituting a species of iron money for gold and silver coin, which till then had been current. I have explained elsewhere the measures that were used to make so difficult an undertaking succeed, and shall confine myself here to examining what judgment should be passed on it as it affects a government.

The poverty to which Lycurgus reduced Sparta, and which seemed to prohibit all conquest, and to deprive it of all means to augment its force and grandeur, was well adapted to rendering it powerful and flourishing. Such a constitution of government, which till then had no example, nor has since been imitated by any state, argues a great fund of prudence and policy in a legislator : and the medium conceived afterwards under Lysander, in continuing individuals in their poverty, and restoring to the public the use of gold and silver coin, was it not a wise amendment of what was too strained and excessive in that law of Lycurgus of which we are speaking ?

It seems if we consult only the common views of human prudence, that it is just to reason in this manner ; but the event, which is an infallible evidence and arbiter in this place, obliges me to be of a quite different opinion. Whilst Sparta remained poor, and persisted in the contempt of gold and silver, which continued for several ages, she was powerful and glorious, and the commencement of her decline may be dated from the time when she began to break through the severe prohibition of Lycurgus against the use of gold and silver money,

* Herod. l. vii. c. 145, 146.

† Plut. in Apoph. Lacon. p. 210.

‡ Idem. in Agesil. p. 603, 604.

§ Multo gloriosius duxit, si institutis patriæ paruisset, quam si bello superasset Asiam. Cornel. Nep. in Agesil. c. iv.

The education which he instituted for the young Lacedæmonians, the hard and sober life which he recommended with so much care, the painful and violent exercises of the body prescribed by him, the abstraction from all other application and employment; in a word, all his laws and institutions show, that his view was to form a people of soldiers, solely devoted to arms and military functions. I do not pretend to justify absolutely this scheme, which had its great inconveniences, and I have expressed my thoughts of it elsewhere. But admitting it good, we must confess that legislator showed great wisdom in the means he took for its execution.

The almost inevitable danger of a people solely trained up for war, who have always arms in their hands, and what is most to be feared, is injustice, violence, ambition, the desire of increasing their power, of taking advantage of their neighbour's weakness, of oppressing them by force, of invading their land under false pretences, which the lust of dominion never fails to suggest, and of extending their bounds as far as possible; all vices and extremes, which are horrid in private persons, and the ordinary commerce of life, but which men have thought fit to applaud as grandeur and glory in the persons of princes and conquerors.

The great care of Lycurgus was to defend his people against this dangerous temptation. Without mentioning the other means he made use of he employed two which could not fail of producing their effect. * The first was to prohibit all navigation and war at sea to his citizens. The situation of his city, and the fear lest commerce, the usual source of luxury and depravation, should corrupt the purity of the Spartan manners, might have a share in this decree. But his principal motive was to put it out of his citizens power to project conquests, which a people shut up within the narrow bounds of a peninsula, could not carry very far without being masters at sea.

The second means, still more efficacious, was to forbid all use of gold or silver money, and to introduce a species of iron coin in its stead, which was of great weight and small value, and could only be current at home. How with such money should foreign troops be raised and paid, fleets fitted out, and numerous armies kept up either by land or sea?

So that the design of Lycurgus in rendering his city warlike, and putting arms into their hands, was not, as † Polybius observes, and Plutarch after him, to make them illustrious conquerors, who might carry war into remote regions, and subject great numbers of people. His sole end was, that, shut up within the extent of the lands and dominions left them by their ancestors, they should have no thoughts but of maintaining themselves in peace, and defending themselves successfully against such of their neighbours as should have the rashness to invade them; and for this they had occasion for neither gold nor silver, finding in their own country, and still more in their sober and temperate manner of life, all that was sufficient for the support of their armies, when they did not quit their own, or the lands of their neighbours.

Now, says Polybius, this plan once admitted, it must be allowed that there is nothing more wise nor more happily conceived than the institutions of Lycurgus, for the maintaining a people in the possession of their liberty, and to secure to them the enjoyment of peace and tranquility. In effect let us imagine a little republic, like that of Sparta, of which all the citizens are inured to labour, accustomed to live on a little, warlike, cour-

* Ἀριστοτέλις δὲ αὐτοῖς νόμισμα σίμα, καὶ ταυμάσιον. Plut. in instit. Lacon. p. 259.

† Polyb. l. vi. p. 481. Plut. in Lycurg. p. 59.

ageous, intrepid; and that the fundamental principle of this small republic, is to do no wrong to any one, nor to disturb its neighbours, nor invade their lands or interests, but, on the contrary, to declare in favour of the oppressed against the injustice and violence of oppressors; is it not certain that such a republic, surrounded by a great number of states of equal extent, would be generally respected by all the neighbouring people, would become the supreme arbiter of all their quarrels, and exercise an empire over them, by so much the more glorious and lasting as it would be voluntary, and founded solely in the opinion those neighbours would have of its virtue, justice and valour?

* This was the end Lycurgus proposed to himself. Convinced that the happiness of a city, like that of a private person, depends upon virtue, and upon being well within itself, he regulated Sparta so as it might always suffice to its own happiness, and act upon principles of wisdom and equity. From thence arose that universal esteem of the neighbouring people and even of strangers for the Lacedæmonians, who asked of them neither money, ships, nor troops, but only that they would lend them a Spartan to command their armies; and when they had obtained their request, they paid him entire obedience, with every kind of honour and respect. In this manner the Sicilians obeyed Gylippus, the Chalcidians, Brasidas, and all the Greeks of Asia, Lysander, Callacratidas, and Agesilaus; † regarding the city of Sparta as a model for all others in the arts of living and governing.

The epocha of the declension of Sparta, begins with the open violation of Lycurgus' laws. I do not pretend that they had always been exactly observed till that time, which was far from the case; but the spirit and genius of those laws had almost always prevailed with the majority of the persons who governed. No sooner had the ambition of reigning over all Greece inspired them with the design of having naval armies and foreign troops, and that money was necessary for the support of those forces, than Sparta forgetting her ancient maxims, saw herself reduced to have recourse to the barbarians, which till then she had detested, and basely to make her court to the kings of Persia, whom she had formerly vanquished with so much glory: and that only to draw from them some aids of money and troops against their own brethren, that is to say, against people born and settled in Greece like themselves. Thus had they the imprudence and misfortune to recal with gold and silver into Sparta all the vices and crimes which the iron money had banished, and to prepare the way for the changes which ensued, and were the cause of their ruin. And this infinitely exalts the wisdom of Lycurgus, in having foreseen, at such a distance, what might strike at the happiness of his citizens, and provided salutary remedies against it in the form of government be established at Sparta. Another legislator, who had preceded him several ages, has a right to share this glory with him.

SECTION III.

LAWS ESTABLISHED BY MINOS IN CRETE.

ALL the world knows, that Lycurgus had formed the plan of most of his laws upon the model of those observed in the island of Crete, where

* Plut. p. 58.

† Προς ευμακίαν τῶν τῶν Σπαρτιαστῶν πολίτῶν, ὡς περὶ παιδαγωγῶν ἢ διδασκάλων εὐχρημοῦς βίῃ καὶ τιμῶν ἀπεβλεποῦσι.

he passed a considerable time for the better studying of them. It is proper I should give some idea of them here, having forgot to do it in the place where it would have been more natural, that is, when I spoke for the first time of Lycurgus and his institutions.

Minos, whom fable calls the son of Jupiter, was the author of these laws. He * lived about 100 years before the Trojan war. He was a powerful, wise, and gentle prince, and still more estimable for his moral virtues than his military abilities. After having conquered the island of Crete, and several others in its neighbourhood, he applied himself to strengthen by wise laws the new state, of which he had possessed himself by the force of arms. † The end which he proposed in the establishment of these laws, was to render his subjects happy by making them virtuous. He banished idleness and voluptuousness from his states, and, with them, luxury and vicious pleasures, the fruitful sources of all vice. Well knowing that liberty was justly regarded as the most precious and greatest good, and that it cannot subsist without a perfect union of the people, he endeavoured to establish a kind of equality amongst them, which is the tie and basis of it, and very proper to remove all envy, jealousy, hatred, and dissension. He did not undertake to make any new division of lands, nor to prohibit the use of gold and silver. He applied himself to the uniting of his subjects by other ties, which seemed to him neither less firm nor less reasonable.

He decreed that the children should be all brought up and educated together by troops and bands; in order that they might learn early the same principles and maxims. Their life was hard and sober. They were accustomed to be satisfied with little, to suffer heat and cold, to walk over steep and rugged places, to skirmish with each other in small parties, to suffer courageously the blows they received, and to exercise themselves in a kind of dance, in which they carried arms in their hands, and which was afterwards called the Pyrrhic; in order, says Strabo, that, even to their diversions, every thing might breathe and form them for war. They were also made to learn certain airs of music, but of a manly martial kind.

‡ They were not taught either to ride, or to wear heavy armour; but in return, they were made to excel in drawing the bow, which was their most usual exercise. Crete is not a flat even country, nor fit for breeding of horses, as is that of the Thessalians, who passed for the best cavalry in Greece; but a rough broken country, full of shelves and high lands, where heavy armed troops could not exercise themselves in the horse race. But as to archery and light armed soldiers, fit to execute the devices and stratagems of war, the Cretans pretended to hold the foremost rank.

Minos thought proper to establish in Crete a community of tables and meals. Besides several other great advantages which he found in this institution, as the introducing a kind of equality in his dominions, the rich and poor having the same diet, the accustoming his subjects to a frugal and sober life, the cementing friendship and unity between them by the usual gaiety and familiarity of the table, he had also in view the custom of war, in which the soldiers are obliged to eat together. || It was the public that supplied the expences of these tables. Out of the revenues of the state, a part was applied to the uses of religion and the salaries of the magistrates, and the rest allotted for the public meals; so that the women, children, and men of all ages were fed at the cost and in the name of the republic. In

* A. M. 2720. Ant. J. C. 1284.

† Plat. de leg. l. i. p. 623.

‡ Strab. l. x. p. 480.

|| Arist. de rep. l. iii. c. 10.

this Aristotle gives the preference to the meals of Crete before those of Sparta, wherein private persons were obliged to furnish their proportion, and without it were not admitted into the assemblies; which was to exclude the poor.

* After eating, the old men discoursed upon the affairs of the state. The conversation turned generally upon the history of the country, upon the actions and virtues of the great men of it, who had distinguished themselves either by their valour in war, or their wisdom in peace; and the youth who were present at these entertainments were exhorted to propose those great persons to themselves as their models, for the forming of their manners, and the regulation of their conduct.

† Minos, as well as Lycurgus, is reproached with having no other view in his laws than war; which is a very great fault in a legislator. It is true, this appears to have been his principal attention, because he was convinced that the repose, liberty, and riches of his subjects were under the protection, and in a manner under the guard of arms and military knowledge; the conquered being deprived of all those advantages by the victor. But he ordained that war should be only made for the sake of peace; and his laws are far from being confined to that sole object.

Amongst the Cretans, the cultivation of the mind was not entirely neglected, and care was taken to give the youth some tincture of learning. The works of Homer, † of much later date than the laws of Minos, were not unknown amongst them, though they set small value upon, and made little use of foreign poets. ‡ They were very curious in such knowledge as is proper to form the manners; and, what is no small praise, they piqued themselves upon thinking much and speaking little. § The poet Epimenides, who made a voyage to Athens in the time of Solon, and was in great estimation there, was of Crete, and by some placed in the number of the seven sages.

One of Minos' institutions, which Plato ¶ admires the most, was to inspire early into the youth an high respect for the maxims, customs, and laws of the state, and not to suffer them to dispute or call in question the wisdom of their institution; but to consider them not as prescribed and imposed by men, but as emanations of the Divinity himself. Accordingly he had industriously apprized the people that Jupiter himself had dictated them to him. He had the same attention in regard to the magistrates and aged persons, whom he recommended to honour in a peculiar manner; and in order that nothing might prevent the respect due to them, he ordained, that if any defects were observed in them, they should never be mentioned in the presence of the youth: a wise precaution, and which would be very becoming in the ordinary practice of life!

The government of Crete was at first monarchical, of which Minos has left us a perfect model to all ages. According to him, as a most great and excellent man** observes, the king can do every thing over the people, but the laws every thing over him. He has an absolute power to do good, and his hands are tied up from doing evil. The laws intrust the people in his hands as the most sacred of deposits, upon condition that he shall be their common father. The same laws require, that a single man by his wisdom and moderation shall constitute the felicity of an infinite number of sub-

* Athen. l. iv. p. 643.

† Plat. de leg. l. i. p. 626.

‡ Plat. de leg. l. ii. p. 630.

§ Idem. l. i. p. 641.

¶ Plut. in Solon. p. 84.

¶ De leg. l. i. p. 683.

** Monsieur de Fenelon, archbishop of Cambray.

jects; and not that the subjects by their misery and abject slavery, shall be substituted to gratify the pride and low passions of a single man. According to him, the king ought to be abroad the defender of his country at the head of armies, and at home the judge of his people, to render them good, wise, and happy. It is not for himself that the gods have made him king, and he is only so for the service of his people. He owes them his whole time, care, and affection; and is worthy of the throne only as he devotes himself to the public good. Such is the idea * Minos had of the sovereignty, of which he was a living image in his own person, and which Hesiod has perfectly expressed in two words, by calling that prince, "the most royal of mortal kings," βασιλευτατος θνητων βασιληων: that is to say, that he possessed in a supreme degree all royal virtues, and was a king in all things.

† It appears that the authority of king was of no long duration, and that it gave place to a republican government, as Minos had intended. The senate, composed of thirty senators, formed the public council. In that assembly the public affairs were examined, and resolutions taken; but they were of no force till the people had given them their approbation, and confirmed them by their suffrages. The magistrates, to the number of ten, established for maintaining good order in the state, and therefore called *kosmi*, † held the two other bodies of the state in respect, and were the balance between them. In time of war the same persons commanded the army. They were chosen by lot, but only out of certain families.—Their office was for life, and they were not accountable to any for their administration. Out of this company the senators were elected.

The Cretans made the slaves and mercenaries cultivate their lands, who were obliged to pay them a certain annual sum. They were called *Periæci*, apparently from their being people in the neighbourhood whom Minos had subjected. As they inhabited an island, and consequently a country separate from all others, the Cretans had not so much to fear from these vassals as the Lacedæmonians from the helots, who often joined the neighbouring people against them. † A custom anciently established in Crete, from whence it was adopted by the Romans, gives us reason to believe that the vassals who manured the lands, were treated with great goodness and favour. In the feasts of Mercury, the masters waited on their slaves at table, and did them the same offices as they received from them the rest of the year; precious remains and traces of the primitive world, in which all men were equal, that seemed to inform the masters, that their servants were of the same condition with themselves, and that to treat them with cruelty or pride, was to renounce humanity.

‡ As a prince cannot do every thing alone, and is obliged to associate co-operators with himself, for whose conduct he is accountable, Minos charged his brother Rhadamanthus with a share in the administration of justice in the capital city; which is the most essential and indispensable function of sovereignty. He knew his probity, disinterestedness, ability, and constancy, and had taken pains to form him for so important an office. Another minister had the care of the rest of the cities, who made a circuit three times a year, to examine whether the laws established by the prince were duly observed, and the inferior magistrates and officers religiously acquitted themselves of their duty.

* Plat. in Min. p. 320.

† Arist. de rep. l. ii. c. 10.

‡ Κοσμος, ordo.

§ Athen. l. xiv. p. 324.

§ Plat. in Min. p. 310.

Crete, under so wise a government, changed its aspect entirely, and seemed to have become the abode of virtue, probity and justice: as we may judge, from what fable tells us of the honour Jupiter did these three brothers, in making them the judges of the other world; for every body knows, that fable is founded upon real history, though disguised under agreeable emblems and allegories, adapted to recommend truth by the ornaments of fancy.

* It was, according to fabulous tradition, a law established from all times, that men in departing out of this life should be judged, in order to their receiving the reward or punishment due to their good or evil actions. In the reign of Saturn, and in the first years of that of Jupiter, this judgment was pronounced at the instant preceding death, which left room for very flagrant injustice. Princes, who had been cruel and tyrannical, appearing before their judges in all the pomp and splendour of their power, and producing witnesses to depose in their favour; because, as they were still alive, they dreaded their anger; the judges, dazzled with this vain show, and deceived by such false evidence, declared these princes innocent, and dismissed them with permission to enter into the happy abodes of the just. The same may be said in regard to the rich; but for the poor and helpless, calumny and malice pursued them even to this last tribunal, and found means to have them doomed for ever as criminals.

Fable adds, that upon reiterated complaints and warm remonstrances made to Jupiter upon this account, he changed the form of these trials. The time for them was fixed to be the very moment after death. Rhadamanthus and Æacus, both sons of Jove, were appointed judges; the first for the Asiatics, the other for the Europeans; and Minos over them, to decide supremely in cases of doubt and obscurity. Their tribunal is situated in a place called "the field of truth," because neither falsehood nor calumny can approach it. The greatest prince must appear there, as soon as he has resigned his last breath, deprived of all his grandeur, reduced to his naked self, without defence or protection, silent and trembling for his own doom, after having made the whole world tremble for theirs. If he be found guilty of crimes which are of a nature to be expiated, he is confined in Tartarus for a certain time only, and with assurance of being released as soon as he shall be sufficiently purified. But if his crimes are unpardonable, such as injustice, perjury, and the oppression of his people, he is cast into the same Tartarus, there to suffer eternal miseries. The just, on the contrary, of whatsoever condition they are, are conducted into the blessed abodes of peace and joy, to partake of a felicity which shall have no end.

Who does not see that the poets, under the cover of these fictions, ingenious indeed, but little to the honour of the gods, intended to give us the model of an accomplished prince, whose first care is to render justice to his people, and to image the extraordinary happiness Crete enjoyed under the wise government of Minos? This happiness did not expire with him. † The laws he established subsisted in all their vigour even in Plato's time; that is to say, more than 900 years after; ‡ and they were considered as the effect of his long § conversations for many years with Jupiter, who had condescended to become his teacher, to enter into a ¶ familiarity with him

* Plat. in Gorg. p. 523—526. In Axioch. p. 871.

† Plat. in Min. p. 321.

‡ Idem. p. 319.

§ Et Jovis arcanis Minos admissus. Horat.

¶ This poetical fiction is perhaps taken from the holy scriptures, which say of

complacency, as a favourite disciple, and a tenderly beloved son. It is in this manner Plato explains these words of Homer: * Διὸς μεγαλήερα κτίσις; the most exalted praise, according to him, that can be given to a mortal, and which that poet ascribes only to Minos.

Notwithstanding so shining and solid a merit, the theatres of Athens resounded with nothing so much as imprecations against the memory of Minos; and Socrates, in the dialogue of Plato I have already often cited, observes upon, and gives the reason for them: but first he makes a reflection well worthy of being weighed. "When either the praise or dispraise of great men is in question, it is infinitely proper, says he, to treat them with circumspection and wisdom; because upon that depends the idea men form to themselves of virtue and vice, and the distinction they ought to make between the good and the bad. "For," adds he, "God conceives a just indignation, when a person is blamed who resembles himself; and, on the contrary, another praised who is the reverse of him. "We must not believe that nothing is sacred but brass and marble; (he speaks of the statues that were worshipped;) the just man is the most sacred, and the wicked the most detestable of all beings in this world."

After this reflection, Socrates observes, that the source and cause of the Athenians hatred of Minos was the unjust and cruel tribute he imposed upon them, in obliging them to send him, every nine years, seven young men and as many maids, to be devoured by the Minotaur; and he could not avoid reproaching that prince, with having drawn upon himself the abhorrence of a city like Athens, abounding with learned men, and of having sharpened the tongues of the poets against him, a dangerous and formidable race of men, from the poisoned shafts they never fail to let fly against their enemies.

It appears from what I have repeated, that Plato imputes to Minos the imposition of that cruel tribute. Apollodorus, Strabo, and Plutarch, seem to be of the same opinion. † Monsieur the Abbe Banier alledges and proves that they are mistaken, and confound the first Minos, of whom we speak, with a second, his grand-son, who reigned after him in Crete, and to avenge the death of his son Androgeus, killed in Attica, declared war against the Athenians, and imposed that tribute, to which Theseus put an end by killing the Minotaur. It would indeed be difficult to reconcile so inhuman and barbarous a conduct with what all antiquity relates of the goodness, lenity, and equity of Minos, and with the magnificent praises it bestows upon the policy and institutions of Crete.

It is true the Cretans degenerated very much from their ancient reputation, which at length they absolutely lost, by an entire change of their manners, becoming avaricious, and self-interested, to a degree of thinking that no gain was base, enemies of labour and regularity of life, professed liars and knaves; so that *to Cretise* became a proverb amongst the Greeks, implying to lie and to deceive. Every body knows that † St. Paul cites against them as truth the testimony of one of their ancient poets (it is believed of Epimenides,) who paints them in colours much to their dishon-

Moses; And the Lord spake unto Moses, face to face, as a man speaketh unto his friend. Exod. xxxiii. 11.

* Odyss. T. ver. 179.

† Mem. de l'Acad. des Insc. tom. III.

‡ Κρητις αει ψευδαι, κακα θηρια, γαστρις αργυραι. The Cretans are always liars: evil beasts, slow bellies. Tit. i. 12.

our; but this change of manners, in whatever time it might arrive, does not at all affect the probity of the ancient Cretans, nor the glory of Minos their king.

* The most certain proof of that legislator's wisdom, as Plato observes, is the solid and lasting happiness, which was the effect of the sole imitation of his laws by Sparta. Lycurgus had regulated the government of that city upon the plan and idea of that of Crete, and it subsisted in an uniform manner for many ages, without experiencing the vicissitudes and revolutions so common in all the other states of Greece.

ARTICLE II.

OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ATHENS.

THE government of Athens was neither so permanent nor so uniform as that of Sparta, but suffered various alterations, according to the diversity of times and conjunctures. Athens, after having long been governed by kings, and afterwards by archons, assumed entire liberty, which gave place however for some years to the tyrannic power of the Pisistratides, but was soon after re-established, and subsisted with splendour till the defeat in Sicily, and the taking of the city by the Lacedæmonians. These subjected them to the thirty tyrants, whose authority was not of long duration, and gave place again to liberty, which continued amidst various events during a long series of years, till the Roman power had subdued Greece, and reduced it into a province.

I shall consider in this place only the popular government, and shall examine in particular five or six heads: the foundation of the government, according to Solon's establishment, the different parts of which the republic consisted, the council or senate of the five hundred, the assemblies of the people, the different tribunals for the administration of justice, the revenues or finances of the republic. I shall be obliged to be more extensive upon what regards the government of Athens than I have been upon that of Sparta, because the latter is almost sufficiently known, from what has been said of it in the life of Lycurgus.†

SECTION I.

FOUNDATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ATHENS.

SOLON was not the first who established the popular government at Athens.† Theseus long before him had traced out the plan, and began the execution of it. After having united the twelve towns into one city, he divided the inhabitants into three bodies; that of the nobility, to whom the superintendance in religious affairs and all offices were confided; the labourers, or husbandmen; and the artisans. He had proposed the establishment of a kind of equality between the three orders: for if the nobles were considerable by their honours and dignities, the husbandmen had the advantage of their utility to the public, and the necessity there was for their labours; and the artisans had the superiority to both the other bodies, in their number. Athens, to speak properly, did not become a popular state, till the establishment of the nine archons, whose authority continued only for one year, whereas before it was for ten; and it was not till ma-

* Plat. p. 320.

† Book v. art. vij.

‡ Plut. in Thes. p. 10, 11.

years after, that Solon, by the wisdom of his laws, instituted and confirmed this form of government.

* Solon's great principle was to establish as much as possible a kind of equality among his citizens, which he regarded with reason as the foundation and essential point of liberty. He resolved therefore to leave the public employments in the hands of the rich, as they had been till then, but to give the poor also some share in the government, from which they were excluded. For this reason he made an estimation of what each individual was worth. Those who were found to have an annual revenue of 500 measures, as well in grain as liquid things, were placed in the first class, and called the pentacosiomediimni, that is, those who had a revenue of 500 measures. The second class was composed of such as had 300, and could maintain a horse for war; these were called horsemen or knights. Those who had only 200, were in the third class, and were called † zugitæ. Out of these three classes only the magistrates and commanders were chosen. All the other citizens, who were below these three classes, and had less revenues, were comprised under the name of theti, hirelings, or workmen labouring with their hands. Solon did not permit them to hold any office, and granted them only the right of giving their suffrages in the assemblies and trials of the people, which at first seemed a very slight privilege, but at length was found to be a very great advantage, as will appear in the sequel. I do not know whether Solon foresaw it, but he used to say, that the people were never more obedient and submissive than when they possessed neither too much nor too little liberty: ‡ which comes very near Galba's expression, § when, to incline Piso to treat the Roman people with goodness and lenity, he desires him to remember ¶ that he was going to command men who were incapable of bearing either entire liberty, or absolute subjection.

¶ The people of Athens, being become more haughty after their victories over the Persians, pretended to have a right to share in all the public offices and the magistracy; and Aristides, to prevent the disorders which too tenacious an opposition might have occasioned, thought proper to give way to them in this point. ** It appears, however, from a passage in Xenophon, that the people contented themselves with the offices from whence some profit arose, and left those which related more particularly to the government of the state in the hands of the rich.

†† The citizens of the three first classes paid every year a certain sum of money, to be laid up in the public treasury; the first a ††† talent, the knights half a talent, and the zugitæ ten minæ.†††

If §§ Plutarch may be believed, Solon formed two councils, which were a kind of double limitation to fix and temper the assemblies of the people. The first was the Areopagus; but it was much more ancient than his institutions, and he only reformed it, and gave it new lustre by augmenting its power. The second was the council of the four hundred, that

* Plut. in. Solon. p. 37.

† It is believed they were so called from their being ranked between the knights and the theti; as in the galleys those who rowed in the middle were termed zugitæ; their place was between the thalamitæ and thranitæ.

‡ Plut. in Solon, p. 110.

§ Tacit. hist. l. x. c. 16.

¶ Imperatorus es hominibus, qui nec totam servitutem pati possunt, nec totam libertatem.

¶ Plut. in Aristid. p. 352.

** Xenoph. de rep. Athen. p. 691.

†† Pollux. l. viii. c. 10.

†† 1000 French crowns.

††† 500 livres.

§§ In Solon. p. 38.

as, an hundred of each tribe; for Cecrops, the first king of the Athenians, had divided the people into four tribes. Clisthenes long after him changed that order, and established ten. It was in this council of the four hundred, all affairs were considered before they were proposed to the assembly of the people, as we shall soon explain.

I do not mention here another division of the people into three parties or factions, which, till the time of Pisistratus, was a continual source of troubles and seditions. One of these three parties was formed out of those who inhabited the high lands, and favoured popular government; the other out of those who lived in the plains, and they were for oligarchy; and the third out of the people upon the coast, and these held the mean between both.

It is necessary, for the better understanding what we have now said, to enter into a more particular account of the Athenian people.

SECTION II.

OF THE INHABITANTS OF ATHENS.

THERE were three sorts of inhabitants of Athens: * citizens, strangers, and servants. In the account taken by Demetrius Phalereus in the 116th Olympiad, their number amounted to 21,000 citizens, 10,000 strangers and 40,000 servants.† The number of citizens was almost the same in the time of Cecrops, and less under Pericles.

1. OF THE CITIZENS.

A citizen could only be such by birth or adoption. To be a natural denizen of Athens, it was necessary to be born of a father and mother both free, and Athenians.‡ We have seen that Pericles restored this law to all its force, which had not been exactly observed, and which he himself some small time after infringed. The people could confer the freedom of the city upon strangers; and those whom they had so adopted enjoyed almost the same rights and privileges as the natural citizens. The quality of citizen of Athens was sometimes granted in honour and gratitude to those who had rendered great services to the state; as to Hippocrates; and even kings have sometimes canvassed that title for themselves and their children. Evagoras, king of Cyprus, thought it much to his honour.

When the young men attained the age of 20, they were inrolled upon the list of citizens, after having taken an oath; and it was only in virtue of that public and solemn act that they became members of the state. The form of this oath is exceedingly remarkable, which Stobæus and § Pollux have preserved in the following words: "I will never dishonour the profession of arms, nor save my life by a shameful flight. I will fight to my last breath for the religion and civil interests of the state, in concert with the other citizens, and alone, if occasion be. I will not bring my country into a worse condition than I found it; but will use my utmost endeavours to make it more happy and flourishing. I will always submit myself to the laws and magistrates, and to all that shall be ordained by the common consent of the people. If any one shall violate, or make void the laws, I will not disguise or conceal such an attempt, but will oppose it either alone or in conjunction with my fellow citizens, and I

* A. M. 3690. Ant. J. C. 314. Athen, l. vi. p. 272.

† The text says, *μυριάδας τετρασκαύοντα*, 400,000, which is a manifest error.

‡ Book v. art. viii.

§ Pollux. l. viii. c. 9.

"I call to witness Agraulis, Enyiaus, Mars, and Jupiter." I leave the reader to his own reflections upon this august ceremony, well adapted to inspire the love of their country into the hearts of the young citizens.

The whole people at first had been divided into four tribes, and afterwards into ten. Each tribe was subdivided into several parts, which were called *Δημοί*, pagi. It was by these two titles the citizens were described in the public acts. *Melitus, e tribu Cecropide e pago Pithensi.*

II. OF THE STRANGERS.

I call those by that name, who, being of a foreign country, came to settle at Athens, or in Attica, whether for the sake of commerce, or the exercising any trade. They were termed *μετοικῆται*, inquilini. They had no share in the government, nor votes in the assembly of the people, and could not be admitted into any office. They put themselves under the protection of some citizen, as we find from a passage in * Terence, and upon that account were obliged to render him certain duties and services, as the clients did at Rome to their patrons. They were held to observe all the laws of the republic, and to conform entirely to all its customs. They paid a yearly tribute to the state of 12 † drachms, and in default of payment were made slaves, and exposed to sale. † Xenocrates, the celebrated, but poor philosopher, was very near experiencing this misfortune, and was carried to prison; but Lycurgus the orator, having paid the tax, released him from the farmers of the public revenues; a kind of men who in all times have been very little sensible to merit, with the exception of an exceeding few of their number. That philosopher, meeting some time after the sons of his deliverer, told them, "I pay your father the favour he has done me with usury, for the world praises him upon my account."

III. OF THE SERVANTS.

There were two kinds of them. The one, who were free, and not able to get their bread by their work, were obliged by the bad state of their affairs to go into service; and their condition was easy, and not laborious. The service of the other was forced and unavoidable; these were slaves, who had either been taken prisoners in war, or bought of such as trafficked publicly in them. Part of their master's estate consisted in them, who disposed absolutely of them, but generally treated them with great humanity. ‖ Demosthenes observes, in one of his harangues, that the condition of servants was infinitely more gentle at Athens than any where else. There was in that city an asylum and place of refuge for slaves, where the bones of Theseus had been interred, and that asylum subsisted in Plutarch's time. How glorious was it for Theseus, that his tomb should do that 1200 years after his death, which he had done himself during his life, and continue the protector of the people as he had been!

§ When the slaves were treated with too much rigour and inhumanity, they had their action against their masters who were obliged to sell them to others, if the fact were sufficiently proved. ¶ They could ransom themselves even against their master's consent, when they had laid up money

* *Thais patri se commendavit in clientelam et fidem: Nobis dedit sese. Eunuch. Act. 5. scen. ult.*

† Six livres.

‡ Plut. in Flamin. p. 373.

‖ Philip. 3.

§ Plut. de superst. p. 166.

¶ Plaut. in Casim.

through for that purpose; for out of what they got by their labour, after having paid a certain proportion to their masters they kept the remainder for themselves, and made a stock of it at their own disposal. Private persons, when they were satisfied with their services, often gave these slaves their liberty; and the same grace was always granted them by the public, when the necessity of the times obliged the state to arm and list them for the war among the citizens.

The humane and equitable usage with which the Athenians treated their servants and slaves, was an effect of the good temper natural to that people, and very remote from the austere and cruel severity of the Lacedæmonians in regard to their helots, which often brought their republic to the very brink of destruction. * Plutarch with great reason, condemns this rigour. He thinks it proper to habituate one's self always to mercy, even with regard to beasts, were it only, says he, to learn by that means to treat men well, and for the sake of habituating humanity and benevolence. He relates upon this occasion a very singular fact, and very proper to explain the character of the Athenians. After having finished the temple called Hecatonpedon, they set all the beasts of burden at liberty that had been employed in the work, and assigned them fat pasturages as consecrated animals: and it was said, that one of these beasts having come to offer himself at the work, and put himself at the head of those that drew the carriages at the citadel, walking foremost, as if to exhort and encourage them; the Athenians ordained by a decree, that the creature should be maintained at the public expence till his death.

SECTION III.

OF THE COUNCIL, OR SENATE OF FIVE HUNDRED.

IN consequence of Solon's institutions, the people of Athens had a great share and authority in the government. Appeals might be brought to their tribunals in all causes; they had a right to cancel the old laws, and establish new ones; in a word, all important affairs, whether relating to war or peace, were decided in their assemblies. In order to their determinations being made with more wisdom and maturity, Solon had instituted a council, composed of 400 senators, 100 out of each tribe, which were then four in number; they prepared and digested the affairs which were to be laid before the people, as we shall soon explain more at large. Clisthenes, about 100 years after Solon, having increased the number of tribes to ten, augmented also that of the senators to 500; each tribe supplying 50. This was called the council, or senate of the five hundred. They received their stipend out of the public treasury.

They were chosen by lot, in which they made use of black and white beans, which were mingled and shaken in an urn, and each tribe gave in the names of those who aspired to that trust, and had the revenue assigned by the laws to qualify them for it. None could be admitted under the age of 30. After inquiry made into the manners and conduct of the candidate, he was made to take an oath, whereby he engaged to give at all times the best council he could to the people of Athens, and never to depart in the least from the tenor of the laws.

This senate assembled every day, except upon the days appointed for festivals. Each tribe in its turn furnished those who were to preside in it,

* Plut. in Catone. p. 332. 339.

continued 35 days, which being reckoned ten times, amounts to the number of days, except four, of the lunar year followed at Athens. This time of the presidency or prytanism, was divided into five weeks with regard to the five tens of the prytanes, who were to preside in them, and every week seven of these ten prytanes, drawn by lot, presided each their day, and were denominated Προεδροι, that is to say, presidents. He † who was so for the day, presided in the assembly of the senators, and in that of the people. He was charged with the public seal, as also with the keys of the citadel and treasury.

The senators, before they assembled, offered a sacrifice to Jupiter and Minerva, under the additional appellation of Goddess of Good Counsel, ‡ to demand the prudence and understanding necessary in wise deliberations. The president proposed the business which was to be considered in the assembly. Every one gave his opinion in his turn, and always standing. After a question had been settled, it was drawn up in writing, and read with a loud voice. Each senator then gave his vote by scrutiny, and putting a bean into the urn. If the number of the white beans carried it; the question passed, otherwise it was rejected. This sort of decree was called ψηφισμα, or Προβουλιμα, as much as to say, preparatory resolution. It was afterwards laid before the assembly of the people, where, if it was received and approved, it had the force of the law; if not, its authority subsisted only one year. This shows with what wisdom Solon established this council, to inform and direct the people, to fix their inconstancy, to prevent their temerity, and to assist their deliberations with a prudence and maturity not to be expected in a confused and tumultuous assembly, composed of a great number of citizens, most of them without education, capacity, or much zeal for the public good. The reciprocal dependency and natural intercourse of the two bodies of the state, which were obliged to lend each other their authority, and remained equally without force when without union and a good understanding, were besides a method judiciously contrived for supporting a wise balance between the two bodies; the people not being able to institute any thing without its being first proposed and approved by the senate, nor the senate to pass any decree into a law till it had been ratified by the people.

We may judge of the importance of this council by the matters which were treated in it, the same, without any exception, as were laid before the people; wars, taxes, maritime affairs, treaties of peace, alliances; in a word, whatever related to government; without mentioning the account which they obliged the magistrates to give on quitting their offices, and their frequent decisions and judgments upon the most serious and important affairs.

SECTION IV.

OF THE AREOPAGUS.

THIS council took its name from the place where it assembled, called † the Quarter, or Hill of Mars, because, according to some, Mars had been cited thither in judgment for a murder committed by him. It was believed to be as ancient as the nation. Cicero and Plutarch attribute the

‡ Πρυτανις.
 † Αρειος, παγος.

† He was called Επιστατης.

‡ Βουλιος, βουλαια.

institution of it to Solon; but he only re-established it, by giving it more lustre and authority than it had had till then, and for that reason was looked upon as its founder. The number of the senators of the Areopagus was not fixed; at certain times they amounted to 200 or 300. Solon thought proper that only those who had borne the office of archon should be honoured with that dignity.

This senate had the care of seeing the laws duly observed, of inspecting the manners of the people, and especially of judging in criminal cases. They held their sittings in an open place, and during the night; the former very probably to avoid being under the same roof with the criminals, and not to defile themselves by such a commerce with them; the latter, that they might not be softened by the sight of the guilty, and might judge according to justice and the laws. It was for the same reason the orators were not permitted to use their exordium or peroration, nor allowed to excite the passions, and were obliged to confine themselves solely to the subject matter of their cause. The severity of their judgments was exceedingly dreaded, particularly in regard to murder, and they were highly attentive to inspire their citizens with horror for that crime. They* condemned a child to be put to death for making it his pastime to put out the eyes of quails; conceiving this sanguinary inclination as the mark of a very wicked disposition, which might one day prove fatal to many, if he were suffered to grow up with impunity.

The affairs of religion, as blasphemies against the gods, contempt of sacred mysteries, different species of impiety, and the introduction of new ceremonies and new divinities, were also brought before this tribunal. † We read in Justin Martyr, that Plato, who in his travels in Egypt had acquired great lights concerning the unity of God, when he returned to Athens took great care to dissemble and conceal his sentiments, for fear of being obliged to appear and give an account of them before the Areopagitæ; and we know that St. Paul, was traduced before them, as teaching a new doctrine, ‡ and endeavouring to introduce new gods.

These judges were in great reputation for their probity, equity, and prudence, and generally respected. Cicero, in writing to his friend Atticus, upon the fortitude, constancy, and wise severity of the Roman senate, thinks he makes a great encomium upon it, in comparing it with the Areopagus. || *Senatus, Aquis magis, nil constantius, nil severius, nil fortius.* Cicero must have conceived a very advantageous idea of it, to speak of it as he does in the first book of his Offices. § He compares the famous battle of Salamis, in which Themistocles had so great a part, with the establishment of the Areopagus, that he ascribes to Solon; and makes no scruple to prefer, or at least to equal, the legislator's service to that for

* Nec mihi videntur Areopagitæ, cum damnaverunt puerum oculos coturnicum eruentum, aliud judicasse, quam id signum esse perniciosissimæ mentis, multisque malo futuræ si adolevisset. Quintil. l. v. c. 9.

† Cohort. ad Græc.

‡ Acts xvii. 18—20.

|| Ad Attic. l. i. ep. 19.

§ Quamvis Themistocles jure laudetur et sit ejus nomen, quam Solonis, illustrius, citeturque Salamis clarissimæ testis victoriæ, quæ anteponatur consilio Solonis ei, quo primum constituit Areopagitas: non minus præclarum hoc, quam illud, judicandum est. Illud enim semel profuit, hoc semper proderit civitati: hoc consilio leges Atheniensium, hoc majorum instituta servantur. Et Themistocles quidem nihil dixerit, in quo ipse Areopagum juverit: at ille adjuvit Themistoclem. Est enim bellum gestum consilio senatus ejus, qui a Solone erat constitutus. Offic. l. i. n. 75.

which Athens was obliged to the general of its army. "For in reality," says he, "that victory was useful to the republic only for once, but the Areopagus will be so throughout all ages; as by the wisdom of that tribunal, the laws and ancient customs of the Athenian state are preserved. Themistocles did no service to the Areopagus, but the Areopagus abundantly contributed to the victory of Themistocles; because the republic was at that time directed by the wise counsels of that august senate."

It appears from this passage of Cicero's, that the Areopagus had a great share in the government, and I do not doubt but it was consulted upon important affairs. Cicero here perhaps may have confounded the council of the Areopagus with that of the five hundred. It is certain, however, that the Areopagites were extremely active in the public affairs.

Pericles, who could never enter into the Areopagus, because chance having always been against him, he had not passed through any of the employments necessary to his admission, attempted to weaken its authority, and attained his point; which is a great blot in his reputation.

SECTION V.

OF THE MAGISTRATES.

OF these a great number were established for different functions. I shall speak only of the archons, who are the most known. I have observed elsewhere that they succeeded the kings, and that their authority at first continued during life. It was at length limited to ten years, and reduced at last only to one. When Solon was commissioned to reform the government, he found them upon this foot, and to the number of nine. He did not abolish their office, but he very much diminished their power.

The first of these nine magistrates was called the archon, by way of eminence, and the year denominated from him: " * Under such an archon such a battle was fought." The second was called the king, which was the remains and footsteps of the authority to which they had succeeded. The third was the polemarch, who at first commanded the armies, and always retained that name, though he had not the same authority, of which he had so long preserved some part. For we have seen, in speaking of the battle of Marathon, that the polemarch had a right to vote in the council of war, as well as the ten generals then in command. The six other archons were called by the common name, Thesmothetæ, which implies that they had a particular superintendance over the laws, in order to their being duly observed. These nine archons had each of them a peculiar province, and were judges in certain affairs allotted to their cognizance. I do not think it necessary to enter into the particulars of their duty, nor into those of many other employments and offices, established for the administration of justice, for the levying of taxes and tributes, for the preservation of good order in the city, for supplying it with provisions, in a word, for every thing relating to commerce and civil society.

* From thence he was called *ἄρχων*.

THESE were of two sorts; the one ordinary and fixed to certain days, and for these there was no kind of summons; the other extraordinary, according to the different occasions that arose, and the people were informed of it by express proclamation.

The place for the assembly was not fixed. Sometimes it was the public market place, sometimes a part of the city near the citadel, called *Πρυτανεία*, and sometimes the theatre of Bacchus.

The prytanes generally assembled the people. Some days before the assembly papers were fixed up, wherein the business to be considered was set down.

All the citizens, poor as well as rich, had a right to give their suffrages. They were liable to a penalty who failed of being present at the assembly, or who came too late; and to induce their punctual attendance, a reward was annexed to it, at first of an obolus, which was the sixth part of a drachm, then of three oboli, which made about five pence French.

The assembly always began with sacrifices and prayers, in order for the obtaining from the gods the knowledge and understanding necessary to wise deliberations; and they never failed to add the most terrible imprecations against such as should wilfully advise any thing contrary to the public good.

The president proposed the affair upon which they were to deliberate. If it had been examined in the senate, and drawn up there as a question, it was read; after which those who would speak were invited to ascend the tribunal, that they might be the better heard by the people, and inform them in the matter proposed. The oldest general spoke first, and then the rest according to their seniority; when the orators had done speaking, and concluded that it was necessary to approve or reject the decree of the senate, the people proceeded to vote, and the most common method of doing it was by holding up their hands, to denote their approbation; which was called *χρησισις*. The assembly was sometimes adjourned till another day, because it was too late for the number of those who lifted up their hands to be distinguished, and the plurality decided. After a resolution had been formed in this manner, it was reduced to writing, and read by an officer to the people with a loud voice, who confirmed it again by holding up their hands as before; after which the decree had the force of a law. And this was called *ψαφισμα*, from a Greek word *ψαφος*, which signifies "a pebble," or "small stone," because they were sometimes used in giving suffrages by scrutiny.

All the great affairs of the republic were discussed in these assemblies. It was in them new laws were proposed, and old ones amended; the religion and worship of the gods examined; magistrates, generals and officers created; their behaviour and conduct inquired into; peace or war concluded; deputies and ambassadors appointed; treaties and alliances ratified; freedom of the city granted; rewards and honours decreed for those who had distinguished themselves in war, or rendered great services to the republic; and punishments ordained for those who had behaved themselves ill, or had violated the laws of the state, and were banished by the ostracism. In fine, justice was administered, and judgment passed there, upon the most important affairs. We see from this account, which is however very imperfect, how far the people's power extended; and

with what truth it may be said that the government of Athens though qualified with aristocracy, and the authority of the elders, was by its constitution democratical and popular.

I shall take occasion to observe in the sequel, of what weight the talent of eloquence is in such a republic; and in what manner orators ought to be considered in it. It is not easy to conceive how they could make themselves heard in so numerous an assembly, and where such a multitude of auditors were present. We may judge how great that was, from what has been said of it in two instances. The first relates to ostracism, and the other to the adoption of a stranger for a citizen. On each of these occasions it was necessary that no less than 6000 citizens should be present in the assembly.

I reserve for another place the reflections which naturally arise from what I have already related, and what it remains for me to say further upon the government of Athens.

SECTION VII.

OF TRIALS.

THERE were different tribunals, according to the difference of affairs to be adjudged; but appeals might be brought to the people from all decrees of other judges, and this it was that rendered their power so great and considerable.* All the allies, when they had any cause to try, were obliged to repair to Athens; where they often remained a considerable time, without being able to obtain audience, from the multiplicity of affairs to be adjudged. This law had been imposed upon them, in order to render them more dependant upon the people, and more submissive to their authority; instead of which, had they sent commissioners to the places, they would have been the sole persons to whom the allies would have made their court, and paid their homage.

The parties pleaded their causes either in person, or employed advocates to do it for them. The time allowed for the hearing was generally fixed, and a water-clock, called in Greek *κλεψυδρα*, regulated its duration. The decree was passed by plurality of voices; and when the suffrages were equal, the judges inclined to the side of mercy, and acquitted the accused. It is remarkable that a friend was not obliged to give evidence against a friend.

All the citizens, even the poorest, and such as had no estates, were admitted into the number of the judges, provided they had attained the age of 30, and were known to be persons of good morals. Whilst they sat in judgment, they held in their hands a kind of sceptre, which was the mark of their dignity, and laid it down when they withdrew.

The judges' salary was different at different times. They had at first only an obolus a day, and afterwards three, where their fee remained fixed. It was but a small matter in itself, but became in time a very great charge to the public, and exhausted the treasury without much enriching particulars. We may judge of this from what is related in Aristophanes' comedy of the wasps, wherein that poet ridicules the passion of the Athenians for trying causes, and their eager desire for the gain arising from it, which protracted and multiplied suits to infinity.

In this comedy, a young Athenian, who was to act the part I have men-

* Xen. de rep. Athen. p. 664.

tioned, of turning the judges and trials of Athens into ridicule, from a state of the revenues paid into the public treasury, finds their amount to be 2000 talents.* He then examines how much of that sum falls to the share of the judges, with whom Athens was over run, at three oboli a head per day. This appears to be annually, including all of them, only 150 talents.† The calculation is easy. The judges were paid only ten months in the year, the other two being employed in festivals, when all proceedings at law were prohibited. Now three oboli a day paid to 6000 men, make 15 talents a month, and in consequence 150 in ten months. According to this calculation, the most assiduous judge gained only 75 livres (about three guineas) a year. "What then becomes of the remainder of the 2000 talents?" cries the young Athenian. "What!" replies his father, who was one of the judges, "it goes to those——; but let us not expose the shame of Athens; let us always be for the people." The young Athenian goes on to explain that the remainder went to such as robbed the public treasury; to the orators, who incessantly flattered the people; and to those who were employed in the government and army. I have extracted this remark from the works of Father Brumoi the Jesuit, with which I shall make very free, when I come to speak of public shows and dramatic representations.

SECTION VIII.

OF THE AMPHYCTIONS.

THE famous council of the Amphyctions is introduced here, though not peculiar to the Athenians, but common to all Greece, because it is often mentioned in the Grecian history, and I do not know whether I shall have a more natural occasion to speak of it.

The assembly of the Amphyctions was in a manner the holding of a general assembly of the states of Greece. The establishment of it is attributed to Amphyction, king of Athens, and son of Deucalion, who gave them his name. His principal view in the institution of this council, was to unite in the sacred band of amity the several people of Greece admitted into it, and to oblige them by that union to undertake the defence of each other, and be mutually vigilant for the happiness and tranquility of their country. The Amphyctions were also created to be the protectors of the oracle of Delphos, and the guardians of the prodigious riches of that temple; and also to adjudge the differences which might arise between the Delphians and those who came to consult the oracle. This council was held at Thermopylæ, and sometimes at Delphos itself. It assembled regularly twice a year, in the spring and autumn, and more frequently when affairs required.

The number of people or cities which had a right to sit in this assembly is not precisely known, and varied, without doubt, at different times. When the Lacedæmonians, in order to pass in it what decrees they thought fit, were for excluding the Thesalians, Argives, and Thebans, † Themistocles, in the speech he made to the Amphyctions to prevent that design from taking effect, seems to insinuate that there were only one-and-thirty cities at that time which had this right.

Each city sent two deputies, and in consequence had two votes in the council; and that without distinction, or the more powerful having any

* About 220,000l. sterl.

† 7000l. sterl.

‡ Plut. in Themist. p. 122.

prerogative of honour or pre-eminence over inferior states in regard to the suffrages; the liberty upon which these people valued themselves requiring that every thing should be equal amongst them.

The Amphictyons had full power to discuss and determine finally in all differences which might arise between the Amphictyonic cities, and to fine the culpable in such a manner as they thought fit. They could employ not only the rigour of the laws in the execution of their decrees, but even raise troops, if it were necessary, to compel such as rebelled to submit to them. The three sacred wars undertaken by their order, of which I have spoken elsewhere, are evident proofs of this power.

Before they were installed into this body, they took a very remarkable oath, of which Æschines * has preserved the form. It runs to this effect: "I swear that I will never destroy any of the cities honoured with the right of sitting in the Amphictyonic council, nor turn their running waters out of their course either in times of war or peace. If any people shall make such an attempt, I hereby engage to carry the war into their country, to demolish their cities, towns and villages, and to treat them in all things as the most cruel enemies. Moreover, if at any time any person shall dare to be so impious as to steal and take away any of the rich offerings preserved in the temple of Apollo at Delphos, or abet any others in committing that crime, either by aiding or only counselling him therein, I will use my feet, hands, voice, in a word, all my powers and faculties, to avenge such sacrilege." That oath was attended with the most terrible imprecations and execrations: "That if any one infringes any thing contained in the oath I have now taken, whether private person, city, or people, may that person, city, or people, be deemed accursed, and in that acceptance experience the whole vengeance of Apollo, Latona, Diana, and Minerva the foreknower. May their country produce none of the fruits of the earth, and their women, instead of generating children resembling their fathers, bring forth nothing but monsters; may their animals share in the same curse. May those sacrilegious men lose all suits at law; may they be conquered in war, have their houses demolished, and themselves and their children put to the sword." I am not astonished that, after such terrible engagements, the holy war, undertaken by the order of the Amphictyons, should be carried on with so much ardour and fury. The religion of an oath was of great force with the ancients; and how much more regard ought to be had to it in the Christian world which professes to believe that the violation of it shall be punished with eternal torments! and yet how many are there amongst us who make a trifle of breaking through the most solemn oaths!

The authority of the Amphictyons had always been of great weight in Greece, but it began to decline exceedingly from the moment they condescended to admit Philip of Macedon into their body. For that prince, enjoying by this means all their rights and privileges, soon knew how to set himself above all law, and to abuse his power so far as to preside by proxy both in this illustrious assembly and in the Pythian games; of which games the Amphictyons were judges and agonothetæ, in virtue of their office. This Demosthenes reproaches him with in his third philippic: "When he does not deign," says he, "to honour us with his presence, he sends his slaves to preside over us." An odious, but emphatical term, and in the spirit of the Grecian liberty, by which the Athenian orator images the base and abject subjection of the greatest lords in Philip's court.

* Æschin. in orat. περί παραπρεσβείας.

If the reader desires a further knowledge of what relates to the Amphictyons, the dissertations of Monsieur Valois * may be consulted, in the Memoirs of the Academy of Belles Letters, wherein this subject is treated with great extent and erudition.

SECTION IX.

OF THE REVENUES OF ATHENS.

THE revenues, † according to the passage of Aristophanes which I have cited above, and in consequence, as they stood in the time of the Peloponnesian war, amounted to 2000 talents, that is to say, to 6,000,000 of livres. They were generally reduced to four species.

1. The first relates to the revenues arising from agriculture, the sale of woods, the produce of mines, and other funds of a like nature, appertaining to the public. Amongst these may be included the duties upon the import and export of merchandise, and the taxes levied upon the inhabitants of the city, as well natives as strangers.

The history of Athens often mentions the silver mines of Laurium, which was a mountain situated between the Piræum and Cape Sunium; and those of Thrace, from whence many persons extracted immense riches. † Xenophon, in a treatise wherein he states this matter at large, demonstrates how much the public might gain by industriously working these mines, from the example of the many persons they had enriched. Hipponicus || let his mines and 600 slaves to an undertaker, who paid him an obolus § a day for each slave, clear of all charges, which amounted in the whole to a mina, about two pounds five shillings. Nicias, who was killed in Sicily, farmed out his mines and 1000 slaves in the same manner, and with the same profit in proportion to that number.

2. The second species of revenue were, the contributions paid the Athenians by the allies for the common expences of the war. At first, under Aristides, they amounted to only 460 talents. ¶ Pericles augmented them almost a third, and raised them to 600, and some time after they were run up to 1300. Taxes which in the beginning were moderate and necessary, became thus in a little time excessive and exorbitant, notwithstanding all the protestations made the allies, and the most solemn engagements to the contrary.

3. A third sort of revenue was, the extraordinary capitation taxes levied upon the inhabitants of the country, as well natives as strangers, in pressing occasions and emergencies of the state.

4. The fines laid upon persons by the judges for different misdemeanours, were applied to the uses of the public, and laid up in the treasury, except a tenth part of them, which was consecrated to Minerva, and a fifth to the other divinities.

The most natural and legal application of these different revenues of the republic was in paying the troops both by sea and land, building and fitting out fleets, keeping up and repairing the public buildings, temples, walls, ports, and citadels. But the greatest part of them, especially after Pericles' time, was misapplied to unnecessary uses, and often consumed in frivolous expences, games, feasts, and shows, which cost immense sums, and were of no manner of utility to the state.

* Vol. III

† *Tal.*

‡ De ration. redituum.

|| Pag. 925.

§ Six oboli make a drachm, 100 drachms a mina, and

60 minæ a talent.

¶ A talent was worth 1000 crowns.

I PLACE this article under the head of government, because all celebrated legislators have with reason believed that the education of youth was an essential part of it.

The exercises that served for the forming of either the bodies or minds of the young Athenians (and as much may be said of almost all the people of Greece,) were dancing; music, hunting, fencing, riding, polite learning, and philosophy. It may be observed that I speak generally, and treat very slightly these several articles.

I. DANCING. MUSIC.

Dancing is one of the exercises of the body cultivated by the Greeks with great attention. It made a part of what the ancients called the Gymnastic, divided, according * to Plato, into two kinds, the orchestric, which takes its name from the dance, and the palestric, † so called from a Greek word which signifies *wrestling*. The exercises of this latter kind principally conduced to form the body for the fatigues of war, navigation, agriculture, and the other uses of society.

Dancing had another end, and taught such rules of motion as were most proper to render the shape free and easy; to give the body a just proportion, and the whole person an unconstrained, noble, and graceful air; in a word, an external politeness, if we may be allowed to use that expression, which never fails to prejudice people in favour of those who have been formed to it early.

Music was cultivated with no less application and success. The ancients ascribed wonderful effects to it. They believed it very proper to calm the passions, soften the manners, and even humanize people naturally savage and barbarous. † Polybius, a grave and serious historian, and who is certainly worthy of belief, attributes the extreme difference between two people of Arcadia, the one infinitely beloved and esteemed for the elegance of their manners, their benevolent inclinations, humanity to strangers, and piety to the gods; the other, on the contrary, generally reproached and hated for their malignity, brutality, and irreligion: Polybius, I say, ascribes this difference to the study of music, I mean, says he, the true and noble music, industriously cultivated by the one, and absolutely neglected by the other people.

After this it is not surprising that the Greeks considered music as an essential part in the education of youth. ‖ Socrates himself, in a very advanced age, was not ashamed to learn to play upon musical instruments. Themistocles, however otherwise esteemed, † was thought to be wanting in point of merit, because at an entertainment he could not touch the lyre, like the rest of the company. ¶ An ignorance in this respect was deemed a defect of education; on the contrary, a capacity in it did honour to the

* *Ορχηστριαι*, saltare.

† *Παλη*

‡ Polyb p. 288—291.

‖ Socrates, jam senex, instituti lyra non erubescibat. Quintil. l. i. c. 10.

§ Themistocles, cum in epulis recusasset lyram, habitus est indoctor. Cic. Tusc. Quæst. l. i. n. 4.

¶ Summam eruditionem Græci sitam censebant in nervorum vocumque cantibus—discebantque id omnes; nec qui nesciebat, satis excultus doctrina putabatur. Ibid.

greatest men. * Epaminondas was praised for dancing; and playing well upon the flute. We may observe in this place the different taste and genius of nations. The Romans were far from having the same opinion with the Greeks in regard to music and dancing, and set no value upon them. It is very likely the wisest and most knowing amongst the latter did not apply to them with any great industry; and Philip's expression to his son Alexander, who had shown too much skill in music at a feast, induces me to be of this opinion; "Are you not ashamed," says he, "to sing so well?"

For the rest, this esteem for dancing and music had its foundation. Both the one and the other were employed in the most august feasts and ceremonies of religion, to express their acknowledgment to the gods with the greater force and dignity, for the favours they had vouchsafed to confer upon them. They had generally the greatest share in their feasts and entertainments, which seldom or ever began or ended without some odes being sung in honour of the victories in the Olympic games, and on other the like occasions. They had a part also in war; and we know that the Lacedæmonians marched to battle dancing, and to the sound of flutes. † Plato, the most grave philosopher of antiquity, considered both these arts, not as simple amusements, but as they had a great share in the ceremonies of religion and military exercises. Hence we see him very intent, in his books of laws, to prescribe rules upon dancing and music, and to keep them within the bounds of utility and decorum.

They did not continue long within these restrictions. The licence of the Grecian stage, on which dancing was in the highest vogue, and in a manner prostituted to buffoons and the most contemptible people, who made no other use of it than to suggest or support the most vicious passions; this licence, I say, soon corrupted an art which might have been of some advantage, had it been regulated by Plato's opinion. Music had a like destiny; and perhaps the corruption of this did not a little contribute to the depraving and perverting of dancing. Voluptuousness and sensual pleasure were the sole arbiters consulted in the uses made of both, and the theatre became a school of every kind of vice.

‡ Plutarch, in lamenting that the art of dancing was so much fallen from the merit which rendered it estimable to the great men of antiquity, does not omit to observe, that it was corrupted by a vicious kind of poetry, and a soft effeminate music, with which it was ill united, and which had taken place of the ancient poetry and music, that had something noble, majestic, and even religious and heavenly in them. He adds, that being made subservient to low taste and sensuality, by their aid it exercised a kind of tyrannical power in theatres, which were become the public schools of criminal passions and gross vices, wherein no regard was had to reason.

The reader, without my observing upon it to him, will make the application of this passage of Plutarch to the sort of music which engrosses our theatres at this day, and which, by its effeminate and wanton airs, has given the last wound to the little manly force and virtue that remained among us. Quintilian describes the music of his times in these terms, *¶ Que nunc in scenis effeminata, et impudicis modis fracta, non ex parte minima, si quid in nobis virilis roboris manebat, excidit.*

* In Epaminondæ virtutibus commemoratum est, saltasse eum commode, scienterque tibiis cantasse—Scilicet non eadem omnibus honesta sunt atque turpia, sed omnia majorum institutis judicantur. Corn. Nep. in præfat. vit. Epam.

† De leg. l. vii.

‡ Sympos. l. ix. qu. 15. p. 746.

¶ Quintil. l. j. c. 1.

The young Athenians, and in general all the Greeks, were very intent upon forming themselves to all the exercises of the body, and to go through their lessons regularly with the masters of the Palæstræ. They called the places allotted for these exercises Palæstræ, or Gymnasia; which answers very near to our academies. Plato, in his books of laws, after having shown of what importance it was in war to cultivate the hands and feet, adds,* that far from banishing from a well regulated republic the profession of the athletæ, on the contrary, prizes ought to be proposed for all exercises that conduce to the improvement of military virtue; such are those which render the body more active, and fitter for the race; more hard, robust, and supple; more capable of supporting great fatigues, and effecting great enterprises. We must remember, that there was no Athenian who ought not to have been capable of handling the oar in the largest galleys. The citizens themselves did this office, which was not left to slaves and criminals, as in these days. They were all destined to the trade of war, and often obliged to wear arms of iron from head to foot of a great weight. For this reason Plato, and all the ancients, looked upon the exercises of the body as highly useful, and even absolutely necessary to the good of the public, and therefore this philosopher excludes only those from them who were incapable of service in war.

† There were also masters, who taught the youth to ride, and to handle their arms, or fence; and others whose business it was to instruct them in all that was necessary to be known, in order to excel in the art military, and to become good commanders. The whole science of the latter consisted in what the ancients called the tactics, that is to say, the art of drawing up troops in battle, and of making military evolutions.

That science was useful, but did not suffice. ‡ Xenophon shows its defect, in producing a young man lately come from such a school, in which he imagined he had learned every thing, though in reality he had only acquired a foolish esteem for himself, attended with perfect ignorance. He gives him, by the mouth of Socrates, admirable precepts upon the business of a soldier, and very proper to form an excellent officer.

Hunting was also considered by the ancients as a fit exercise for forming youth to the stratagems and fatigues of war. It is for this reason Xenophon, who was no less a great general than a great philosopher, § did not think it below him to write a treatise expressly upon hunting, in which he descends to the lowest particular, and observes upon the considerable advantages consequential of it, from being inured to suffer hunger, thirst, heat, cold, without being discouraged either by the length of the course, the difficulty of the clefts and thickets through which it is often necessary to press, or the small success of the long and painful fatigues, which they often undergo to no purpose. He adds, that this innocent pleasure removes others equally shameful and criminal; and that a wise and moderate man would not however abandon himself so much to it as to neglect the care of his domestic affairs. ¶ The same author, in the *Cyropædia* frequently praises hunting, which he looks upon as a real exercise of war, and shows, in the example of his young hero, the good use that may be made of it.

* Lib. viii. de leg. p. 832, 833.

† Memorab. l. iii. p. 761, &c.

‡ Cyrop. l. i. p. 5, 6. et l. ii. p. 59, 60.

† Plut. in Lachete, p. 181.

§ De venatione.

Athens, to speak properly, was the school and abode of polite learning, arts and sciences. The study of poesy, eloquence, philosophy and mathematics, were in great vogue there, and much cultivated by the youth.

The young people were sent first to learn grammar under masters who taught them regularly, and upon proper principles, their own language; by which they attained a knowledge of its whole beauty, energy, number, and cadence. Hence * proceeded the universal fine taste of Athens, where, as history informs us, a simple herb-woman distinguished Theophrastus to be a stranger, from the affectation of a single word in expressing himself: and from the same cause the orators were greatly apprehensive of letting fall the least injudicious expression, for fear of offending so refined and delicate an audience. It was very common for the young people to get the tragedies represented upon the stage by heart. We have seen, that, after the defeat of the Athenians before Syracuse, many of them who had been taken prisoners and made slaves, softened their slavery by reciting the works of Euripides to their masters, who, extremely delighted with bearing such sublime verses, treated them from thenceforth with kindness and humanity. The compositions of the other poets had no doubt the same effect: and Plutarch tells us, that Alcibiades, when very young, having entered a school in which there was not an Homer, gave the master a box on the ear as an ignorant fellow,† and one who dishonoured his profession.

As for eloquence, it is no wonder that it was particularly studied at Athens. It was that which opened the way to the highest offices, reigned absolute in the assemblies, decided the most important affairs of the state, and gave an almost unlimited power to those who had the talent of speaking in an eminent degree.

This therefore was the great employment of the young citizens of Athens, especially of those who aspired to the highest employments. To the study of rhetoric they annexed that of philosophy: I comprise under the latter all the sciences, which are either parts of, or relate to it. The persons known to antiquity under the name of sophists, had acquired a great reputation at Athens, especially in the time of Socrates. These teachers who were as presumptuous as avaricious, set themselves up for universal scholars. Their whole art lay in philosophy and eloquence, both of which they corrupted by the false taste and wrong principles they instilled into their disciples. I have observed, in the life of Socrates, that philosopher's endeavours and success in discrediting them.

* Cic. in Brut. n. 172. Quintil. l. viii. c. 1. Plut. in Peric. p. 156.

† In Alcib. p. 194.

CHAPTER II.

OF WAR.

SECTION I.

PEOPLE OF GREECE IN ALL TIMES VERY WARLIKE.

NO people of antiquity, I except the Romans, could dispute the glory of arms and military virtue with the Greeks. During the Trojan war, Greece signalized her valour in battle, and acquired immortal fame by the bravery of the captains she sent thither. This expedition was however, properly speaking, no more than the cradle of her infant glory; and the great exploits by which she distinguished herself there were only her first essays and apprenticeship in the art of war.

There were in Greece at that time several small republics, neighbours to one another by their situation, but extremely remote in their customs, laws, characters, and particularly in their interests. This difference of manners and interests was a continual source and occasion of divisions amongst them. Every city, little satisfied with its own dominion, was studious to aggrandize itself at the expence of its next neighbours, according as they lay most commodious for it. Hence all these little states, either out of ambition, and to extend their conquests, or the necessity of a just defence, were always under arms, and by that continual exercise of war, formed in the universal people a martial spirit, and an intrepidity of courage, which made them invincible in the field; as appeared in the sequel, when the whole united forces of the east came to invade Greece, and made her sensible what she was, and of what capable.

Two cities distinguished themselves above the rest, and held indisputably the first rank; these were Sparta and Athens: in consequence of which, those cities either successively or together, had the empire of Greece, and maintained themselves through a long series of time in a power, which the sole superiority of merit, universally acknowledged by all the other states, had acquired them. This merit consisted principally in their military knowledge and martial virtue; of which they had given the most glorious proofs in the war against the Persians. Thebes disputed this honour with them for some years, by surprising actions of valour, which had something of prodigy in them; but this was but a short lived blaze, which after having shone out with exceeding splendour, soon disappeared and left that city in its original obscurity. Sparta and Athens will therefore be the only objects of our reflections as to what relates to war, and we shall join them together in order to be the better able to distinguish their characters, as well in what they resemble as in what they differ from each other.

SECTION II.

ORIGIN AND CAUSE OF THE VALOUR AND MILITARY VIRTUE OF THE LACEDÆMONIANS AND ATHENIANS.

ALL the laws of Sparta and institutions of Lycurgus, seem to have no other object than war, and tended solely to the making the subjects of that republic a body of soldiers. All other employments, all other exercises, were prohibited amongst them. Arts, polite learning, sciences, trades,

even husbandry itself, had no share in their applications, and seemed in their eyes unworthy of them. From their earliest infancy no other taste was instilled into them but for arms; and indeed the Spartan education was wonderfully well adapted to that end. To go barefoot, to lie hard, to shift with little meat and drink, to suffer heat and cold, to exercise continually, hunting, wrestling, running on foot and horseback, to be inured to blows and wounds, so as to vent neither complaint nor groan; these were the rudiments of the Spartan youth with regard to war, and enabled them one day to support all its fatigues, and to confront all its dangers.

The habit of obeying, contracted from the most early years, respect for the magistrates and elders, a perfect submission to the laws, from which no age nor condition was exempted, prepared them amazingly for military discipline, which is in a manner the soul of war, and the principle of success in all great enterprises.

Now one of these laws was, to conquer or die, and never to surrender to the enemy. Leonidas with his 300 Spartans, was an illustrious example of this; and his intrepid valour, extolled in all ages with the highest applauses, and proposed as a model to all posterity, had given the same spirit to the nation, and traced them out the plan they were to follow. The disgrace and infamy annexed to the violation of this law, and to such as quitted their arms in battle, confirmed the observance of it, and rendered it in a manner inviolable. The mothers recommended to their sons, when they set out for the field, to return either with, or upon their bucklers. They did not weep for those who died with their arms in their hands, but for those who preserved themselves by flight. Can we be surprised after this, that a small body of such soldiers, with such principles, should put an innumerable army of barbarians to a stand?

The Athenians were not bred up so roughly as the people of Sparta, but had no less valour. The taste of the two people was quite different in regard to education and employment; but they attained the same end, though by different means. The Spartans knew only how to use their arms, and were no more than soldiers: but among the Athenians (and we must say as much of the other people of Greece,) arts, trades, husbandry, commerce, and navigation, were held in honour, and thought no disgrace to any one. These occupations were no obstacles to the valour and knowledge necessary in war; they disqualified none for rising to the greatest commands and the first dignities of the republic. Plutarch observes, that Solon, seeing the territory of Attica was barren, applied himself to turning the industry of his citizens upon arts, trades and commerce, in order to supply his country thereby with what it wanted on the side of fertility. This taste became one of the maxims of the government and fundamental laws of the state, and perpetuated itself amongst the people, but without lessening in the least their ardour for war.

The ancient glory of the nation, which had always distinguished itself by military bravery, was a powerful motive for not degenerating from the reputation of their ancestors. The famous battle of Marathon, wherein they had sustained alone the shock of the barbarians, and gained a signal victory over them, infinitely heightened their courage; and the battle of Salamin, in the success of which they had the greatest share, raised them to the highest pitch of glory, and rendered them capable of the greatest enterprises.

A noble emulation not to give place in point of merit to Sparta, the rival of Athens, and a lively jealousy of their glory, which during the war with the Persians, contained itself within due bounds, were another strong

SECTION I.

PEOPLE OF GREECE IN A

NO people of antiquity, I except of arms and military virtue with Greece signalized her valour in the bravery of the captains she properly speaking, no more great exploits by which essays and apprentices

There were in Greece one another by their laws, characters, manners and customs amongst themselves. The Athenians, and rendered their troops very numerous. In the battle of Plataea, where the army commanded by Mardonius, consisted of no less than 300,000 men, and the united forces of the Greeks of only 108,200, in the latter only 10,000 Lacedæmonians, of which one thousand were Spartans, that is to say, inhabitants of Sparta, and 8000 Athenians. Each Spartan brought with him seven helots, which made 70,000 men; but they were scarce ever reckoned as soldiers. The shining merit in point of martial valour, generally acknowledged by the other states and people, did not suppress in their minds all sentiments of envy and jealousy, as appeared once in relation to the Lacedæmonians. The allies who were very much superior to them in number, were in pain to see themselves subjected to their order, and murmured against it in secret. Agesilaus, king of Sparta, without seeming to have any knowledge of their disgust, assembled the whole army; and after having made all the allies sit down on one side, and the Lacedæmonians by themselves on the other, he caused proclamation to be made by an herald, that all smiths, masons, carpenters, and so on through the other trades, should rise up. Almost all the allies did so, and not one of the Lacedæmonians, to whom all trades were prohibited. Agesilaus then smiling, "You see," said he, "how many more soldiers Sparta furnishes than all the rest of the allies together;" thereby intimating, that to be a good soldier, it was necessary to be only a soldier; that trades diverted the artisan from applying himself wholly to the profession of arms and the science of war, and prevented his succeeding so well in it as those who made it their sole business and exercise. But Agesilaus spoke and acted in that manner from the prejudice of his opinion in favour of the Lacedæmonian education; for indeed those whom he was for having considered only as simple artisans, had well demonstrated in the glorious victories they had obtained over the Persians, and even Sparta itself, that they were by no means inferior to the Lacedæmonians, entirely soldiers as they were, either in valour or military knowledge.

* Plut. in. Sol. p. 96. Ib. in Menex. p. 248, 249. Diog. Laert. in Sol. p. 37.

DIFFERENT KIND OF TROOPS WHICH COMPOSED THE ARMIES OF THE LACEDÆMONIANS AND ATHENIANS.

The armies both of Sparta and Athens were composed of four sorts of citizens, allies, mercenaries, and slaves. The soldiers were marked in the hand to distinguish them from the slaves, who had a letter impressed upon their forehead. Interpreters believe, from reason to this double manner of marking, it is said in the Revelation that all were obliged "to receive the mark of the beast in their right hand, or in their foreheads;" and that St. Paul says of himself, "I have not received the mark of the Lord Jesus."

The citizens of Lacedæmonia were of two sorts, either those who inhabited Sparta itself, and who for that reason were called Spartans, or those who lived in the country. In Lycurgus' time, the Spartans amounted to 9000, and the others to 30,000. This number seems to have been somewhat diminished in the time of Xerxes, as Demaratus speaking to him of the Lacedæmonian troops, computes only 8000 Spartans. The latter were the flower of the nation; and we may judge of the value they set upon them, by the anxiety the republic expressed for 300 or 400, besieged by the Athenians in the small island of Sphacteria, where they were taken prisoners. The Lacedæmonians generally spared the troops of their country very much, and sent only a few of them into the armies. When a Lacedæmonian general was asked how many Spartans there were in the army, he answered, "As many as are necessary to repulse the enemy." They served the state at their own expence, and it was not till after a length of time that they received pay from the public.

The greatest number of the troops in the two republics, were composed of the allies, who were paid by the cities which sent them.

The foreign troops in the pay of the republic, to the aid of which they were called in, were styled mercenaries.

The Spartans never marched without helots, and we have seen that in the battle of Platæa every citizen had seven. I do not believe this number was fixed, nor do I well comprehend for what service they were designed. It would have been very ill policy to have put arms into the hands of so great a number of slaves, generally much discontented with their masters' harsh treatment of them, and who in consequence had every thing to fear from them in a battle. Herodotus, however, in the passage I have cited from him, represents them carrying arms in the field, as light armed soldiers.

The infantry consisted of two kinds of soldiers. The one were heavy armed, and carried great bucklers, lances, half pikes, and scimitars. The other were light armed, that is to say, with bows and slings. They were commonly placed in the front of the battle, or upon the wings, as a first line, to shoot their arrows and sling their javelins and stones at the enemy; and when they had discharged, they retired through the intervals behind the battalions as a second line, and continued their volleys.

‡ Thucydides, in describing the battle of Mantinæa, divides the Lacedæmonian troops in this manner: There were seven regiments of four companies each, without including the squirates, to the number of 600; these were horsemen, of whom I shall soon speak further. The company

* Rev. xiii. 16.

† Gal. vi. 17.

‡ Lib. v. p. 330.

consisted, according to the Greek interpreter, of 120 men, and was subdivided into four platoons, each of 32 men; so that a regiment amounted to 512 men; and the seven made together 3584. Each platoon had four men in front and eight in depth; for that was the usual depth of the files, which the officers might change according to occasion.

The Lacedæmonians did not actually begin to use cavalry, till after the war with Messene, where they perceived their want of it. * They raised their horse principally in a small city not far from Lacedæmon, called Sciros, from whence these troops were denominated scirites, or squirites. They were always on the extremity of the left wing, and this was their post by right.

Cavalry was still more rare amongst the Athenians: the situation of Attica, broken with abundance of mountains, was the cause of this. It did not amount, after the war with the Persians, which was the time when the prosperity of Greece was at the highest, to more than 300 horse; but increased afterwards to 1200: a small body for so powerful a republic.

I have already observed, that amongst the ancients, as well Greeks as Romans, no mention is made of the stirrup, which is very surprising. They threw themselves nimbly on horseback,

————— Corpora saltu
Subjiciunt in equos————— Æn. l. xi. ver. 287.
“And with a leap sit steady on the horse.”

Sometimes the horse, broke early to that kind of manage, would stoop down before, to give his master the opportunity of mounting with more ease:

Inde inclinatus collum, submissus et armos
De more, inflexis præbebat scandere terga
Cruribus. Sil. Ital. de equo Cælii. Equ. Rom.

Those whom age or weakness rendered heavy, made use of a servant in mounting on horseback; in which they imitated the Persians, with whom it was the common custom. Gracchus caused fine stones to be placed on each side of the great roads of Italy, at certain distances from one another, to help travellers to get on horseback without the assistance of any body. †

I am surprised that the Athenians, expert as they were in the art of war, did not distinguish that the cavalry was the most essential part of an army, especially in battles; and that some of their generals did not turn their attention that way, as Themistocles did in regard to maritime affairs. Xenophon was well capable of rendering them a like service in respect to the cavalry, of the importance of which he was perfectly apprised. He wrote two treatises upon this subject, one of which regards the care it is necessary to take of horses, and how to understand and break them; to which he adds the exercise of the squadron; both well worth the reading of all who profess arms. In the latter he states the means of placing the cavalry in honour, and lays down rules upon the art military in general, which might be of very great use to all those who are designed for the trade of war.

I have wondered, in running over this second treatise, to see with what care Xenophon, a soldier, and a pagan, recommends the practice of religion, a veneration for the gods, and the necessity of imploring their aid up-

* Lib. v. p. 390.

† *Ἀναβόλος μὴ δεόμενος*. This word *αναβόλος*, signifies a servant, who helped his master to mount on horseback.

on all occasions. He repeats this maxim in thirteen different places of a tract, in other respects brief enough; and rightly judging that these religious insinuations might give some people offence; he makes a kind of apology for them, and concludes the piece with a reflection, which I shall repeat entire in this place. "If any one," says he, "wonders that I insist so much here upon the necessity of not forming any enterprize without first endeavouring to render the Divinity favourable and propitious, let him reflect, that there are in war a thousand unforeseen and obscure conjunctures, wherein the generals, vigilant to take advantages, and lay ambuscades for each other, from the uncertainty of an enemy's motions, can take no other council than that of the gods. Nothing is doubtful or obscure with them. They unfold the future to whomsoever they please, on the inspection of the entrails of beasts, by the singing of birds, by visions, or in dreams. Now we may presume that the gods are more inclined to illuminate the minds of such as consult them not only in urgent necessities, but who at all times, and when no dangers threaten them, render them all the homage and adoration of which they are capable."

It became this great man, to give the most important of instructions to his son Gryllus, to whom he addresses the treatise we mention, and who, according to the common opinion, was appointed to discipline the Athenian cavalry.

SECTION IV.

OF MARITIME AFFAIRS, FLEETS, AND NAVAL FORCES.

If the Athenians were inferior to the Lacedæmonians in respect to cavalry, they carried it infinitely against them in naval affairs; and we have seen their abilities that way make them masters at sea, and give them a great superiority to all the other states of Greece. As this subject is very necessary to the understanding many passages in this history, I shall treat it more extensively than other matters, and shall make great use of what the learned father Don Bernard de Montfaucon has said of it in his book upon antiquity.

The principal parts of a ship were the prow or head, the poop or stern, and the middle, called in latin *carina*, the hulk or waist.

The prow was the part in the front of the waist, or belly of the ship; it was generally adorned with paintings and different sculptures of gods, men, or animals. The beak, called *rostrum*, lay lower, and level with the water: it was a piece of timber which projected from the prow, covered at the point with brass, and sometimes with iron. The Greeks termed it *μῦλον*.

The other end of the ship, opposite to the prow, was called the poop. There the pilot sat and held the helm, which was a longer and larger oar than the rest.

The wist was the hollow of the vessel, or the hold.

The ships were of two kinds. The one were rowed with oars, which were ships of war, the other carried sails, and were vessels of burden, intended for commerce and transports. Both of them sometimes made use of oars and sails together, but that very rarely. The ships of war are also very often called long ships by authors, and by that name distinguished from vessels of burden.

The long ships were further divided into two species; those which were called *actuariæ naves*, and were very light vessels, like our brigantines; and those called only long ships. The first were usually termed open ships, because they had no decks. Of these light vessels there were some larger than ordinary, of which some had 20, some 30, and others 40 oars, half on one side and half on the other all on the same line.

The long ships, which were used in war, were of two sorts. Some had only one rank of oars on each side; the others two, three, four, five, or a greater number, to forty; but these last were rather for show than use.

The long ships of one rank of oars were called *aphracti*, that is to say, uncovered, and had no decks. This distinguished them from the *calaphracti*, which had decks. They had only small places to stand on at the head and stern, in the time of action.

The ships most commonly used in the battles of the ancients were those which carried from three to five ranks or benches of oars, and were called *triremes* and *quinqueremes*.

It is a great question, and has given occasion for abundance of learned dissertations, how these benches of oars were disposed. Some will have it that they were placed at length, like the ranks of oars in the modern galleys. Others maintain, that the ranges of the biremes, triremes, quinqueremes, and so on, to the number of 40 in some vessels, were one above another. To support this last opinion, innumerable passages are cited from ancient authors, which seem to leave no manner of doubt in it, and are considerably corroborated by the column of Trajan, which represents these ranks one above another. Father Montfaucon however avers, that all the persons of greatest skill in naval affairs whom he had consulted, declared, that the thing conceived in that manner seemed to them utterly impossible. But such a way of reasoning is a weak proof against the experience of so many ages, confirmed by so many authors. It is true, that in admitting these ranks of oars to be disposed perpendicularly one above another, it is not easy to comprehend how they could be worked; but in the biremes and triremes of the column of Trajan, the lower ranks are placed obliquely, and as it were rising by degrees.

In ancient times the ships with several ranks of oars were not known: they made use of long ships, in which the rowers, of whatever number they were, worked all upon the same line. * Such was the fleet which the Greeks sent against Troy. It was composed of 1200 sail, of which the galleys of Bœotia had each 120 men, and those of Philoctetes 60; and this no doubt intends the greatest and smallest vessels. Their galleys had no decks, but were built like common boats; which is still practised, says Thucydides, by the pirates to prevent their being so soon discovered at a distance.

† The Corinthians are said to have been the first who changed the form of ships, and, instead of simple galleys, made vessels with three ranks, in order to add by the multiplicity of oars to the swiftness and impetuosity of their motion. Their city, advantageously situated between two seas, lay well for commerce, and served as a staple for merchandise. From their example the inhabitants of Corcyra, and the tyrants of Sicily, equipped also many galleys of three benches, a little before the war against the Persians. It was about the same time the Athenians, at the warm instances of Themistocles, who foresaw the war which soon broke out, built ships of the same form, the whole deck not being yet in use; and from

* Thucyd. l. i. p. 8.

† Ibid. p. 10.

therefore they applied themselves to naval affairs with incredible ardour and success.

The beak of the prow, *rostrum*, was that part of the vessel of which most use was made in sea fights. * Ariston of Corinth persuaded the Syracusans, when their city was besieged by the Athenians, to make their prows lower and shorter; which advice gained them the victory: for the prows of the Athenian vessels being very high and very weak, their beaks struck only the parts above water, and for that reason did little damage to the enemy's ships; whereas the Syracusans, whose prows were strong and low, and their beaks level with the water, at a single blow often sunk the triremes of the Athenians.

Two sorts of people served on board these galleys. The one were employed in steering and working the ship, who were the rowers *remiges*, and the mariners *naulæ*. The rest were soldiers intended for the fight, and are meant in Greek by the word *ισκιόταυ*. This distinction was not understood in the early times, when the same persons rowed, fought, and did all the necessary work of the ship; which was also not wholly disused in latter days: for † Thucydides, in describing the arrival of the Athenian fleet at the small island of Sphacteria, observes, that only the rowers of the lowest bench remained in the ships, and that the rest went on shore with their arms.

1. The condition of the rowers was very hard and laborious. I have already said, that the rowers as well as mariners were all citizens and freemen, and not slaves or strangers, as in these days. The rowers were distinguished by their several stages. The lower rank were called *thalamitæ*, the middle *zugitæ*, and the highest *thranitæ*. Thucydides remarks, that the latter had greater pay than the rest, because they worked with longer and heavier oars than those of the lower benches. ‡ It seems that the crew, in order to act in concert, and with better effect, were sometimes guided by the singing of a man, and sometimes by the sound of an instrument; and this grateful harmony served not only to regulate the motion of their oars, but to diminish and soothe the pains of their labour.

It is a question amongst the learned, whether there was a man to every oar in these great ships, or several, as in the galleys of these days. What Thucydides observes on the pay of the *thranitæ*, seems to imply that they worked single: for if others had shared the work with them, wherefore had they greater pay given them than those who managed an oar alone, as the latter had as much, and perhaps more of the labour than they? Father Montfaucon believes that in the vessels of five ranks there might be several men to one oar.

He who took care of the whole crew, and commanded the vessel, was called *naulerus*, and was the principal officer. The second was the pilot, *gubernator*; his place was in the poop, where he held the helm in his hand, and steered the vessel. His skill consisted in knowing the coasts, ports, rocks, shoals, and especially the winds and stars; for before the invention of the compass, the pilot had nothing to direct him during the night but the stars.

* Diod. l. xii. p. 141.

† Thucyd. iv. p. 175.

‡ Musicam natura ipsa videtur ad tolerandos facilius labores veluti muneri nobis dedisse. Siquidem et remiges cantus hortatur; nec solum in iis operibus, in quibus plurium conatus præeunte aliqua jucunda voce conspirat, sed etiam singulorum fatigatio quamlibet se rudi modulatione solatur. Quintil. l. i. c. 10.

2. The soldiers, who fought in the ships, were armed almost in the same manner with the land forces.

* The Athenians, at the battle of Salamin, had 180 vessels, and in each of them 18 fighting men, four of whom were archers, and the rest heavy armed troops. The officer who commanded these soldiers was called *πρωταρχος*, and the commander of the whole fleet, *ναυαρχος*, or *στρωγος*.

We cannot exactly state the number of soldiers, mariners, and rowers, that served on board each ship; but it generally amounted to 200, more or less, as appears from Herodotus' estimate of the Persian fleet in the time of Xerxes, and in other places where he mentions that of the Greeks. I mean here the great vessels, the triremes, which were the species most in use.

The pay of those who served in these ships varied very much at different times. When young Cyrus arrived in Asia † it was only three oboli, which was half a drachm, or five pence; and the † treaty between the Persians and Lacedæmonians was concluded upon this foot; which gives reason to believe that the usual pay was three oboli. Cyrus, at Lysander's request, added a fourth, which made six pence half-penny a day. † It was often raised to a whole drachm, about ten pence French. In the fleet fitted out against Sicily the Athenians gave a drachm a day to the troops. The sum of 60 talents, § which the people of Egæta advanced the Athenians monthly for the maintaining of 60 ships, shows that the pay of each vessel for a month amounted to a talent, that is to say, to 3000 livres; which supposes that each ship's company consisted of 200 men, each of whom received a drachm or ten pence a day. As the officers pay was higher, the republic perhaps either furnished the overplus, or it was deducted out of the total of the sum advanced for a vessel, by abating something in the pay of the private men.

The same may be said of the land troops as has been said of the sea-men, except that the horse had double their pay. It appears that the ordinary pay of the foot was three oboli a day, and that it was augmented according to times and occasions. ** Thimbron the Lacedæmonian, when he marched against Tissaphernes, promised a daric a month to each soldier, two to a captain, and four to the colonels. Now a daric a month is four oboli a day. Young Cyrus, to animate his troops, whom a too long march had discouraged, instead of one daric, promised one and a half to each soldier, which amounted to a drachm, or ten pence French a day.

It may be asked how the Lacedæmonians, whose iron coin, the only species current among them, would go no where else, could maintain armies by sea and land, and where they found money for their subsistence. It is not to be doubted but they raised it, as the Athenians did, by contributions from their allies, and still more from the cities to which they gave liberty and protection, or from those they had conquered from their enemies. Their second fund for paying their fleet and armies were the aids they drew from the king of Persia, as we have seen on several occasions.

* Plut. in Themist. p. 119.

† Xenoph. hist. l. i. p. 441.

‡ This treaty stipulated that the Persians should pay thirty minæ a month for each ship, which was half a talent; the whole amounted to three oboli a day for every man that served on board.

§ Thucyd. l. vi. p. 431.

¶ Thucyd. l. vi. p. 415.

‡ About 8400l. sterling.

** Xenoph. Expd. Cyr. l. vii.

PECULIAR CHARACTER OF THE ATHENIANS.

PLUTARCH furnishes us with almost all the matter upon this head. Every body knows how well he succeeds in copying nature in his portraits, and how proper a person he was to trace the character of a people, whose genius and manners he had studied with so profound an attention.

I. "The * people of Athens," says Plutarch, † "were easily provoked to anger, and as easily induced to resume their sentiments of benevolence and compassion." History supplies us with an infinity of examples of this kind. The sentence of death passed against the inhabitants of Mitylene, and revoked the next day: the condemnation of the ten generals, and that of Socrates, both followed with an immediate repentance and the most lively grief.

II. "They ‡ were better pleased with penetrating, and almost guessing an affair of themselves, than to give themselves leisure to be informed in it thoroughly, and in all its extent."

Nothing is more surprising than this circumstance in their character, which it is very hard to conceive, and seems almost incredible. Artificers, husbandmen, soldiers, mariners, are generally a dull, heavy kind of people, and very gross in their conceptions; but the people of Athens were of a quite different turn. They had naturally an amazing penetration, vivacity, and even delicacy of wit. I have already mentioned what happened to Theophrastus. ¶ He was cheapening something of an old woman at Athens that sold herbs: "No, Mr. Stranger," said she, "you shall have it for no less." He was strangely surprised to see himself treated as a stranger, who had passed almost his whole life at Athens, and who piqued himself upon excelling all others in the elegance of his language. It was however from that she knew he was not of her country. We have said, that the Athenian soldiers knew the fine passages of Euripides by heart. These artificers and soldiers, from assisting at the public deliberations, were besides versed in affairs of state, and understood every thing at half a word. We may judge of this from the orations of Demosthenes, whose style we know is ardent, brief, and concise.

III. "As § they naturally inclined to relieve persons of a low condition, and mean circumstances, so were they fond of conversations seasoned with pleasantry, and proper to make people laugh."

¶ They assisted persons of a mean condition, because from such they had nothing to apprehend in regard to their liberty, and saw in them the characters of equality and resemblance with themselves. They loved pleasantry, and showed in that they were men; but men abounding with humanity and indulgence, who understood raillery, who were not prone to take offence, nor over delicate in point of the respect to be paid them.

* Plut. in præcept. reip. ger. p. 798.

† Ο δῆμος Ἀθηναίων ευκίνητος εἰς πρὸς ὀργήν, ευμεταβίβητος πρὸς εὐσίαν.

‡ Μαλλον ὀφείως υπνοειν : η̄ διδασκισθαι καθ̄ η̄ουχητων βουλομενος.

¶ Cum Theophrastus percontaretur ex anicula quadam, quanti aliquid venderet, et respondisset illa, atque addidisset: Hospes, non pote minoris; tulit moleste, se non effugere hospitii speciem, cum ætatem egerit Athenis, optimeque loqueretur. Cic. de clar. orat. n. 17.

§ Ὅσπερ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς καὶ ταπεινοῖς βοηθῶν προθυμότερος, ἢ τῶν λαγῶν τῶν παργυλιῶν καὶ γυλιῶν ἀσπαζέσθαι καὶ προτιμᾶ.

Xenoph. de Athen. rep. p. 691.

One day when the assembly was fully formed, and the people had already taken their places and sat down, Cleon, after having made them wait his coming a great while, appeared at last with a wreath of flowers upon his head, and desired the people to adjourn their deliberations to the next day. "For to day," said he, "I have business. I have been sacrificing to the gods, and am to entertain some strangers, my friends, at supper." The Athenians setting up a laugh, rose and broke up the assembly. At Carthage, such a pleasantry would have cost any man his life that had presumed to vent it, and to take such a liberty with a * proud, haughty, jealous, morose people, of a genius averse to complacency, and less inclined to humour. Upon another occasion, the orator Stratocles, having informed the people of a victory, and in consequence caused sacrifices to be offered, three days after news came of the defeat of the army. As the people expressed their discontent and resentment upon the false information, he asked them, "of what they had to complain, and what harm he had done them, in making them pass three days more agreeably than they would else have done?"

IV. "They † were pleased with hearing themselves praised, and could not bear to be railed at, or criticised." The least acquaintance with Aristophanes and Demosthenes, will show with what address and effect they employed praises and criticism with regard to the people of Athens.

† When the republic enjoyed peace and tranquility, says the same Plutarch in another place, the Athenian people diverted themselves with the orators who flattered them; but in important affairs, and emergencies of the state, they became serious, and gave the preference to those whose custom it had been to oppose their unjust desires; such as Pericles, Phocion, and Demosthenes.

V. "They ‡ kept those who governed them in awe, and showed their humanity even to their enemies."

The people of Athens made good use of the talents of those who distinguished themselves by their eloquence and prudence; but they were full of suspicion, and kept themselves always on their guard against their superiority of genius and ability: they took pleasure in restraining their courage, and lessening their glory and reputation. This may be judged from the ostracism, which was instituted only as a curb on those whose merit and popularity ran too high, and which spared neither the greatest nor the most worthy persons. The hatred of tyranny and tyrants, which was in a manner innate in the Athenians, made them extremely jealous and apprehensive for their liberty with regard to those who governed.

As to what relates to their enemies, they did not treat them with rigour: they did not make an insolent use of victory, nor exercise any cruelty towards the vanquished. The amnesty decreed after the tyranny of the thirty, shows that they could forget the injuries which had been done them.

To these different characteristics, which Plutarch unites in the same passage of his works, some others may be added, extracted principally from the same author.

VI. It was from this fund § of humanity and benevolence, of which I

* Πικροί σκληροί, παιδικοί και χαροί ἀνηδύτοι και σκληροί.

† Τοίς μὲν ἐπαινοῖσι μάλα μὲ χαίρει, τοίς δὲ ἐκπλήσιν οὐκ ἀδυνατεί.

‡ Plut. in Phocion, p. 748.

§ Φόβος ἐστὶν ἀχρὶ τῶν ἀρχόντων, εἴτα φιλανθρώπος ἀχρὶ τοῦ πολέμου.

¶ Πατριῶν αὐτοῖς και συμφύτων ἢ το φιλανθρώπων. In Pelop. p. 280.

so attentive to the rules of politeness, and so delicate in point of just behaviour; qualities one would not expect to find among the common people. * In the war against Philip of Macedon, having intercepted one of his couriers, they read all the letters he carried, except that of Olympias his wife, which they returned sealed up and unopened, out of regard to conjugal love and secrecy, the rites of which are sacred, and ought to be respected even among enemies. The same Athenians having decreed that a strict search should be made after the presents distributed by Harpalus among the orators, would not suffer the house of Callicles, who was lately married, to be visited, out of respect for his bride, not long brought home. Such behaviour is not very common, and upon like occasions people do not stand much upon forms and politeness.

VII. The taste of the Athenians for all arts and sciences is too well known to require dwelling long upon it in this place. Besides which, I shall have occasion to speak of it with some extent elsewhere. But we cannot see, without admiration, a people composed for the most part, as I have said before, of artizans, husbandmen, soldiers, and mariners, carry delicacy of taste in every kind to so high a degree of perfection, which seems the peculiar attribute of a more exalted condition and a nobler education.

VIII. It is no less wonderful, that this people should have such great views, and rise so high in their pretensions. In the war Alcibiades made them undertake, filled with vast projects and unbounded hopes, they did not confine themselves to the taking of Syracuse, or the conquest of Sicily, but had already added Italy, Peloponnesus, Libya, the Carthaginian states, and the empire of the sea, to the Pillars of Hercules. Their enterprise failed, but they had formed it; and the taking of Syracuse, which seemed no great difficulty, might have enabled them to put it in execution.

IX. The same people, so great, and one may say so haughty in their projects, had nothing of that character in other respects. In what regarded the expence of the table, dress, furniture, private buildings, and, in a word, private life, they were frugal, simple, modest, and poor; but sumptuous and magnificent in all things public, and capable of doing honour to the state. Their victories, conquests, wealth and continual communication with the people of Asia Minor, introduced neither luxury, gluttony, pomp, nor vain profusion among them. † Xenophon observes that a citizen could not be distinguished from a slave by his dress. The richest inhabitants, and the most famous generals, were not ashamed to go to market themselves.

It was very glorious for Athens to have produced and formed so many excellent persons in the arts of war and government; in philosophy, eloquence, poesy, painting, sculpture, and architecture: of having furnished alone more great men in every kind than any other city of the world; if, perhaps, we except Rome, which † had imbibed learning and arts from her, and knew how to apply her lessons to the best advantage; of having been in some sort the school and tutor of almost the whole universe; of

* Plut. in Demetr. p. 898.

† *Μεγα φρονι, μεγαλην αεισηται.* Plut.

‡ De rep. Athen. p. 898

|| *Græcia capta ferum victorem cepit, et artes*

Intulit agresti Latio.

Horat. Epist. i. l. 2.

taught the language and prescribed the laws of all that regards the talents and productions of the mind. The part of this history, wherein I shall treat the sciences and learned men that rendered Greece illustrious, with the arts also, and those who excelled in them, will set this in a clear light.

X. I shall conclude this description of the Athenians with one more attribute, which cannot be denied them, and appears evidently in all their actions and enterprises; and that is, their ardent love of liberty. This was their darling passion and great principle of policy. We see them, from the commencement of the war with the Persians, sacrifice every thing to the liberty of Greece. They abandoned, without the least regret, their lands, estates, city and houses, and removed to their ships, in order to fight the common enemy, whose view was to enslave them. What could be more glorious for Athens, than when all the allies were trembling at the vast offers made her by the king of Persia, to answer his ambassador * by the mouth of Aristides, that all the gold and silver in the world was not capable of tempting them to sell their own or the liberty of Greece! It was from such generous sentiments that the Athenians not only became the bulwark of Greece, but preserved the rest of Europe and all the western world from the invasion of the Persians.

These great qualities were mingled with great defects, often the very reverse of them, such as we may imagine in a fluctuating, light, inconstant, capricious people as the Athenians.

SECTION VI.

COMMON CHARACTER OF THE LACEDÆMONIANS AND ATHENIANS.

I CANNOT refuse giving a place here to what Mr. Bossuet says upon the character of the Lacedæmonians and Athenians. The passage is long but will not appear so, and includes all that is wanting to a perfect knowledge of the genius of both those people.

Among all the republics of which Greece was composed, Athens and Lacedæmon were undoubtedly the principal. No people could have more wit than the Athenians, nor more solid sense than the Lacedæmonians. Athens affected pleasure; the Lacedæmonian way of life was hard and laborious. Both loved glory and liberty; but the liberty of Athens tended to licence; and controuled by severe laws at Lacedæmon, the more restrained it was at home, the more ardent it was to extend itself in rule abroad. Athens was also for reigning, but upon another principle, in which interest had a share with glory. Her citizens excelled in the art of navigation, and the sovereignty at sea had enriched her. To continue in the sole possession of all commerce, there was nothing she would not have subjected to her power; and her riches, which inspired this passion, supplied her with the means of gratifying it. On the contrary, at Lacedæmon, money was in contempt. As all the laws tended to make the latter a military republic, the glory of arms was the sole object that engrossed the citizens. From thence she naturally affected dominion; and the more she was above interest, the more she abandoned herself to ambition.

Lacedæmon from her regular life, was steady and determinate in her

* Plut. in Arist. p. 324.

maxims and measures. Athens was more lively and active; and the people too much masters. Their laws and philosophy had indeed the most happy effects upon such exquisite natural parts as theirs; but reason alone was not capable of keeping them within due bounds. * A wise Athenian, who knew admirably the genius of his country, informs us, that fear was necessary to these too ardent and free spirits, and that it was impossible to govern them after the victory at Salamin had removed their fears of the Persians.

Two things then ruined them, the glory of their great actions; and the supposed security of their present condition. The magistrates were no longer heard, and as Persia was afflicted with excessive slavery, so Athens, says Plato, experienced all the evils of excessive liberty.

Those two great republics, so contrary in their manners and conduct; interfered with each other in the design they had each formed of subjecting all Greece; so that they were always enemies, more from the contrary of their interests, than the incompatibility of their humours.

The Grecian cities were against submitting to the dominion of either the one or the other; for, besides the desire of preserving their liberty; they found the empire of those two republics too grievous to bear. That of the Lacedæmonians was severe. That people were observed to have something almost brutal in their character. † A government too rigid; and a life too laborious, rendered their tempers too haughty; austere, and imperious in power; besides which, they could never expect to live in peace under the influence of a city, which, being formed for war, could not support itself but by continuing perpetually in arms. ‡ So that the Lacedæmonians were capable of attaining the command, and all the world were afraid they should do so.

§ The Athenians were naturally obliging and agreeable. Nothing was more delightful to behold than their city, in which feasts and games were perpetual, where wit, liberty, and the various passions of men, daily exhibited new objects. But the inequality of their conduct disgusted their allies, and was still more insupportable to their own subjects. It was impossible for them not to experience the extravagance and caprice of a flattered people, that is to say, according to Plato, something more dangerous than the same excesses in a prince vitiated by flattery.

¶ These two cities did not permit Greece to continue in repose. We have seen the Peloponnesian and other wars, which were always occasioned or fomented by the jealousy of Lacedæmon and Athens. But the same jealousies which involved Greece in troubles, supported it in some measure, and prevented its falling into the dependance of either the one or the other of those republics.

¶ The Persians soon perceived this condition of Greece, and accordingly the whole mystery of their politics consisted in keeping up those jealousies, and fomenting those divisions. Lacedæmon, which was the most ambitious, was the first that gave them occasion to enter into the quarrels of the Greeks. They engaged in them from a sole view of making themselves masters of the whole nation; and industrious to weaken the Greeks by their own arms, they waited only the opportunity to crush them altogether. § The states of Greece in their wars, already regarded only the

* Plat. l. iii. de Leg.

† Arist. Polit. l. i. p. 4.

‡ Xenoph. de rep. Lacou:

§ Plat. de rep. l. vii.

¶ Plut. l. iii. de Leg. Isocrat. Panegyrr.

way of eminence, as if they had already seen of the number of his subjects. But it was impossible that the ancient spirit of Greece should not revive, when they were upon the point of falling into slavery and the hands of the barbarians.

The petty kings of Greece undertook to oppose this great king, and to ruin his empire. * With a small army, but bred in the discipline we have related, Agesilaus, king of Sparta, made the Persians tremble in Asia Minor, and showed it was not impossible to subvert their power. The divisions of Greece alone put a stop to his conquests. The famous retreat of the 10,000, who, after the death of young Cyrus, made their way in a hostile manner, through the whole Persian empire, and returned into their own country; that action, I say, demonstrated to Greece more than ever, that their soldiery was invincible, and superior to all opposers; and that only their domestic divisions could subject them to an enemy too weak to resist their united force.

We shall see in the series of this history by what methods Philip king of Macedon, taking advantage of these divisions, came at length, between address and force, to make himself little less than the sovereign of Greece, and to oblige the whole nation to march under his colours against the common enemy. What he had only planned, his son Alexander brought to perfection, and showed the wondering world how much ability and valour avail against the most numerous armies and the most formidable preparations.

* Polyb. l. iii.

BOOK XI.

THE

HISTORY

OF

DIONYSIUS THE ELDER AND YOUNGER,

TYRANTS OF SYRACUSE.

SYRACUSE had regained its liberty about 60 years, by the expulsion of the family of Gelon. The events which passed in that interval, except the invasion of the Athenians, are of no great importance, and little known; but those which follow are of a different nature, and make amends for the chasm; I mean the reigns of Dionysius the father and son, tyrants of Syracuse; the first of whom governed 38, and the * other 12, in all 50 years.

As this history is entirely foreign to what passed in Greece at the same time, I shall relate it in this place all together, and by itself; observing only, that the first 20 years of it, upon which I am now entering, agree almost in point of time with the last preceding 20 years.

This history will present to our view a series of the most odious and horrid crimes, though it abounds at the same time with instruction. When † on the one side we behold a prince, the declared enemy of liberty, justice, and laws, treading under his feet the most sacred rights of nature and religion, inflicting the most cruel torments upon his subjects, beheading some, burning others for a slight word, delighting and feasting himself with human blood, and gratifying his savage inhumanity with the sufferings and miseries of every age and condition; I say, when we behold such an object, can we deny a truth which the pagan world itself hath confessed, and Plutarch takes occasion to observe in speaking of the tyrants of Sicily, that God in his anger gives such princes to a people, and makes use of the impious and the wicked to punish the guilty and the criminal? On the other side, when the same prince, the dread and terror of Syracuse, is perpetually anxious and trembling for his own life, and abandoned to re-

* After having been expelled for more than ten years, he reascended the throne, and reigned two or three years.

† *Erit Dionysius illic tyrannus, libertatis, justitiæ, legum exitium. Alios uret, alios verberabit, alios ob levem offensam jubebit detruncari. Senec. de consul. ad Marc. c. xvii.*

Sanguine humano non tantum gaudet, sed pascitur; sed ut supplicii omnium ætatum crudelitatem insatiabilem explet. Id. de benef. l. vii. c. 19.

That it is not without reason the Oracle of wisdom has declared, that in the hearts of tyrants could be seen, we should find them torn in pieces "with a thousand evils; it being certain that the body does not suffer more from inflictions and torments, than the minds of such wretches from their crimes, cruelties, and the injustice and violence of their proceedings?"

The condition of a good prince is quite different. He loves his people, and is beloved by them; he enjoys a perfect tranquility within himself, and lives with his subjects as a father with his children. Though he knows that the sword of justice is in his hands, he apprehends the use of it. He loves to turn aside its edge, and can never resolve to evidence his power but with extreme reluctance, in the last extremity, and with all the forms and sanction of the † laws. A tyrant punishes only from caprice and passion, and believes, says Plutarch upon Dionysius, that he is not really † master, and does not act with supreme authority, but as he sets himself above all laws, has no other but his will and pleasure, and sees himself obeyed implicitly: whereas, continues the same author, he that can do whatever he will, is in great danger of doing what he ought not.

Besides these characteristics of cruelty and tyranny which particularly distinguish the first Dionysius, we shall see in his history whatever unbounded ambition, sustained by great valour, extensive abilities, and the necessary talents for acquiring the confidence of a people, is capable of undertaking for the attainment of sovereignty; the various means he had the address to employ for the maintaining himself in it against the opposition of his enemies and the odium of the public; and lastly the tyrant's success in escaping, during a reign of 38 years, the many conspiracies formed against him, and in transmitting peaceably the tyranny to his son, as a legitimate possession and a right of inheritance.

CHAPTER I.

THIS chapter contains the history of Dionysius the elder, who reigned 38 years.

* Neque frustra præstantissimus sapientiæ firmare solitus est si recludentur tyrannorum mentes, posse aspici laniatus et ictus: quando, ut corpora verberibus, ita sævitia, libidine, malis consultis animus dilaceraretur. Tacit. Annal. l. vi. c. 6.

† Hæc est in maxima potestate verissima animi temperantia, non cupiditate aliqua, non temeritate incendi; non priorum principum exemplis corruptum, quantum in cives suos liceat, experiendo tentare; sed hebetare aciem imperii sui— Quid interest inter tyrannum et regem, species enim ipsa fortunæ ac licentia par est, nisi quod tyranni in voluptate sæviunt, reges non nisi ex causa et necessitate? Senec. de Clem. lib. i. c. 11.

† Εφη απολαυειν μαλιστα της αρχης α βυλεται ποιη. Μεγας εν ο κινδυνος βυλευθαι αι μη δι, ται α βυλεται ποιειν δ'υπαμεινοι. Ad princ. indoct. p. 782.

DIONYSIUS was a native of Syracuse,* of noble and illustrious extraction according to some; but others say his birth was base and obscure. However it was, he distinguished himself by his valour, and acquired great reputation in a war with the Carthaginians. He was one of those who accompanied Hermocrates when he attempted to re-enter Syracuse by force of arms, after having been banished through the intrigues of his enemies. The event of that enterprise was not happy. Hermocrates was killed. The Syracusans did not spare his accomplices, several of whom were publicly executed. Dionysius was left among the wounded. The report of his death, designedly given out by his relations, saved his life. Providence had spared Syracuse an infinity of misfortunes, had he expired either in the fight or by the executioner.

The Carthaginians had made several attempts to establish themselves in Sicily, and to possess themselves of the principal towns of that island, as we have observed elsewhere. † Its happy situation for their maritime commerce, the fertility of its soil, and the riches of its inhabitants, were powerful inducements to such an enterprise. We may form an idea of the wealth of its cities from Diodorus Siculus' account of Agrigentum. ‡ The temples were of extraordinary magnificence, especially that of Jupiter Olympius, which was 340 feet in length, 60 in breadth, and 120 in height. The piazzas or galleries, in their extent and beauty, answered to the rest of the building. On one side was represented the battle of the giants, on the other the taking of Troy, in figures as large as life. Without the city was an artificial lake, which was seven stadia, above a quarter of a league in circumference. It was full of all kinds of fish, covered with swans and other water fowls, and afforded the most agreeable prospect imaginable.

It was about the time of which we speak that Exenetus, victor in the Olympic games, entered the city in triumph in a magnificent chariot, attended by 300 more, all drawn by white horses. Their habits were adorned with gold and silver, and nothing was ever more splendid than their appearance. Gellias, the most wealthy of the citizens of Agrigentum, erected several large apartments in his house for the reception and entertainment of his guests. Servants waited by his order at the gates of the city to invite all strangers to lodge at their master's house, whither they conducted them. Hospitality was much practised and esteemed by the generality of that city. A violent storm having obliged 500 horsemen to take shelter there, Gellias entertained them all in his house, and supplied them immediately with dry clothes, of which he had always a great quantity in his wardrobe. This is understanding how to make a noble use of riches. His cellar is much talked of by historians, in which he had 300 reservoirs hewn out of the rock, each of which contained 100 || amphoræ.

This great and opulent city was besieged, and at length taken by the

* Diod. l. xiii. p. 197.

† In the history of the Carthaginians, book ii. part. i.

‡ Diod. l. xiii. p. 203, 206.

|| An amphora contained about seven gallons; one hundred consequently consisted of seven hundred gallons, or eleven hogsheads seven gallons.

weakly aided it. Dionysius, who from that time had no other design but of his grand designs, and was secretly active in laying the foundations of his future power, took the advantage of this favourable opportunity, and of the general complaints of Sicily against the Syracusans, to render the magistrates odious, and to exclaim against their administration. In a public assembly, held to consider of the present state of affairs, when nobody dared to open their mouths for fear of the persons at the helm, Dionysius rose up and boldly accused the magistrates of treason; adding that it was his opinion that they ought to be deposed immediately, without waiting till the term of their administration should expire. They retorted this audacity with treating him as a seditious person, and a disturber of the public tranquility, and as such laid a fine upon him according to the laws. This was to be paid before he could be admitted to speak again, and Dionysius was not in a condition to discharge it. Philistus, one of the richest citizens, who wrote the history of Sicily, which is not come down to us, deposited the money, and exhorted him at the same time to give his opinion upon the state of affairs with all the liberty which became a citizen zealous for his country.

Dionysius accordingly resumed his discourse with more vigour than before. He had long cultivated the habit of eloquence, which he looked upon with reason as a very necessary talent in a republican government, especially in his views of acquiring the people's favour, and of reconciling them to his measures. He began with describing in a lively and pathetic manner the ruin of Agrigentum, a neighbouring city in their alliance; the deplorable extremity to which the inhabitants had been reduced, of quitting the place under the cover of the night; the cries and lamentations of infants, and of aged and sick persons, whom they had been obliged to abandon to a cruel and merciless enemy; and the consequential murder of all who had been left in the city, whom the barbarous victor dragged from the temples and altars of the gods; feeble refuges against the Carthaginian fury and impiety. He imputed all these evils to the treachery of the commanders of the army, who, instead of marching to the relief of Agrigentum, had retreated with their troops; to the criminal protraction and delay of the magistrates, corrupted by Carthaginian bribes; and to the pride of the great and rich, who regarded nothing but establishing their own power upon the ruins of their country's liberty. He represented Syracuse as composed of two different bodies; the one, by their power and influence, usurping all the dignities and wealth of the state: the other, obscure, despised, and trod under foot, bearing the same yoke of a shameful servitude, and rather slaves than citizens. He concluded with saying that the only remedy for so many evils was to elect persons from among the people devoted to their interests, and who, not being capable of rendering themselves formidable by their riches and authority, would be solely employed for the public good, and apply in earnest to the re-establishment of the liberty of Syracuse.

This discourse was listened to with infinite pleasure, as all speeches are which flatter the natural propensity of inferiors to complain of the government, and was followed with the universal applause of the people, who always give themselves up blindly to those who know how to deceive them under the specious pretext of serving their interest. All the magistrates were deposed upon the spot, and others substituted in their room, with Dionysius at the head of them.

He had also in view the displacing of the generals of the army, and to have their power transferred to himself. The design was bold and dangerous, and he applied to it with address. Before he attacked them openly, he planted his batteries against them at a distance; calumniating them by his emissaries to the people, and sparing no pains to render them suspected. He caused it to be whispered among the populace, that those commanders held secret intelligence with the enemy; that disguised couriers were frequently seen passing and repassing; and that it was not to be doubted but some conspiracy was on foot. He affected on his side not to see those leaders, nor to open himself to them at all upon the affairs of the public. He communicated none of his designs to them, as if he was apprehensive of rendering himself suspected by having any intercourse or correspondence with them. Persons of sense and discernment were not at a loss to discover the tendency of these undermining arts; nor were they silent upon the occasion: but the common people, prejudiced in his favour, incessantly applauded and admired his zeal, and looked upon him as the sole protector and asserter of their rights and liberties.

Another scheme which he set at work with his usual address was of very great service to him, and exceedingly promoted his designs. There was a great number of banished persons dispersed throughout Sicily, whom the faction of the nobility of Syracuse had expelled the city at different times, and upon different pretences. He knew what an addition of strength so numerous a body of citizens would be to him, whom gratitude to a benefactor, and resentment against those who had occasioned their banishment, the hope of retrieving their affairs, and of enriching themselves out of the spoils of their enemies, rendered most proper for the execution of his designs, and attached unalterably to his person and interest. He applied therefore earnestly to obtain their recall. It was given out, that it was necessary to raise a numerous body of troops to oppose the progress of the Carthaginians; and the people were in great pain upon the expence to which the new levies would amount. Dionysius took the advantage of this favourable conjuncture, and the disposition of the public. He represented, that it was ridiculous to bring foreign troops at a great expence from Italy and Peloponnesus, whilst they might supply themselves with excellent soldiers without being at any charge at all; that there were numbers of Syracusans in every part of Sicily, who, notwithstanding the ill treatment they had received, had always retained the hearts of citizens under the name and condition of exiles; that they preserved a tender affection and inviolable fidelity for their country, and had chose rather to wander about Sicily without support or settlement, than to take part in the armies of the enemy, however advantageous the offers to induce them to it had been. This discourse of Dionysius had all the effect upon the people he could have wished. His colleagues, who perceived plainly what he had in view, were afraid to contradict him; rightly judging, that their opposition would not only prove ineffectual, but incense the people against them, and even augment the reputation of Dionysius, to whom it would leave the honour of recalling the exiles. Their return was therefore decreed, and they accordingly came all to Syracuse without losing time.

A deputation from Gela, a city in the dependance of Syracuse, arrived about the same time, to demand that the garrison should be reinforced. Dionysius immediately marched thither with 2000 foot and 400 horse. He found the city in a great commotion, and divided into two factions;

have their estates confiscated for the use of the public. This confiscation was applied to pay off the arrears which had long been due to the former garrisons, commanded by Dexippus the Lacedæmonian; and Dionysius promised the troops he brought with him to Syracuse to double the pay they were to receive from the city. This was attaching so many new creatures to himself. The inhabitants of Gela treated him with the highest marks of honour, and sent deputies to Syracuse to return their thanks for the important service that city had done them in sending Dionysius thither. Having endeavoured in vain to bring Dexippus into his measures, he returned with his troops to Syracuse, after having promised the inhabitants of Gela, who used all means in their power to keep him amongst them, that he would soon return with more considerable aid.

He arrived at Syracuse just as the people were coming out of the theatre, who ran in throngs about him, inquiring with earnestness what he had heard of the Carthaginians. He answered with a sad and dejected air, that the city nourished far more dangerous and formidable enemies in her bosom; that whilst Carthage was making extraordinary preparations for the invasion of Syracuse, those who were in command, instead of rousing the zeal and attention of the citizens, and setting every thing at work against the approach of so potent an enemy, lulled them with trivial amusements and idle shows, and suffered the troops to want necessaries; converting their pay to their private uses in a fraudulent manner destructive to the public affairs; that he had always sufficiently comprehended the cause of such a conduct; that however it was not now upon mere conjecture, but upon too evident proof, his complaints were founded: that Imilcar, the general of the Carthaginians, had sent an officer to him, under pretext of treating about the ransom of prisoners, but in reality to prevail on him not to be too strict in examining into the conduct of his colleagues; and that if he would not enter into the measures of Carthage, at least that he would not oppose them; that for his part, he came to resign his command, and to abdicate his dignity, that he might leave no room for injurious suspicions of his acting in concert, and holding intelligence with traitors who sold the commonwealth.

This discourse being rumoured amongst the troops and about the city, occasioned great inquietude and alarm. The next day the assembly was summoned, and Dionysius renewed his complaints against the generals, which were received with universal applause. Some of the assembly cried out that it was necessary to appoint him generalissimo, with unlimited power, and that it would be too late for so salutary a recourse when the enemy was at the gates of Syracuse; that the importance of the war which threatened them required such a leader; that it was in the same manner formerly that Gelon was elected generalissimo, and defeated the Carthaginian army at Himera, which consisted of 300,000 men; that as for the accusation alledged against the traitors, it might be referred to another day, but that the present affair would admit of no delay. Nor was it deferred in effect; for the people, who, when once prejudiced, run headlong after their opinion without examining any thing, elected Dionysius generalissimo with unlimited power that instant. In the same assembly he caused it to be decreed, that the soldier's pay should be doubled; insinuating that the state would be amply reimbursed by the conquests consequential of that advance. This being done, and the assembly dismissed, the Syracusans, upon cool reflection on what had passed, began to be in some

DIONYSIUS had a rude shock to experience * in the beginning of his usurpation. The Carthaginians having besieged Gela, he marched to its relief, and after some unsuccessful endeavours against the enemy, threw himself into the place. He behaved there with little vigour; and all the service he did the inhabitants was to make them abandon their city in the night, and to cover their flight in person. He was suspected of acting in concert with the enemy, and the more because they did not pursue him, and that he lost very few of his foreign soldiers. All the inhabitants who remained at Gela were butchered. Those of Camarina, to avoid the same fate, followed their example, and withdrew with all the effects they could carry away. The moving sight of aged persons, matrons, young virgins, and tender infants, hurried on beyond their strength, struck Dionysius' troops with compassion, and incensed them against the tyrant. Those he had raised in Italy withdrew to their own country; and the Syracusan cavalry, after having made a vain attempt to kill him upon the march, from his being surrounded with his foreigners, made forwards, and having entered Syracuse, went directly to his palace, which they plundered, using his wife at the same time with so much violence and ill usage, that she died of it soon after. Dionysius, who had foreseen their design, followed them close with only 100 horse, and 400 foot; and having marched almost 20 leagues† with the utmost expedition, he arrived at midnight at one of the gates, which he found shut against him. He set fire to it, and opened himself a passage in that manner. The richest of the citizens ran thither to dispute his entrance, but were surrounded by the soldiers, and almost all of them killed. Dionysius having entered the city, put all to the sword that came in his way, plundered the houses of his enemies, of whom he killed a great number, and forced the rest to leave Syracuse. The next day in the morning the whole body of his troops arrived. The unhappy fugitives of Gela and Camarina, out of horror for the tyrant, retired to the Leontines. Imilcar having sent an herald to Syracuse, a treaty was concluded, as mentioned in the history of the Carthaginians.‡ By one of the articles it was stipulated, that Syracuse should continue under the government of Dionysius; which confirmed all the suspicions that had been conceived of him. This happened in the year Darius Nothus died.||

It was then he sacrificed every thing that gave umbrage to his repose and security. He knew, that after having deprived the Syracusans of all that was dear to them, he could not fail of incurring their extreme abhorrence; and the fear of the miseries he had to expect in consequence, increased in the usurper in proportion to their hatred of him. He looked upon all his new subjects as so many enemies, and believed that he could only avoid the dangers which surrounded him on all sides and dogged him in all places, by cutting off one part of the people to intimidate the other. He did not observe, that in adding the cruelty of executions to the oppression of the public, he only multiplied his enemies, and induced them, after the loss of their liberty, to preserve at least their lives by attempting upon his.

* Dioid. l. xiii. p. 227, 231.

† 400 stadia.

‡ Vol. I.

|| A. M. 3800. Ant. J. C. 404.

arrived to his assistance: the face of things was then entirely altered, and terror and dejection changed parties. Dionysius, in a sally, drove them vigorously as far as that part of the city called Neapolis. The slaughter was not very considerable, because he had given orders to spare those who fled. He caused the dead to be interred, and gave those who had retired to Ætna to understand that they might return with entire security. Many came to Syracuse, but others did not think it advisable to confide in the faith of a tyrant. The Campanians were rewarded to their satisfaction, and dismissed.

The Lacedæmonians at this time took such measures in regard to Syracuse as were most unworthy of the Spartan name. They had lately subverted the liberty of Athens, and declared publicly in all the cities of their dependance against popular government. They deputed one of their citizens to Syracuse, to express in appearance the part they took in the misfortunes of that city, and to offer it their aid; but in reality he was sent to confirm Dionysius in supporting himself in the tyranny, expecting that, from the increase of his power, he would prove of great advantage and support to their own.

Dionysius saw, from what had so lately happened at Syracuse, what he was to expect from the people for the future. Whilst the inhabitants were employed abroad in harvest work, he entered their houses, and seized upon all the arms he could find. He afterwards inclosed the citadel with an additional wall, fitted out abundance of ships, armed great numbers of strangers, and took all possible measures to secure himself against the disaffection of the Syracusans.

After having made this provision for his safety at home, he prepared to extend his conquests abroad; from whence he did not only propose the increase of his dominions and revenues, but the additional advantage of diverting his subjects from the sense of their lost liberty, by turning their attention upon their ancient and always abhorred enemy, and by employing them in lofty projects, military expeditions, and glorious exploits, to which the hopes of riches and plunder would be annexed. He conceived this to be also the means to acquire the affection of his troops, and that the esteem of the people would be a consequence of the grandeur and success of his enterprises.

Dionysius wanted neither courage nor policy, and had all the qualities of a great general. He took, either by force or fraud, Naxos, Catania, Leontium, and some * other towns in the neighbourhood of Syracuse, which for that reason were very agreeable to his purposes. Some of them he treated with favour and clemency, to engage the esteem and confidence of the people; others he plundered, to strike terror into the country. The inhabitants of Leontium were transplanted to Syracuse.

These conquests alarmed the neighbouring cities, which saw themselves threatened with the same misfortune. Rhegio situated upon the opposite coast of the strait which divides Sicily from Italy, prepared to prevent it, and entered into an alliance with the Syracusan exiles, who were very numerous, and with the Messenians on the Sicilian side of the strait, who were to aid them with a powerful supply. They had levied a considerable army, and were upon the point of marching against the tyrant, when discord arose among the troops, and rendered the enterprise abortive. It

* Ætna. Enna.

to Syracuse, and part from Mount Etna, which at that time produced abundance of pine and fir trees. In a short space, a fleet of 200 galleys was seen in a manner to rise out of the earth; and 100 others, formerly built, were refitted by his order. He caused also 160 sheds to be erected within the great port, each of them capable of containing two galleys, and 150 more to be repaired.

The sight of such a fleet, built in so short a time, and fitted out with so much magnificence, would have given reason to believe that all Sicily had united its labours and revenues in accomplishing so great a work. On the other side, the view of such an incredible quantity of arms newly made, would have inclined one to think that Dionysius had solely employed himself in providing them, and had exhausted his treasures in the expence. They consisted of 140,000 shields, and as many helmets and swords; and upwards of 14,000 cuirasses, finished with all the art and elegance imaginable. They were intended for the horse, for the tribunes and centurions of the foot, and for the foreign troops who had the guard of his person. Darts, arrows, and lances, were innumerable, and engines and machines of war in proportion to the rest of the preparations.

The fleet was to be manned by an equal number of citizens and strangers. Dionysius did not think of raising troops till all his preparations were complete. Syracuse and the cities in its dependance supplied him with part of his forces. Many came from Greece, especially from Sparta. The considerable pay he offered brought soldiers in crowds from all parts to list in his service.

He omitted none of the precautions necessary to the success of his enterprise, the importance as well as difficulty of which was well known to him. He was not ignorant that every thing depends upon the zeal and affection of the troops for their general, and applied himself particularly to the gaining of the hearts, not of his own subjects only, but of all the inhabitants of Sicily, and succeeded in it to a wonder. He had entirely changed his behaviour for some time. Kindness, courtesy, clemency, a disposition to do good, and an insinuating complacency for all the world, had taken place of that haughty and imperious air and inhumanity of temper which had rendered him so odious. He was so entirely altered, that he did not seem to be the same man.

Whilst he was hastening his preparations for the war, and applying to the attainment of his subjects' affections, he meditated an alliance with the two powerful cities, Rhegium and Messina, which were capable of concerting his great designs by a formidable diversion. The league formed by those cities some time before, though without any effect, gave him some uneasiness. He therefore thought it necessary to make sure of the amity of them both. He presented the inhabitants of Messina with a considerable quantity of land, which was situated in their neighbourhood, and lay very commodiously for them. To give the people of Rhegium an instance of his esteem and regard for them, he sent ambassadors to desire that they would give him one of their citizens in marriage. He had lost his first wife in the popular commotion, as before related.

Dionysius, sensible that nothing establishes a throne more effectually than the prospect of a successor, who may enter into the same designs, have the same interests, pursue the same plan, and observe the same maxims of government, took the opportunity of the present tranquility of his affairs to contract a double marriage in order to have a successor to whom

simplicity enough; that the same reasons would have the same effect upon the mind of Dionysius; and from that opinion could not rest till he had prevailed upon the tyrant to hear and converse with him. Dionysius consented; but the lust of tyrannic power had taken too deep a root in his heart to be ever eradicated from it. It was * like an indelible dye, that had penetrated his inmost soul, from whence it was impossible ever to efface it.

† Though the stay of Plato at the court made no alteration in Dionysius, he persevered in giving Dion the same instances of his esteem and confidence, and even to support, without taking offence, the freedom with which he spoke to him. Dionysius ridiculing one day the government of Gelon, formerly king of Syracuse, and saying in allusion to his name, that he had been the “laughing stock †” of Sicily, the whole court fell into great admiration, and took no small pains in praising the quaintness and delicacy of the conceit, insipid and flat as it was, and indeed as puns and quibbles generally are. Dion took it in a serious sense, and was so bold as to represent to him that he was in the wrong to talk in that manner of a prince whose wise and equitable conduct had been an excellent model of government, and given the Syracusans a favourable opinion of monarchical power. “You reign,” added he, “and have been trusted for Gelon’s sake; but for your sake no man will ever be trusted after you.” It was very much that a tyrant should suffer himself to be talked to in such a manner with impunity.

SECTION III.

DIONYSIUS DECLARES WAR AGAINST THE CARTHAGINIANS.—VARIOUS SUCCESS OF IT.

DIONYSIUS seeing his great preparations were complete, and that he was in a condition to take the field, publicly opened his design to the Syracusans, in order to interest them the more in the success of the enterprise and told them that it was against the Carthaginians. He represented that people as the perpetual and inveterate enemy of the Greeks, and especially of those who inhabited Sicily; that the plague, which had lately wasted Carthage, had made the opportunity favourable, which ought not to be neglected; that the people in subjection to so cruel a power, waited only the signal to declare against it; that it would be much for the glory of Syracuse to reinstate the Grecian cities in their liberty, after having so long groaned under the yoke of the barbarians; that in declaring war at present against the Carthaginians, they only preceded them in doing so for some time, since, as soon as they had retrieved their losses, they would not fail to attack Syracuse with all their forces:

The assembly were unanimously of the same opinion. Their ancient and natural hatred of the barbarians, their anger against them for having given Syracuse a master, and the hope that with arms in their hands, they might find some occasion of recovering their liberty, united them in their

* Την βαρβην εκ αιαιτας της τυρανιδος, εν πολλω χρονω δευσοποιον ησαν και δυσπετυτον. Δρομωνας δε οττας ετι δει των χρητων αντιλαμβανεισθαι λαβον. Plut. in moral. p. 779.

† Plut. p. 960.

‡ Γελως signifies laughing stock.

the allurements and hope of gain.

The Carthaginians made an extraordinary effort the next year, and raised an army of 300,000 foot, and 4000 horse. The fleet under Mago's command, consisted of 400 galleys, and upwards of 600 vessels laden with provisions and engines of war. Imilcar had given the captains of the fleet his orders sealed up, which were not to be opened till they were out at sea. He had taken this precaution, that his designs might be kept secret, and to prevent spies from sending advices of them to Sicily. The rendezvous was at Palermo; where the fleet arrived without much loss in their passage. Imilcar took Eryx by treachery, and soon after reduced Motya to surrender. Messina seemed to him a place of importance; because it might favour the landing of troops from Italy and Sicily, and bar the passage of those that should come from Peloponnesus. After a long and vigorous defence it fell into his hands, and some time after he entirely demolished it.

Dionysius, seeing his forces extremely inferior to the enemy, retired to Syracuse. Almost all the people of Sicily, who hated him from the beginning, and were only reconciled to him in appearance, and out of fear, took this occasion to quit his party, and to join the Carthaginians. The tyrant levied new troops, and gave the slaves their liberty, that they might serve on board the fleet. His army amounted to 30,000 foot, and 3000 horse, and his fleet to 180 galleys. With these forces he took the field, and removed about 18 leagues from Syracuse. Imilcar advanced perpetually with his land army, followed by the fleet, which kept near the coast. When he arrived at Naxos, he could not continue his march upon the sea side, and was obliged to take a long compass round Mount Etna, which by a new eruption had set the country about it on fire, and covered it with ashes. He ordered his fleet to wait his coming up at Catania. Dionysius apprised of this, thought the opportunity favourable for attacking it, whilst separate from the land forces, and whilst his own, drawn up in battle upon the shore, might be of service to animate and support his fleet. The scheme was wisely concerted, but the success not answerable to it. Leptineus, his admiral, having advanced inconsiderately with 30 galleys, contrary to the opinion of Dionysius, who had particularly recommended to him not to divide his forces, at first sunk several of the enemy's ships, but upon being surrounded by the greater number, was forced to fly. His whole fleet followed his example, and was warmly pursued by the Carthaginians. Mago detached boats full of soldiers, with orders to kill all that endeavoured to save themselves by swimming to shore. The land army drawn up there saw them perish miserably, without being able to give them any assistance. The loss on the side of the Sicilians was very great; more than 100 galleys being either taken or sunk, and 20,000 men perishing either in the battle or the pursuit.

The Sicilians, who were afraid to shut themselves up in Syracuse, where they could not fail of being besieged very soon, solicited Dionysius to lead them against Imilcar, whom so bold an enterprise might disconcert; besides which, they should find his troops fatigued with their long and hasty march. The proposal pleased him at first; but upon reflecting that Mago, with the victorious fleet, might notwithstanding advance and take Syracuse, he thought it more advisable to return thither; which was the occasion of his losing abundance of his troops, who deserted in numbers on all sides. Imilcar, after a march of two days, arrived at Ca-

lustrious of the citizens, a person of cease and valour, took upon him to speak and to declare boldly for liberty. "We are told" said he, "of restoring peace, terminating the war, and of being delivered from the enemy. What signifies such language from Dionysius? Can we have peace in the wretched state of slavery imposed upon us? Have we any enemy more to be dreaded than the tyrant who subverts our liberty, or a war more cruel than that he has made upon us for so many years? Let Imilcar conquer, so he contents himself with laying a tribute upon us, and leaves us the exercise of our laws: the tyrant that enslaves us knows no other but his avarice, his cruelty, his ambition! The temples of the gods, robbed by his sacrilegious hands, our goods made a prey, and our lands abandoned to his instruments, our persons daily exposed to the most shameful and cruel treatment, the blood of so many citizens shed in the midst of us and before our eyes; these are the fruits of his reign, and the peace he obtains for us! Was it for the support of our liberties he built yon citadel, that he has inclosed it with such strong walls and high towers, and has called in for his guard that tribe of strangers and barbarians, who insult us with impunity? How long, O Syracusans, shall we suffer such indignities, more insupportable to the brave and generous than death itself? Bold and intrepid abroad against the enemy, shall we always tremble like cowards in the presence of a tyrant? Providence, which has again put arms into our hands, directs us in the use of them! Sparta, and the other cities in our alliance, who hold it their glory to be free and independent, would deem us unworthy of the Grecian name if we had any other sentiments. Let us show that we do not degenerate from our ancestors. If Dionysius consents to retire from amongst us, let us open him our gates, and let him take along with him whatever he pleases; but if he persists in the tyranny, let him experience what effects the love of liberty has upon the brave and determinate."

After this speech, all the Syracusans, in suspense betwixt hope and fear, looked earnestly upon their allies, and particularly upon the Spartans. Pharcides, who commanded their fleet rose up to speak. It was expected that a citizen of Sparta would declare in favour of liberty; but he did quite the reverse, and told them that his republic had sent him to the aid of the Syracusans and Dionysius, and not to make war upon Dionysius, or to subvert his authority. This answer confounded the Syracusans, and the tyrant's guard arriving at the same time, the assembly broke up. Dionysius perceiving more than ever what he had to fear, used all his endeavours to ingratiate himself with the people, and to attach the citizens to his interests; making presents to some, inviting others to eat with him, and affecting upon all occasions to treat them with kindness and familiarity.

* It must have been about this time that Polyxenus, Dionysius' brother in law, who had married his sister Thesta, having without doubt declared against him in this conspiracy, fled from Sicily for the preservation of his life, and to avoid falling into the tyrant's hands. Dionysius sent for his sister, and reproached her very much for not apprising him of her husband's intended flight, as she could not be ignorant of it. She replied without expressing the least surprise or fear, "have I then appeared so

such weakness and vanity. These haughty victors, entered at first triumphant into the great port, insulting the citizens, are now reduced to fly shamefully under the covert of the night; dragging away with them the sad ruins and miserable remains of their fleet and army, and trembling for the fate of their native country. Imilcar, who had neither regarded the sacred refuge of temples, nor the inviolable sanctity of tombs, after having left 150,000 men unburied in the enemy's country, returns to perish miserably at Carthage, avenging upon himself by his death the contempt he had expressed for gods and men.

Dionysius, who was suspicious of the strangers in his service, removed 10,000 of them and under the pretence of rewarding their merit, gave them the city of Leontium, which was in reality very commodiously situated, and an advantageous settlement. He confided the guard of his person to other foreigners, and the slaves he had made free. He made several attempts upon places in Sicily, and in the neighbouring country, especially against Rhegium.† The people of Italy, seeing themselves in danger, entered into a powerful alliance to put a stop to his conquests. The success was tolerably equal on both sides.

‡ About this time the Gauls, who some months before had burned Rome, sent deputies to Dionysius to make an alliance with him, who was at that time in Italy. The advices he had received of the great preparations making by the Carthaginians for war, obliged him to return to Sicily.

The Carthaginians having set on foot a numerous army under the conduct of Mago, made new efforts against Syracuse, but with no better success than the former. They terminated in an accommodation with Dionysius.

§ He attacked Rhegium again, and at first received no inconsiderable check. But having gained a great victory against the Greeks of Italy, in which he took more than 10,000 prisoners, he dismissed them all without ransom, contrary to their expectation, with a view of dividing the Italians from the interests of Rhegium, and of dissolving a powerful league, which might have defeated his designs. Having by this action of favour and generosity acquired the good opinion of all the inhabitants of the country, and from enemies, made them his friends and allies, he returned against Rhegium. He was extremely incensed against that city upon account of their refusing to give him one of their citizens in marriage, and the insolent answer with which that refusal was attended. The besieged, finding themselves incapable of resisting so numerous an army as that of Dionysius, and expecting no quarter if the city were taken by assault, began to talk of capitulating: to which he hearkened not unwillingly. He made them pay 300,000 crowns, deliver up all their vessels to the number of 70, and put 100 hostages into his hands; after which he raised the siege. It was not out of favour and clemency that he acted in this manner, but to make their destruction sure, after having first reduced their power.

Accordingly the next year, under the false pretext, and with the reproach of their having violated the treaty, he besieged them again with all his forces, first sending back their hostages. Both parties acted with the

* Diodorus Siculus.

† Diod. l. xiv. p. 304—310.

‡ A. M. 3615. Ant. J. C. 389.

§ Justin. xx. c. 5.

with which he treated the husband of his sister Thesta upon account of her husband's flight, his gracious and insinuating deportment upon several other occasions to the Syracusans, the familiarity of his discourse with the meanest citizens, and even workmen, the equality he observed between his two wives, and his kindness and respect for them : all which imply that Dionysius had more equity, moderation, affability, and generosity, than is commonly ascribed to him. He is not such a tyrant as Phalaris, Alexander of Phæræ, Caligula, Nero, or Caracalla.

But to return to Dionysius' taste for poetry. In his intervals of leisure, he loved to unbend in the conversation of persons of wit, and in the study of arts and sciences. He was particularly fond of versifying, and employed himself in the composition of poems, especially of tragedies. Thus far this passion of his may be excused, having something undoubtedly laudable in it : I mean in the taste for polite learning, the esteem he expressed for learned men, his inclination to do them good offices, and the application of his leisure hours. Was it not better to employ them in the exercise of his wit and the cultivation of science, than feasting, dancing, theatrical amusements, gaming, frivolous company, and other pleasures still more pernicious ? Which wise reflection Dionysius the younger made when at Corinth. * Philip king of Macedon being at table with him, spoke of the odes and tragedies his father had left behind him, with an air of raillery and contempt, and seemed to be under some difficulty to comprehend at what time of his life he had leisure for such compositions : Dionysius smartly reparteed, " the difficulty is very great indeed ! Why, " he composed them at those hours which you and I, and an infinity of " others, as we have reason to believe, pass in drinking and other diversions."

† Julius Cæsar and the emperor Augustus applied themselves to poetry, and composed tragedies. Lucullus intended to have written the memoirs of his military actions in verse. The comedies of Terence were attributed to Lælius and Scipio, both great captains, especially the latter ; and that report was so far from lessening their reputation at Rome, that it added to the general esteem for them.

These unbendings therefore were not blameable in their own nature ; this taste for poetry was rather laudable, if kept within due bounds ; but Dionysius was ridiculous for pretending to excel all others in it. He could not endure either a superior or competitor in any thing. From being in the sole possession of supreme authority, he had accustomed himself to imagine his wit of the same rank with his power : in a word, he was in every thing a tyrant. His immoderate estimation of his own merit flowed in some measure from the overbearing turn of mind which empire and command had given him. The continual applauses of a court, and the flatteries of those who knew how to recommend themselves by his darling foible, were another source of this vain conceit ; and of what will not a great man, † a minister, a prince, think himself capable, who has such incense and adoration continually paid to him ? It is well known that Car-

† Plut. in Timol. c. lxxxv. p. 243. Plut. in Lucul. p. 492.

† Suet. in Cæs. c. lvi. in August.

‡ — Nihil est quod credere de se

Non possit, eam laudatur diis æqua potestas. JUVENAL.

of dramatic poems, but piqued himself on his excellency that way; and what is more, his jealousy in that point rose so high as to use his authority by way of criticism upon the compositions of those to whom the public; a just and incorruptible judge in the question, had given the preference against him.

Dionysius did not reflect that there are things which, though estimable in themselves, and which do honour to private persons, it does not become a prince to desire to excel in. I have mentioned elsewhere Philip of Macedon's expression to his son, upon his having shown too much skill in music at a public entertainment: "Are you not ashamed," said he, "to sing so well?" It was acting inconsistently with the dignity of his character. If Cæsar and Augustus, when they wrote tragedies, had taken it into their heads to equal or excel Sophocles, it had not only been ridiculous, but a reproach to them: and the reason is, because a prince, being obliged by an essential and indispensable duty to apply himself incessantly to the affairs of government, and having an infinitude of various business always recurring to him, he can make no other use of the sciences, than to divert him at such short intervals as will not admit any great progress in them, and the excelling of those who employ themselves in no other study. Hence, when the public sees a prince affect the first rank in this kind of merit, it may justly conclude that he neglects his more important duties, and what he owes to his people's happiness, to give himself up to an employment which wastes his time and application of mind ineffectually.

We must however do Dionysius the justice to own, that he never was reproachable for letting poetry interfere to the prejudice of his great affairs, or that it made him less active and diligent on any important occasion.

* I have already said that this prince, in an interval of peace, had sent his brother Thearides to Olympia, to dispute the prizes of poetry and the chariot race in his name. When he arrived in the assembly, the beauty as well as number of his chariots, and the magnificence of his pavilion, embroidered with gold and silver, attracted the eyes and admiration of all the spectators. The ear was no less charmed when the poems of Dionysius began to be read. He had chosen expressly for the occasion † readers with sonorous, musical voices, who might be heard far and distinctly, and who knew how to give a just emphasis and numerosity to the verses they repeated. At first this had a very happy effect, and the whole audience were deceived by the art and sweetness of the pronunciation. But that charm was soon at an end, and the mind not long amused by the ears. The verses then appeared in all their ridicule. The audience were ashamed of having applauded them, and their praise was turned into laughter, scorn, and insult. To express their contempt and indignation, they tore Dionysius' rich pavilion in pieces. Lycias, the celebrated orator, who was come to the Olympic games to dispute the prize of eloquence, which he had carried several times before, undertook to prove that it was inconsistent with the honour of Greece, the friend and assertor of liberty, to admit an impious tyrant to share in the celebration of the sacred games, who had no other thoughts than of subjecting all Greece to his power. Dionysius was not affronted in that manner then; but the event proved as

* Diod. l. xiv. p. 318.

† These readers were called *Parvades*.

in pieces against one another: and to complete the misfortune, the galley which carried the persons Dionysius had sent to the games met with a violent storm, and did not return to Syracuse without great difficulty. When the pilots arrived there, out of hatred and contempt for the tyrant, they reported throughout the city that it was his vile poems which had occasioned so many miscarriages to the readers, racers, and even to the ship itself. This bad success did not at all discourage Dionysius, nor make him abate any thing in his high opinion of his poetic vein. The flatterers, who abounded in his court, did not fail to insinuate that such injurious treatment of his poems could proceed only from envy, which always fastens upon what is most excellent; and that sooner or later the invidious themselves would be convinced by demonstration to do justice to his merit, and acknowledge his superiority to all other poets.

*The extravagance of Dionysius in that respect was inconceivable. He was undoubtedly a great warrior and an excellent captain; but he fancied himself a much better poet, and believed that his verses were a far greater honour to him than all his victories. To attempt to undeceive him in an opinion so favourable to himself had been an ill way of making court to him; so that all the learned men and poets, who ate at his table in great numbers, seemed to be in an ecstasy of admiration whenever he read them his poems. Never, according to them, was there any comparison: all was great, all noble in his poetry; all majestic, or to speak more properly, all divine.

Philoxenus was the only one of all the tribe who did not run with the stream into excessive praise and flattery. He was a man of great reputation, and excelled in dithyrambic poetry. There is a story told of him, which Fontaine has known how to apply admirably. Being at table with Dionysius, and seeing a very small fish set before him, and a huge one before the king, the whim took him to lay his ear close to the little fish. He was asked his meaning for that pleasantry: "I was inquiring," said he, "into some affairs that happened in the reign of Nereus, but this young native of the floods can give me no information; yours is elder, and without doubt knows something of the matter."

Dionysius having read one day some of his verses to Philoxenus, and having pressed him to give him his opinion of them, he answered with entire freedom, and told him plainly his real sentiments. Dionysius, who was not accustomed to such language, was extremely offended, and ascribing his boldness to envy, gave orders to carry him to the mines; the common jail being so called. The whole court were afflicted upon this account, and solicited for the generous prisoner, whose release they obtained. He was enlarged the next day, and restored to favour.

At the entertainment made that day by Dionysius for the same guests, which was a kind of ratification of the pardon, and at which they were for that reason more than usually gay and cheerful; after they had plentifully regaled a great while, the prince did not fail to introduce his poems into the conversation, which were the most frequent subject of it. He chose some passages which he had taken extraordinary pains in composing, and conceived to be masterpieces, as was very discernible from the self-satisfaction and complacency he expressed whilst they were reading. But his delight could not be perfect without Philoxenus' approba-

tus, who had done him such great services, and to whom he was obliged for his power. They retired to Thurium in Italy, from whence they were recalled some time after, and reinstated in all their fortunes and his favour : Leptinus in particular, who married Dionysius' daughter.

* To remove his melancholy for the ill success of his verses, it was necessary to find some employment, with which his wars and buildings supplied him. He had formed a design of establishing powerful colonies in the part of Italy situated upon the Adriatic sea facing Epirus, in order that his fleet might not want a secure retreat, when he should employ his forces on that side ; and with this view he made an alliance with the Illyrians, and restored Alcetes, king of the Molossians, to his throne. His principal design was to attack Epirus, and to make himself master of the immense treasures which had been for many ages amassing in the temple of Delphos. Before he could set this project on foot, which required great preparations, he seemed to make an essay of his genius for it, by another of the same kind, though of much more easy execution. Having made a sudden irruption into Tuscany, under the pretence of pursuing pirates, he plundered a very rich temple in the suburbs of Agyllum, a city of that country, and carried away a sum exceeding 4,500,000 livres.† He had occasion for money to support his great expences at Syracuse, as well in fortifying the port, and to make it capable of receiving 200 galleys, as to inclose the whole city with good walls, erect magnificent temples, and build a place of exercise upon the banks of the river Anapus.

‡ At the same time he formed the design of driving the Carthaginians entirely out of Sicily. A first victory which he gained, put him almost into a condition to accomplish his project ; but the loss of a second battle, in which his brother Leptinus was killed, put an end to his hopes, and obliged him to enter into a treaty, by which he gave up several towns to the Carthaginians, and paid them great sums of money to reimburse their expences in the war. An attempt which he made upon them some years after, taking advantage of the desolation occasioned by the plague at Carthage, had no better success.

¶ Another victory of a very different kind, though not less at his heart, made him amends, or at least comforted him for the ill success of his arms. He had caused a tragedy of his to be represented at Athens for the prize in the celebrated feast of Bacchus, and was declared victor. Such a victory with the Athenians, who were the best judges of this kind of literature, seems to argue the poetry of Dionysius not so mean and pitiful, and that it is very possible the aversion of the Greeks for every thing which came from a tyrant had a great share in the contemptuous sentence passed upon his poems in the Olympic games. However it was, Dionysius received the news with inexpressible transports of joy. Public thanksgivings were made to the gods, the temples being scarce capable of containing the concourse of the people. Nothing was seen throughout the city but feasting and rejoicing ; and Dionysius regaled all his friends with the most extraordinary magnificence. Self-satisfied to a degree that cannot be described, he believed himself at the summit of glory, and did the honours of his table with a gaiety and ease, and at the same time with

* Diod. l. xv. p. 336, 337.

† 1500 talents, about 200,000l. Sterling.

‡ See the history of the Carthaginians.

¶ Diod. p. 334, 335.

As for less prizes, such as cups and crowns of gold, which the statues held in their hands, those he carried off without any ceremony; saying, it was not taking, but receiving them: and that it was idle and ridiculous to ask the gods perpetually for good things, and to refuse them, when they held out their hands themselves to present them to you. These spoils were carried by his order to the market, and sold at the public sale: and when he had got the money for them, he ordered proclamation to be made, that whoever had in their custody any things taken out of sacred places, should restore them entire within a limited time to the temples from whence they were brought; adding in this manner to his impiety to the gods, injustice to man.

The amazing precautions that Dionysius thought necessary to the security of his life, show to what anxiety and apprehension he was abandoned. * He wore under his robe a cuirass of brass. He never harangued the people but from the top of an high tower; and thought proper to make himself invulnerable by being inaccessible. Not daring to confide in any of his friends or relations, his guard was composed of slaves and strangers. He went abroad as little as possible; fear obliging him to condemn himself to a kind of imprisonment. These extraordinary precautions regard, without doubt, certain intervals of his reign, when frequent conspiracies against him rendered him more timid and suspicious than usual; for at other times we have seen that he conversed freely enough with the people, and was accessible even to familiarity. In those dark days of distrust and fear, he fancied that he saw all mankind in arms against him. † A word which escaped his barber, who boasted by way of jest, that he held a razor at the tyrant's throat every week, cost him his life. From thenceforth, not to abandon his head and life to the hands of a barber, he made his daughters, though very young, do him that despicable office; and when they were more advanced in years, he took the scissars and razors from them, and taught them to singe off his beard with nut shells. ‡ He was at last reduced to do himself that office, not daring, it seems, to trust his own daughters any longer. He never went into the chamber of his wives at night, till they had been first searched with the utmost care and circumspection. His bed was surrounded with a very broad and deep trench, with a small draw bridge over it for the entrance. After having well locked and bolted the doors of his apartment, he drew up the bridge that he might sleep in security. § Neither his brother nor even his sons, could be admitted into his chamber, without first changing their clothes, and being visited by the guards. Is passing one's days in such a continual circle of distrust and terror, to live, to reign?

In the midst of all his greatness, possessed of riches and surrounded with pleasures of every kind, during a reign of almost 40 years, notwithstanding all his presents and profusions, he never was capable of making a single friend. He passed his life with none but trembling slaves and sordid flatterers, and never tasted the joy of loving, or of being beloved, nor the charms of social truth and reciprocal confidence. This he owned himself upon an occasion not unworthy of repetition.

* Cic. Tusc. Quæst. l. v. n. 57, 68.

† Cic. de offic. l. ii. n. 55.

‡ Plut. de gurrul. p. 508.

§ Plut. in Dion. p. 961.

DIONYSIUS the Elder,* was succeeded by one of his sons of his own name, commonly called Dionysius the Younger. After his father's funeral had been solemnized with the utmost magnificence, he assembled the people, and desired they would have the same good inclinations for him as they had professed for his father. They were very different from each other in their character; † for the latter was as peaceable and calm in his disposition as the former was active and enterprising; which would have been no disadvantage to his people, had that mildness and moderation been the effect of a wise and judicious understanding, and not of natural sloth and indolence of temper.

It was surprising to see Dionysius the younger, take quiet possession of the tyranny after the death of his father, as of a right of inheritance, notwithstanding the passion of the Syracusans for liberty, which could not but revive upon so favourable an occasion, and the weakness of a young prince, undistinguished by his merit, and void of experience. It seemed as if the last years of the elder Dionysius, who had applied himself towards the close of his life, in making his subjects taste the advantage of his government, had in some measure reconciled them to the tyranny, especially after his exploits by sea and land had acquired him a great reputation and infinitely exalted the glory of the Syracusan power, which he had found means to render formidable to Carthage itself, as well as to the most potent states of Greece and Italy. Besides which, it was to be feared, that should they attempt a change in the government, the sad consequences of a civil war might deprive them of those advantages; and at the same time the gentle and humane disposition of young Dionysius gave them reason to entertain the most favourable hopes of the future. He therefore peaceably ascended his father's throne.

England has seen something of this kind in the famous Cromwell, who died in his bed with as much tranquility as the best of princes, and was interred with the same honours and pomp as the most lawful sovereign. Richard his son succeeded him, and was for some time in equal authority with his father, though he had not any of his great qualities.

‡ Dion, the bravest, and at the same time the wisest of the Syracusans, Dionysius' brother-in-law, might have been of great support to him, had he known how to make use of his counsels. In the first assembly held by Dionysius and all his friends, Dion spoke in so wise a manner upon what was necessary and expedient in the present conjuncture, as showed that the rest were like infants in comparison with him, and in regard to a just boldness and freedom of speech, were no more than despicable slaves of the tyranny, solely employed in the abject endeavour of pleasing the prince. But what surprised and amazed them most, was, that Dion, at a time when the whole court was struck with terror at the prospect of the storm forming on the side of Carthage, and just ready to break upon Sicily, should insist, that if Dionysius desired peace, he would embark immediately for Africa, and dispel this tempest to his satisfaction; or, if he preferred the war, that he would furnish and maintain him 50 galleys of three benches, completely equipped for service.

* A. M. 9632. Ant. J. C. 372. Diod. l. xv. p. 385

† Id. l. xvi. p. 410.

‡ Plut. in Dion. p. 960, 961.

made him absolutely necessary, especially at a time when the state was threatened with great danger and emergency.

* As he believed that all the vices of young Dionysius were the effect of his bad education and entire ignorance of his duty, he conceived justly that the best remedy would be to associate him if possible, with persons of wit and sense, whose solid but agreeable conversation might at once instruct and divert him; for the prince did not naturally want parts and genius.

The sequel will show that Dionysius the younger had a natural propensity to what was good and virtuous, and a taste and capacity for arts and sciences. He knew how to set a value upon the merit and talents by which men are distinguished. He delighted in conversing with persons of ability, and from his correspondence with them made himself capable of the highest improvements. He went so far as to familiarise the throne with the sciences, which of themselves have little or no access to it; and by rendering them in a manner his favourites, he gave them courage to make their appearance in courts. His protection was the patent of nobility, by which he raised them to honour and distinction. Nor was he insensible to the joys of friendship. In private he was a good parent, relation, and master, and acquired the affection of all that approached him. He was not naturally inclined to violence or cruelty; and it might be said of him, that he was rather a tyrant by succession and inheritance than by temper and inclination.

All which demonstrates that he might have made a very tolerable prince (not to say a good one,) had an early and proper care been taken to cultivate the happy disposition which he brought into the world with him. But his father, to whom all merit, even in his own children, gave umbrage, industriously suppressed in him all tendency to goodness, and every noble and elevated sentiment, by a base and obscure education, with the view of preventing his attempting any thing against himself. It was therefore necessary to find a person of the character before mentioned, or rather to inspire himself with the desire of having such an one found.

This was what Dion laboured with wonderful address. He often talked to him of Plato, as the most profound and illustrious of philosophers, whose merit he had experienced, and to whom he was obliged for all he knew. He enlarged upon the elevation of his genius, the extent of his knowledge, the amiableness of his character, and the charms of his conversation. He represented him particularly as the man of the world most capable of forming him in the arts of governing, upon which his own and the people's happiness depended. He told him, that his subjects, governed for the future with lenity and indulgence, as a good father governs his family, would voluntarily render that obedience to his moderation and justice which force and violence extorted from them against their will; and that by such a conduct he would from a tyrant become a just king, to whom all submission would be paid out of affection and gratitude.

It is incredible how much these discourses, introduced in conversation from time to time, as if by accident, without affectation, or the ap-

"the companion of solitude." I have shown elsewhere wherein this version is faulty. Art of teaching the Belles Lettres, vol. 3. p. 505.

* Plut. in Dion. p. 662. Plat. Epist. 7. p. 327, 328.

the desire of knowing and conversing with Plato. He wrote the most importunate and obliging manner to that purpose patched couriers after couriers to hasten his voyage; whilst apprehended the consequences, and had small hopes of an effect of it, protracted the affair, and, without absolutely resolutely intimated that he could not resolve upon it without licence to himself. The obstacles and difficulties made to the ce's request, were so far from disgusting him, that they only a commonly happens, to inflame his desire. The Pythagorean of Græcia Major in Italy, joined their intreaties with his own who on his part redoubled his instances, and used the strongest to conquer Plato's repugnance. "This is not," said he, "of a private person, but of a powerful prince, whose changes will have the same effect throughout his whole dominion the extent of which you are not unacquainted. It is himself all these advances, who importunes and solicits you to compliance, and employs the interest of all your friends to that end. What more favourable conjuncture could we expect from providence than that which now offers itself? Are you not your delays will give the flatterers who surround the young opportunity of drawing him over to themselves, and of seducing change his resolution? What reproaches would you not make and what dishonour would it not be to philosophy, should said that Plato, whose counsels to Dionysius might have established a wise and equitable government in Sicily, abandoned it to a of tyranny, rather than undergo the fatigues of a voyage, know not what other imaginary difficulties."

* Plato could not resist solicitations of so much force. V by the consideration of his own character and to obviate the of his being a philosopher in words only, without having established himself such in his actions, and conscious besides of the great advantages which Sicily might acquire from his voyage, he suffered to be persuaded.

The flatterers at the court of Dionysius, terrified with the result had taken, contrary to their remonstrances, and fearing the power of Plato, of which they foresaw the consequences, united together him as their common enemy. They rightly judged, that if, according to the new maxims of government, all things were to be measured by the standard of true merit, and no favour to be expected from the tyrant but for the services done the state, they had nothing further to hope, and might wait their whole lives at court to no manner of purpose. They therefore spared no pains to render Plato's voyage impossible, though they were not able to prevent it. They prevailed upon Dionysius to recal Philistus from banishment, who was not only a soldier, but a great historian, very eloquent and learned, and an assertor of the tyranny. They hoped to find a counterpoise against Plato and his philosophy. Upon his being banished Dionysius the elder, on some personal discontent, he retired to the city of Adria, where it is believed he composed the greatest part of his writings. † He wrote the history of Egypt in 12 books, that of Greece in 11, and of Dionysius the tyrant in 6; all which works are

* Plut. p. 362.

† Diod. l. xiii. p. 222.

not unhappily. The courtiers at the same time made complaints against Dion to Dionysius, accusing him of having held conferences with Theodotus and Heraclides, the secret enemies of that prince, upon measures for subverting the tyranny.

* This was the state of affairs when Plato arrived in Sicily. He was received with infinite caresses, and with the highest marks of honour and respect. Upon his landing, he found one of the prince's chariots, equally magnificent in its horses and ornaments, attending upon him. The tyrant offered a sacrifice, as if some singular instance of good fortune had befallen him. Nor was he mistaken: for a wise man, who is capable of giving a prince good counsels, is a treasure of inestimable value to a whole nation. But the worth of such a person is rarely known, and more rarely applied to the uses which might be made of it.

Plato found the most happy dispositions imaginable in young Dionysius, who applied himself entirely to his lessons and counsels; but as he had improved infinitely from the precepts and examples of Socrates his master, the most exquisite of all the pagan world in forming the mind for a right taste of truth, he took care to adapt himself with wonderful address to the young tyrant's humour, avoiding all direct attacks upon his passions; taking pains to acquire his confidence by kind and insinuating behaviour; and particularly endeavouring to render virtue amiable, and at the same time triumphant over vice, which keeps mankind in its chains, by the sole force of allurements, pleasures, and voluptuousness.

The change was sudden and surprising. The young prince, who had abandoned himself till then to idleness, pleasure, and luxury, and was ignorant of all the duties of his character, the inevitable consequence of a dissolute life, awaking as from a lethargic sleep, began to open his eyes, to have some idea of the beauty of virtue, and to relish the refined pleasure of conversation equally solid and agreeable. He was now as passionately fond of learning and instruction, as he had once been averse and repugnant to them. The court, which always apes the prince, and falls in with his inclinations in every thing, entered into the same way of thinking. The apartments of the palace, like so many schools of geometry, were full of the dust made use of by the professors of that science in tracing their figures; and in a very short time the study of philosophy and of every kind of literature became the reigning and universal taste.

The great benefit of these studies in regard to a prince does not consist alone in storing his mind with an infinity of the most curious, useful, and often necessary notions of things, but has the further advantage of abstracting him from idleness, indolence, and the frivolous amusements of a court; of habituating him to a life of application and reflection; of inspiring him with a passion to inform himself in the duties of the sovereignty, and to know the characters of such as have excelled in the art of reigning; in a word, of making himself capable of governing the state in his own person, and of seeing every thing with his own eyes, that is to say, to be indeed a king; but that the courtiers and flatterers are almost always unanimous in opposing.

They were considerably alarmed by a word that escaped Dionysius, and showed how much he was affected with the discourses he had heard

ple as their common father, and the wretched condition whom they abhor and detest. Some days after Plato's anniversary, on which a solemn sacrifice was offered in the prince's prosperity. The herald having prayed to this effect to custom, "that it would please the gods to support the "preserve the tyrant," Dionysius, who was not far from whom these terms began to grow odious, called out to him "not you give over cursing me!" Philiatus and his party alarmed at that expression, and judged from it, that time as give Plato an invincible ascendant over Dionysius, if the course of a few days could so entirely alter his disposition. They themselves at work upon new and more effectual stratagems.

They began by turning the retired life which Dionysius led and the studies in which he employed himself, into ridicule, and endeavored to make a philosopher of him. But that was not all; they in concert to render the zeal of Dion and Plato suspected, and odious to him. They represented them as impertinent censorious pedagogues, who assumed an authority over him, which consisted with his age nor rank. It is no wonder that a young Dionysius, who, with the most excellent natural parts, and amiable examples, would have found it difficult to have supported himself at length give way to such artful insinuations in a court that he infected, where there was no emulation but to excel in vice, he was continually besieged by a crowd of flatterers incessantly and admiring him in every thing.

But the principal application of the courtiers was to decry the talents and conduct of Dion himself; not separately, nor in the method proper, but altogether, and in public. They talked openly, and would give them the hearing, that it was visible Dion made use of eloquence to insinuate and enchant Dionysius, with a design to induce into a voluntary resignation of the throne, that he might take possession of it for his nephews, the children of Aristomache, and establish the sovereignty. They added, that it was very extraordinary and surprising, that the Athenians, who had formerly invaded Sicily with success both by sea and land, which had all perished there without to take Syracuse, should now with a single sophist attain their purpose to subvert the tyranny of Dionysius, by persuading him to dismiss his strangers of his guard; to lay aside his fleet of 400 galleys, which were always kept in readiness for service; and to disband his 10,000 men, the greatest part of his foot; for the sake of going to find in Italy, the place where Plato taught, a pretended supreme good, and to make himself happy in imagination by the study of it, whilst he abandoned to Dion and his nephews a real and felicity, consisting in empire, riches, luxury, and pleasure.

SECTION II.

BANISHMENT OF DION.

THE courtiers, intent upon making the best use of every moment, perpetually besieged the young prince, and covered their secret motives under the appearance of zeal for his service, and moderation in regard to Dion, incessantly advised him to

as soon raised in the mind of Dionysius, and broke out in an open rupture. Letters were privately brought to Dionysius, written by Dion to the Carthaginian ambassadors, wherein he tells them, "that when they should treat of peace with Dionysius, he would advise them not to open the conferences but in his presence; because he would assist them in making their treaty more firm and lasting." Dionysius read these letters to Philistus, and having concerted with him what measures to take, * he amused Dion with the appearance of a reconciliation, and led him alone to the sea-side below the citadel, where he showed him his letters, and accused him of having entered into a league against him with the Carthaginians. Dion would have justified himself, but he refused to hear him, and made him immediately go on board a brigantine which had orders to carry him to the coast of Italy, and to leave him there. Dion immediately after set sail for Peloponnesus.

† So hard and unjust a treatment could not fail of making abundance of noise, and the whole city declared against it; especially as it was reported, though without foundation, that Plato had been put to death.

‡ Dionysius, who apprehended the consequences, took pains to appease the public discontent, and to obviate complaints. He gave Dion's relations two vessels to transport to him in Peloponnesus his riches and numerous family: for he had the equipage of a king.

As soon as Dion was gone, Dionysius made Plato change his lodging, and brought him into the citadel; in appearance to do him honour, but in reality to assure himself of his person, and to prevent him from going to join Dion. In bringing Plato near to him, he might also have in view the opportunity of hearing him more frequently and more commodiously. For, charmed with the delights of his conversation, and studious of pleasing him in every thing, and to merit his affection, he had conceived an esteem, or rather passion for him, which rose even to jealousy, but a jealousy of that violence, that could suffer neither companion nor rival. He was for engrossing him entirely to himself, for reigning solely in his thoughts and affections, and for being the only object of his love and esteem. He seemed content to give him all his treasures and authority, provided he would but love him better than Dion, and not prefer the latter's friendship to his. Plutarch has reason to call this passion a tyrannic affection. Plato had much to suffer from it, for it had all the symptoms of the most ardent jealousy. § Sometimes it was all friendship, caresses, and fond respect, with an unbounded effusion of heart, and an endless swell of tender sentiments; sometimes it was all reproaches, menaces, fierce passion, and wild emotion; and soon after it sunk into repentance, excuses, tears, and humble entreaties of pardon and forgiveness.

About this time a war broke out very conveniently for Plato, which obliged Dionysius to restore him to his liberty, and send him home. At his departure he would have laden him with presents, but Plato refused them, contenting himself with his promise to recal Dion the following spring: he did not keep his word, and only sent him his revenues, desir-

* Diod. l. xvi. p. 410, 411.

† Plut. p. 964.

‡ Plat. Epist. vii.

§ In amore hæc omnia insunt vitia; suspiciones, inimicitia, injuriæ, induciæ, bellum, pax, rursum. Terent. in Eunuch.

In amore hæc sunt mala, bellum, pax, rursum. HORAT.

and to impute it only to the war. He assured him as soon as he could be concluded, that Dion should return; upon condition, however, that he should continue quiet, and not intermeddle in affairs, nor lessen him in the opinion of the Greeks.

Plato, in his return to Greece, went to see the games where he happened to lodge amongst strangers of distinction and passed whole days with them, behaving himself in a simple manner, without ever mentioning Socrates or the academy, so that he was not long known in any thing, except that his name was known to the strangers with having met with so kind and a companion; but as he never talked of any thing out of common, they had not the least notion that he was the philosopher of whose reputation was so universal. When the games were over, they returned to Athens, where he provided them with lodgings. They arrived there, when they desired him to carry them to see the philosopher of his name, who had been Socrates' disciple. Plato smiling, that he was the man: upon which the strangers, their having possessed so inestimable a treasure without knowing it, were much displeas'd with, and secretly reproach'd themselves for not having discern'd the great merit of the man, through the veil of his modesty he had thrown over it, whilst they admir'd him on that account.

* The time Dion pass'd at Athens was not lost. He employ'd himself in the study of philosophy, for which he had a great taste, and which was become his passion. He knew, however, which is not very common, to confine it within its just bounds, and never gave himself up to the expense of any duty. It was at the same time Plato made a particular friendship with his nephew Speusippus, who, united with the easy and insinuating manners of a courtier with the gravity of a philosopher, knew how to associate mirth and innocent pleasure with the affairs, and by that character, very rarely found among men, was the most proper of all men to soften what was too rough in the humour of Dion.

Whilst Dion was at Athens, it fell to Plato's turn to give the games, and to have tragedies performed at the feast of Bacchus, which was usually attended with great magnificence and expense, and an extraordinary emulation which had grown into fashion. Dion was at the whole charge. Plato, who was studious of all occasions to do good to the public, was well pleas'd to resign that honour to Dion, and thought the munificence might make him still better beloved and esteem'd by the Athenians.

Dion visit'd also the other cities of Greece, where he was receiv'd with all their feasts and assemblies, and conversed with the most eminent wits, and the most profound statesmen. He was not disturb'd by the loftiness and pride too common in persons of high rank, but, on the contrary, by an unaffected, simple, and modest behaviour, especially by the elevation of his genius, the extent of his knowledge, and the wisdom of his reflections. All cities paid him the highest respect, and the Lacedæmonians declared him a citizen of Sparta, with the exception of the resentment of Dionysius, though he actually assist'd them at that time with a powerful supply in their war against the Thebans.

* Plut. in Dion. p. 954.

ceived by his own oulcers.

* After Dionysius had put an end to the war he was engaged in in Sicily, of which history relates no circumstance, he was afraid that his treatment of Plato would prejudice the philosophers against him, and make him pass for their enemy. For this reason he invited the most learned men of Italy to his court, where he held frequent assemblies, in which, out of a foolish ambition, he endeavoured to excel them all in eloquence and profound knowledge, venting, without application, such of Plato's discourses as he retained. But as he had those discourses only by rote, and his heart had never been rightly affected with them, the source of his eloquence was soon exhausted. He then perceived what he had lost by not having made a better use of that treasure of wisdom once in his own possession and under his own roof, and by not having heard in all their extent the admirable lectures of the greatest philosopher in the world.

As in tyrants every thing is violent and irregular, Dionysius was suddenly seized with an excessive desire of seeing Plato again, and used all means for that purpose. He prevailed upon Architas and the other Pythagorean philosophers to write to him that he might return with all manner of security, and to be bound for the performance of all the promises which had been made to him. They deputed Archidemus to Plato, and Dionysius sent at the same time two galleys of three benches of rowers, with several of his friends on board, to entreat his compliance. He also wrote letters to him with his own hand, in which he frankly declared, that if he would not be persuaded to come to Sicily, Dion had nothing to expect from him; but if he came, that he might entirely dispose of every thing in his power.

Dion received several letters at the same time from his wife and sister, who pressed him to prevail upon Plato to make the voyage, and to satisfy the impatience of Dionysius, that he might have no new pretexis against him upon that account. Whatever repugnance Plato had to it, he could not resist the warm solicitations made to him, and determined to go to Sicily for the third time, at 70 years of age.

His arrival gave the whole people new hopes, who flattered themselves that his wisdom would at length overthrow the tyranny; and the joy of Dionysius was inexpressible. He appointed the apartment of the gardens for his lodging, the most honourable in the palace, and had so much confidence in him, that he suffered his access to him at all hours, without being searched; a favour not granted to any of his best friends.

After the first caresses were over, Plato was for entering into Dion's affair, which he had much at heart, and which was the principal motive of his voyage: but Dionysius put it off at first; to which ensued complaints and murmurings, though not outwardly expressed for some time. The tyrant took great care to conceal his sentiments upon that head, endeavouring by all manner of honours, and by all possible regard and complacency, to abate his friendship for Dion. Plato dissembled on his side, and though extremely shocked at so notorious a breach of faith, he kept his opinion to himself.

Whilst they were upon these terms, and believed that nobody penetrated their secret, Helicon of Cyzicum, one of Plato's particular friends,

* Plat. epist. vii. p. 338—340. Plut. in Dion. p. 964, 966.

which happening according to his prediction exactly at the ysius was so much surprised and astonished at it (a proof the great philosopher,) that he made him a present of a talent. jesting upon that occasion, said, that he had also something ble and extraordinary to foretel. Upon being pressed to exp "I prophecy," said he, "that it will not be long before Di " Plato, who seem to agree so well with each other, will be en

Dionysius verified this prediction ; for being weary of the laid upon himself, he ordered all Dion's lands and effects to l applied the money to his own use. At the same time he made the apartments in the garden, and gave him another lodging castle in the midst of his guards, who had long hated him, have been glad of an opportunity to kill him, because he l Dionysius to renounce the tyranny, to break them, and to l any other guard but the love of his people. Plato was sensi owed his life to the tyrant's favour, who restrained the fury of

Architas, the celebrated Pythagorean philosopher, who w cipal person and supreme magistrate of Tarentum, had no s of Plato's great danger, than he sent ambassadors with a g oars to demand him from Dionysius, and to remind him that l Syracuse only upon his promise, and that of all the Pythago ophers, who had engaged for his safety ; that therefore he c tain him against his will, nor suffer any insult to be done to without a manifest breach of faith, and absolutely forfeiting of all honest men. These just remonstrances awakened a sens in the tyrant who at last permitted Plato to return into Greece.

* Philosophy and wisdom abandoned the palace with him. l versations, as agreeable as useful, to that taste and passion and sciences, to the grave and judicious reflections of a prof politician, idle tattle, frivolous amusements, and a stupid ind tively averse to every thing serious or reasonable, were seen l Gluttony, drunkenness, and debauchery, resumed their emp court, and transformed it from the school of virtue, which it ha der Plato, into the real stable of Circe.

SECTION III.

DION SETS OUT TO DELIVER SYRACUSE.—HIS DEATH

WHEN † Plato had quitted Sicily, Dionysius threw off all re married his sister Arete, Dion's wife, to Timocrates, one of l So unworthy a treatment was in a manner the signal of the w that moment Dion resolved to attack the tyrant with open fo revenge himself for all the wrongs he had done him. Plato did power to make him change his resolution, but finding his ende effectual, he foretold the misfortunes he was about to occasion clared, that he must expect neither assistance nor relief from as he had been the guest and companion of Dionysius, had lod palace, and joined in the same sacrifices with him, he should

* Plut. in Moral. p. 52.

† A. M. 3643. Ant. J. O. 361. Plut. in Dion p. 966, 968.

his friendship for Dion, that he would continue neuter, always ready to discharge the offices of a mediator between them, though he should oppose their designs when they tended to the destruction of each other.

Whether prudence or gratitude, or the conviction that Dion could not justifiably undertake to dethrone Dionysius, this was Plato's opinion. On the other hand, Speusippus, and all the rest of Dion's friends, perpetually exhorted him to go and restore the liberty of Sicily, which opened its arms to him, and was ready to receive him with the utmost joy. This was indeed the disposition of Syracuse, which Speusippus, during his residence there with Plato, had sufficiently experienced. This was the universal cry, whilst they importuned and conjured Dion to come thither, desiring him not to be in pain for the want of ships or troops, but only to embark in the first merchant vessel he met with, and lend his person and name to the Syracusans against Dionysius.

Dion did not hesitate any longer upon taking that resolution, which in one respect cost him not a little. From the time that Dionysius had obliged him to quit Syracuse and Sicily, he had led in his banishment the most agreeable life it was possible to imagine for a person who like him had contracted a taste for the delights of study. He enjoyed in peace the conversation of the philosophers, and was present at their disputations, shining in a manner entirely peculiar to himself, by the greatness of his genius and the solidity of his judgment; going to all the cities of the learned Greece to see and converse with the most eminent for knowledge and capacity, and to correspond with the ablest politicians: leaving every where the marks of his liberality and magnificence; equally beloved and respected by all that knew him; and receiving, wherever he came, the highest honours, which were rendered more to his merit than his birth. It was from so happy a life that he withdrew himself to go to the relief of his country, which implored his protection, and to deliver it from the yoke of a tyranny under which it had long groaned.

No enterprise perhaps was ever formed with so much boldness, or conducted with so much prudence. Dion began to raise foreign troops privately by proper agents, for the better concealment of his design. A great number of considerable persons, and who were at the head of affairs, joined with him. But what is very surprising, of all those the tyrant had banished, and who were no less than 1000, only 25 accompanied him in this expedition; so much had fear got possession of them. The isle of Zacynthus was the place of rendezvous, where the troops assembled, to the number of almost 800; but all of them: courage-proved upon great occasions, excellently disciplined and robust, of an audacity and experience rarely to be found amongst the most brave and warlike; and in fine, highly capable of animating the troops which Dion was in hopes of finding in Sicily, and of setting them the example of fighting with all the valour so noble an enterprise required.

But when they were to set forwards, and it was known that this armament was intended against Sicily and Dionysius (for till then it had not been declared,) they were all in a consternation, and repented their having engaged in the enterprise, which they could not but conceive as the effect of extreme rashness and folly, that in the last despair was for putting every thing to the hazard. Dion had occasion at this time for all his resolution and eloquence to reanimate the troops and remove their fears. But after he had spoke to them, and with an assured, though modest tone, had made them understand that he did not lead them in this expedition

all the people of Sicily, who had been long prepared for dread and sadness were changed into shouts of joy, and the thing so much as to proceed on their voyage.

Dion having prepared a magnificent sacrifice to be offered himself at the head of his troops completely armed, and age marched in procession to the temple. He afterwards feasted the whole company, at the end of which, after the solemn prayers had been made, there happened a sudden moon. Dion, who was well versed in the causes of such reassured his soldiers, who were at first in some terror upon The next day they embarked on board two trading vessels followed by a third not so large, and by two barks of 30 oars

Who could have imagined, says an historian, * that a merchant vessels should ever dare to attack a prince who had of war, 100,000 foot, and 10,000 horse, with magazines corn, in proportion, and treasures sufficient to pay and maintain who besides all this, was in possession of one of the greatest cities then in the world, with ports, arsenals, and impregnated with the additional strength and support of a great number of allies? The event will show, whether force and power are sufficient chains for retaining a state in subjection, as the elder Dionysius himself: or if the goodness, humanity, and justice of princes towards their subjects, are not infinitely stronger and more indissoluble

† Dion having put to sea with his small body of troops, was under sail with little wind, and the thirteenth arrived at Pachynus of Sicily about twelve or fifteen leagues from Syracuse. When he was near that place, the pilot gave notice that they must land there was reason to fear an hurricane, and therefore not proper to go to sea. But Dion, who apprehended making his descent so near the coast, and chose to land further off, doubled the cape of Pachynus. He had no sooner passed, than a furious storm arose, attended with thunder and lightning, which drove his ships to the eastern coast where they were in great danger of dashing to pieces against the rocks. Happily for them a south wind rising suddenly, contrary to their expectation, unfurled all their sails, and after having made vows to the gods, stood out to sea for Sicily. They ran in this manner four days, and the fifth entered the port of Minoa, a small town of Sicily under the dominion of the Carthaginians, whose commander Synalus was Dion's particular friend. They were perfectly well received, and would have staid there some days to refresh themselves, after the rude fatigues they had suffered in the storm, if they had not been informed that Dionysius was about to embark some days before for the coast of Italy, attended

* Diod. l. xvi. p. 413.

† It is not easy to comprehend how the two Dionysii were capable of maintaining so great a force by sea and land, their dominions being only in Sicily, and consequently of no great extent. It is true, that the island had been very much enriched by commerce; and that those who were under their dominion received great contributions both from the places of Sicily and Italy. But it is still no easy matter to conceive how all this should be supported; the enormous expences of Dionysius the elder, in fitting out great armies, and maintaining numerous armies, and erecting magnificent buildings. It to be wished that historians had given us some better lights upon this

‡ Plut. in Dion. p. 968—972. Diod. l. xvi. p. 414—417.

and Dion, having desired Synamus to send his baggage after him when proper, marched directly to Syracuse.

His troops increased considerably upon his route, by the great number of those who came to join him from all parts. The news of his arrival being soon known at Syracuse, Timocrates, who had married Dion's wife, the sister of Dionysius, to whom he had left the command of the city in his absence, dispatched a courier to him into Italy, with advice of Dion's progress. But that courier, being almost at his journey's end, was so fatigued with having run the best part of the night; that he found himself under the necessity of stopping to take a little sleep. In the mean time a wolf, attracted by the smell of a piece of meat, which he had in his wallet, came to the place, and ran away with both the flesh and the bag, in which he had also put his dispatches. Dionysius was by this means prevented for some time from knowing that Dion was arrived, and then received the news from other hands.

When Dion was near the Anapus, which runs about half a league from the city, he ordered his troops to halt, and offered a sacrifice upon the river side, addressing his prayers to the rising sun. All who were present, seeing him with a wreath of flowers upon his head, which he wore upon account of the sacrifice, crowned themselves also in the same manner, as animated with one and the same spirit. He had been joined on his march by at least 5000 men, and advanced with them towards the city. The most considerable of the inhabitants came out in white habits to receive him at the gates. At the same time the people fell upon the tyrant's friends, and upon the spies and informers, an accursed race of wretches, *the enemies of the gods and men*, says Plutarch, who made it the business of their lives to disperse themselves into all parts, to mingle with the citizens, to pry into all their affairs, and to report to the tyrant whatever they said or thought, and often what they neither said nor thought. These were the first victims to the fury of the people, and were knocked on the head with staves immediately. Timocrates, not able to throw himself into the citadel, rode off on horseback.

At that instant Dion appeared within sight of the walls. He marched at the head of his troops magnificently armed, with his brother Megacles on one side, and Calippus the Athenian on the other, both crowned with chaplets of flowers. After him came 100 of the foreign soldiers, fine troops, whom he had chosen for his guard. The rest followed in order of battle, with their officers at the head of them. The Syracusans beheld them with inexpressible satisfaction, and received them as a sacred procession, whom the gods themselves regarded with pleasure, and who restored them their liberty with the democracy, 48 years after they had been banished from their city.

After Dion had made his entry, he ordered the trumpets to sound, to appease the noise and tumult; and silence being made, an herald proclaimed, that "Dion and Megacles were come to abolish the tyranny, and to free the Syracusans and all the people of Sicily from the yoke of the tyrant." And being desirous to harangue the people in person, he went to the upper part of the city, through the quarter called Achradina. Wherever he passed, the Syracusans had set out, on both sides of the streets, tables and bowls, and had prepared victims, and as he came before their houses, they threw all sorts of flowers upon him, addressing vows and prayers to him as to a god. Such was the origin of idolatry, which paid divine honours to those who had done the people any great and

of liberty ? Not far from the citadel, and below the place where he stood a sun dial upon an high pedestal, erected by Dion placed himself upon it, and in a speech to the people, extolled their employ their utmost efforts for the recovery and preservation of liberty. The Syracusans, transported with what he said, and with their gratitude and affection, elected him and his brother Carthage with supreme authority ; and by their consent, and at their command with them 20 of the most considerable citizens, half of which was the number of those who had been banished by Dionysius, with Dion.

Having afterwards taken the castle of Epipolis, he set the Syracusan prisoners in it at liberty, and fortified it with strong walls. Syllus arrived from Italy seven days after, and entered the city. The same day a great number of carriages brought Dion the arms he had left with Syllus. These he distributed among the soldiers who were unprovided. All the rest armed and equipped themselves as they could, expressing the greatest ardour and satisfaction.

Dionysius began by sending ambassadors to Dion and the Syracusans proposals which seemed very advantageous. The answer was, that of preliminary, he must abdicate the tyranny ; to which Dionysius seem averse. From thence he came to interviews, and conferences were only feints to gain time, and abate the ardour of the Syracusans the hope of an accommodation. Accordingly, having made Dionysius who were sent to treat with him, prisoners, he suddenly attacked a great part of his troops, the wall with which the Syracusans defended the citadel, and made several breaches in it. So warm an assault put Dion's soldiers in great confusion, who immediately Dion endeavoured in vain to stop them, and believing expedient prevalent than words, he threw himself fiercely into the midst of the enemy, where he stood their charge with intrepid courage, and with the numbers of them. He received a wound in the hand from a spear, whose arms were scarce proof against the great number of darts thrown at him, and his shield being pierced through in many places with spear points, he was at length beat down. His soldiers immediately fled off from the enemy. He left Timonides to command them, and on horseback, rode through the whole city, stopped the flight of the Syracusans, and taking the foreign soldiers, whom he had left to guard the quarter called Achradina, he led them on fresh against Dionysius' troops, who were already fatigued, and entirely discouraged by so vigorous and unexpected resistance. It was now no longer a battle, but a pursuit. A number of the tyrant's troops were killed on the spot, and the rest were driven with difficulty into the citadel. The victory was signal and glorious. Dionysius to reward the valour of the foreign troops, gave each a considerable sum of money ; and these soldiers, to honour Dionysius, adorned him with a crown of gold.

Soon after came heralds from Dionysius, with several letters from the women of his family, and with one from Dionysius himself, which he ordered them all to be read in a full assembly. That of Dionysius couched in the form of a request and justification, intermixed with the most terrible menaces against the persons who were opposed to Dion ; his sister, wife, and son. It was written with an art and a seeming propriety proper to render Dion suspected. Dionysius put on a show of the ardour and zeal he had formerly expressed for the sub-

for himself. He advises him not to give the people their liberty, who were far from affecting him at heart; nor to abandon his own safety, and that of his friends and relations, to the capricious humour of a violent and inconstant multitude.

* The reading of this letter had the effect Dionysius proposed from it. The Syracusans, without regard to Dion's goodness to them, and the greatness of his soul in forgetting his dearest interests, and the ties of nature, to restore them their liberty, took umbrage at his too great authority, and conceived injurious suspicions of him. The arrival of Heraclides confirmed them in their sentiments, and determined them to act accordingly. He was one of the banished persons, a good soldier, and well known amongst the troops for having been in considerable commands under the tyrant, very bold and ambitious, and a secret enemy of Dion, between whom and himself there had been some difference in Peloponnesus. He came to Syracuse with seven galleys of three benches of oars, and three other vessels, not to join Dion, but in the resolution to march with his own forces against the tyrant, whom he found reduced to shut himself up in the citadel. His first endeavour was to ingratiate himself with the people; for which an open and insinuating behaviour made him very fit, whilst Dion's austere gravity was offensive to the multitude; especially as they were become more haughty and untractable from the last victory, and expected to be treated like a popular state, even before they could call themselves a free people; that is to say, in the full sense of the Greek terms, they were for being used with complaisance, flattery, regard, and a deference to all their capricious humours.

What gratitude could be expected from a people that consulted only their passions and blind prejudices? The Syracusans formed an assembly immediately upon their own accord, and chose Heraclides admiral. Dion came unexpectedly thither, and complained highly of such a proceeding; as the charge conferred upon Heraclides was an abridgement of his office; that he was no longer generalissimo if another commanded at sea. Those remonstrances obliged the Syracusans, against their will, to deprive Heraclides of the office they had so lately conferred upon him. When the assembly broke up, Dion sent for him, and after some gentle reprimands for his strange conduct with regard to him in so delicate a conjuncture, wherein the least division amongst them might ruin every thing, he summoned a new assembly himself, and, in the presence of the whole people, appointed Heraclides admiral, and gave him a guard, as he had himself.

He thought by the force of kind offices, to get the better of his rival's ill will, who, in his expressions and outward behaviour, made his court to Dion, confessed his obligations to him, and obeyed his orders with a promptitude and punctuality, which expressed an entire devotion to his service, and a desire of occasions to do him pleasure. But underhand, by his intrigues and cabals, he influenced the people against him, and opposed his designs in every thing. If Dion gave his consent that Dionysius should quit the citadel by treaty, he was accused of favouring, and intending to awe him: if, to satisfy them, he continued the siege without hearkening any proposals of accommodation, they did not fail to reproach him with desire of protracting the war, for the sake of continuing in command, 'to keep the citizens in awe and respect.

* Plut. in Dion. p. 972—975. Diod. l. xvi. p. 419—422.

been defeated and put to death, Dionysius sent to offer Dion with the arms and troops in it, and money to pay them for five he might be permitted by a treaty to retire into Italy for the rest and be allowed the revenue of certain lands, which he mentioned in the neighbourhood of Syracuse. The Syracusans, who were in favour of keeping Dionysius alive, rejected these proposals; and Dionysius, in order to reconcile them to his terms, left the citadel in the hands of his son Apollocrates, and taking the advantage of a favourable wind for Italy with his treasures and effects of the greatest value of his friends as were dearest to him.

Heraclides, who commanded the galleys, was very much blamed for suffering him to escape by his negligence. To regain the favour, he proposed a new distribution of lands, insinuating, that it was founded in equality, so poverty was the principle of servitude. Dion's opposing this motion, Heraclides persuaded the people to pay of the foreign troops, who amounted to 3000 men, to decide the division of land, to appoint new generals, and deliver themselves from Dion's insupportable severity. The Syracusans nominated twenty-five new officers, Heraclides being one of the number.

At the same time they sent privately to solicit the foreign troops to abandon Dion, and join with them, promising to give them a government as natives and citizens. Those generous troops refused the offer with disdain; and then placing Dion in the centre of their fidelity and affection of which there are few examples, they made their bodies and their arms a rampart for him, and carried him out of the city without doing the least violence to any body, but warmly reprimanded they met with ingratitude and perfidy. The Syracusans, who were of their small number, and attributed their moderation to fear and a want of courage; began to attack them, not doubting but that they should put them all to the sword, before they got out of the city.

Dion, reduced to the necessity of either fighting the citizens, or retiring with his troops, held out his hands to the Syracusans, imploring in the most tender and affectionate manner to desist, and point out the citadel full of enemies, who saw all that passed with the utmost exactness, finding them deaf and insensible to all his remonstrances, he ordered his soldiers to march in close order without attacking; which they contented themselves with making a great noise with their arms, and shouting great cries, as if they were going to fall upon the Syracusans. The latter were dismayed with those appearances, and ran away in great confusion without being pursued. Dion hastened the march of his troops to the country of the Leontines.

The officers of the Syracusans, laughed at and ridiculed by the people of the city, were desirous to retrieve their honour, and made them take arms, and return to the pursuit of Dion. They came up with him at the pass of a river, and made their horse advance to skirmish. When they saw that Dion was resolved in earnest to repel their insults, they made his troops face about with great indignation, they were agitated with terror, and taking to their heels in a more shameful manner than before, made all the haste they could to regain the city.

* A. M. 3644. Ant. J. C. 360.

Some days after which, they sent ambassadors to demand justice for the ill treatment of those troops to the Syracusans, who on their side sent deputies to complain of Dion. Syracuse was intoxicated with inconsiderate joy, and insolent prosperity, which entirely banished reflection and judgment.

Every thing conspired to swell and inflame their pride. The citadel was so much reduced by famine, that the soldiers of Dionysius, after having suffered very much, resolved at last to surrender it. They sent in the night to make that proposal, and were to perform conditions the next morning. But at day-break, whilst they were preparing to execute the treaty, Nysius, an able and valiant general, whom Dionysius had sent from Italy, with corn and money to the besieged, appeared with his galleys, and anchored near Arethusa. Plenty succeeding on a sudden to famine, Nysius landed his troops, and summoned an assembly, wherein he made a speech to the soldiers suitable to the present conjuncture, which determined them to hazard all dangers. The citadel, that was upon the point of surrendering, was relieved in this manner, contrary to all expectation.

The Syracusans at the same time hastened on board their galleys, and attacked the enemy's fleet. They sunk some of their ships, took others, and pursued the rest to the shore.

But this very victory was the occasion of their ruin. Abandoned to their own discretion, without either leader or authority to command them, or counsel, the officers as well as soldiers gave themselves up to rejoicing, feasting, drinking, debauchery, and every kind of loose excess. Nysius knew well how to take advantage of this general infatuation. He attacked the wall that inclosed the citadel, of which having made himself master, he demolished it in several places, and permitted his soldiers to enter and plunder the city. All things were in the utmost confusion. Here the citizens, half asleep, had their throats cut; their houses were plundered, whilst the women and children were driven off into the citadel, without regard to their tears, cries, and lamentations.

There was but one man who could remedy this misfortune, and preserve the city. This was in every body's thoughts, but no one had courage enough to propose it; so much ashamed were they of the ungenerous manner in which they had driven him out. As the danger increased every moment, and already approached the quarter Achradina, in the height of their extremity and despair, a voice was heard from the horse and allies, which said "that it was absolutely necessary to recal Dion and the Peloponnesian troops from the country of the Leontines." As soon as any body had courage enough to utter those words, they were the general cry of the Syracusans, who with tears of joy and grief, made prayers to the gods, that they would bring him back to them. The hope alone of seeing him again, gave them new courage, and enabled them to make head against the enemy. The deputies set out immediately with full speed, and arrived at the city of Leontium late in the evening.

As soon as they alighted, they threw themselves at Dion's feet, bathed in their tears, and related the deplorable extremity to which the Syracusans were reduced. Some of the Leontines, and several of the Peloponnesian soldiers, who had seen them arrive, were already got round them.

* Plut. p. 975—981. Diod. p. 422, 423.

something very extraordinary had happened. Dion had a what they had to say, than he carried them with him to which formed itself immediately, for the people ran this dance of eagerness. The two principal deputies exclaimed the greatness of their distress, and "implored the foreign to "to the relief of the Syracusans, and to forget the ill treat "received; and the rather, because that unfortunate peopl "paid a severer penalty for it than the most injured among "desire to impose.

The deputies having finished their discourse, the whole the assembly was held, continued sad and silent. Dion rose as he began to speak, a torrent of tears suppressed his utteral eign soldiers called out to him to take courage; and express compassion for his grief. At length, having recovered himd spoke to them in these terms: "Men of Peloponnesus, an "lies, I have assembled you here, that you might deliberate "gards yourselves; as for my part, I must not deliberate w "when Syracuse is in danger. If I cannot preserve it, I go t "it, and to bury myself in its ruins. But for you, if you are "assist us once more; us, who are the most imprudent and l "nate of mankind; come and relieve the city of Syracuse, "forth the work of your hands. If not, and the just subjects "which you have against the Syracusans, determine you to a "in their present condition, and to suffer them to perish, may "from the immortal gods the reward you merit for the affecti "ity which you have hitherto expressed for me. For the rest, "to desire, that you will keep Dion in your remembrance, "abandon you when unworthily treated by his country, nor "when fallen into misfortunes."

He had no sooner ceased speaking, when the foreign soldi with loud cries, and entreated him to lead them on that mo relief of Syracuse. The deputies, transported with joy, saluted ced them, praying the gods to bestow upon Dion and them, happiness and prosperity. When the tumult was appeased, D them to prepare for the march, and as soon as they had su turn with their arms to the same place, being determined to same night, and fly to the relief of his country.

In the mean time at Syracuse, the officers of Dionysius, done all the mischief they could to the city, retired at night in del, with the loss of some of their soldiers. This short resp seditious orators new courage, who flattering themselves that would lie still after what they had done, exhorted the Syracu no further of Dion, nor to receive him if he came to their re foreign troops, nor to yield to them in courage, but to defen and liberty with their own arms and valour. New deputies w dispatched from the general officers to prevent his coming, a principal citizens and his friends, to desire him to hasten his m difference of sentiments, and contrariety of advices, occasioned ing slowly, and by small journeys.

When the night was far spent, Dion's enemies seized the g city, to prevent his entrance. At the same instant Nypsius, v of all that passed in Syracuse, made a sally from the citadel wi

ed. Nothing but slaughter and blood was seen every where. Nor did they stop for the pillage, but seemed to have no other view than to ruin and destroy all before them. One would have thought that the son of Dionysius, whom his father had left in the citadel, being reduced to despair and prompted by an excess of hatred for the Syracusans, was determined to bury the tyranny in the ruins of the city. To prevent Dion's relief of it, they had recourse to fire, the swiftest of destructions, burning with torches and lighted straw, all places within their power, and darting combustibles against the rest. The Syracusans, who fled to avoid the flames, were butchered in the streets; and those who, to shew the all-murdering sword, retired into the houses, were driven out of them again by the incroaching fire; for there was abundance of houses burning, and many that fell upon the people in the streets.

These very flames opened the city for Dion, by obliging the citizens to agree in not keeping the gates shut against him. Couriers after couriers were dispatched to hasten his march. Heraclides himself, his most declared and mortal enemy, deputed his brother, and afterwards his uncle Theodotus, to conjure him to advance with the utmost speed, there being nobody besides himself to make head against the enemy, he being wounded, and the city almost entirely ruined and reduced to ashes.

Dion received this news when he was about 60 stadia (two or three leagues) from the gates. His soldiers upon that occasion, marched with the utmost diligence, and with so good a will, that it was not long before he arrived at the walls of the city. He there detached his light armed troops against the enemy, to re-animate the Syracusans by the sight of them. He then drew up his heavy armed infantry, and the citizens who came running to join him on all sides. He divided them into small parties, of greater depth than front, and put different officers at the head of them, that they might be capable of attacking in several places at once, and appear stronger and more formidable to the enemy.

After having made these dispositions, and prayed to the gods, he marched across the city against the enemy. In every street as he passed, he was welcomed with acclamations, cries of joy, and songs of victory, mingled with the prayers and blessings of all the Syracusans, who called Dion their preserver and their god, and his soldiers, their brothers and fellow citizens. At that instant there was not a single man in the city so fond of life, as not to be much more in pain for Dion's safety than his own, and not to fear much more for him than for all the rest together, seeing him march foremost to so great a danger, over blood, fire, and dead bodies, with which the streets and public places were universally covered.

On the other hand, a view of the enemy was no less terrible: for they were animated by rage and despair, and were posted in line of battle behind the ruins of the wall they had thrown down, which made the approach very difficult and dangerous. They were under the necessity of defending the citadel, which was their safety and retreat, and durst not remove from it, lest their communication should be cut off. But what was most capable of disordering and discouraging Dion's soldiers, and made their march very painful and difficult, was the fire; for wherever they turned themselves, they marched by the light of the houses in flames, and were obliged to go over ruins in the midst of the fires; exposing themselves to be crushed in pieces by the fall of walls, beams, and roofs of houses, and tottered half consumed by the flames, and under the necessity of fighting

mingled with dust.

When they had joined the enemy, only a very small number were capable of coming to blows, from the want of room and evenness of the ground. But at length, Dion's soldiers, encouraged by the cries and ardour of the Syracusans, charged with such redoubled vigour, that the troops of Nypsius gave the greatest part of them escaped into the citadel, which was the only place those who remained without being broken, were cut to pieces by the foreign troops.

The time would not admit their making immediate rejoicing in victory, in the manner so great an exploit deserved; the Syracusans being obliged to apply to the preservation of their houses, and to spend the whole night in extinguishing the fire; which however they did without great difficulty.

At the return of day, none of the seditious orators durst at all appear, but all fled self-condemned, to avoid the punishment due to their crime. Only Heraclides and Theodotus came to Dion, and put themselves at his hands, confessing their injurious treatment of him, and promising not to imitate their ill conduct: that it became Dion, superior to all other respects to the rest of mankind, to show himself a man of that greatness of soul, which could conquer resentment, and forgive the ungrateful, who owned themselves unworthy of his pardon.

Heraclides and Theodotus having made these supplications, their friends advised him not to spare men of their vile and unworthy disposition, but to abandon Heraclides to the soldiers, and in consequence to terminate from the state that spirit of sedition and intrigue: that has really something of madness in it, and is no less to be feared for its pernicious consequences than tyranny itself. But Dion to show that he said, "that other captains generally made the means of conquering their enemies their sole application; that for his part he had spent his time in the academy, in learning to subdue anger, envy, and all the violent passions of the mind: that the sign of having conquered was not kindness and affability to friends and persons of merit, but to those with humanity who have injured us, and in being always ready to forgive them: that he did not desire so much to appear superior to his enemies in power and ability, as in wisdom and justice; for the true and essential superiority consists. That if Heraclides be worthy of pardon, and not infamous, and perfidious, must Dion contaminate and dishonour himself by showing less resentment? It is true, according to human laws, there is less injustice in revenging an injury than committing it; but in a more enlightened and more mature, we shall find both the one and the other to have the same weakness of mind. Besides, there is no disposition to be more cruel and savage but may be vanquished by the force of kind usage." Dion upon these maxims pardoned Heraclides.

His next application was to inclose the citadel with a new wall, and to order each of the Syracusans to go and cut a large stake. He then he set his soldiers to work, whilst the Syracusans took their arms, and surrounded the citadel in this manner with a strong palisade, before it was perceived; so that in the morning, the greatness of the work, and the suddenness of the execution, were matter of admiration for all eyes, as well the enemy as the citizens.

Having finished this palisade, he buried the dead; and di-

proposed in it, that Dion should be elected generalissimo, with supreme authority by sea and land. All the people of worth, and the most considerable of the citizens were pleased with the proposal, and desired that it might have the authority of the assembly. But the mariners and artisans who were sorry that Heraclides should lose the office of admiral; and convinced, that although he was very little estimable in all other respects, he would at least be more for the people than Dion: they opposed it with all their power. Dion, to avoid disturbance and confusion, did not insist upon that point, and acquiesced that Heraclides should continue to command in chief at sea. But his opposing the distribution of lands and houses, which they were earnest for having take place, and his cancelling and annulling whatever had been decreed upon that head, embroiled him with them irretrievably.

Heraclides, taking advantage of a disposition so favourable to his views, did not fail to revive his cabals and intrigues; as appeared openly by an attempt of his to make himself master of Syracuse, and to shut the gates upon his rival; but it proved unsuccessful. A Spartan, who had been sent to the aid of Syracuse, negotiated a new accommodation between Heraclides and Dion, under the strictest oaths, and the strongest assurances of obedience on the side of the former: weak ties to a man void of faith and probity.

The Syracusans, having dismissed their sea forces, who were become unnecessary, applied solely to the siege of the citadel, and rebuilt the wall which had been thrown down. As no relief came to the besieged, and bread began to fall short with them, the soldiers grew mutinous, and would observe no discipline. The son of Dionysius, finding himself without hope of resource, capitulated with Dion, to surrender the citadel, with all the arms and munitions of war. He carried his mother and sisters away with him; filled five galleys with his people and effects, and went to his father: for Dion gave him entire liberty to retire unmolested. It is easy to conceive the joy of the city upon his departure. Women, children, old people, all were passionately fond of gratifying their eyes, from the port with so agreeable a spectacle, and solemnized the joyful day on which, after so many years servitude, the sun arose for the first time upon the Syracusan liberty.

Apollocrates having set sail, and Dion begun his march to enter the citadel; the princesses who were there did not stay till he arrived, but came out to meet him at the gates. Aristomache led the son of Dion, after whom came Arete his wife, with her eyes fixed upon the ground, and full of tears. Dion embraced his sister first, and afterwards his son. Aristomache then presenting Arete to him, spoke thus: "The tears you see her shed, the shame expressed in her looks, at the time your presence restores us life and joy, her silence itself, and her confusion, sufficiently denote the grief she suffers at the sight of an husband, to whom another has been substituted contrary to her will, but who alone has always possessed her heart. Shall she salute you as her uncle, shall she embrace you as her husband?" Aristomache having spoke in this manner, Dion, with his face bathed in tears, tenderly embraced his wife; to whom he gave his son, and sent them home to his house; because he thought proper to leave the citadel to the discretion of the Syracusans, as an evidence of their liberty.

For himself, after having rewarded with a munificence truly royal all those that had contributed to his success, according to their rank and merit,

ly of Sicily but of Carthage and all Greece, who esteemed him and most fortunate captain that ever lived, he constantly retained his original simplicity; as modest and plain in his garb, equipped as if he had lived in the academy with Plato, and not with armies, with officers and soldiers, who often breathe nothing but of pomp and magnificence. Accordingly, at the time Plato wrote that "the eyes of all mankind were upon him alone;" little affected by general admiration, his thoughts were always intent upon that school of wisdom and virtue, where exploits and successes are judged from the external splendour and noise with which they are attended, but from the wise and moderate use of them.

Dion designed to establish a form of government in Syracuse of the Spartan and Cretan, but wherein the aristocratical would prevail, and to decide important affairs by the authority, wishing to his plan, was to be vested in a council of elders. Heraclides opposed him in this scheme, still turbulent and seditious accoutred, and solely intent upon gaining the people by flattery, and other popular arts. One day, when Dion sent for him to the assembly, he answered that he would not come; and that, being only a private citizen, he should be in the assembly with the rest of the citizens, and not be summoned. His view, in such behaviour, was to make Dion odious to the people, and to render Dion odious; who, weary of his repeated attempts to kill him he had formerly prevented. Therefore he went to his house and dispatched him. We shall see presently the consequences of this action.

The Syracusans were highly affected at his death; but as Dion had dignified his funeral with great magnificence, followed his body in person to the head of his whole army, and afterwards harangued the army on the occasion, they were appeased and forgave him the murder, and concluded that it was impossible for the city ever to be free from sedition whilst Heraclides and Dion reigned together.

* After that murder Dion never knew joy or peace of mind, but was haunted by a diabolical spectre, which he saw in the night, filled him with terror and melancholy. The phantom seemed a woman of enormous stature, who, in her attire, air, and haggard looks, resembled a fury who had been guilty of a house with violence. His son's death, who for some unknown reason had thrown himself from the roof of an house, passed for the account of that ominous apparition, and was the prelude to his misfortune. Calippus gave the last hand to them. He was an Athenian with whom Dion had contracted an intimate friendship, whilst he lodged in Athens, and with whom he had lived ever after with entire and unbounded confidence. Calippus, having given himself up to ambitious views, and entertained thoughts of making himself master of Syracuse, threw off all regard for the sacred ties of friendship and contrived to get rid of Dion, who was the sole obstacle to his ambition. Notwithstanding his care to conceal them, they got air, and ears of Dion's sister and wife, who lost no time, and spared not to discover the truth by a very strict enquiry. To prevent its effect upon them with tears in his eyes, and the appearance of being ignorant of what any body should suspect him of such a crime, or think him capable of so black a design. They insisted upon his taking the great oath

* Plut. p. 981—983. Diad. p. 432.

ced in the temple the most dreadful execrations against him: it is possible to imagine.

The oath cost him nothing, but did not convince the princesses. They daily received new intimations of his guilt from several hands, as did Dion himself, whose friends in general persuaded him to prevent Calippus' crime by a just and sudden punishment. But he never could resolve upon it. The death of Heraclides, which he looked upon as an horrible blot in his reputation and virtue, was perpetually present to his troubled imagination, and renewed by continual terrors his grief and repentance. Tormented night and day by that cruel remembrance, he professed that he had rather die a thousand deaths, and present his throat to whoever would kill him, than to live under the necessity of continual precautions, not only against his enemies, but the best of his friends.

Calippus ill deserved that name. He hastened the execution of his crime, and caused Dion to be assassinated in his own house by the Zacynthian soldiers, who were entirely devoted to his interest. The sister and wife of that prince were put into prison, where the latter was delivered of a son whom she resolved to nurse there herself.

* After this murder, Calippus was for some time in a splendid condition, having made himself master of Syracuse, by the means of the troops, who were entirely devoted to his service, in effect of the gifts he bestowed upon them. The pagans believed that the divinity ought to punish great crimes in a sudden and extraordinary manner in this life: and Plutarch observes, that the success of Calippus occasioned very great complaints against the gods, as suffering calmly, and without indignation, the vilest of men to raise himself to so exalted a fortune by so detestable and impious a method. But providence was not long without justifying itself; for Calippus soon suffered the punishment of his guilt. Having marched with his troops to take Catana, Syracuse revolted against him, and threw off so shameful a subjection. He afterwards attacked Messina, where he lost abundance of men, and particularly the Zacynthian soldiers, who had murdered Dion. No city of Sicily would receive him; but all detesting him as the most execrable of wretches, he retired to Rhegium, where, after having led for some time a miserable life, he was killed by Leptinus and Polyperchon, and, it was said with the same dagger with which Dion had been assassinated.

History has few examples of so distinct an attention of providence to punish great crimes, such as murder, perfidy, treason, either in the authors of those crimes themselves, who commanded or executed them, or in the accomplices any way concerned in them. The divine justice evidences itself from time to time in this manner, to prove that it is not unconcerned and inattentive; and to prevent the inundation of crimes, which an entire impunity would occasion; but it does not always distinguish itself by remarkable chastisements in this world, to intimate to mankind that greater punishments are reserved for guilt in the next.

As for Aristomache and Arete as soon as they came out of prison, Ictetes of Syracuse, one of Dion's friends, received them into his house, and treated them at first with an attention, fidelity, and generosity of the most exemplary kind, had he persevered: but complying at last with Dion's enemies, he provided a bark for them, and having put them on board, un-

the sea. He was not long without receiving the chastisement
black treachery; for being taken by Timoleon, he was
The Syracusans, fully to avenge Dion, killed also the two
traitor.

* The relations and friends of Dion, soon after his death,
to Plato to consult him upon the manner in which they should
the present troubled and fluctuating condition of Syracuse,
what sort of government it was proper to establish there.
knew the Syracusans were equally incapable of entire liberty
servitude, exhorted them strenuously to pacify all things as
ble, and for that purpose to change the tyranny, of which this
was odious, into a lawful sovereignty, which would make sul
and agreeable. He advised them, and according to him it
on's opinion to create three kings; one to be Hipparinus,
another Hipparinus, Dionysius the younger's brother, who so
well inclined towards the people; and Dionysius himself,
comply with such conditions as should be prescribed him; t
ty to be not unlike that of the kings of Sparta. By the s
35 magistrates were to be appointed to take care that the la
duly observed, to have great authority both in times of war,
and to serve as a balance between the power of the kings, the
the people.

It does not appear that this advice was ever followed, which
its great inconveniences. It is only known that Hipparinus,
brother, having landed at Syracuse with a fleet, and consid
expelled Calippus, and exercised the sovereign power two yea

The history of Sicily, as related thus far, includes about 5
ginning with Dionysius the elder, who reigned 38 of them, a
ing to the death of Dion. I shall return in the sequel to the
city, and shall relate the end of Dionysius the younger, and
liberment of the Syracusan liberty by Timoleon.

SECTION IV.

CHARACTER OF DION.

IT is not easy to find so many excellent qualities in one a
person as were united in Dion. I do not consider in this plac
derful taste for the sciences, his art of associating them with
employments of peace and war, of extracting from them the r
duct and maxims of government, and of making them an eq
and honourable entertainment of his leisure; I confine my
statesman and patriot, and in this view how admirably does
Greatness of soul, elevation of sentiment, generosity in be
wealth, heroic valour in battle, attended with a coolness of ten
prudence scarce to be paralleled, a mind vast and capable of
views, a constancy not to be shaken by the greatest dangers, o
unexpected revolutions of fortune, the love of his country and
fic good, carried almost to excess: these are part of Dion's vir
design he formed of delivering his country from the yoke of ty

* Plat. epist. viii.

† Dioid. l. xvi. p. 436.

worthy of admiration, and, if I may say so, the most above human nature, is the greatness of soul, and unexampled patience, with which he suffered the ingratitude of his country. He had abandoned and sacrificed every thing to come to their relief; he had reduced the tyranny to extremities, and was upon the point of re-establishing them in the full possession of their liberty: in return for such great services they shamefully expelled him the city, accompanied with an handful of foreign soldiers, whose fidelity they had not been able to corrupt; they load him with injuries, and add to their base perfidy the most cruel outrages and indignity: to punish those ungrateful traitors he had only a signal to give, and to leave the rest to the indignation of his soldiers: master of theirs, as well as his own temper, he stops their impetuosity, and without disarming their hands, restrains their just rage, suffering them in the very height and ardour of an attack, only to terrify and not to kill his enemies, because he could not forget that they were his fellow-citizens and brethren.

There seems to be only one defect that can be objected to Dion, which is, his having something rigid and austere in his manner, that made him less accessible and sociable than he should have been, and kept even persons of worth and his best friends at a kind of distance. Plato, and those who had his glory sincerely at heart, had often animadverted upon this turn of mind in him: but notwithstanding the reproaches which were made him upon his too austere gravity, and the inflexible severity with which he treated the people, he still piqued himself upon abating nothing of them: whether his genius was entirely averse to the arts of insinuation and persuasion, or that from the view of correcting and reforming the Syracusans, vitiated and corrupted by the flattering and complaisant discourses of their orators, he chose that rough and manly manner of behaving to them.

Dion was mistaken in the most essential point of governing. From the throne to the lowest office in the state, whoever is charged with the care of ruling and conducting others, ought particularly to study the * art of managing men's tempers, and of giving them that bent and turn of mind that may best suit his measures: which cannot be done by assuming the severe master, by commanding haughtily, and contenting one's self with laying down the rule and the duty with inflexible rigour. There is in the right itself, in virtue, and the exercise of all functions, an exactitude and steadiness, or rather a kind of stiffness, which frequently degenerates into a vice when carried into extremes. I know it is never allowable to break through rules; but it is always laudable, and often necessary to soften and make them more convertible; which is best effected by a kindness of manners, and an insinuating behaviour; not always exacting the discharge of a duty in its utmost rigour; overlooking abundance of small faults, that do not merit much notice, and observing upon those which are more considerable, with favour and goodness; in a word, in endeavouring by all possible means to acquire people's affection, and to render virtue and duty amiable.

Dion's permission to kill Heraclides, which was obtained with difficulty,

* Which art an ancient poet called "flexanima, atque omnium regina rerum oratio." Cic. l. i. de divin. n. 80.

that lasted to the day of his death, and of which we have no cause.

SECTION V.

DIONYSIUS THE YOUNGER REASCENDS THE THRONE

CALIPPUS, * who had caused Dion to be murdered, and tuted himself in his place, did not possess his power long months after, Hipparinus, Dionysius' brother, arriving near Syracuse with a numerous fleet, expelled him from the city, and restored his paternal sovereignty, which he held during two years.

Syracuse † and all Sicily, being harassed by different factious wars, were in a miserable condition. Dionysius, taking advantage of those troubles, ten years after he had been obliged to leave the throne, had assembled some foreign troops, and having overcome them, who had made himself master of Syracuse, he reinstated the possession of his dominions.

‡ It was perhaps to thank the gods for his re-establishment, to express his gratitude to them, that he sent statues of gold and ivory to Delphos of very great value. The galleys which were taken by Iphicrates, who was at that time near Corcyra || He wrote to Athens to know in what manner he should dispose of the booty, and was answered not to examine scrupulously for the sake of the gods, but to make use of it for the subsistence of his troops. Dionysius complained excessively of such treatment to the Athenians in a letter which he wrote them, wherein he reproached with gravity and justice their avarice and sacrilegious impiety.

§ A commander of pirates had acted much more nobly and generously in regard to the Romans about 50 years before. After the capture of Veii, which had been ten years besieged, they sent a golden statue to Delphos. The deputies who carried that present were taken prisoners at Lipara, and carried to that island. It was the custom of the pirates to divide all the prizes they took as a common stock. The island at that time was under the government of a magistrate more like the Romans in their manners than those he governed. He was called Timasitheus, † whose behaviour agreed well with the signification of his name. Full of respect for the envoys, the sacred gift they carried, the motive of their mission, and more for the majesty of the god for whom it was designed, he treated the multitude, that generally follow the example of those who are in power, with the same sentiments of respect and religion. They were received therefore with all the marks of distinction, and the expenses borne by the public. Timasitheus conveyed them with a squadron to Delphos, and brought them back in the same manner. It is easy to judge how sensibly the Romans were affected with a proceeding. By a decree of the senate they rewarded Timasitheus with great presents, and granted him the right of hospitality.

* A. M. 3647. Ant. J. C. 357. Diød. l. xvi. p. 462—466.

† A. M. 3654. Ant. J. C. 350. † Diød. l. xvi. p. 458.

|| Corfu.

§ Tit. Liv. Decad. i. l. v. c. 28. Diød. l.

¶ Timasitheus signifies one who honours the gods.

themselves obliged to do further honour to the family of their benefactor, and resolved that all his descendants should be for ever exempted from the tribute imposed upon the other inhabitants of that island.

This was certainly great and noble on both sides : but the contrast does no honour to the Athenians.

To return to Dionysius : though he expressed some regard for the gods, his actions argued no humanity to his subjects. His past misfortunes, instead of correcting and softening his disposition, had only served to inflame it, and to render him more savage and brutal than before.

* The most worthy and considerable of the citizens, not being able to support so cruel a servitude, had recourse to Ictetas, king of the Leontines, and abandoning themselves to his conduct, elected him their general ; not that they believed he differed in any thing from the most declared tyrants, but because they had no other resource.

During these transactions, the Carthaginians, who were almost always at war with the Syracusans, arrived in Sicily with a great fleet, and having made a great progress there, the Sicilians and the people of Syracuse resolved to send an embassy into Greece, to demand aid of the Corinthians, from whom the Syracusans were descended, and who had always openly declared against tyrants in favour of liberty. Ictetas, who proposed no other end from his command than to make himself master of Syracuse, and had no thoughts of setting it free, treated secretly with the Carthaginians, though in public he affected to praise the wise measures of the Syracusans, and even sent his deputies along with theirs.

† Corinth received the ambassadors perfectly well, and immediately appointed Timoleon their general. He had led a retired life for 20 years, without interfering in public affairs, and was far from believing, that at his age, and in the circumstances he then was, he should be thought of upon such an occasion.

He was descended from one of the noblest families of Corinth, loved his country passionately, and discovered upon all occasions a singular humanity of temper, except against tyrants and bad men. He was an excellent captain : and as in his youth he had all the maturity of age, in age he had all the fire and courage of the most ardent youth.

He had an elder brother called Timophanes, whom he tenderly loved, as he had demonstrated in a battle, in which he covered him with his body, and saved his life at the great danger of his own ; but his country was still dearer to him. That brother having made himself tyrant of it, so black a crime gave him the sharpest affliction. He made use of all possible means to bring him back to his duty ; kindness, friendship, affection, remonstrances, and even menaces. But finding all his endeavours ineffectual, and that nothing could prevail upon a heart abandoned to ambition, he caused his brother to be assassinated in his presence by two of his friends and intimates, and thought that upon such an occasion the laws of nature ought to give place to those of his country.

That action was admired and applauded by the principal citizens of Corinth, and by most of the philosophers, who looked upon it as the most noble effort of human virtue ; and Plutarch seems to pass the same judg-

* Diod. l. xvi. p. 459, et 464. Plut. in Timol. p. 236, et 243.

† A. M. 3655. Ant. J. C. 349.

down the vengeance of the gods upon him. His mother esp excess of her grief, uttered the most dreadful curses and against him; and when he came to console her, not being the sight of her son's murderer, she thrust him away with and shut her doors against him.

He was then struck with all the horror of the most guilty himself up to the cruelest remorse, considered Timophanes a tyrant, but as a brother, and resolved to put an end to his life ing from all nourishment. It was with great difficulty his friend him from that fatal resolution. Overcome by their prayers he was at length prevailed upon to live; but he condemned pass the rest of his days in solitude. From that moment he all public affairs; and for several years never came to the c dered about in the most solitary and desert places, abandoned of grief and melancholy; so true it is, that neither the praise nor the false reasonings of politicians can suppress the cries of which is at once the witness, judge, and executioner of those to violate the most sacred rights and ties of nature.

He passed 20 years in this condition. He did indeed return at the latter part of that time, but lived there always private without concerning himself with the administration of the It was not without the greatest repugnance that he accepted ment of general; but he did not think it allowable to refuse to his country, and his duty prevailed against his inclination.

Whilst Timoleon assembled his troops, and was preparing Corinthians received letters from Ictetas, in which he told them "was not necessary for them to make any further levies, or themselves in great expences to come to Sicily, and expose to evident danger; that the Carthaginians, apprized of "were waiting to intercept their squadron in its passage with "and that their slowness in sending their troops had obliged "in the Carthaginians themselves to his aid, and to make "against the tyrant." He had made a secret treaty with them it was stipulated that after the expulsion of Dionysius from Sicily should take possession of it in his place.

The reading of these letters, far from cooling the zeal of the ans, only incensed them more than at first, and hastened them of Timoleon. He embarked on board ten galleys, and arrived on the coast of Italy, where the news that came from Sicily perplexed him, and discouraged his troops. It brought an account Ictetas had defeated Dionysius, and having made himself master of the greatest part of Syracuse, had obliged the tyrant to shut himself in the citadel, and in that quarter called the isle, where he believed and that he had given orders to the Carthaginians to prevent approach, and to come on shore, that they might make a partition of Sicily between them, when they should have reduced the tyrant to retire.

The Carthaginians in consequence had sent 20 galleys to Rhegium. The Corinthians, upon their arrival at that port, found ambassador Ictetas, who declared to Timoleon, that he might come to Sicily would be well received there, provided he dismissed his troops. His proposal was entirely injurious, and at the same time more

and to retire, and to abandon all Sicily to extreme distress, which could not avoid being the reward of Ictas' treachery, and of the support which the Carthaginians should give the tyranny.

In this delicate conjuncture, Timoleon demanded a conference with the ambassadors, and the principal officers of the Carthaginian squadron, in the presence of the people of Rhegium. It was only, he said, to discharge himself, and for his own security, that his country might not accuse him of having disobeyed its orders, and betrayed its interests. The governour and magistrates of Rhegium were of intelligence with him. They desired nothing more than to see the Corinthians in possession of Sicily, and apprehending nothing so much as the neighbourhood of the barbarians. They summoned therefore an assembly, and shut the gates of the city, upon pretence of preventing the citizens from going abroad, in order to their applying themselves solely to the present affair.

The people being assembled, long speeches were made of little or no tendency, every body treating the same subject, and repeating the same reasons, or adding new ones, only to protract the council, and to gain time. Whilst this was doing, nine of the Corinthian galleys went off, and were suffered to pass by the Carthaginian vessels, believing that their departure had been concerted with their own officers, who were in the city, and that those nine galleys were to return to Corinth, the tenth remaining to carry Timoleon to Ictas' army at Syracuse. When Timoleon was informed in a whisper, that his galleys were at sea, he asept gently through the crowd, which to favour his going off, thronged exceedingly around the tribunal. He got to the sea-side, embarked directly, and having rejoined his galleys, they arrived together at Tauromenium, a city of Sicily, where they were received with open arms by Andromachus, who commanded it, and who joined his citizens with the Corinthian troops, to reinstate the Sicilian liberties.

It is easy to comprehend, how much the Carthaginians were surprised and ashamed of being so deceived: but, as somebody told them, being Phœnicians, who passed for the greatest cheats in the world, fraud and artifice ought not to give them so much astonishment and displeasure.

Upon the news of Timoleon's arrival, Ictas was terrified, and made the greatest part of the Carthaginian galleys advance. They had 150 long ships, 50,000 foot, and 300 armed chariots. The Syracusans lost all hope when they saw the Carthaginians in possession of the port; Ictas master of the city, Dionysius blocked up in the citadel, and Timoleon without any other hold in Sicily than by a nook of its coast, the small city of Tauromenium, with little hope and less force; for his troops did not amount in all to more than 1000 soldiers, and he had scarce provisions for their subsistence; besides which the cities placed no confidence in him. The ills they had suffered from the extortion and cruelty that had been practised amongst them had exasperated them against all commanders of troops, especially after the horrid treachery of Calippus and Pharas; who being both sent, the one from Athens, and the other from Sparta, to free Sicily and expel the tyrants, made them conceive the tyranny gentle and desirable, so severe were the vexations with which they had oppressed them. They were afraid of experiencing the same treatment from Timoleon.

The inhabitants of Adranon, a small city below Mount Ætna, being divided amongst themselves, one party had called in Ictas and the Car-

almost at the same time in the neighbourhood of Adranon; the former with 5000 men, and the latter with only 1200. Notwithstanding this inequality, Timoleon, who justly conceived that he should find the Carthaginians in disorder, and employed in taking up their quarters, and pitching their tents, made his troops advance, and without losing time to rest them, as the officers advised him, he marched directly to charge the enemy, who no sooner saw him than they took to their heels. This occasioned their killing only 300, and taking twice as many prisoners; but the Carthaginians lost their camp, and all their baggage. The Adranites opened their gates at the time, and received Timoleon. Other cities sent their deputies to him soon after, and made their submission.

Dionysius himself, who renounced his vain hopes, and saw himself at the point of being reduced, as full of contempt for Icetas, who had suffered himself to be so shamefully defeated, as of admiration and esteem for Timoleon, sent ambassadors to the latter, to treat of surrendering himself and the citadel to the Corinthians. Timoleon, taking the advantage of so unexpected a good fortune, made Euclid and Telemachus, with 400 soldiers, file off into the castle; not all at once, nor in the day time, that being impossible, the Carthaginians being masters of the gate, but in platoons, and by stealth. Those troops having got successfully into the citadel, took possession of it with all the tyrant's moveables, and provisions of war: for he had a considerable number of horse, all sorts of engines and darts, besides 70,000 suits of armour, which had been laid up there long before. Dionysius had also 2000 regular troops, which with the rest he surrendered to Timoleon; and for himself, taking with him his money, and some few of his friends, he embarked unperceived by the troops of Icetas, and repaired to the camp of Timoleon.

It was the first time of his life that he had appeared in the low and abject state of a private person, and a suppliant; he who had been born and nurtured in the arms of the tyranny, and had seen himself master of the most powerful kingdom that had ever been usurped by tyrants. He had possessed it ten years entire, before Dion took arms against him, and some years after, though always in the midst of wars and battles. He was sent to Corinth,* with only one galley, without convoy, and with very little money. He served there for a sight, every body running to gaze at him; some with a secret joy of heart, to feed their eyes with a view of the miseries of a man, whom the name of tyrant rendered odious; others with a kind of compassion, from comparing the splendid condition from which he had fallen with the inextricable abyss of distress into which they beheld him plunged.

His manner of life at Corinth did not long excite any sentiments in regard to him, but those of contempt and indignation. He passed whole days in perfumers' shops, in taverns, or with actresses and singers, disputing with them upon the rules of music, and the harmony of airs. Some people have thought, that he behaved in such a manner out of policy, not to give umbrage to the Corinthians, nor to discover any thought or desire of recovering his dominions. But such an opinion does him too much honour; and it seems more probable, that nurtured and educated as he was in drunkenness and debauchery, he only followed his inclination, and that he passed his life in the kind of slavery into which he was fallen, as

* A. M. 3657. Ant. J. C. 347.

* Some writers say, that the extreme poverty to which he was reduced at Corinth, obliged him to open a school there, and to teach children to read; perhaps says Cicero, (without doubt jestingly) to retain a species of empire, and not absolutely to renounce the habit and pleasure of commanding. Whether † that were his motive or not, it is certain that Dionysius, who had seen himself master of Syracuse, and of almost all Sicily, who had possessed immense riches, and had numerous fleets and great armies of horse and foot under his command: that the same Dionysius, reduced now almost to beggary, and from a king become a schoolmaster, was a good lesson for persons of exalted stations not to confide in their grandeur, nor to rely too much upon their fortune. The Lacedæmonians some time after gave Philip this admonition. † That prince having written to them in very haughty and menacing terms, they made him no other answer, but, "Dionysius at Corinth."

An expression of Dionysius, which has been preserved, seems to argue, if it be true, that he knew how to make a good use of his adversity, and to turn his misfortunes to his advantage; which would be very much to his praise, but contrary to what has been related of him before. ¶ While he lived at Corinth, a stranger rallied him unseasonably, and with an indecent grossness, upon his commerce with the philosophers during his most splendid fortune, and asked him by way of insult, of what consequence all the wisdom of Plato had been to him? "Can you believe then," replied he, "that I have received no benefit from Plato, and see me hear ill fortune as I do?"

SECTION VI.

TIMOLEON RESTORES LIBERTY TO SYRACUSE, AND INSTITUTES WISE LAWS.—HIS DEATH.

AFTER the retreat of Dionysius, Ictetas pressed the siege of the citadel of Syracuse with the utmost vigour, and kept it so closely blocked up, that the convoys sent to the Corinthians, could not enter it without great difficulty. Timoleon, who was at Catania, sent them frequently thither. To deprive them of this relief, Ictetas and Mago set out together with a design to besiege that place. During their absence, Leon the Corinthian, who commanded in the citadel, having observed from the ramparts, that those who had been left to continue the siege were very remiss in their duty; he made a sudden furious sally upon them, whilst they were dispersed, killed part of them, put the rest to flight, and seized the quarter of the city called Achradina, which was the strongest part of it, and had been least injured by the enemy. Leon fortified it in the best manner the time would admit, and joined it to the citadel by works of communication.

This bad news caused Mago and Ictetas to return immediately. At the same time a body of troops from Corinth landed safe in Sicily, having deceived the vigilance of the Carthaginian squadron posted to intercept them. When they were landed, Timoleon received them with joy, and after having taken possession of Messina, marched in battle array against Syracuse.

* Cic. Tusc. Quæst. l. iii. n. 27.

† Val. Max. lvi. c. 9.

‡ Demet. Phaler. de eloq. 11. l. viii.

¶ Plut. in Timol. p. 243.

§ A. M. 3638. Ant. J. C. 346. Plut. in Timol. p. 243—248. Diod. l. xvi. p. 465, et. 474.

Icetas. They represented to them that it was highly shameful for Greeks, as they were, to labour that Syracuse and all Sicily should be given up to the Carthaginians, the wickedest and most cruel of all barbarians : that Ice-tas had only to join Timoleon, and to act in concert with him against the common enemy. Those soldiers, having spread these insinuations through-out the whole camp, gave Mago violent suspicions of his being betrayed ; besides which, he had already for some time sought a pretext to retire. For these reasons, notwithstanding the entreaties and warm remonstrances of Ice-tas, he weighed anchor, and set sail for Africa, shamefully abandoning the conquest of Sicily.

Timoleon's army the next day appeared before the place in line of battle, and attacked it in three different quarters with so much vigour and success that Ice-tas' troops were universally overthrown and put to flight. Thus, by a good fortune that has few examples, he carried Syracuse by force in an instant, which was at that time one of the strongest cities in the world. When he had made himself master of it, he did not act like Dion in sparing the forts and public edifices for their beauty and magnificence. To avoid giving the same cause of suspicion, which at first decried, though without foundation, and at length ruined that great man, he caused proclamation to be made by sound of trumpet, that all Syracusans, who would come with their tools, might employ themselves in demolishing the forts of the tyrants. In consequence of which, the Syracusans considering that proclamation and day as the commencement of their liberty, ran in multitudes to the citadel, which they not only demolished, but the palaces of the tyrants ; breaking open their tombs at the same time, which they also threw down and destroyed.

The citadel being razed, and the ground made level, Timoleon caused tribunals to be erected upon it, for the dispensation of justice in the name of the people ; that the same place from whence, under the tyrants, every day some bloody edict had issued, might become the asylum and bulwark of liberty and innocence.

Timoleon was master of the city ; but it wanted people to inhabit it ; for some having perished in the wars and seditions, and others having fled to avoid the power of the tyrants, Syracuse was become a desert, and the grass was grown so high in the streets that horses grazed in them. All the cities of Sicily were almost in the same condition. Timoleon and the Syracusans therefore found it necessary to write to Corinth, to desire that people might be sent from Greece to inhabit Syracuse ; that otherwise the country could never recover itself, and was besides threatened with a new war : for they had received advice, that Mago having killed himself, the Carthaginians, enraged at his having acquitted himself so ill of his charge, had hung up his body upon a cross, and were making great levies to return into Sicily with a more numerous army than at the beginning of the year.

Those letters being arrived with ambassadors from Syracuse, who conjured the Corinthians to take compassion of their city, and to be a second time the founders of it, the Corinthians did not consider the calamity of that people as an occasion of aggrandizing themselves, and of making themselves masters of the city, according to the maxims of a base and infamous policy, but sending to all the sacred games of Greece, and to all public assemblies, they caused proclamation to be made in them by heralds, that the Corinthians having abolished the tyranny, and expelled the tyrants, they declared free and independent the Syracusans, and all the people of

into all the isles, whither great numbers of fugitives had retired, to invite them to come as soon as possible to Corinth, which would provide them vessels, commanders, and a safe convoy to transport them into their country at its own expence.

Upon this publication, Corinth received universal praises and blessings, as it justly deserved. It was every where proclaimed, that Corinth had delivered Syracuse from the tyrants, had preserved it from falling into the hands of the barbarians, and restored it to its citizens. It is not necessary to insist here upon the grandeur of so noble and generous an action: the mere relation of it must make the impression that always results from the great and noble; and every body owned, that never conquest nor triumph equalled the glory which the Corinthians then acquired by so perfect and magnanimous a disinterestedness.

Those who came to Corinth, not being sufficiently numerous, demanded an addition of inhabitants from that city and from all Greece to augment this kind of colony. Having obtained their request, and finding themselves increased to 10,000, they embarked for Syracuse, where a multitude of people from all parts of Italy and Sicily had joined Timoleon. It was said their number amounted to 60,000 and upwards. Timoleon distributed the lands amongst them gratis; but sold them the houses, with which he raised a very great sum; leaving it to the discretion of the old inhabitants to redeem their own: and by this means he collected a considerable fund for such of the people as were poor and unable to support either their own necessities or the charges of the war.

The statues of the tyrants, and all the princes who had governed Sicily, were put up to sale; but first they were cited, and sentenced in the forms of law. One only escaped the rigour of this inquiry, and was preserved; which was Gelon, who had gained a celebrated victory over the Carthaginians at Himera, and governed the people with lenity and justice; for which his memory was still cherished and honoured. If the same scrutiny were made into all statues, I do not know whether many would continue in being.

* History has preserved another sentence passed also in regard to a statue, but of a very different kind. The fact is curious, and will excuse a digression. Nicon, a champion of Thasus, an island in the *Ægean* sea, had been crowned 1400 times victor in the solemn games of Greece. A man of that merit could not fail of being envied. After his death, one of his competitors insulted his statue, and gave it several blows; to revenge perhaps those he had formerly received from him it represented. But the statue, as if sensible of that outrage, fell from its height upon the person that insulted it, and killed him. The son of him who had been crushed to death, proceeded juridically against the statue, as guilty of homicide, and punishable by the law of Draco. That famous legislator of Athens, to inspire a greater horror for the guilt of murder, had ordained that even inanimate things should be destroyed which should occasion the death of a man by their fall. The Thasians, conformable to this law, decreed that the statue should be thrown into the sea. But some years after, being afflicted with great famine, and having consulted the oracle of Delphos,

* Suidas in *Nicon* Pausan. l. vi. p. 364.

Syracuse being raised in a manner from the grave, and people fleeing from all parts to inhabit it, Timoleon, desirous of freeing the other cities of Sicily, and finally to extirpate tyranny and tyrants out of it, began his march with his army. He compelled Ictas to renounce his alliance with the Carthaginians, obliged him to demolish his forts, and to live as a private person in the city of the Leontines. Leptinus, tyrant of Apollonia, and of several other cities and fortresses, seeing himself in danger of being taken by force, surrendered himself. Timoleon spared his life, and sent him to Corinth; for he thought nothing more great and honourable, than to let Greece see the tyrants of Sicily in a state of humiliation, and living like exiles.

He returned afterwards to Syracuse, to regulate the government, and to institute such laws as should be most important and necessary, in conjunction with Cephalus and Dionysius, two legislators sent to him by the Corinthians: for he had not the weakness to desire unlimited power, and sole administration. But on his departure, that the troops in his pay might get something for themselves, and to keep them in exercise at the same time, he sent them, under the command of Dinarchus and Demaratus, into all the places subject to the Carthaginians. Those troops brought over several cities from the barbarians, lived always in abundance, made much booty, and returned with considerable sums of money, which was of great service in the support of the war.

* About this time the Carthaginians arrived at Lilybæum, under Asdrubal and Imilcar, with an army of 70,000 men, 200 ships of war, 1000 transports laden with machines, armed chariots, horses, ammunition and provisions. They proposed no less than the entire expulsion of the Greeks out of Sicily. Timoleon did not think fit to wait their advancing; and though he could raise only 6 or 7000 men, so great was the people's terror, he marched with that small body of troops against the formidable body of the enemy, and obtained a celebrated victory near the river Crimæus; an account of which may be found in the history of the Carthaginians. Timoleon returned to Syracuse amidst shouts of joy and universal applauses.

He had before effected the conquest and reduction of the Sicilian tyrants, but had not changed them, nor taken from them their tyrannical disposition. They united together, and formed a powerful league against him. Timoleon immediately took the field, and soon put a final end to their hopes. He made them all suffer the just punishment their revolt deserved. Ictas, amongst others, with his son, were put to death, as tyrants and traitors. His wife and daughters having been sent to Syracuse, and presented to the people, were also sentenced to die, and executed accordingly. The people, without doubt, designed to avenge Dion their first deliverer by that decree: for it was the same Ictas who had caused Arete, Dion's wife, his sister Aristomache, and his son, an infant, to be thrown into the sea.

Virtue is seldom or never without envy. Two accusers summoned Timoleon to answer for his conduct before the judges, and having assigned him a certain day for his appearance, demanded sureties of him. The people expressed great indignation against such a proceeding, and would have dispensed with so great a man's observing the usual formali-

* Plut. in Timol. p. 248, et 255.

Timoleon, without giving himself the trouble to refute those calumnies, only replied, "that he thanked the gods, who had heard his prayers, and "that he at length saw the Syracusans enjoy an entire liberty of saying every thing; a liberty absolutely unknown to them under the tyrants, but "which it was just to confine within due bounds."

That great man had given Syracuse wise laws, had purged all Sicily of the tyrants who had so long infested it, had re-established peace and security universally, and supplied the cities ruined by the war with the means of reinstating themselves. After such glorious actions, which had acquired him an unbounded credit, he quitted his authority to live in retirement. The Syracusans had given him the best house in the city in gratitude for his great services, and another very fine and agreeable one in the country, where he generally resided with his wife and children, whom he had sent for from Corinth; for he did not return thither, and Syracuse was become his country. He had the wisdom, in resigning every thing, to abstract himself entirely also from envy, which never fails to attend exalted stations, and pays no respect to merit, however great and substantial. He shunned the rock on which the greatest men, through an insatiate lust of honours and power, are often shipwrecked; that is, by engaging to the end of their lives in new cares and troubles, of which age renders them incapable, and by choosing rather to sink under, than to lay down the weight of them.

Timoleon, who knew all the value of a noble and glorious leisure, acted in a different manner. He passed the rest of his life as a private person, enjoying the grateful satisfaction of seeing so many cities, and such a numerous people indebted to him for their happiness and tranquility: but he was always respected and consulted as the common oracle of Sicily. Neither treaty of peace, institution of law, division of land, nor regulation of government, seemed well done, if Timoleon had not been consulted, and put the last hand to it.

His age was tried with a very sensible affliction, which he supported with astonishing patience; it was the loss of sight. That accident, far from lessening him in the consideration and regard of the people, served only to augment them. The Syracusans did not content themselves with paying him frequent visits; they conducted all strangers both in town and country to see their benefactor and deliverer. When they had any important affair to deliberate upon in the assembly of the people, they called him in to their assistance, who came thither in a chariot drawn by two horses, which crossed the public place to the theatre; and in that manner he was introduced into the assembly, amidst the shouts and acclamations of joy of the whole people. After he had given his opinion, which was always religiously observed, his domestics re-conducted him across the theatre, followed by all the citizens beyond the gates with continual shouts of joy and clapping of hands.

He had still greater honours paid to him after his death. Nothing was wanting that could add to the magnificence of the procession which followed his bier, of which the tears that were shed, and the blessings uttered by every body in honour of his memory, were the noblest ornaments. Those tears were neither the effect of custom and the formality of mourning, nor exacted by a public decree, but flowed from a native source, sincere affection, lively gratitude, and inconsolable sorrow. A law was also made, that annually for the future, upon the day of his death, the music

man. But what was still more honourable for the memory of that great man, was the decree of the Syracusan people, that whenever Sicily should be engaged in a war with foreigners, they should send to Corinth for a general.

I do not know that history has any thing more great and accomplished than what it says of Timoleon. I speak not only of his military exploits, but the happy success of all his undertakings. Plutarch observes a characteristic in them, which distinguishes Timoleon from all the great men of his times, and makes use upon that occasion of a very remarkable comparison. There are, says he, in painting and poetry, pieces which are excellent in themselves, and which at the first view may be known to be the works of a master, but some of them denote their having cost abundance of pains and application; whereas in others an easy and native grace is seen, which adds exceedingly to their value; and amongst the latter he places the poems of Homer. There is something of this sort occurs when we compare the great actions of Epaminondas and Agesilaus with those of Timoleon. In the former, we find them executed with force and innumerable difficulties; but in the latter, there is an easiness and facility which distinguish them as the work not of fortune, but of virtue, which fortune seems to have taken pleasure in seconding. It is Plutarch who still speaks.

But not to mention his military actions, what I admire most in Timoleon, is his warm and disinterested passion for the public good, and his reserving only for himself the pleasure of seeing others happy by his services; his extreme remoteness from ambition and haughtiness; his honourable retirement into the country; his modesty, moderation, and indifference for the honours paid him; and what is still more uncommon, his aversion for all flattery, and even just praises. When somebody extolled in his presence his wisdom, valour, and glory, in having expelled the tyrants, he made no answer, but that he thought himself obliged to express his gratitude to the gods, who, having decreed to restore peace and liberty to Sicily, had vouchsafed to make choice of him in preference to all others for so honourable a ministration; for he was fully persuaded that all human events are guided and disposed by the secret decrees of divine providence. What a treasure, what a happiness for a state is such a minister!

For the better understanding his value, we have only to compare the condition of Syracuse under Timoleon with its state under the two Dionysiiuses. It is the same city, inhabitants, and people; but how different is it under the different governments we speak of! The two tyrants had no thoughts but of making themselves feared, and of depressing their subjects to render them more passive. They were terrible in effect, as they desired to be; but at the same time detested and abhorred, and had more to fear from their subjects than their subjects from them. Timoleon, on the contrary, who looked upon himself as the father of the Syracusan people, and who had no thoughts but of making them happy, enjoyed the refined pleasure of being beloved and revered as a parent by his children; and he was remembered amongst them with blessings, because they could not reflect upon the peace and felicity they enjoyed without calling to mind at the same time the wise legislator to whom they were indebted for those inestimable blessings.



BOOK XII.

THE

HISTORY

OF THE

PERSIANS AND GRECIANS.

CHAPTER I.

THIS book contains principally the history of two very illustrious generals of the Thebans, Epaminondas and Pelopidas; the deaths of Agesilaus, king of Sparta, and of Artaxerxes Mnemon, king of Persia.

SECTION I.

STATE OF GREECE FROM THE TREATY OF ANTALCIDES.

THE peace of Antalcides, * of which mention has been made in the third chapter of the ninth book, had given the Grecian states great matter of discontent and division. In effect of that treaty, the Thebans had been obliged to abandon the cities of Bœotia, and let them enjoy their liberty: and the Corinthians to withdraw their garrison from Argos, which by that means became free and independent. The Lacedæmonians, who were the authors and executors of this treaty, saw their power extremely augmented by it, and were industrious to make further additions to it. They compelled the Mantineans, against whom they pretended to have many causes of complaint in the last war, to demolish the walls of their city, and to inhabit four different places, as they had done before.

† The two kings of Sparta, Agesipolis and Agesilaus, were of quite different characters, and as opposite in their opinions upon the present state of affairs. The first, who was naturally inclined to peace, and a strict observer of justice, was for having Sparta, already much exalted against for the treaty of Antalcides, suffer the Grecian cities to enjoy their liberties, according to the tenor of that treaty, and not disturb their tranquility through an unjust desire of extending their dominions. The other, on the contrary, restless, active, and full of great views of ambition and conquest, breathed nothing but war.

‡ At the same time, deputies arrived at Sparta from Acanthus and

* A. M. 3617. Ant. J. C. 387. Xenoph. hist. Græc. l.v. p. 550, 558.

† Diod. l. xv. p. 341.

‡ A. M. 3621. Ant. J. C. 363.

bœa.* Athens, after the victories of Salamin and Marathon, had conquered many places on the side of Thrace, and even in Thrace itself. Those cities threw off the yoke, as soon as Sparta, at the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war, had ruined the power of Athens. Olynthus was of this number. The deputies of Acanthus and Apollonia, represented in the general assembly of the allies, that Olynthus, situated in their neighbourhood, daily improved in strength in an extraordinary manner; that it perpetually extended its dominions by new conquests; that it obliged all the cities round about to submit to it, and to enter into its measures; and was upon the point of concluding an alliance with the Athenians and the Thebans. The affair being taken into consideration, it was unanimously resolved, that it was necessary to declare war against the Olynthians. It was agreed, that the allied cities should furnish ten thousand troops, with liberty, to such as desired it, to substitute money, at the rate of three oboli a day for each foot soldier, and four times as much for the horse. The Lacedæmonians, to lose no time, made their troops march directly, under the command of Eudamidas, who prevailed with the Ephori, that Phæbidas his brother, might have the leading of those which were to follow, and to join him soon after. When he arrived in that part of Macedonia, which is also called Thrace, he garrisoned such places as applied to him for that purpose, seized upon Potidæa, a city in alliance with the Olynthians, which surrendered without making any defence, and began the war against Olynthus, though slowly, as it was necessary for a general to act before his troops were all assembled.

† Phæbidas began his march soon after, and being arrived near Thebes, encamped without the walls near the gymnasium, or public place of exercise. Ismenius and Leontides, both polemarchs, that is, generals of the army, and supreme magistrates of Thebes, were at the head of two different factions. The first, who had engaged Pelopidas in his party, was no friend to the Lacedæmonians, nor they to him, because he publicly declared for popular government and liberty. The other, on the contrary, favoured an oligarchy and was supported by the Lacedæmonians with their whole interest. I am obliged to enter into this detail, because the event I am going to relate, and which was a consequence of it, occasions the important war between the Thebans and Spartans.

This being the state of affairs at Thebes, Leontides applied to Phæbidas, and proposed to him to seize the citadel called Cadmœa, to expel the adherents of Ismenius, and to give the Lacedæmonians possession of it. He represented to him that nothing could be more glorious for him than to make himself master of Thebes, whilst his brother was endeavouring to reduce Olynthus; that he would thereby facilitate the success of his brother's enterprise; and that the Thebans, who had prohibited their citizens by decree to bear arms against the Olynthians would not fail, upon his making himself master of the citadel, to supply him with whatever number of horse and foot he should think proper for the reinforcement of Eudamidas.

Phæbidas, who had much ambition and little conduct, and who had no other view than to signalize himself by some extraordinary action, with-

* Dioid. l. xv. p. 554—556.

† A. M. 3622. Ant. J. C. 332. Xenoph. p. 556—558. Plut. in Agesil. p. 608, 609. Id. in Pelop. p. 280. Dioid. l. xv. p. 541, 512.

concluded by the Grecian states, celebrated the feast of Ceres, and expected nothing less than such an act of hostility, Phæbidas, conducted by Leontides, took possession of the citadel. The senate was then sitting. Leontides went to them, and declared that there was nothing to be feared from the Lacedæmonians, who had entered the citadel; that they were only the enemies of those who were for disturbing the public tranquility; that as for himself, by the power his office of polemarch gave him of confining whoever caballed against the state, he should put Ismenius into a place of security, who factiously endeavoured to break the peace. He was seized accordingly, and carried to the citadel. The party of Ismenius seeing their chief a prisoner, and apprehending the utmost violence for themselves, quitted the city with precipitation, and retired to Athens, to the number of 400 and upwards. They were soon after banished by a public decree. Pelopidas was of the number; but Epaminondas remained at Thebes unmolested, being disregarded as a man entirely devoted to the study of philosophy, who did not intermeddle in affairs of state, and also from his poverty, which left no room to fear anything from him. A new polemarch was nominated in the room of Ismenius, and Leontides went to Lacedæmon.

The news of Phæbidas' enterprise, who at a time of general peace had taken possession of a citadel by force, upon which he had no claim or right, had occasioned great murmurings and complaints. Such especially as opposed Agesilaus, who was suspected of having shared in the scheme, demanded by whose orders Phæbidas had committed so strange a breach of public faith. Agesilaus, who well knew that those warm reproaches were aimed at him, made no difficulty of justifying Phæbidas, and declared openly, and before all the world, "that the action ought to be considered in itself, in order to understand whether it were useful or not; that whatever was expedient for Sparta, he was not only permitted, but commanded to act upon his own authority, and without waiting the orders of any body:"—strange principles to be advanced by a person who upon other occasions had maintained, "that justice was the supreme of virtues, and that without it, valour itself, and every other great quality, were useless and unavailing." It is the same man that made answer, when somebody in his presence magnified the king of Persia's grandeur, "he whom you call the great king, in what is he greater than me, unless he be more just?" A truly noble and admirable maxim, *that justice must be the rule of whatever excels and is great*; but a maxim that he had only in his mouth, and which all his actions contradicted: conformable to the principle of the generality of politicians, who imagine that a statesman ought always to have justice in his mouth, but never lose an occasion of violating it for the advantage of his country.

But let us now hear the sentence which the august assembly of Sparta, so renowned for the wisdom of its counsels and the equity of its decrees, is about to pronounce. The affair being maturely considered, the whole discussed at large, and the manner of it set in its full light, the assembly resolved that Phæbidas should be deprived of his command, and fined 100,000 drachms;* but that they should continue to hold the citadel, and keep a good garrison in it. What a strange contradiction was this, says Polybius! † what a disregard of all justice and reason! to punish the crim-

* About 2020l. Sterling.

† Lib. iv. p. 106.

But this was not all; commissioners appointed by all the cities in alliance with Sparta, were dispatched to the citadel of Thebes to try Ismenius, upon whom they passed sentence of death, which was immediately executed. Such flagrant injustice seldom remains unpunished. To act in such a manner, says Polybius again, is neither for one's country's interest, nor one's own.

* Teleutias, Agesilaus' brother, had been substituted in the place of Phæbidas, to command the rest of the troops of the allies designed against Olynthus, whither he marched with all expedition. The city was strong, and furnished with every thing necessary to a good defence. Several sallies were made with great success, in one of which Teleutias was killed. The next year king Agesipolis had the command of the army. The campaign passed in skirmishing, without any thing decisive. Agesipolis died soon after of a disease, and was succeeded by his brother Cleombrotus, who reigned nine years. † About that time began the 100th Olympiad. Sparta made fresh efforts to terminate the war with the Olynthians. Polybidas their general pressed the siege with vigour. The place being in want of provisions, was at last obliged to surrender, and was received by the Spartans into the number of their allies.

SECTION II.

SPARTA'S PROSPERITY.—CHARACTER OF TWO ILLUSTRIOUS THEBANS, EPAMINONDAS AND PELOPIDAS.

THE fortune of the Lacedæmonians never appeared with greater splendour, nor their power more strongly established. All Greece was subjected to them either by force or alliance. They were in possession of Thebes, a most powerful city, and with that of all Bœotia. They had found means to humble Argos, and to hold it in dependance. Corinth was entirely at their devotion, and obeyed their orders in every thing. The Athenians, abandoned by their allies, and reduced almost to their own strength, were in no condition to make head against them. If any city or people in their alliance attempted to abstract themselves from their power, an immediate punishment reduced them to their former obedience, and terrified all others from following their example. Thus masters by sea and land, all trembled before them; and the most formidable princes, as the king of Persia and the tyrant of Sicily, seemed to emulate each other in courting their friendship and alliance.

A prosperity founded in injustice can be of no long duration. The greatest blows that were given the Spartan power came from the quarter where they had acted the highest injuries, and from whence they did not seem to have any thing to fear, that is to say, from Thebes. Two illustrious citizens of that state will make a glorious appearance upon the theatre of Greece, and for that reason deserve our notice in this place.

These are Pelopidas and Epaminondas, † both descended from the noblest families of Thebes. Pelopidas, nurtured in the greatest affluence, and, whilst young, sole heir of a very rich and flourishing family, em-

* Xenoph. l. v. p. 569—565. Diod. l. xv. p. 342, 343.

† A. M. 3624. Ant. J. C. 330.

‡ Plut. in Pelop. p. 279.

riches, as they were really their master, and not their slave: for, according to Aristotle's remark, repeated by Plutarch, * most men either make no use at all of their fortunes, out of avarice, or abuse them in bad or trifling expences. As for Epaminondas, poverty was all his inheritance, in which his honour, and one might almost say his joy and delight, consisted. He was born of poor parents, and consequently familiarized from his infancy with poverty, which he made more grateful and easy to him by his taste for philosophy. Pelopidas, who supported a great number of citizens, never being able to prevail on him to accept his offers, and to make use of his fortune, resolved to share in the poverty of his friend, by making him his example, and became the model as well as admiration of the whole city, from the modesty of his dress, and the frugality of his table.

† If Epaminondas was poor as to the goods of fortune, those of the head and heart made him most ample amends. Modest, prudent, grave, happy in improving occasions, possessing in a supreme degree the science of war, equally valiant and wise, easy and complaisant, in the commerce of the world, suffering with incredible patience the people's, and even his friends' ill treatment, uniting with the ardour for military exercises a wonderful taste for study and the sciences, piquing himself especially so much upon truth and sincerity, that he made a scruple of telling a lie even in jest, or for diversion. *Adeo veritatis diligens, ut ne joco quidem mentiretur.*

† They were both equally inclined to virtue. But Pelopidas was best pleased with the exercises of the body, and Epaminondas with the cultivation of the mind. For which reason they employed their leisure, the one in the palæstra and the chase, and the other in conversation and the study of philosophy.

But what persons of sense and judgment must principally admire in them, and which is rarely found in their high rank, is the perfect union and friendship that always subsisted between them during the whole time they were employed together in the administration of the public affairs, whether in war or peace. If we examine the government of Aristides and Themistocles, that of Cimon and Pericles, of Nicias and Alcibiades, we shall find them full of trouble, dissention, and debate. The two friends we speak of held the first offices in the state; all great affairs passed through their hands; every thing was confided to their care and authority. In such delicate conjunctures what occasions of pique and jealousy generally arise! But neither difference of sentiment, diversity of interest, nor the least emotion of envy, ever altered their union and good understanding; the reason of which was, their being founded upon an unalterable principle, that is, upon virtue; which in all their actions, says Plutarch, occasioned their having neither glory nor riches, the fatal sources of strife and division in view, but solely the public good, and made them desire not the advancement or honour of their own families, but to render their country more powerful and flourishing. Such were the two illustrious men who are about to make their appearance, and to give a new face to

* Των πολλων, οι μιν ε χρησιμει τω πλετω δικη μικρολογικη, οι δε παραχρησται δι ασωφειαν.

† Cor. Nep. in Epam. c. iii.

† Plut. in Pelop. p. 279.

* Leontides, being apprised that the exiles had retired to Athens, where they had been well received by the people, and were in great esteem with all people of worth and honour, sent thither certain unknown persons to assassinate the most considerable of them. Only Androclides was killed, all the rest escaping the contrivances of Leontides.

At the same time the Athenians received letters from Sparta, to prohibit their receiving or assisting the exiles, and with orders to expel them their city, as they were declared common enemies by all the allies. The humanity and virtue peculiar and natural to the Athenians, made them reject so infamous a proposal with horror. They were transported with the occasion of expressing their gratitude to the Thebans for a previous obligation of the same nature; for the Thebans had contributed most to the re-establishment of the popular government at Athens, having declared in their favour by a public decree, contrary to the prohibition of Sparta; and it was from Thebes Thrasylulus set out to deliver Athens from the tyranny of the thirty.

Pelopidas, though at that time very young, went to all the exiles one after another, of whom Melon was the most considerable. He represented to them, "that it was unworthy of honest men to content themselves with having saved their own lives, and to look with indifference upon their country, enslaved and miserable: that whatever good will the people of Athens might express for them, it was not fit that they should suffer their fate to depend upon the decrees of a people, which their natural inconstancy, and the malignity of orators that turned them any way at will, might soon alter: that it was necessary to hazard every thing, after the example of Thrasylulus, and to set before them his intrepid valour and generous fortitude as a model: that as he set out from Thebes to suppress and destroy the tyrants of Athens, so they might go from Athens to restore Thebes its ancient liberty."

This discourse made all the impression upon the exiles that could be expected. They sent privately to inform their friends at Thebes of their resolution, who extremely approved their design. Charon, one of the principal persons of the city, offered to receive the conspirators into his house. Philidas found means to get himself made secretary to Archidas and Philip, who were then polemarchs, or supreme magistrates of the city. As for Epaminondas, he had for some time diligently endeavoured to inspire the younger Thebans by his discourse with a passionate desire to throw off the Spartan yoke. † He was ignorant of nothing that had been projected, but he believed that he ought not to have any share in it, because, as he said, he could not resolve to imbrue his hands in the blood of his country; foreseeing that his friends would not keep within the due bounds of the enterprise, however lawful in itself, and that the tyrants would not perish alone; and convinced besides, that a citizen, who should not appear to have taken either party, would have it in his power to influence the people with the better effect.

The day for the execution of the project being fixed, the exiles thought proper, that Pherenicus, with all the conspirators, should stop at Thria-

* A. M. 3626. Ant. J. C. 378. Xenoph. hist. Gr. l. v. p. 566—568. Plut. in Pelop. 280—284. Id. de Socrat. gen. p. 586—588, et 594—598. Diod. l. xv. p. 344—346. Cor. Nep. in Pelop. c. i—iv.

† Plut. de gen. Socrat. p. 594.

families of Thebes, all united by a strict and faithful friendship with each other, though competitors for glory and honour, offered themselves for this bold enterprise. Pelopidas was of this number. After having embraced their companions, and dispatched a messenger to Charon to give him notice of their coming, they set out dressed in mean habits, carrying hounds with them, and poles in their hands for pitching of nets, that such as they met on the way might have no suspicion of them, and take them only for hunters that had wandered after their game.

Their messenger being arrived at Thebes, and having informed Charon that they were set out, the approach of danger did not alter his sentiments; and as he wanted neither courage nor honour, he prepared his house for their reception.

One of the conspirators, who was no bad man, loved his country, and would have served the exiles with all his power, but had neither the resolution nor constancy necessary for such an enterprise, and could think of nothing but difficulties and obstacles that presented themselves in crowds to his imagination. Much disordered with the prospect of danger, this person retired into his house without saying any thing, and dispatched one of his friends to Melon and Pelopidas, to desire them to defer their enterprise, and return to Athens till a more favourable opportunity. Happily that friend, not finding his horse's bridle, and losing a great deal of time in quarrelling with his wife, was prevented from going.

Pelopidas and his companions, disguised like peasants, and having separated from each other, entered the city at different gates towards the close of the day. It was then early in the winter, the north wind blew, and the snow fell; which contributed to conceal them, every body keeping within doors upon account of the cold weather; besides which, it gave them an opportunity of covering their faces. Some who were in the secret received and conducted them to Charon's house, where of exiles and others their whole number amounted to 48.

Philidas, secretary to the *bœotarch, who was in the plot, had some time before invited Archias and his companions to supper, promising them an exquisite repast, and the company of some of the finest women in the city. The guests being met at the appointed time, they sat down to table. They had been free with the glass, and were almost drunk, when it was whispered about, but not known where the report began, that the exiles were in the city. Philidas, without showing any concern, did his utmost to change the discourse. Archias however, sent one of his officers to Charon, with orders to come to him immediately. It was now late, and Pelopidas and the conspirators were preparing to set out, and had put on their armour and swords, when on a sudden they heard a knocking at the door. Somebody went to it, and being told by the officer, that he was come from the magistrates with orders for Charon to attend them immediately, he ran to him half out of his wits to acquaint him with that terrible message. They all concluded that the conspiracy was discovered, and believed themselves lost before it would be possible to execute any thing worthy their cause and valour. However, they were all of opinion that Charon should obey the order, and present himself with an

* The magistrates and generals who were charged with the government of Thebes were called bœotarchs, that is to say, commanders or governours of Bœotia.

Charon was a man of intrepid courage in dangers which threatened only himself; but at that time, terrified for his friends, and apprehending also that he should be suspected of some treachery, if so many brave citizens, whom he had received into his house, should be destroyed, he went to his wife's apartment, and fetched his only son, of 15 years old at most, who in beauty and strength excelled all the youths of his age, and put him into the hands of Pelopidas, saying at the same time, "if you discover that I have betrayed you, and have been guilty of treachery upon this occasion, revenge yourselves on me in this my only son, whom, as dear as he is to me, I abandon to you, and let him fall a victim without mercy to his father's perfidy."

These expressions wounded them to the heart: but what gave them the most sensible pain, was his imagining there was any one amongst them so mean and ungrateful as to form to himself the least suspicion in regard to him. They conjured him unanimously not to leave his son with them, but to put him into some place of safety, that his friends and country might not want an avenger, if he should be so fortunate as to escape the tyrants. "No," replied the father, "he shall stay with you, and share your fate. If he must perish, what nobler end can he make, than with his father and best friends? For you, my son, exert yourself beyond your years, and show a courage worthy of you and me. You see here the most excellent of the Thebans. Make under such masters a noble essay of glory, and learn to fight; or, if it must be so, to die, like them, for liberty. For the rest, I am not without hopes; for I believe, that the justice of our cause will draw down the favour and protection of the gods upon us." He concluded with a prayer for them, and after embracing the conspirators went out.

He took pains on his way to recover himself, and to compose his looks and voice, that he might not appear under any concern. When he came to the door of the house where the feast was kept, Archias and Philidas came out to him, and asked the meaning of a report, that disaffected people were arrived in the city, and were concealed in some house. He seemed astonished; and finding by their answers to his questions that they had no precise information of any thing, he assumed a bolder tone, and said, "it is very likely the report you speak of is only a false alarm, intended to interrupt your mirth: however, as it ought not to be neglected, I will go immediately and make the strictest inquiry possible into it." Philidas praised his prudence and zeal; and carrying Archias back into the company, he plunged him again in the debauch, and continued the entertainment, by keeping the guests in continual expectation of the women he had promised them.

Charon, on his return home, found his friends all prepared, not to conquer or to save their lives, but to die gloriously, and to sell themselves as dear as they could. The serenity and joy of his look explained beforehand that they had nothing to fear. He repeated all that had passed; after which, they had no thoughts but of the instant execution of a design, to which the least delay might occasion a thousand obstacles.

In effect, at that very instant happened a second storm, far more violent than the first, and which seemed as if it could not possibly fail of making the enterprise miscarry. A courier from Athens arrived in great haste with a packet, which contained a circumstantial account of the whole conspiracy, as was afterwards discovered. That courier was

but pleasure and the bottle. In giving him his dispatches, he said, my "lord, the person who writes you these letters, conjures you to read them "immediately, being serious affairs." Archias replied, laughing, " * serious affairs to-morrow : " which words were afterwards used by the Greeks as a proverb : and taking the letters he put them † under his pillow, and continued the conversation and debauch.

The conspirators were at that time in the streets, divided into two parties ; the one, with Pelopidas at their head, marched against Leontides, who was not at the feast ; the other against Archias, under the command of Charon. These had put on women's habits over their armour, and crowned themselves with pine and poplar wreaths, which entirely covered their faces. When they came to the door of the apartment where the feast was kept, the guests made a great noise, and set up loud shouts of joy. But they were told that the women would not come in till the servants were all dismissed, which was done immediately. They were sent to neighbouring houses, where there was no want of wine for their entertainment. The conspirators by this stratagem, having made themselves masters of the field of battle, entered sword in hand, and showing themselves in their true colours, put all the guests to the sword, and with them the magistrates, who were full of wine, and in no condition to defend themselves. Pelopidas met with more resistance. Leontides, who was asleep in bed, awaked with the noise that was made, and rising immediately, armed himself with his sword, and laid some of the conspirators at his feet ; but was at last killed himself.

This grand affair being executed in this manner, with so much dispatch and success, couriers were immediately dispatched to Thriasium. The doors of the prisons were broke open, and 500 prisoners let out. The Thebans were called upon to resume the liberty, and arms were given to all they met. The spoils affixed to their porticoes were taken down, and the armourers' and cutlers' shops, broke open for that purpose. Epaminondas and Gorgidas came in arms to join them, with some old persons of great estimation, whom they had got together.

The whole city was in great terror and confusion ; the houses all illuminated with torches, and the streets thronged with the multitude passing to and fro. The people, in a consternation at what had happened, and for want of sufficient information, waited impatiently for the day to know their destiny. The Lacedæmonian captains were therefore thought guilty of a very great error in not falling upon them during their disorder ; for the garrison consisted of 1500 men, besides 3000 who had taken refuge in the citadel. Alarmed by the cries they heard, the illuminations they saw in the houses, and the tumult of the multitude running backwards and forwards, they lay still and contented themselves with guarding the citadel, after having sent couriers to Sparta with the news of what had happened, and to demand an immediate reinforcement.

The next day at sunrise the exiles arrived with their arms, and the people were summoned to assemble. Epaminondas and Gorgidas conducted Pelopidas thither, surrounded with all their sacrifices, carrying in their hands the sacred bandages and fillets, and exhorting the citizens to assist their country, and to join with their gods. At this sight the whole assembly rose up with loud acclamations and clapping of hands, and received

* Οὐκ ἔν τις αὐρίων, εἶη, τὰ σπυδαία.

† The Greeks ate lying on beds.

Soon after the exiles, arrived 5000 foot, and 500 horse, sent by the Athenians to Pelopidas, under the command of Demophoon. Those troops, with others which joined them from all the cities of Bœotia, composed an army of 12,000 foot, and as many horse: and without loss of time besieged the citadel, that it might be taken before relief could come from Sparta.

The besieged made a vigorous defence, in hopes of a speedy succour, and seemed resolved rather to die than surrender the place: at least the Lacedæmonians were of that opinion; but they were not the greatest number of the garrison. When provisions began to fall short, and famine to press them, the rest of the troops obliged the Spartans to surrender. The garrison had their lives granted them, and were permitted to retire whither they thought fit. They were scarce marched out, when the aid arrived. The Lacedæmonians found Cleombrotus at Megara, at the head of a powerful army, which, with a little more expedition, might have saved the citadel. But this was not the first time the natural slowness of the Lacedæmonians had occasioned the miscarriage of their enterprises. The three commanders who had capitulated were tried. Two of them were punished with death, and the third had so great a fine laid upon him, that, not being able to pay it, he banished himself from Peloponnesus.

Pelopidas had all the honour of this great exploit, the most memorable that ever was executed by surprise and stratagem. Plutarch, with reason, compares it to that of Thrasylulus. Both exiles, destitute in themselves of all resource, and reduced to implore a foreign support, form the bold design of attacking a formidable power with an handful of men, and overcoming all obstacles to their enterprise solely by their valour, had each of them the good fortune to deliver their country, and to change the face of its affairs entirely. For the Athenians were indebted to Thrasylulus for that sudden and happy change, which freeing them from the oppression they groaned under, not only restored their liberty, but with it their ancient splendour, and put them into a condition to humble, and make Sparta tremble in their turn. We shall see in like manner, that the war which reduced the pride of Sparta, and deprived it of the empire both by sea and land, was the work of this single night, in which Pelopidas, without taking either citadel or fortress, and entering only one of twelve into a private house, unloosed and broke the chains imposed by the Lacedæmonians on all the other states of Greece, though it appeared impracticable ever to produce such an effect.

SECTION III.

SPHODRIAS FORMS A DESIGN AGAINST THE PIRÆUS.

THE Lacedæmonians,* after the injury they pretended to have received by the enterprise of Pelopidas, did not continue quiet, but applied themselves in earnest to their revenge. Agesilaus, rightly judging an expedition of that kind, of which the end was to support tyrants, would not reflect much honour upon him, left it to Cleombrotus, who had lately succeeded king Agesipolis, under pretence that his great age dispensed with his undertaking it. Cleombrotus entered Bœotia with his army. The first

* A. M 8627. Ant. J. C. 377. Xenoph. l. v. p. 568—572. Plut. in Ages. p. 609, 610. Id. in Pelop. p. 264, 282.

troops to Sphodrias, who commanded at Thespiæ, returned to Sparta.

The Athenians, who did not think themselves in a condition to make head against the Lacedæmonians, and were afraid of the consequences in which their league with the Thebans was likely to engage them, repented their having entered into it, and renounced it. Those who persisted to adhere to the Theban party, were some imprisoned, some put to death, others banished, and the rich severely fined. The Theban affairs seemed almost desperate, not having any alliance to support them. Pelopidas and Gorgidas were then at the head of them, and were studious of finding means to embroil the Athenians with the Lacedæmonians; and this was the stratagem they contrived.

Sphodrias the Spartan, had been left at Thespiæ with a body of troops to receive and protect such of the Bœotians as should revolt against Thebes. He had acquired some reputation among the soldiery, and wanted neither courage nor ambition; but he was rash, superficial, full of himself, and consequently apt to entertain vain hopes. Pelopidas and Gorgidas sent privately a merchant of his own acquaintance to him with the offer, as from himself, of a considerable sum of money, and with insinuations more agreeable to him than money, as they flattered his vanity. "After having represented to him, that one of his merit and reputation ought to form some great enterprise to immortalize his name, he proposed to him the seizing of Piræus by surprise, when the Athenians had no expectation of such an attempt: he added, that nothing could be more grateful to the Lacedæmonians than to see themselves masters of Athens, and that the Thebans enraged at the Athenians, whom they considered as traitors and deserters would lend them no assistance."

Sphodrias, fond of acquiring a great name, and envying the glory of Phæbidas, who in his sense, had rendered himself renowned and illustrious by his unjust attempt upon Thebes, conceived it would be much more a shining and glorious exploit to seize the Piræus of his own accord, and deprive the Athenians of their great power at sea, by an unforeseen attack by land. He undertook the enterprise therefore with great joy; which was neither less unjust nor less horrid than that of the Cadmææ, but not executed with the same boldness and success. For having set out in the night from Thespiæ, with the view of surprising the Piræus before light, the day-break overtook him in the plain of Thriasium near Eleusis, and finding himself discovered, he returned shamefully to Thespiæ with some booty which he had taken.

The Athenians immediately sent ambassadors with their complaints to Sparta. These ambassadors found that the Lacedæmonians had not waited their arrival to accuse Sphodrias, but had already cited him before the council to answer for his conduct. He was afraid to obey that summons, having just reason to apprehend the issue of a trial, and the resentment of his country. He had a son, who had contracted a strict and tender friendship with the son of Agesilaus. The latter solicited his father so earnestly, or rather tormented him with such extreme importunity and perseverance, that he could not refuse Sphodrias his protection, and got him fully absolved. Agesilaus was little delicate, as we have seen already, in point of justice, when the service of his friends was in question. He was besides, of all mankind, the most tender and indulgent father to his children. It is reported of him, that when they were little, he would play with them, and divert himself with riding upon a stick amongst them:

exceedingly incensed the Athenians, and determined them to renew their alliance with Thebes immediately, and to assist them with all their power. They fitted out a fleet, and gave the command of it to Timotheus, son of the illustrious Conon, whose reputation he well sustained by his own valour and exploits. It was he whom his enemies, in envy of the glory he had acquired by his great actions, painted sleeping, with the goddess fortune at his feet, taking towns in nets for him: † but upon this occasion he proved that he was not asleep. After having ravaged the coast of Laconia, he attacked the isle of Corcyra, ‡ which he took. He treated the inhabitants with great humanity, and made no alteration in their liberty or laws, which very much inclined the neighbouring cities in favour of Athens. The Spartans on their side made powerful preparations for the war, and were principally intent upon retaking Corcyra. Its happy situation between Sicily and Greece rendered that island very important. They therefore engaged Dionysius the tyrant in the expedition, and demanded aid of him. In the mean time they dispatched their fleet under Mnasiippus. The Athenians sent 60 sail against them to the relief of Corcyra, under Timotheus at first; but soon after, upon his seeming to act too slowly, Iphicrates was substituted in his place. Mnasiippus having made himself odious to his troops by his haughtiness, rigour and avarice, was very ill obeyed by them, and lost his life in an engagement. Iphicrates did not arrive till after his death, when he received advice, that the Syracusan squadron of ten galleys approached, which he attacked so successfully, that not one of them escaped. He had demanded, that the orator Callistratus, and Chabrias, one of the most renowned captains of his time, should be joined in commission with him. Xenophon admires his wisdom and greatness of soul upon that account, in being satisfied with appearing to have occasion for counsel, and not apprehending to share the glories of his victories with others.

Agésilus had been prevailed upon to take upon him the command of the troops against Thebes. He entered Bœotia, where he did abundance of damage to the Thebans, not without considerable loss on his own side. The two armies came every day to blows, and were perpetually engaged, though not in formal battle, yet in skirmishes which served to instruct the Thebans in the trade of war, and to inspire them with valour, boldness and experience. It is reported that the Spartan Antalcides told Agésilus very justly upon this head, when he was brought back from Bœotia much wounded, "my lord Agésilus, you have a fine reward for the lessons you have given the Thebans in the art of war, which before you taught it them, they neither would nor could learn." It was to prevent this inconvenience, that Lycurgus, in one of the three laws which he calls *rhetæ*, forbade the Lacedæmonians to make war often upon the same enemy, lest they should make them too good soldiers by obliging them to the frequent defence of themselves.

Several campaigns passed in this manner without any thing decisive on either side. It was prudent in the Theban generals not to hazard a battle hitherto, and to give their soldiers time to inure and embolden themselves,

* Xenoph. l. v. p. 584—589. Plut. in Ages. p. 610, 611. Id. in Pelop. p. 225—228.

† Plut. in Syl. p. 454.

‡ Corfu.

they called them on, contented with their courage and alacrity. The principal glory of their success, and this wise conduct was due to Pelopidas.

The engagement at Tegyra, which was a kind of prelude to the battle of Leuctra, added much to his reputation. Having failed in his enterprize against Orchomenos, which had joined the Lacedæmonians, at his return he found the enemy posted to intercept him near Tegyra. As soon as the Thebans perceived them from the defiles, somebody ran in all haste to Pelopidas, and told him, "we are fallen into the enemy's hands." "Ah!" replied he, "why should we not rather say, that they 'are fallen into 'ours'?" At the same time he ordered his cavalry, which were his rear guard, to advance to the front, that they might begin the fight. He was assured that his foot, which were only 300, and were called the sacred battalion, would break through the enemy wherever they charged, though superior in number as they were by at least two thirds. The assault began where the generals of each party were posted, and was very rude. The two generals of the Lacedæmonians, who had charged Pelopidas, were presently killed; all that were with them being either slain or dispersed. The rest of the Lacedæmonian troops were so daunted, that they opened a passage for the Thebans, who might have marched on to save themselves if they had thought fit: but Pelopidas, disdainng to make use of that opening for his retreat, advanced against those who were still drawn up in battle, and made so great a slaughter of them, that they were all dismayed and fled in disorder. The Thebans did not pursue them far, lest they should be surprized. They contented themselves with having broken them, and with making a glorious retreat not inferior to a victory, because through the enemy dispersed and defeated.

This little encounter, for it can be called no more, was in a manner the source of the great actions and events we are about to treat of. It had never happened till then in any war, either against the barbarians or Greeks, that the Lacedæmonians had been defeated with the superiority of number on their side, nor even in equal forces in battle array. For which reason they were insupportably proud, and their reputation alone kept their enemies in awe, who never durst show themselves in the field before them, unless superior in number. They now lost that glory, and the Thebans in their turn became the terror and dread even of those who had rendered themselves so universally formidable.

The enterprize of Artaxerxes Mnemon against Egypt,* and the death of Evagoras king of Cyprus, should naturally come in here. But I shall defer those articles to avoid breaking in upon the Theban affairs.

SECTION IV.

NEW TROUBLES IN GREECE.—THE LACEDÆMONIANS DECLARE WAR AGAINST THEBES.

WHILST † the Persians were engaged in the Egyptian war, great troubles arose in Greece. In that interval the Thebans, having taken Plataea, ‡ and afterwards Thespiæ, entirely demolished those cities, and expelled the inhabitants. The Plataeans retired to Athens with their wives

* A. M. 3627. Ant. J. C. 377.

† A. M. 3633. Ant. J. C. 371. Diod. l. 5. p. 567, 562.

‡ Plataea, a city of Bœotia. Thespiæ of Achaia.

Artaxerxes being informed of the state of the Grecian affairs, sent a new embassy thither to persuade the several cities and republics at war to lay down their arms, and accommodate their differences upon the plan of the treaty of Antalcides. By that peace, as has been observed in its place, it was concluded, that all the cities of Greece should enjoy their liberty, and be governed by their own laws. In virtue of this article, the Lacedæmonians pressed the Thebans to restore their liberty to all the cities of Bœotia, to rebuild Platæa and Thespiæ which they had demolished, and to restore them with their dependances to their ancient inhabitants. The Thebans on their side insisted also, that the Lacedæmonians should give liberty to all those of Laconia, and that the city of Messene should be restored to its ancient possessors. This was what equity required; but the Lacedæmonians, believing themselves much superior to the Thebans, were for imposing a law upon them which they would not submit to themselves.

All Greece being weary of a war, which had already lasted several campaigns, and had no other end than the aggrandizing of that state, was seriously intent upon a general peace, and, with that view, had sent deputies to Lacedæmon, to concert together the means of attaining so desirable an effect. † Among those deputies Epaminondas was of the first rank. He was at that time celebrated for his great erudition and profound knowledge in philosophy; but he had not yet given any very distinguished proofs of his great capacity for the command of armies, and the administration of public affairs. Seeing that all the deputies, out of respect for Agesilaus, who declared openly for the war, were afraid to contradict him or to differ from his opinion in any thing, a very common effect of too imperious a power on one side, and too servile a submission on the other; he was the only one that spoke with a wise and noble boldness, as became a statesman who had no other view but the public good. He made a speech, not for the Thebans alone, but for Greece in general; in which he proved, that the war augmented only the power of Sparta, whilst the rest of Greece was reduced and ruined by it. He insisted principally upon the necessity of establishing the peace in equality and justice, because no peace could be solid and of long duration but that wherein all parties should find an equal advantage.

A discourse like this, founded evidently upon reason and justice, and pronounced with a grave and serious tone, never fails of making impression. Agesilaus plainly distinguished from the attention and silence with which it was heard, that the deputies were extremely affected with it, and would not fail to act conformably to his opinion. To prevent that effect, he demanded of Epaminondas, “whether he thought it just and reasonable that Bœotia should be free and independent?” That is to say, whether he agreed that the cities of Bœotia should depend no longer upon Thebes. Epaminondas immediately asked in his turn with great vivacity, “whether he thought it just and reasonable, that Laconia should enjoy the same independence and liberty?” Upon which Agesilaus rising from his seat in great rage, insisted upon his declaring plainly, “whether he would consent that Bœotia should be free?” Epaminondas retorted this question again, and asked, “whether on his side, he would consent that Laconia

* Xenoph. Hist. Græc. l. vi. p. 590—595. Dion. p. 865, 866.

† Plut. in Ages. p. 611.

they were about to conclude. The rest of the allies signed it, less out of inclination, than not to offend the Lacedæmonians, whose power they dreaded.

* In consequence of this treaty, all the troops in the field were to be disbanded. Cleobrotus, one of the kings of Sparta, was then at Phocis, at the head of the army. He wrote to the ephori to know the republic's resolutions. Prothous, one of the principal senators, represented, that there was no room for deliberations, for that Sparta, by the late agreement, had made the recal of the troops indispensable; Agesilaus was of a very different opinion. Angry with the Thebans, and particularly with Epaminondas, he was absolutely bent on the war for an opportunity of revenge; and the present seemed most favourable, when all Greece was free and united, and only the Thebans excluded the treaty of peace. The advice of Prothous was therefore rejected by the whole council, who treated him as an honest well meaning dotard, that knew nothing of the matter; the Divinity, from thenceforth, as Xenophon observes, promoting their downfall. The ephori wrote immediately to Cleombrotus, to march against the Thebans with his troops, and sent orders at the same time to all their allies to assemble their forces, who were averse to this war, and did not join in it but with great reluctance, and out of fear of contradicting the Lacedæmonians, whom they did not yet dare to disobey. Though no happy consequences could be expected from a war, visibly undertaken contrary to all reason and justice, and from the sole motive of resentment and revenge: the Lacedæmonians, however, from the superiority of their numbers, assured themselves of success, and imagined that the Thebans, abandoned by their allies, were in no condition to oppose them.

† The Thebans were much alarmed at first. They saw themselves alone, without allies to support, whilst all Greece looked upon them as utterly lost; not knowing that in a single man they had more than armies. This was Epaminondas. He was appointed general, and had several colleagues joined in commission with him. He immediately raised all the troops he could, and began his march. His army did not amount to 6000 men, and the enemy had above four times that number. As several bad omens were told him to prevent his setting out, he replied only by a verse of Homer, of which the sense is, † "there is but one good omen to fight for one's country." However, to reassure the soldiers, by nature superstitious, and whom he observed to be discouraged, he instructed several persons to come from different places, and report auguries and omens in his favour, which revived the spirit and hopes of the troops.

Pelopidas was not then in office, but commanded the sacred battalion. When he left his house to go to the army, his wife, in taking her last adieu, conjured him with a flood of tears to take care of himself: "That," said he, "should be recommended to young people; but for generals, they have no occasion for such advice; the care of others should be recommended to them."

Epaminondas had wisely taken care to secure a pass, by which Cleombrotus might have shortened his march considerably. The latter after

* Xenoph. l. vi. p. 593—597. Diod. l. xv. p. 365—371. Plut. in Ages. p. 611, 612. Id. in Pelop. p. 238, 239.

† A. M. 3634 Ant. J. C. 370.

‡ *Εἰς οἶκον ἀριστος, ἀλλοτρίων περὶ πατρὸς.* Iliad. xi. v. 423.

give battle; which Cleombrotus resolved by the advice of all his officers, who represented to him, that if he declined fighting with such a superiority of troops, it would confirm the current report, that he secretly favoured the Thebans. The latter had an essential reason for hastening a battle before the arrival of the troops, which the enemy daily expected. However, the six generals, who formed the council of war, differed in their sentiments. The seventh, who was Epaminondas, came in very good time to join the three that were for fighting, and his opinion carrying the question, the battle was resolved upon. This was in the second year of the 102d Olympiad.

The two armies were very unequal in number. That of the Lacedæmonians, as has been said, consisted of 24,000 foot, and 1600 horse. The Thebans had only 6000 foot and 400 horse; but all of them choice troops, animated by their experience of the war, and determined to conquer or die. The Lacedæmonian cavalry, composed of men picked up by chance, without valour, and ill disciplined, was as much inferior to their enemies in courage, as superior in number. The infantry could not be depended on, except the Lacedæmonians; the allies, as has been said, having engaged in the war with reluctance, because they did not approve the motive of it, and were besides dissatisfied with the Lacedæmonians.

The ability of the generals on either side supplied the place of numerous armies, especially of the Theban, who was the most accomplished captain of his time. He was supported by Pelopidas at the head of the sacred battalion, composed of 300 Thebans, united in a strict friendship and affection, and engaged under a particular oath never to fly, but to defend each other to the last drop of their blood.

Upon the day of battle the two armies drew up on a plain, Cleombrotus was upon the right, consisting of Lacedæmonians, on whom he confided most, and whose files were twelve deep. To take the advantage which his superiority of horse gave him in an open country, he posted them in the front of his Lacedæmonians. Archidamus, Agesilaus' son, was at the head of the allies, who formed the left wing.

Epaminondas, who resolved to charge with his left, which he commanded in person, strengthened it with the choice of his heavy armed troops, whom he drew up 50 deep. The sacred battalion was upon his left, and closed the wing. The rest of his infantry were posted upon his right in an oblique line, which, the farther it extended, was the more distant from the enemy. By this uncommon disposition, his design was to cover his flank on the right, to keep off his right wing as a kind of reserved body, that he might not hazard the event of the battle upon the weakest part of his army; and to begin the action with his left wing, where his best troops were posted, to turn the whole weight of the battle upon king Cleombrotus, and the Spartans. He was assured, that if he could penetrate the Lacedæmonian phalanx, the rest of the army would soon be put to the route. As for his horse, he disposed them after the enemy's example in the front of his left.

The action began by the cavalry. As that of the Thebans were better mounted, and braver troops than the Lacedæmonian horse, the latter were not long before they were broke, and driven upon the infantry, which they put into some confusion. Epaminondas following his horse close, marched swiftly up to Cleombrotus, and fell upon his phalanx with all the weight of his heavy battalion. The latter, to make a diversion,

with incredible speed and boldness at the head of the sacred battalion to prevent the enemy's design, and flanked Cleombrotus himself, who, by that sudden and unexpected attack, was put into disorder. The battle was very rude and obstinate, and whilst Cleombrotus could act, the victory continued in suspense, and declared for neither party. When he fell dead with his wounds, the Thebans, to complete the victory, and the Lacedæmonians, to avoid the shame of abandoning the body of their king, redoubled their efforts, and a great slaughter ensued on both sides. The Spartans fought with so much fury about the body, that at length they gained their point and carried it off. Animated by so glorious an advantage, they prepared to return to the charge, which would perhaps have proved successful, had the allies seconded their ardour. But the left wing, seeing the Lacedæmonian phalanx had been broke, and believing all lost, especially when they heard that the king was dead, took to flight, and drew off the rest of the army along with them. Epaminondas followed them vigorously, and killed a great number in the pursuit. The Thebans remained masters of the field of battle, erected a trophy, and permitted the enemy to bury their dead.

The Lacedæmonians had never received such a blow. The most bloody defeats till then had scarce ever cost them more than 400 or 500 of their citizens. They had been seen, however animated, or rather violently incensed, against Athens, to ransom, by a truce of 50 years, about 800 of their citizens, who had suffered themselves to be shut up in the little island of Sphacteria. Here they lost 4000 men, of whom 1000 were Lacedæmonians, and 400 Spartans, * out of 700 who were in the battle. The Thebans had only 300 men killed, among whom were few of their citizens.

The city of Sparta celebrated at that time the gymnastic games, and was full of strangers, whom curiosity had brought thither. When the couriers arrived from Leuctra with the terrible news of their defeat, the ephori, though perfectly sensible of all the consequences, and that the Spartan empire had received a mortal wound, would not permit the representations of the theatre to be suspended, nor any changes in the celebration of the festival. They sent to every family the names of their relations who were killed, and staid in the theatre to see that the dances and games were continued without interruption to the end.

The next day in the morning the loss of each family being known, the fathers and relations of those who had died in the battle, met in the public place, and saluted and embraced each other with great joy and serenity in their looks; whilst the others kept themselves close in their houses, or if necessity obliged them to go abroad, it was with a sadness and dejection of aspect, which sensibly expressed their profound anguish and affliction. That difference was still more remarkable in the women. Grief, silence, tears, distinguished those who expected the return of their sons; but such as had lost their sons were seen hurrying to the temples to thank the gods, and congratulating each other upon their glory and good fortune. It cannot be denied, but such sentiments argue great courage and resolution; but I would not have them entirely extinguish natural tenderness, and should have been better pleased, had there been less ferocity in them.

* Those were properly called Spartans who inhabited Sparta; the Lacedæmonians were settled in the country.

most powerful families in the city, it was not safe to inflict upon them the punishments assigned by the laws, lest their despair should induce them to take some violent resolution fatal to the state: for such as fled were not only excluded from all offices and employments, but it was a disgrace to contract any alliance with them by marriage. Any body that met them in the streets might buffet them, which they were obliged to suffer. They were besides to wear dirty and ragged habits, full of patches of different colours. And lastly, they were to shave half their beards, and to let the other half grow. It was a great loss to the Spartans to be deprived of so many of their soldiery, at the time they had such pressing occasion for them. To remove this difficulty, they chose Agesilaus legislator, with absolute power to make such alterations in the laws as he should think fit. Agesilaus, without adding, retrenching, or changing any thing, found means to save the fugitives without prejudice to the state. In a full assembly of the Lacedæmonians, he decreed, "that for the present day, the laws should be suspended, and of no effect; but ever after to remain in full force and authority." By those few words he preserved the Spartan laws entire, and at the same time restored to the state a great number of its members, in preventing their being for ever degraded, and consequently useless to the republic.

* After the battle of Leuctra the two parties were industriously employed, the one in retrieving, and the other in improving their victory.

† Agesilaus, to revive the courage of his troops, marched them into Arcadia; but with a full resolution carefully to avoid a battle. He confined himself to attacking some small towns of the Mantineans, which he took, and laid the country waste. This gave Sparta some joy, and they began to take courage from believing their condition not entirely desperate.

The Thebans, soon after this victory, sent an account of it to Athens, and to demand aid at the same time against the common enemy. The senate was then sitting, which received the courier with great coldness, did not make him the usual presents, and dismissed him without taking any notice of aid. The Athenians, alarmed at the considerable advantage which the Thebans had gained over the Lacedæmonians, could not dissemble the umbrage and dissatisfaction which so sudden and unexpected an increase of a neighbouring power gave them, which might soon render itself formidable to all Greece.

At Thebes, Epaminondas and Pelopidas had been elected joint governors of Bœotia. Having assembled all the troops of the Bœotians and their allies, whose number daily increased, they entered Peloponnesus, and made abundance of places and people revolt from the Lacedæmonians; Elis, Argos, Arcadia, and the greatest part of Laconia itself. It was then about the winter solstice, and towards the end of the last month of the year, so that in a few days they were to quit their offices; the first day of the next month being assigned by law for their resigning them to the persons appointed to succeed them, upon pain of death if they held them beyond that term. Their colleagues, apprehending the badness of the season, and more, the dreadful consequences of infringing that law, were for marching back the army immediately to Thebes. Pelopidas was

* Xenoph. l. vi. p. 598. Diod. l. xv. p. 375—378.

† Plut. in Agesil. p. 613—615. Id. in Pelop. p. 290.

and to pursue their enterprise in neglect of a formality, from the observance of which they might justly believe themselves dispensed by the state itself, as the service of the state, when founded in justice, is the sovereign law and rule of the people's obedience.

They entered Laconia therefore at the head of an army of 70,000 good soldiers, of which the twelfth part were not Thebans. The great reputation of the two generals was the cause that all the allies, even without order or public decree, obeyed them with respectful silence, and marched with entire confidence and courage under their command. It was 800 years since the Dorians had established themselves at Lacedæmon, and in all that time they had never seen an enemy upon their lands; none daring till then to set foot in them, and much less to attack their city, though without walls. The Thebans and their allies, finding a country hitherto untouched by an enemy, ran through it with fire and sword, destroying and plundering as far as the river Eurotas, without any opposition whatsoever.

Parties had been posted to defend some important passes. Ischolas the Spartan, who commanded one of these detachments, distinguished himself in a peculiar manner. Finding it impossible, with his small body of troops, to support the enemy's attack, and thinking it below a Spartan to abandon his post, he sent back the young men who were of age and condition to serve their country effectually, and kept none with him but such as were advanced in years. With these devoting himself, after the example of Leonidas, to the public good, they sold their lives dear; and after having defended themselves a long time, and made a great slaughter of their enemies, they all perished to a man.

Agesilaus acted upon this occasion with great address and wisdom. He looked upon this irruption of the enemy as an impetuous torrent, which it was not only in vain, but dangerous to oppose, whose rapid course would be but of short duration, and after some ravages subside of itself. He contented himself with distributing his best troops into the middle, and all the most important parts of the city, strongly securing all the posts. He was determined not to quit the town, nor to hazard a battle, and persisted in that resolution, without regard to all the raillery, insults, and menaces of the Thebans, who defied him by name, and called upon him to come out and defend his country, who had alone been the cause of all its sufferings, in kindling the war.

But far greater afflictions to Agesilaus were the commotions and disorders excited within the city, the murmurs and complaints of the old men in the highest affliction and despair from being witnesses of what they saw, as well as of the women, who seemed quite distracted with hearing the threatening cries of the enemy, and seeing the neighbouring country all on fire, whilst the flames and smoke, which drove almost upon them, seemed to denounce a like misfortune to themselves. Whatever courage Agesilaus might express in his outward behaviour, he could not fail of being sensibly affected with so mournful an object, to which was added, the grief of losing his reputation; who, having found the city in a most flourishing and potent condition, when he came to the government, now saw it fallen to such a degree, and all its ancient glory lost under him! He was, besides, secretly mortified at so mournful a contradiction of a boast he had often made, "that no woman of Sparta had ever seen the smoke of an enemy's camp."

as if he had been entirely unacquainted with their bad design, he said to them, "comrades, it is not there I sent you." At the same time, he pointed to different posts to divide them; to which they went, believing their enterprise had not been discovered. This order, which he gave without emotion argues a great presence of mind in Agesilaus, and shows, that in times of trouble it is not proper to see too much, that the culpable may not want time to reflect and repent. He thought it more advisable to suppose that small troop innocent, than to urge them to a declared revolt by a too rigorous inquiry.

The Eurotas was at that time very much swoln by the melting of the snows, and the Thebans found more difficulty in passing it than they expected, as well from the extreme coldness of the water as its rapidity. As Epaminondas passed at the head of his infantry, some of the Spartans showed him to Agesilaus; who, after having attentively considered and followed him with his eyes a long time, said only, "wonderful man!"* in admiration of the valour that could undertake such great things. Epaminondas would have been glad to have given battle in Sparta, and to have erected a trophy in the midst of it. He did not however think proper to attempt the forcing of the city, and not being able to induce Agesilaus to quit it, chose to retire. It would have been difficult for Sparta, without aid, and unfortified, to have defended itself long against a victorious army. But the wise captain who commanded it apprehended that he should draw upon his hands the whole force of Peloponnesus, and still more, that he should excite the jealousy of the Greeks, who would never have pardoned his destroying so potent a republic, and "pulling out," as Leptianus says, "one of the eyes of Greece," as a proof of his skill.† He confined himself therefore to the glory of having humbled the proud, whose laconic language added new haughtiness to their commands, and of having reduced them to the necessity, as he boasted himself, of enlarging their style, and lengthening their monosyllables.‡ At his return he again wasted the country.

|| In this expedition the Thebans reinstated Arcadia into one body, and took Messenia from the Spartans, who had been in possession of it § very long after having expelled all its inhabitants. It was a country equal in extent to Laconia, and as fertile as the best in Greece. Its ancient inhabitants, who were dispersed in different regions of Greece, Italy, and Sicily, on the first notice given them, returned with incredible joy; animated by the love of their country, natural to all men, and almost as much by their hatred of the Spartans, which the length of time had only increased. They built themselves a city, which, from the ancient name was called Messene. Amongst the bad events of this war, none gave the Lacedæmonians more sensible displeasure, or rather more lively grief; because

* Ω τῆ μεγαλοπραγμωνος ανθρωπι. The Greek expression is not easy to be translated; it signifies, "Oh the actor of great deeds!"

† Arist. Rhet. l. iii. c. 10.

‡ The Lacedæmonians sometimes answered the most important dispatches by a single monosyllable. Philip having wrote to them, "if I enter your country I shall put all to fire and sword;" they replied, "if;" to signify they should take all possible care to put it out of his power.

|| Paus. l. iv. p. 267, 268.

§ The Messenians had been driven out of their country 287 years.

Sparta and Messene, which seemed incapable of being extinguished but by the final ruin of the one or the other.

* Polybius reflects upon an ancient error in the conduct of the Messenians with regard to Sparta, which was the cause of all their misfortunes. This was their too great solicitude for the present tranquility, and through an excessive love of peace, their neglecting the means of making it sure and lasting. Two of the most powerful states of Greece were their neighbours, the Arcadians and Lacedæmonians. The latter, from their first settlement in the country, had declared open war against them; the others, on the contrary, always joined with them, and entered into all their interests. But the Messenians had neither the courage to oppose their violent and irreconcilable enemies with valour and constancy, nor the prudence to treat with due regard their faithful and affectionate allies. When the two states were either at war with each other, or carried their arms elsewhere, the Messenians, little provident for the future, and regarding only their present repose, made it a rule with them never to engage in the quarrel on either side, and to observe an exact neutrality. On such conjunctures they congratulated themselves upon their wisdom and success in preserving their tranquility, whilst their neighbours all around them were involved in trouble and confusion. But this tranquility was of no long duration. The Lacedæmonians, having subdued their enemies, fell upon them with all their forces; and finding them unsupported by allies, and incapable of defending themselves, they reduced them to submit either to the yoke of a rigid slavery, or to banish themselves from their country. And this was several times their case. They ought to have reflected, says Polybius, that as there is nothing more desirable or advantageous than peace, when founded in justice and honour; so there is nothing more shameful, and at the same time more pernicious, when attained by bad measures, and purchased at the price of liberty.

SECTION V.

THE TWO THEBAN GENERALS, AT THEIR RETURN, ARE ACCUSED AND ABSOLVED.—SPARTA IMPLORES AID OF ATHENS.

IT might be expected, that the two Theban captains, on their return to their country after such memorable actions, should have been received with the general applause, and all the honours that could be conferred upon them. Instead of which they were both summoned to answer as criminals against the state; in having, contrary to the law, whereby they were obliged to resign their command to new officers, retained it four months beyond the appointed term; during which they had executed in Messenia, Arcadia, and Laconia, all those great things we have related.

A behaviour of this kind is surprising, and the relation of it cannot be read without a secret indignation: but such a conduct had a very plausible foundation. The zealous assertors of a liberty lately regained were apprehensive that the example might prove very pernicious, in authorizing some future magistrate to maintain himself in command beyond the established term, and in consequence to turn his arms against his country. It is not to be doubted but the Romans would have acted in the same manner; and if they were so severe, to put an officer to death, though victo-

* Polyb. l. iv. p. 299, 800.

behaved to a general who should have commanded our men, and upon his own authority ?

* Pelopidas was the first cited before the tribunal. He defended himself with less force and greatness of mind than was expected from a man of his character, by nature warm and fiery. That valour, haughty and intrepid in fight, forsook him before the judges. His air and discourse, which had something timid and creeping in it, denoted a man who was afraid of death, and did not in the least incline the judges in his favour, who acquitted him not without difficulty. Epaminondas appeared, and spoke with a quite different air and tone. He seemed, if I may be allowed the expression, to charge danger in front without emotion. Instead of justifying himself, he made a panegyric upon his actions, and repeated in a lofty style in what manner he had ravaged Laconia, re-established Messenia, and reunited Arcadia into one body. He concluded with saying, that he should die with pleasure, if the Thebans would renounce the sole glory of those actions to him, and declare that he had done them by his own authority, and without their participation. All the voices were in his favour; and he returned from his trial, as he used to return from battle, with glory and universal applause. Such dignity has true valour, that in a manner seizes the admiration of mankind by force.

He was by nature designed for great actions, and every thing he did had an air of grandeur in it. † His enemies, jealous of his glory, and with design to affront him, got him elected telearch; an office very unworthy of a person of his merit. He however thought it no dishonour to him, and said, that he would demonstrate, that ‡ “the office did not show the man, but the man the office.” He accordingly raised that employment to very great dignity, which before consisted in only taking care that the streets were kept clean, the dirt carried away, and the drains and common sewers in good order.

|| The Lacedæmonians, having every thing to fear from an enemy, whom the late successes had rendered still more haughty and enterprising than ever, and seeing themselves exposed every moment to a new irruption, had recourse to the Athenians, and sent deputies to them to implore their aid. The person who spoke, began with describing in the most pathetic terms the deplorable condition and extreme danger to which Sparta was reduced. He enlarged upon the insolent haughtiness of the Thebans, and their ambitious views, which tended to nothing less than the empire of all Greece. He insinuated what Athens in particular had to fear, if they were suffered to extend their power by the increase of allies, who every day went over to their party, and augmented their forces. He called to mind the happy times, in which the strict union betwixt Athens and Sparta had preserved Greece to the equal glory of both states; and concluded with saying, how great an addition it would be to the Athenian name, to aid a city, its ancient friend and ally, which more than once had generously sacrificed itself for the common interest and safety.

The Athenians could not deny all that the deputy advanced in his discourse, but at the same time they had not forgot the bad treatment which

* Plut. de sui laude, p. 540.

† Plut. de præcept. reip. ger. p. 811.

‡ Ου μόνον αρχη ανδρα δεικνυσιν, αλλα και αρχη ανθρ.

|| Xenoph. l. vi. p. 609—615.

present misfortunes of Sparta carried it against the sense of the former injuries, and determined them to assist the Lacedæmonians with all their forces. * Some time after, the deputies of several states being assembled at Athens, a league and confederacy was concluded against the Thebans, conformably to the late treaty of Antalcides, and the intention of the king of Persia, who continually made instances for its execution.

† A slight advantage gained by the Spartans over their enemies, raised them from the dejection of spirit, in which they had hitherto remained, as it generally happens, when in a mortal distemper the least glimpse of a recovery enlivens hope and recalls joy. Archidamus, son of Ageilaus, having received aid from Dionysius the younger, tyrant of Sicily, put himself at the head of his troops, and defeated the Arcadians in a battle called, "the battle without tears," because he did not lose a man, and killed a great number of the enemy. The Spartans before had been so much accustomed to conquer, that they became insensible to the pleasure of victory: but when the news of this battle arrived, and they saw Archidamus return victorious, they could not contain their joy, nor keep within the city. His father was the first that went out to meet him, weeping with joy and tenderness. He was followed by the great officers and magistrates. The crowd of old men and women came down as far as the river, lifting up their hands to heaven, and returning thanks to the gods, as if this action had obliterated the shame of Sparta, and they began to see those happy days again, in which the Spartan glory and reputation had risen so high,

‡ Philiscus, who had been sent by the king of Persia to reconcile the Grecian states, was arrived at Delphos, whither he summoned their deputies to repair. The god was not at all consulted in the affair discussed in that assembly. The Spartans demanded, that Messene and its inhabitants should return to their obedience to them. Upon the Theban's refusal to comply with that demand, the assembly broke up, and Philiscus retired, after having left considerable sums of money with the Lacedæmonians for levying of troops and carrying on the war. Sparta, reduced and humbled by its losses, was no longer the object of the Persians' fear or jealousy; but Thebes, victorious and triumphant, gave them just cause of inquietude.

§ To form a league against Thebes with greater certainty, the allies had sent deputies to the great king. The Thebans on their side deputed Pelopidas; an extremely wise choice, from the great reputation of the ambassador, which is no indifferent circumstance in respect to the success of a negociation. The battle of Leuctra had spread its fame into the remotest provinces of Asia. When he arrived at the court, and appeared amongst the princes and nobility, they cried out in admiration of him, "this is he who deprived the Lacedæmonians of their empire by sea and land, and reduced Sparta to confine itself between the Eurotas and Taygetus, that not long since, under its king Ageilaus, threatened no less than to invade us in Susa and Ecbatana."

Artaxerxes, extremely pleased with his arrival, paid him extraordinary

* Xenoph. l. vii. p. 615—616.

† Plut. in Agesil. p. 614, 615. Xenoph. l. vii. p. 619, 620.

‡ Diod. l. xv. p. 583.

§ Xenoph. p. 619. Diod. p. 381.

§ Xenoph. l. vii. p. 620—622 Plut. in Pelop. p. 294.

vanity and self love, and to insinuate to his subjects, that the greatest and most illustrious persons made their court to him, and paid homage to his power and good fortune. But after having admitted him to audience, and heard his discourse, in his opinion more nervous than that of the Athenian ambassadors and more simple than that of the Lacedæmonians, which was saying a great deal, he esteemed him more than ever; and as it is * common with kings, who are but little accustomed to constraint, he did not dissemble his extreme regard for him, and his preference of him to all the rest of the Grecian deputies.

Pelopidas, as an able politician, had apprised the king how important it was to the interest of his crown to protect an infant power, which had never borne arms against the Persians, and which, in forming a kind of balance between Sparta and Athens, might be able to make an useful diversion against those republics, the perpetual and irreconcilable enemies of Persia, that had lately cost it so many losses and inquietudes. Timagoras, the Athenian, was the best received after him; because being passionately desirous of humbling Sparta, and at the same time of pleasing the king, he did not appear averse to the views of Pelopidas.

The king having pressed Pelopidas to explain what favours he had to ask of him, he demanded, "that Messene should continue free and exempt from the yoke of Sparta; that the Athenian galleys, which had sailed to infest the coast of Bœotia should be recalled, or that war should be declared against Athens; that those who would not come in to the league, or march against such as should oppose it, should be attacked first." All which was decreed, and the Thebans declared friends and allies of the king. Leon, Timagoras' colleague, said, loud enough to be heard by Artaxerxes, "Athens has nothing now to do but to find some other ally."

Pelopidas, having obtained all he desired left the court, without accepting any more of the king's many presents than what was necessary to carry home as a token of his favour and good will; and this aggravated the complaints which were made against the other Grecian ambassadors, who were not so reserved and delicate in point of interest. One of those from the Arcadians said on his return home, that he had seen many slaves at the king's court, but no men. He added, that all his magnificence was no more than vain ostentation, and that the so much boasted † plantain of gold, which was valued at so high a price, had not shade enough under it for a grasshopper.

Of all the deputies, Timagoras had received the most presents. He did not only accept of gold and silver, but of a magnificent bed, and slaves to make it, the Greeks not seeming to him expert enough in that office: which shows that sloth and luxury were little in fashion at Athens. He received also 24 cows, with slaves to take care of them, as having occasion to drink milk for some indisposition. Lastly, at his departure, he was carried in a chair to the sea-side at the king's expence, who gave four talents † for that service. His colleague Leon, on their arrival at Athens, accused him of not having communicated any thing to him, and of having joined with Pelopidas in every thing. He was brought to trial in consequence, and condemned to suffer death.

* Παιδες βασιλικων παιδων.

† It was a tree of gold, of exquisite workmanship and great value, which people went to see out of curiosity. † 4000 crowns.

been at the Persian court, and had also received presents, having said in a full assembly, that he was of opinion a decree ought to pass, by which, instead of the nine archons annually elected, nine ambassadors should be chosen out of the poorest of the people to be sent to the king, in order to their being enriched by the voyage, the assembly only laughed, and made jest of it. But what offended them more, was the Thebans having obtained all they demanded: in which, says Plutarch, they did not duly consider the great reputation of Pelopidas, nor comprehend how much stronger and more efficacious that was in persuading, than all the harangues and the rhetorical flourishes of the other ambassadors; especially with a prince accustomed to caress and comply with the strongest, as the Thebans undoubtedly were at that time, and who besides was not sorry to humble Sparta and Athens, the ancient and mortal enemies of his throne.

The esteem and regard of the Thebans for Pelopidas were not a little augmented by the good success of this embassy, which had procured the freedom of Greece, and the re-establishment of Messene: and he was extremely applauded for his conduct at his return.

But Thessalia was the theatre where the valour of Pelopidas made the greatest figure, in the expedition of the Thebans against Alexander, tyrant of Pheræ. I shall relate it entire, and unite in one point of view all which relates to that great event, without any other interruption than the journey of Pelopidas into Macedonia, to appease the troubles of that court.

SECTION VI.

PELOPIDAS MARCHES AGAINST ALEXANDER, TYRANT OF PHERÆ—IS KILLED IN A BATTLE.—TRAGICAL END OF ALEXANDER.

THE reduced condition of Sparta and Athens,* which for many years had lorded it over all Greece, either in conjunction or separately, had inspired some of their neighbours with the desire of supplanting those cities, and given birth to the hope of succeeding them in the pre-eminence. A power had risen up in Thessaly, which began to grow formidable. Jason, tyrant of Pheræ, had been declared generalissimo of the Thessalians by the consent of the people of that province; and it was to his merit, universally known, he owed that dignity. He was at the head of an army of above 8000 horse, and 20,000 heavy armed foot, without reckoning the light armed soldiers, and might have undertaken any thing with such a body of disciplined and intrepid troops, who had an entire confidence in the valour and conduct of their general. But death prevented his designs. He was assassinated by persons who had conspired his destruction.

His two brothers, Polydorus and Polyphron, were substituted in his place; the latter of whom killed the other for the sake of reigning alone, and was soon after killed himself by Alexander of Pheræ,† who seized the tyranny under the pretence of revenging the death of Polydorus his father. Against him Pelopidas was sent.

As the tyrant made open war against several people of Thessaly, and was secretly intriguing to subject them all, the citizens sent ambassadors to Thebes to demand troops and a general. Epaminondas being employ-

* A. M. 3634. Ant. J. C. 370. Xenoph. l. vi. p. 579—583, et 598—601. Diod. l. xv. p. 371—373.

† A. M. 3655. Ant. J. C. 369.

Paris, and obliged Alexander to make his submission to him. He there endeavoured by mild usage and friendship, to change his disposition, and from a tyrant, to make him become a just and humane prince; but finding him incorrigible, and of unexampled brutality, and hearing new complaints every day of his cruelty, debauched life, and insatiable avarice, he began to treat him with warm reproofs and menaces. The tyrant alarmed at such usage, withdrew secretly with his guard; and Pelopidas leaving the Thessalians in security from any attempts of his, and in good understanding with each other, set out for Macedonia, where his presence had been desired.

Amyntas II. was lately dead, and had left issue three legitimate children, Alexander, Perdiccas, and Philip, and one natural son called Ptolemy. Alexander reigned but one year, and was succeeded by Perdiccas,* with whom his brother Ptolemy disputed the crown. The two brothers invited Pelopidas either to be the arbitrator and judge of their quarrel, or to espouse the side on which he should see most right.

Pelopidas was no sooner arrived, than he put an end to all disputes, and recalled those who had been banished by either party. Having taken Philip, the brother of Perdiccas, and 30 other children of the noblest families of Macedonia, for hostages, he carried them to Thebes to show the Greeks how far the authority of the Thebans extended, from the reputation of their arms, and an entire confidence in their justice and fidelity. It was this Philip who was father of Alexander the Great, and afterwards made war against the Greeks to subject them to his power.

The troubles and factions arose again in Macedonia some years after, occasioned by the death of Perdiccas, who was killed in a battle. The friends of the deceased called in Pelopidas. Being desirous to arrive before Ptolemy had time to execute his projects, who made new efforts to establish himself upon the throne, and not having an army, he raised some mercenary troops in haste, with whom he marched against Ptolemy. When they were near each other, Ptolemy found means to corrupt those mercenary soldiers by presents of money, and to bring them over to his side. At the same time, awed by the reputation and name of Pelopidas, he went to meet him as his superior and master, had recourse to caresses and entreaties, and promised in the most solemn manner to hold the crown only as guardian to the son of the deceased, to acknowledge as friends and enemies all those that were so to the Thebans; and in security of his engagements, he gave his son Philoxomus and 50 other children, who were educated with him, as hostages. These Pelopidas sent to Thebes.

The treachery of the mercenary soldiers ran very much in his thoughts. He was informed that they had sent the greatest part of their effects, with their wives and children into the city of Pharsalus,† and conceived that a fair opportunity for being revenged of them for their perfidy. He therefore drew together some Thessalian troops, and marched to Pharsalus, where he was scarce arrived before Alexander the tyrant came against him with a powerful army. Pelopidas who had been appointed ambassador

* Plutarch makes this quarrel between Alexander and Ptolemy, which cannot agree with Æschines' account (de Fals. Legat. p. 400,) of the affairs of Perdiccas after Alexander's death, which I shall relate in the history of Philip. As Æschines was their contemporary, I thought it proper to substitute Perdiccas to Alexander.

† A city of Thessaly.

without any precaution. He was not ignorant of his being an impious wretch, as void of faith as of honour; but he imagined that respect for Thebes, and regard to his dignity and reputation, would prevent him from attempting any thing against his person. He was mistaken, for the tyrant seeing them alone and unarmed, made them both prisoners, and seized Pharsalus.

Polybius exceedingly blames the imprudence of Pelopidas upon this occasion.* There is in the commerce of society, says he, certain assurances, and as it were ties of mutual faith, upon which one may reasonably rely: such are the sanctity of oaths, the pledge of wives and children delivered as hostages, and, above all, consistency of the past conduct of those with whom one treats: when, notwithstanding these motives for our confidence, we are deceived, it is misfortune, but not a fault: but to trust one's self to a known traitor, a reputed villain, is certainly an unpardonable instance of error and temerity.

† So black a perfidy filled Alexander's subjects with terror and distrust, who very much suspected that after so flagrant an injustice and so daring a crime, the tyrant would spare nobody, and would look upon himself upon all occasions, and with all sorts of people, as a man in despair, that needed no farther regard to his conduct and actions. When the news was brought to Thebes, the Thebans incensed at so vile an insult, immediately sent an army into Thessaly; and as they were displeas'd with Epaminondas, upon the groundless suspicion of his having been too favourable to the Lacedæmonians upon a certain occasion, they nominated other generals; so that he served in this expedition only as a private man. The love of his country and of the public good, extinguished all resentment in the heart of that great man, and would not permit him, as is too common, to abandon its service through any pique of honour, or personal discontent.

The tyrant however carried Pelopidas to Pheræ, and made a show of him to all the world at first, imagining that such a treatment would humble his pride and abate his courage. But Pelopidas seeing the inhabitants of Pheræ in great consternation, perpetually consoled them, advising them not to despair, and assuring them that it would not be long before the tyrant would be punished. He caused him to be told, that it was as imprudent as unjust to torture and put to death every day so many innocent citizens, that had never done him any wrong, and to spare his life, who, he knew would be no sooner out of his hands, than he would punish him as his crimes deserved. The tyrant, astonished at his greatness of soul, sent to ask him why he took so much pains for death? "It is," returned the illustrious prisoner, "that thou mayest perish the sooner by being still "more detestable to the gods and men."

From that time the tyrant gave orders that nobody should see or speak to him. But Thebe his wife, the daughter of Jason, who had also been tyrant of Pheræ, having heard of the constancy and courage of Pelopidas from those who guarded him, had a curiosity to see and converse with him; and Alexander could not refuse her his permission.‡ He loved her tenderly, if a tyrant may be said to love any body: but notwithstanding

* Lib. v. iii. p. 512.

† Plut. in Pelop. p. 292, 293. Diod. l. xv. p. 382, 383.

‡ Cic. de Offic. l. ii. n. 25.

with a naked sword in his hand, and sending some of his guard to search every coffer for concealed poniards. Wretched prince, cries Cicero, who could confide more in a slave and a barbarian than his own wife!

Thebe therefore desiring to see Pelopidas, found him in a melancholy condition, dressed in a poor habit, his hair and beard neglected, and void of every thing that might console him in his distress. Not being able to refrain from tears at such a sight, "Ah unfortunate Pelopidas," said she, "how I lament your poor wife!" "No, Thebe," replied he, "it is yourself you should lament, who can suffer such a monster as Alexander, without being his prisoner." These words touched Thebe to the quick; for it was with extreme reluctance she bore the tyrant's cruelty, violence, and infamous way of living. Hence, going often to see Pelopidas, and frequently bewailing before him the injuries she suffered, she daily conceived new abhorrence for her husband, whilst hatred and the desire of revenge grew strong in her heart.

The Theban generals, who had entered Thessaly, did nothing there of any importance, and were obliged by their incapacity and ill conduct to abandon the country. The tyrant pursued them in their retreat, harassed them shamefully, and killed abundance of their troops. The whole army had been defeated, if the soldiers had not obliged Epaminondas, who had served as a private man amongst them, to take upon him the command. Epaminondas at the head of the cavalry and light armed foot, posted himself in the rear; where sometimes sustaining the enemy's attacks, and sometimes charging them in his turn, he completed the retreat with success, and preserved the Bœotians. The generals upon their return were each of them fined 10,000 drachms,* and Epaminondas substituted in their place. As the public good was his sole view, he overlooked the injurious treatment and kind of affront which he had received, and had full amends in the glory that attended so generous and disinterested a conduct.

Some days after, he marched at the head of his army into Thessaly, whither his reputation had preceded him. It had spread already both terror and joy through the whole country; terror amongst the tyrant's friends, whom the very name of Epaminondas dismayed, and joy amongst the people, from the assurance of being speedily delivered from the yoke of the tyranny, and the tyrant punished for all his crimes. But Epaminondas preferring the safety of Pelopidas to his own glory, instead of carrying on the war with vigour, as he might have done, chose rather to protract it, from the apprehension that the tyrant, if reduced to despair, like a wild beast, would turn his whole rage upon his prisoner; for he knew the violence and brutality of his nature, which would hearken neither to reason nor justice; and that he took delight in burying men alive; that some he covered with the skins of bears and wild boars, that his dogs might tear them in pieces, or he shot them to death with arrows. These were his frequent sports and diversions. In the cities of Milibœa and Scotusa,† which were in alliance with him, he called an assembly of the citizens, and causing them to be surrounded by his guards, he ordered the throats of all their young to be cut in his presence.

Hearing one day a famous actor perform a part in the *Troades* of Euripides, he suddenly went out of the theatre, and sent to the actor to tell him not to be under any apprehension upon that account; for that his

* About 225l. sterling.

† Cities of Magnesia.

cules and Andromache, who had cut so many of their throats without any compassion.

Though he was little susceptible of pity, he was much so of fear at this time. Amazed at the sudden arrival of Epaminondas, and dazzled with the majesty that surrounded him, he made haste to dispatch persons to him with apologies for his conduct. Epaminondas could not suffer that the Thebans should make either peace or alliance with so wicked a man. He only granted him a truce for 30 days, and after having got Pelopidas and Ismenius out of his hands, he retired with his troops.

* Fear is not a master whose lessons make any deep and lasting impression upon the mind of man. The tyrant of Phæræ soon returned to his natural disposition. He ruined several cities of Thessaly, and put garrisons into those of Phthia, Achæa, and Magnesia. Those cities sent deputies to Thebes to demand a succour of troops, praying that the command of them might be given to Pelopidas; which was granted. He was upon the point of setting out, when there happened a sudden eclipse of the sun, by which the city of Thebes was darkened at noon-day. The dread and consternation was general. Pelopidas knew very well that this accident had nothing more than natural in it; but he did not think it proper for him to expose 7000 Thebans against their will, nor to compel them to march in the terror and apprehension with which he perceived they were seized. He therefore gave himself to the Thessalians alone, and taking with him 300 horse of such Thebans and strangers as would follow him, he departed contrary to the prohibition of the soothsayers, and the opinion of the most wise and judicious.

He was personally incensed against Alexander, in resentment of the injuries he had received from him. What Thebe his wife had said, and he himself knew, of the general discontent in regard to the tyrant, gave him hopes of finding great divisions in his court, and an universal disposition to revolt. But his strongest motive was the beauty and grandeur of the action in itself. For his sole desire and ambition was to show all Greece, that at the same time the Lacedæmonians sent generals and officers to Dionysius the tyrant, and the Athenians on their part were in a manner in the pay of Alexander, to whom they had erected a statue of brass, as to their benefactor, the Thebans were the only people that declared war against tyranny, and endeavoured to exterminate from amongst the Greeks all unjust and violent government.

After having assembled his army at Pharsalus, he marched against the tyrant: who, being apprised that Pelopidas had but few Thebans, and knowing that his own infantry was twice as strong as that of the Thessalians, advanced to meet him. Pelopidas being told by somebody, that Alexander approached with a great army: "So much the better," replied he, "we shall beat the greater number."

Near a place called Cynocephalus, there were very high and steep hills, which lay in the midst of the plain. Both armies were in motion to seize that post with their foot, when Pelopidas ordered his cavalry to charge that of the enemy. The horse of Pelopidas broke that of Alexander's, and whilst they pursued them upon the plain, Alexander appeared suddenly upon the top of the hills, having outstripped the Thessalians; and charging rudely such as endeavoured to force those heights and entrenchments,

* Plut. in Pelop. p. 295—298. Xenoph. l. vi. p. 601.

them orders to attack the enemy's loot, he took his buckler and ran to those who fought upon the hills.

He presently made way through his infantry, and passed in a moment from the rear to the front, revived his soldiers' vigour and courage in such a manner as made the enemies believe themselves attacked by fresh troops. They supported two or three charges with great resolution: but finding Pelopidas' infantry continually gaining ground, and that his cavalry were returned from the pursuit to support them, they began to give way, and retired slowly, still making head in their retreat. Pelopidas, seeing the whole army of the enemy from the top of the hills, which though it was not yet actually put to flight, began to break, and was in great disorder, he stopped for some time, looking about every where for Alexander.

As soon as he perceived him upon his right wing, rallying and encouraging his mercenary soldiers, he could contain himself no longer, but fired with that view, and abandoning to his sole resentment the care of his life, and the conduct of the battle, he got a great way before his battalions; and ran forwards with all his force, calling upon and defying Alexander. The tyrant made no answer to his defiance, and not daring to wait his coming up, withdrew to hide himself amongst his guards. The battalion standing firm for some time, Pelopidas broke the first ranks, and killed the greatest part of the guards upon the spot. The rest continuing the fight at a distance, pierced his arms and breast at length with their javelins. The Thessalians, alarmed at the danger in which they saw him, made all the haste they could from the tops of the hills to his assistance; but he was fallen dead when they arrived. The infantry and the Theban horse, returning to the fight against the enemy's main body, put them to flight, and pursued them a great way. The plain was covered with the dead; for more than 3000 of the tyrant's troops were killed.

This action of Pelopidas, though it appears the effect of a consummate valour, is inexcusable, and has been generally condemned, because there is no true valour without wisdom and prudence. The greatest courage is cool and sedate. It spares itself where it ought, and exposes itself when occasion makes it necessary. A general ought to see every thing, and to have every thing in his thoughts. To be in a condition to apply the proper remedy on all occasions, he must not precipitate himself to the danger of being cut off, and of causing the loss of his army by his death.

* Euripides, after having said in one of his pieces, that it is highly glorious for a general of an army to obtain the victory by taking care of his own life, adds, "that if it be necessary for him to die, it must be when he resigns his life into the hands of virtue;" to signify that only virtue, not passion, anger, or revenge, has a right over the life of a general, and that the first duty of valour is to preserve him who preserves others.

† It is in this sense the saying of Timotheus is so just and estimable. When Chares showed the Athenians the wounds he had received whilst he was their general, and his shield pierced through with a pike: "And for me," said Timotheus, "when I besieged Samos, I was much ashamed to see a dart fall very near me as having exposed myself like a young man without necessity, and more than was consistent for the general of so great an army." Hannibal certainly cannot be suspected of fear, and

* Plut. in Pelop. p 317.

† Ibid. p. 278.

ought, he never received any wound, except only at the siege of Saguntum.

It is therefore not without reason that Pelopidas is reproached with having sacrificed all his other virtues to his valour, by such a prodigality of his life, and with having died rather for himself than his country.

Never was captain more lamented than he. His death changed the victory so lately gained into mourning. A profound silence and universal affliction reigned throughout the whole army, as if it had been entirely defeated. When his body was carried to Thebes, from every city by which it passed, the people of all ages and sexes, the magistrates and priests, came out to meet the bier, and to march in procession before it, carrying crowns, trophies, and armour of gold. The Thessalians, who were at the same time highly afflicted for his death, and equally sensible of their obligations to him, made it their request, that they might be permitted to celebrate at their sole expence, the obsequies of a general who had devoted himself for their preservation; and that honourable privilege could not be refused to their grateful zeal.

His funeral was magnificent, especially in the sincere affliction of the Thebans and Thessalians; for, says Plutarch, the external pomp of mourning, and those marks of sorrow, which may be imposed by the public authority upon the people, are not always certain proofs of their real sentiments. The tears which flow in private as well as public, the regret expressed equally by great and small, the praises given by the general, and unanimous voice to a person who is no more, and from whom nothing further is expected, are an evidence not to be questioned, and an homage never paid but to virtue. Such were the obsequies of Pelopidas, and in my opinion, nothing more great and magnificent could be imagined.

Thebes was not contented with lamenting Pelopidas, but resolved to avenge him. A small army of 7000 foot and 700 horse were immediately sent against Alexander. The tyrant who had not yet recovered the terror of his defeat, was in no condition to defend himself. He was obliged to restore to the Thessalians the cities he had taken from them, and to give the Magnesians, Phthians, and Achæans, their liberty, to withdraw his garrisons from their country, and to swear that he would always obey the Thebans; and march at their orders against all their enemies.

Such a punishment was very gentle; nor, says Plutarch, did it appear sufficient to the gods, or proportioned to his crimes. They had reserved one for him worthy of a tyrant. Thebe, his wife, who saw with horror and detestation the cruelty and perfidy of her husband, and had not forgot the lessons and advice which Pelopidas had given her, whilst in prison, entered into a conspiracy with her three brothers to kill him. The tyrant's whole palace was full of guards who kept watch in the night; but he placed little confidence in them; and as his life was in some sort in their hands, he feared them the most of all men. He lay in a high chamber, to which he ascended by a ladder that was drawn up after his entrance. Near this chamber a great dog was chained to guard it. He was exceedingly fierce, and knew nobody but his master, Thebe, and the slave who fed him.

The time pitched upon for the execution of the plot being arrived, Thebe shut up her brothers during the day time in an apartment near the tyrant's. When he entered it at night, as he was full of meat and wine, he fell into a deep sleep immediately. Thebe went out presently after, and ordered the slave to take away the dog, that he might not disturb her husband's re-

pared, she made her brothers ascend, armed with daggers; who, when they came to the door, were seized with terror, and would go no farther. Thebe, quite out of her wits, threatened to awake the tyrant if they did not proceed immediately, and to discover the plot to him. Their shame and fear reanimated them: she made them enter, led them to the bed, and held the lamp herself, whilst they killed him with repeated wounds. The news of his death was immediately spread through the city. His dead body was exposed to all sorts of outrages, trampled under foot by the people, and given for a prey to the dogs and vultures: a just reward for his violent oppressions and detestable cruelties.

SECTION VII.

EPAMINONDAS CHOSEN GENERAL OF THE THEBANS.—HIS DEATH AND CHARACTER.

THE extraordinary prosperity of Thebes* was no small subject of alarm to the neighbouring states. Every thing was at that time in motion in Greece. A new war had sprung up between the Arcadians and the Eleans, which had occasioned another between the Arcadians themselves. The people of Tegea had called in the Thebans to their aid; and those of Mantinæa, the Spartans and Athenians. There were besides several other allies on each side. The former gave Epaminondas the command of their troops, who immediately entered Arcadia, and encamped at Tegea, with design to attack the Mantinæans who had quitted their alliance with Thebes to attach themselves to Sparta.

Being informed that Agesilaus had begun his march with his army, and advanced towards Mantinæa, he formed an enterprise, which he believed would immortalize his name, and entirely reduce the power of the enemy. He left Tegea in the night with his army, unknown to the Mantinæans and marched directly to Sparta by a different route from that of Agesilaus. He would undoubtedly have taken the city by surprise, as it had neither walls, defence nor troops: but happily for Sparta, a Cretan having made all possible haste to apprise Agesilaus of his design, he immediately dispatched one of his horse to advise the city of the danger that threatened it, and arrived there soon after in person.

He had scarce entered the town, when the Thebans were seen passing the Eurotas, and coming on against the city. Epaminondas, who perceived that his design was discovered, thought it incumbent on him not to retire without some attempt.† He therefore made his troops advance, and making use of valour instead of stratagem, he attacked the city at several quarters, penetrated as far as the public place, and seized that part of Sparta which lay upon the side of the river. Agesilaus made head every where, and defended himself with much more valour than could be expected from his years. He saw well that it was not now a time, as before to spare himself, and to act only upon the defensive; but that he had need of all his courage and daring, and to fight with all the vigour of despair: means which he had never used nor placed his confidence in before, but which he employed with great success in the present dangerous emergency; for

* A. M. 3641. Ant. J. C. 363. Xenoph. l. vii. p. 612—644. Plat. in Agesil. 615. Diad. p. 391. 392. Polyb. l. ix. p. 547.

of the Spartan youth, behaved with incredible valour wherever the danger was greatest, and with his small troop stopped the enemy, and made head against them on all sides.

A young Spartan, named Isadas, distinguished himself particularly in this action. He was very handsome in the face, perfectly well shaped, of an advantageous stature, and in the flower of his youth. He had neither armour nor clothes upon his body, which shone with oil, and held a spear in one hand, and a sword in the other. In this condition he quitted his house with the utmost eagerness, and breaking through the press of the Spartans that fought, he threw himself upon the enemy, gave mortal wounds at every blow, and laid all at his feet who opposed him, without receiving any hurt himself. Whether the enemy were dismayed at so astonishing a sight, or, says Plutarch, the gods took pleasure in preserving him upon account of his extraordinary valour, it is said the ephori decreed him a crown after the battle in honour of his exploits, but afterwards fined him 1000 drachms * for having exposed himself to so great a danger without arms.

Epaminondas having failed of his aim, foreseeing that the Arcadians would certainly hasten to the relief of Sparta, and not being willing to have them with all the Lacedæmonian forces upon his hands at the same time, returned with expedition to Tegea. The Lacedæmonians and Athenians, with their allies, followed him close in the rear.

† That general considering his command was upon the point of expiring, that if he did not fight, his reputation might suffer extremely, and that immediately after his retreat, the enemy would fall upon the Theban allies, and entirely ruin them, he gave orders to his troops to hold themselves in readiness for battle.

The Greeks had never fought amongst themselves with more numerous armies. The Lacedæmonians consisted of more than 20,000 foot and 2000 horse; the Thebans of 30,000 foot and 3000 horse. Upon the right wing of the former, the Mantinæans, Arcadians, and Lacedæmonians were posted in one line; the Eleans and Achæans, who were the weakest of their troops, had the centre; and the Athenians alone composed the left wing. In the other army, the Thebans and Arcadians were on the left, the Argives on the right, and the other allies in the centre. The cavalry on each side were disposed in the wings.

The Theban general marched in the same order of battle in which he intended to fight, that he might not be obliged, when he came up with the enemy, to lose, in the disposition of his army, a time which cannot be too much saved in great enterprises.

He did not march directly, and with his front to the enemy, but in a column upon the hills with his left wing foremost, as if he did not intend to fight that day. When he was over against them, at a quarter of a league's distance, he made his troops halt and lay down their arms, as if he designed to encamp there. The enemy in effect were deceived by that stand, and reckoning no longer upon a battle, they quitted their arms, dispersed themselves about the camp, and suffered that ardour to extinguish, which the near approach of a battle is wont to kindle in the hearts of the soldiers.

Epaminondas, however, by suddenly wheeling his troops to the right,

* 500 livres.

† Xenoph. l. vii. p. 645—647.

them double their files upon the front of his left wing, to add to its strength, and to put it into a condition to attack in a point the Lacedæmonian phalanx, which by the movement he had made, faced it directly. He ordered the centre and right wing of his army to move very slow, and to halt before they came up with the enemy, that he might not hazard the event of the battle upon troops of which he had no great opinion.

He expected to decide the victory by that body of chosen troops which he commanded in person, and which he had formed in a column to attack the enemy in a point like a galley, says Xenophon. He assured himself, that if he could penetrate the Lacedæmonian phalanx, in which the enemy's principal force consisted, he should not find it difficult to rout the rest of their army, by charging upon the right and left with his victorious troops.

But that he might prevent the Athenians in the left wing from coming to the support of their right against his intended attack, he made a detachment of his horse and foot advance out of the line, and posted them upon the rising ground in readiness to flank the Athenians; as well to cover his right, as to alarm them, and give them reason to apprehend being taken in flank and rear themselves, if they advanced to sustain their right.

After having disposed his whole army in this manner, he moved on to charge the enemy with the whole weight of his column. They were strangely surprised when they saw Epaminondas advance towards them in this order, and resumed their arms, bridled their horses and made all the haste they could to their ranks.

Whilst Epaminondas marched against the enemy, the cavalry that covered his flank on the left, the best at that time in Greece, entirely composed of Thebans and Thessalians, had orders to attack the enemy's horse. The Theban general, whom nothing escaped, had artfully bestowed bowmen, slingers, and dartmen, in the intervals of his horse, in order to begin the disorder of the enemy's cavalry, by a previous discharge of a shower of arrows, stones, and javelins, upon them. The other army had neglected to take the same precaution, and had made another fault, not less considerable, in giving as much depth to the squadrons as if they had been a phalanx. By this means their horse were incapable of supporting long the charge of the Thebans. After having made several ineffectual attacks with great loss, they were obliged to retire behind their infantry.

In the mean time Epaminondas, with his body of foot had charged the Lacedæmonian phalanx. The troops fought on both sides with incredible ardour; both the Thebans and Lacedæmonians being resolved to perish rather than yield the glory of arms to their rivals. They began by fighting with the spear; and those first arms being soon broken in the fury of the combat, they charged each other sword in hand. The resistance was equally obstinate, and the slaughter very great on both sides. The troops, despising danger, and desiring only to distinguish themselves by the greatness of their actions, chose rather to die in their ranks than to lose a step of their ground.

The furious slaughter on both sides having continued a great while without the victory's inclining to either, Epaminondas, to force it to declare for him, thought it his duty to make an extraordinary effort in person, without regard to the danger of his own life. He formed therefore a troop of the bravest and most determinate about him, and putting himself

nians with the first javelin he threw. His troop, by his example, having wounded or killed all that stood in their way, broke and penetrated the phalanx. The Lacedæmonians, dismayed by the presence of Epaminondas, and overpowered by the weight of that intrepid party, were reduced to give ground. The gross of the Theban troops, animated by their general's example and success, drove back the enemy upon his right and left, and made a great slaughter of them. But some troops of the Spartans, perceiving that Epaminondas abandoned himself too much to his ardour, suddenly rallied, and returning to the fight, charged him with a shower of javelins. Whilst he kept off part of those darts, shunned some of them, fenced off others, and was fighting with the most heroic valour to assure the victory to his army, a Spartan named Callicrates, gave him a mortal wound with a javelin in the breast across his cuirass. The wood of the javelin being broke off, and the iron head containing in the wound, the torment was insupportable, and he fell immediately. The battle began around him with new fury, the one side using their utmost endeavours to take him alive, and the other to save him. The Thebans gained their point at last, and carried him off, after having put the enemy to flight. They did not pursue them far, and returning immediately, contented themselves with remaining masters of the field and of the dead, without making any advantage of their victory, or undertaking any thing further, as if they staid for the orders of their general.

The cavalry, dismayed by the accident of Epaminondas, whom they believed to be dead, and seeming rather vanquished than victorious, neglected to pursue their success in the same manner, and returned to their former post.

Whilst this passed on the left wing of the Thebans, the Athenian horse attacked their cavalry on the right; but as the latter, besides the superiority of number, had the advantage of being seconded by the light infantry posted in their intervals, they charged the Athenians rudely, and having galled them extremely with their darts, they were broken and obliged to fly. After having dispersed and repulsed them in this manner, instead of pursuing them, they thought proper to turn their arms against the Athenian foot, which they took in flank, put into disorder, and pushed with great vigour. Just as they were ready to turn tail, the general of the Elean cavalry, who commanded a body of reserve, seeing the danger of that phalanx, came upon the spur to its relief, charged the Theban horse, who expected nothing so little, forced them to retreat, and regained from them their advantage. At the same time, the Athenian cavalry, which had been routed at first, finding they were not pursued, rallied themselves, and instead of going to the assistance of their foot, which was roughly handled, they attacked the detachment posted by the Thebans upon the heights without the line, and put it to the sword.

After these different movements, and this alternative of losses and advantages, the troops on both sides stood still and rested upon their arms, and the trumpets of the two armies, as if by consent, sounded the retreat at the same time. Each party pretended to the victory, and erected a trophy: the Thebans, because they had defeated the right wing, and remained masters of the field of battle; the Athenians, because they cut the detachment in pieces. And from this point of honour, both sides refused at first to ask leave to bury their dead, which, with the ancients, was confessing their defeat. The Lacedæmonians, however, sent first to

Such was the event of the famous battle of Mantinea. Xenophon, in his relation of it, recommends the disposition of the Theban troops, and the order of battle, to the reader's attention, which he describes as a man of knowledge and experience in the art of war; and Monsieur Follard, who justly looks upon Epaminondas as one of the greatest generals Greece ever produced, in his description of the same battle, ventures to call it the masterpiece of that great captain.

Epaminondas had been carried into the camp. The surgeons, after having examined the wound, declared that he would expire as soon as the head of the dart was drawn out of it. These words gave all that were present the utmost sorrow and affliction, who were inconsolable on seeing so great a man about to die, and to die without an issue. For him, the only concern he expressed, was about his arms, and the success of the battle. When they showed him his shield, and assured him that the Thebans had gained the victory, turning towards his friends with a calm and serene air: "Do not regard," said he, "this day as the end of my life, but as the beginning of my happiness, and the completion of my glory. I leave Thebes triumphant, proud Sparta humbled, and Greece delivered from the yoke of servitude. For the rest, I do not reckon that I die without issue; Leuctra and Mantinea, are two illustrious daughters, that will not fail to keep my name alive, and to transmit it to posterity." Having spoke to this effect, he drew the head of the javelin out of the wound, and expired.

It may be truly said, that the Theban power expired with this great man; whom Cicero * seems to rank above all the illustrious men Greece ever produced. † Justin is of the same opinion, when he says, that as a dart is no longer in a condition to wound when the point of it is blunted, so Thebes, after having lost its general, was no longer formidable to its enemies, and its power seemed to have lost its edge, and to be annihilated by the death of Epaminondas. Before him, that city was not distinguished by any memorable action, and afterwards, it was not famous for its virtues but misfortunes, till it sunk into its original obscurity; so that it saw its glory take birth and expire with this great man.

It has been ‡ doubted whether he was a more excellent captain or good man. He sought not power for himself, but for his country; and was so perfectly void of self-interest, that at his death he was not worth the expences of his funeral. Truly a philosopher, and poor out of taste, he despised riches, without affecting any reputation from that contempt; and if Justin may be believed, he coveted glory as little as he did money. It was always against his will that commands were conferred upon him, and

* Epaminondas, princeps, meo judicio, Græciæ. Acad. Quæst. l. i. n. 4.

† Nam sicuti telo, si primam aciem præfergeris, reliquo ferro vim nocendi sustuleris; sic illo velut mucrone teli ablato duce Thebanorum, rei quoque publicæ vires hebetatæ sunt: ut non tam illum amisisse, quam cum illo omnes interiisse viderentur. Nam neque hunc ante ducem ullum memorabile bellum gessere, nec postea virtutibus, sed cladibus, insignes fuere: ut manifestum sit, patriæ gloriam et natam et extinctam cum eo fuisse. Justin. l. vi. c. 8.

‡ Fuit incertum, vir melior an dux esset. Nam imperium non sibi semper, sed patriæ quæsivit; et pecuniæ adeo parvus fuit, ut sumptus funeri desuerit. Gloriæ quoque non cupidior, quam pecuniæ: quippe recusanti omnia imperia ingesta sunt, honoresque ita gessit, ut ornamentum non accipere, sed dare ipsi dignitati videretur. Justin.

Though poor himself, and without any estate, his very poverty, by drawing upon him the esteem and confidence of the rich, gave him the opportunity of doing good to others. One of his friends being in great necessity, Epaminondas sent him to a very rich citizen, with orders to ask him for 1000 *.crowns in his name. That rich man coming to his house, to know his motives for directing his friend to him upon such an errand: "† Why," replied Epaminondas, "it is because this honest man is in "want, and you are rich.†"

He had † cultivated those generous and noble sentiments in himself by the study of polite learning and philosophy, which he had made his usual employment and sole delight from his earliest infancy; so that it was surprising, and a question frequently asked, how, and at what time, it was possible for a man, always busy amongst books, to attain, or rather seize, the knowledge of the art military in so great a degree of perfection. Fond of leisure, which he devoted to the study of philosophy, his darling passion, he shunned public employments, and made no interests but to exclude himself from them. His moderation concealed him so well, that he lived obscure and almost unknown. His merit, however, discovered him. He was taken from his solitude by force to be placed at the head of armies; and he demonstrated that philosophy, though generally in contempt with those who aspire at the glory of arms, is wonderfully useful in forming heroes; for besides its being a great advance towards conquering the enemy, to know how to conquer one's self, in this school † anciently were taught the great maxims of true policy, the rules of every kind of duty, the motives for a due discharge of them, what we owe our country, the right use of authority, wherein true courage consists; in a word the qualities that form the good citizen, statesman, and great captain.

He possessed all the ornaments of the mind; he had the talent of speaking in perfection, and was well versed in the most sublime sciences. But a modest reserve threw a veil over all those excellent qualities, which still augmented their value, and of which he knew not what it was to be ostentatious. Spintharus, in giving his character, said, "¶ that he never had met with a man who knew more and spoke less."

It may be said therefore of Epaminondas, that he falsified the proverb, which treated the Bœotians as gross and stupid. This was their common ** characteristic, and was imputed to the gross air of the country, as the Athenian delicacy of taste was attributed to the subtilty of the air they breathed. Horace says, that to judge of Alexander from his bad taste of poetry, one would swear him a true Bœotian;

Bœotum in crasso jurares aere natum.

Epist. i. l. 2.

"In thick Bœotian air you'd swear him born."

* A talent.

† Plut. de præcept. reipub. ger. p. 809.

‡ Οτι χρεος, ηπις, ετος ηι πισι ου δι πλατις.

¶ Jam literarum studium, jam philosophiæ doctrina tanta, ut mirabile videtur, unde tam insignis militiæ scientia homini inter literas nato. Justin.

§ The works of Plato, Xenophon, and Aristotle, are proofs of this.

¶ Plut. de audit. p. 39.

** Inter locorum naturas quantum intersit, videmus—Athenis tenue cœlum, ex quo acutiores etiam putantur Attici; crassum Thebis, itaque pingues Thebani. Cic. de fato. n. 7.

“ who know not how to speak.” Pindar and Plutarch, who had very little of the soil in them, and who are proofs that genius is of all nations, do themselves condemn the stupidity of their countrymen. Epaminondas did honour to his country, not only by the greatness of his military exploits, but by that sort of merit which results from elevation of genius and the study of science.

I shall conclude his portrait and character with a circumstance that gives place in nothing to all his other excellencies, and which may in some sense be preferred to them, as it expresses a good heart, and a tender and sensible spirit; qualities very rare amongst the great, but infinitely more estimable than all those splendid attributes, which the vulgar of mankind commonly gaze at with admiration, and seem almost the only objects worthy either of being imitated or envied. The victory at Leuctra had drawn the eyes and admiration of all the neighbouring people upon Epaminondas, who looked upon him as the support and restorer of Thebes, as the triumphant conqueror of Sparta, as the deliverer of all Greece; in a word as the greatest man, and the most excellent captain that ever was in the world. In the midst of this universal applause so capable of making the general of an army forget the man for the victor, Epaminondas, little sensible to so affecting and so deserved a glory, “ † my joy,” said he, “ arises from my sense of that which the news of my victory will give my father and my mother.”

Nothing in history seems so valuable to me as such sentiments which do honour to human nature, and proceed from a heart, which neither false glory nor false greatness have corrupted. I confess it is with grief I see these noble sentiments daily expire amongst us, especially in persons whose birth and rank raise them above others, who, too frequently, are neither good fathers, good sons, good husbands, nor good friends, and who would think it a disgrace to them to express for a father and mother the tender regard, of which we have here so fine an example from a pagan.

Until Epaminondas' time, two cities had exercised alternately a kind of empire over all Greece. The justice and moderation of Sparta had at first acquired it a distinguished pre-eminence, which the pride and haughtiness of its generals, and especially of Pausanias, soon lost it. The Athenians, until the Peloponnesian war, held the first rank, but in a manner scarce discernible in any other respect, than their care in acquitting themselves worthily, and in giving their inferiors just reason to believe themselves their equals. They judged at that time and very justly, that the true method of commanding and of continuing their power, was to evidence their superiority only by services and benefactions. Those times, so glorious for Athens, were of about 45 years continuance, and they retained a part of that pre-eminence during the 27 years of the Peloponnesian war, which make in all the 72 or 73 years, which Demosthenes gives to the duration of their empire: † but for this latter space of time, the Greeks, disgusted by the haughtiness of Athens, received no laws from that city without reluctance. Hence the Lacedæmonians became again the arbiters of Greece, and continued so from the time Lysander made himself master of Athens, until the first war undertaken by the Athenians,

* They were great musicians.

† Plut. in Coriol. p. 215.

‡ Demost. Philip. iii. p. 89.

by the exalted merit of a single man, saw itself at the head of all Greece. But that glorious condition was of no long continuance; and the death of Epaminondas, as we have already observed, plunged it again into the obscurity in which he found it.

Demosthenes remarks, in the passage above cited, that the pre-eminence granted voluntarily either to Sparta or Athens, was a pre-eminence of honour, not of dominion, and that the intent of Greece was to preserve a kind of equality and independence in the other cities. Hence, says he, when the governing city attempted to ascribe to itself what did not belong to it, and aimed at any innovations contrary to the rules of justice and established customs, all the Greeks thought themselves obliged to have recourse to arms, and without any motive of personal discontent, to espouse with ardour the cause of the injured.

I shall add here another very judicious reflection from Polybius.* He attributes the wise conduct of the Athenians, in the times I speak of, to the ability of the generals who were then at the head of their affairs; and he makes use of a comparison which explains, not unhappily the character of that people. A vessel without a master, says he, is exposed to great dangers, when every one insists upon its being steered according to his opinion, and will comply with no other measures. If then a rude storm attacks it, the common danger conciliates and unites them; they abandon themselves to the pilot's skill, and all the rowers doing their duty, the ship is saved, and in a state of security. But if the tempest ceases, and when the weather grows calm again, the discord of the mariners revives; if they will hearken no longer to the pilot, and some are for continuing their voyage, whilst others resolve to stop in the midst of their course; if on one side they loose their sails, and furl them on the other; it often happens, that after having escaped the most violent storms, they are shipwrecked even in the port. This, says Polybius, is a natural image of the Athenian republic. As long as it suffered itself to be guided by the wise counsels of an Aristides, a Themistocles, a Pericles, it came off victorious from the greatest dangers. But prosperity blinded and ruined it; following no longer any thing but caprice, and being become too insolent to be advised or governed, it plunged itself into the greatest misfortunes.

SECTION VIII.

DEATH OF EVAGORAS, KING OF SALAMIN.—ADMIRABLE CHARACTER OF THAT PRINCE.

THE third year of the 101st Olympiad, † soon after the Thebans had destroyed Platæa and Thespiæ, as has been observed before, Evagoras, king of Salamin, in the isle of Cyprus, of whom much has been already said, was assassinated by one of his eunuchs. His son Nicocles succeeded him. He had a fine model before him in the person of his father; and he seemed to make it his duty to be entirely intent upon treading in his steps.‡ When he took possession of the throne, he found the public

* Polyb. l. vii. p. 482.

† A. M. 3630. Ant. J. C. 374. Diod. l. xv. p. 363.

‡ Isocrat. ad Nicoc.

knew that the generality of princes, upon like occasions, thought every means just for the re-establishment of their affairs; but for him he acted upon different principles. In his reign there was no talk of banishment, taxes, and confiscation of estates. The public felicity was his sole object, and justice his favourite virtue. He discharged the debts of the state gradually, not by crushing the people with excessive imposts, but by retrenching all unnecessary expences, and by using a wise economy in the administration of his revenue. "I am assured *," said he, "that no citizen can complain that I have done him the least wrong; and I have the satisfaction to know that I have enriched many with an unsparring hand." He believed this kind of vanity, if it be vanity, might be permitted in a prince, and that it was glorious for him to have it in his power to make his subjects such a defiance.

† He piqued himself also in particular upon another virtue, which is the more admirable in princes, as very uncommon in their fortune; I mean temperance. It is most amiable, but very difficult, in an age and a fortune, to which every thing is lawful, and wherein pleasure, armed with all her arts and attractions, is continually lying in ambush for a young prince, and preventing his desires, to make a long resistance against the violence and insinuation of her soft assaults. Nicocles gloried in having never known any woman besides his wife during his reign, and was amazed that all other contracts of civil society should be treated with due regard, whilst that of marriage, the most sacred and inviolable of obligations, was broke through with impunity, and that men should not blush to commit an infidelity in respect to their wives, of which, should their wives be guilty, it would throw them into the utmost anguish and despair.

What I have said of the justice and temperance of Nicocles, Isocrates puts into that prince's own mouth; and it is not probable that he should make him speak in such a manner if his conduct had not agreed with such sentiments. It is in a discourse, supposed to be addressed by that king to his people, wherein he describes to them the duties of subjects to their princes; love, respect, obedience, fidelity, and devotion to their service; and to engage them more effectually to the discharge of those duties, he does not disdain to give them an account of his own conduct and sentiments.

‡ In another discourse, which precedes this, Isocrates explains to Nicocles all the duties of the sovereignty, and makes excellent reflections upon that subject, of which I can repeat here only a very small part. He begins by telling him, that the virtue of private persons is much better supported than his own, by the mediocrity of their condition, by the employments and cares inseparable from it, by the misfortunes to which they are frequently exposed, by their distance from pleasures and luxury, and particularly, by the liberty which their friends and relations have of giving them advice; whereas the generality of princes have none of these advantages. He adds, that a king, who would make himself capable of governing well, ought to avoid an idle and inactive life, should set apart a proper time for business and the public affairs, should form his council of the most able and experienced persons in his kingdom, should endeavour to make himself as much superior to others by his merit and wisdom,

* Isocrat. ad Nicoc. p. 65, 66.

† Ibid. p. 64.

‡ Ibid.

mon father. "Persist," said he, "in the religion you have received from your forefathers; but be assured that the most grateful adoration and sacrifice that you can offer to the Divinity, is that of the heart, in rendering yourself good and just. Show, upon all occasions, so high a regard for truth, that a single word from you may be more confided in than the oath of others. Be a warrior, by your ability in military affairs, and by such a warlike provision as may intimidate your enemies: but let your inclinations be pacific, and be rigidly exact in never pretending to, or undertaking any thing unjustly. The only certain proof that you have reigned well, will be the power of bearing this testimony to yourself; that your people are become both more happy, and more wise, under your government."

What seems to me most remarkable in this discourse, is that the advice which Isocrates gives the king is neither attended with praises, nor with those studied reservations and artificial turns, without which fearful and modest truth dares not venture to approach the throne. This is most worthy of applause, and more for the prince's than the writer's praise. Nicoles far from being offended at these counsels, received them with joy, and to express his gratitude to Isocrates, made him a present of 20 talents, that is to say 20,000 crowns.*

SECTION IX.

ARTAXERXES MNEEMON UNDERTAKES THE REDUCTION OF EGYPT.

ARTAXERXES,† after having given his people a relaxation of several years, had formed the design of reducing Egypt, which had shaken off the Persian yoke long before, and made great preparations for war for that purpose. Achoris, who then reigned in Egypt, and had given Evagoras powerful aid against the Persians, foreseeing the storm, raised abundance of troops of his own subjects, and took into his pay a great body of Greeks, and other auxiliary soldiers, of whom Chabrias had the command.‡ He had accepted that office without the authority of the republic.

Pharnabasis, having been charged with this war, sent to Athens to complain that Chabrias had engaged himself to serve against his master, and threatened the republic with the king's resentment, if he was not immediately recalled. He demanded at the same time Iphicrates, another Athenian, who was looked upon as one of the most excellent captains of his time, to give him the command of the body of Greek troops in the service of his master. The Athenians who had a great interest in the continuance of the king's friendship, recalled Chabrias, and ordered him upon pain of death, to repair to Athens by a certain day. Iphicrates was sent to the Persian army.

The preparations of the Persians went on so slowly, that two whole years elapsed before they entered upon action. Achoris,|| king of Egypt, died in that time, and was succeeded by Psammuthis, who reigned but a year. Nephretitus was the next; and four months after, Nectanebis, who reigned 10 or 12 years.

* Plut. in vit. Isoc. p. 838.

† A. M. 3627. Ant. J. C. 377. Diod. l. xv. p. 328, et 357.

‡ Cor. Nep. in Chab. et in Iphic.

|| Euseb. in Chron.

all live in peace with each other, conformably to the treaty of Antalcides, that all garrisons should be withdrawn, and all the cities suffered to enjoy their liberty under their respective laws. All Greece received this declaration with pleasure, except the Thebans, who refused to conform to it.

† At length, every thing being in readiness for the invasion of Egypt, a camp was formed at Acæ, since called Ptolemias, in Palestine, the place appointed for the general rendezvous. In a review there, the army was found to consist of 200,000 Persians, under the command of Pharnabazus, and 20,000 Greeks under Iphicrates. The forces at sea were in proportion to those at land; their fleet consisting of 300 galleys, besides 200 vessels of 30 oars, and a prodigious number of barks, to transport the necessary provisions for the fleet and army.

The army and fleet began to move at the same time, and that they might act in concert, they separated from each other as little as possible. This war was to open with the siege of Pelusium; but so much time had been given the Egyptians, that Nectanebis had rendered the approach to it impracticable both by sea and land. The fleet, therefore, instead of making a descent, as had been projected, sailed forwards and entered the mouth of the Nile called Mendesium. The Nile at that time emptied itself into the sea by seven different channels, of which only two† remain at this day; and at each of those mouths there was a fort with a good garrison to defend the entrance. The Mendesium not being so well fortified as that of Pelusium, where the enemy was expected to land, the descent was made with no great difficulty. The fort was carried sword in hand, and no quarter given to those who were found in it.

After this signal action, Iphicrates thought it advisable to re-embark upon the Nile without loss of time, and to attack Memphis the capital of Egypt. If that opinion had been followed before the Egyptians had recovered the panic into which so formidable an invasion, and the blow already received, had thrown them, they had found the capital without any defence, it had inevitably fallen into their hands, and all Egypt been re-conquered. But the gross of the army not being arrived, Pharnabazus believed it necessary to wait its coming up, and would undertake nothing till he had reassembled all his troops, under pretext that they would then be invincible, and that there would be no obstacle capable of withstanding them.

Iphicrates, who knew that in affairs of war especially, there are certain favourable and decisive moments, which it is absolutely proper to seize, judged quite differently, and in despair to see an opportunity suffered to escape, that might never be retrieved, he made pressing instances for permission to go at least with the 20,000 men under his command. Pharnabazus refused to comply with that demand, out of abject jealousy; apprehending that if the enterprise succeeded, the whole glory of the war would redound to Iphicrates. This delay gave the Egyptians time to look about them. They drew all their troops together into a body, put a good garrison into Memphis, and with the rest of their army kept the field, and harassed the Persians in such a manner that they prevented their advancing further into the country. After which came on the inundation of the Nile, which laying all Egypt under water, the Persians were obliged to

* A. M. 3630. Ant. J. C. 374. Diod. l. xv. p. 555.

† Ibid. p. 558. 559.

‡ Damietta and Rosetta.

preparations alone had given so much difficulty for upwards of two years, entirely miscarried, and produced no other effect than an irreconcilable enmity between the two generals who had the command of it. Pharnabasus to excuse himself, accused Iphicrates of having prevented its success; and Iphicrates with much more reason, laid all the fault upon Pharnabasus. But well assured that the Persian lord would be believed at his court in preference to him, and remembering what had happened to Conon, to avoid the fate of that illustrious Athenian, he chose to retire secretly to Athens in a small vessel which he hired. Pharnabasus caused him to be accused there of having rendered the expedition against Egypt abortive. The people of Athens made answer, that if he could be convicted of that crime, he should be punished as he deserved; but his innocence was too well known at Athens to give him any disquiet upon that account. It does not appear that he was ever called in question about it; and some time after the Athenians declared him sole admiral of their fleet.

* Most of the projects of the Persian court miscarried by their slowness in putting them in execution. Their generals' hands were tied up, and nothing was left to their discretion. They had a plan of conduct in their instructions from which they did not dare to depart. If any accident happened that had not been foreseen and provided for, they must wait for new orders from court, and before they arrived, the opportunity was entirely lost. Iphicrates having observed that Pharnabasus took his resolutions with all the presence of mind and penetration that could be desired in an accomplished general,† asked him one day, how it happened that he was so quick in his views, and so slow in his actions? "It is," replied Pharnabasus, "because my views depend only upon me, but their execution upon my master."

SECTION X.

THE LACEDÆMONIANS SEND AGESILAUS TO THE AID OF TACHOS.—HIS DEATH.

AFTER the battle of Mantinæa,‡ both parties equally weary of the war, had entered into a general peace with all the other states of Greece, upon the king of Persia's plan, by which the enjoyment of its laws and liberties was secured to each city, and the Messenians included in it, notwithstanding all the opposition and intrigues of the Lacedæmonians to prevent it. Their rage upon this occasion separated them from the other Greeks. They were the only people who resolved to continue the war, from the hope of recovering the whole country of Messenia in a short time. That resolution, of which Agesilaus was the author, occasioned him to be justly regarded as a violent and obstinate man, insatiable of glory and command, who was not afraid of involving the republic again in inevitable misfortunes, from the necessity to which the want of money exposed them of borrowing great sums, and of levying great imposts, instead of taking the favourable opportunity of concluding a peace, and of putting an end to all their evils.

* Diod. l. xv. p. 358.

† Ibid. 375.

‡ Plut. in Agesil. p. 616—618. Diod. l. xv. p. 397—401.

the king of Persia, who executed a new invasion of Egypt, notwithstanding the ill success of his past endeavours to reduce that kingdom. For this purpose Tachos sent into Greece, and obtained a body of troops from the Lacedæmonians, with Agesilaus to command them, whom he promised to make generalissimo of his army. The Lacedæmonians were exasperated against Artaxerxes, from his having forced them to include the Messenians in the late peace, and were fond of taking this occasion to express their resentment. Chabrias went also into the service of Tachos, but of his own head, and without the republic's participation. This commission did Agesilaus no honour. It was thought below the dignity of a king of Sparta, and a great captain, who had made his name glorious throughout the world, and was then more than 80 years old, to receive the pay of an Egyptian, and to serve a barbarian who had revolted against his master.

When he had landed in Egypt, the king's principal generals, and the great officers of his house, came to his ship to receive and make their court to him. The rest of the Egyptians were as solicitous to see him, from the great expectation which the name and renown of Agesilaus had excited in them, and came in multitudes to the shore for that purpose. But when instead of a great and magnificent prince, according to the idea his exploits had given them of him, they saw nothing splendid or majestic in either his person or equipage, and saw only an old man of a mean aspect and small body, without any appearance, and dressed in a bad robe of a very coarse stuff, they were seized with an immoderate disposition to laugh, and applied the fable of the mountain in labour to him.

When he met king Tachos, and had joined his troops with those of Egypt, he was very much surprized at not being appointed general of the whole army, as he expected, but only of the foreign troops; that Chabrias was made general of the sea forces, and that Tachos retained the command in chief to himself, which was not the only mortification he had experienced.

Tachos came to a resolution to march into Phœnicia, thinking it more advisable to make that country the seat of the war, than to expect the enemy in Egypt. Agesilaus, who knew better, represented to him in vain that his affairs were not sufficiently established to admit of his removing out of his dominions; that he would do much better to remain in them, and content himself with acting by his generals in the enemy's country. Tachos despised this wise counsel, and expressed no less disregard for him on all other occasions. Agesilaus was so much incensed at such conduct, that he joined the Egyptians, who had taken arms against him during his absence, and had placed Nectanebis his † cousin upon the throne. Agesilaus, abandoning the king to whose aid he had been sent, and joining the rebel who had dethroned him, alledged in justification of himself, that he was sent to the assistance of the Egyptians; and that they, having taken up arms against Tachos, he was not at liberty to serve against them without new orders from Sparta. He dispatched expresses thither, and the instructions he received were to act as he should judge most advantageous for his country. He immediately declared for Nectanebis. Tachos, obli-

* A. M. 3641. Ant. J. C. 363. Xenoph. de reg. Agcsil. p. 683. Cor. Nep. in Agesil. c. viii.

† Diodorus calls him his son; Plutarch his cousin.

clemency the command of his troops against the rebels.

Agesilaus covered so criminal a conduct with the veil of the public utility. But, says Plutarch, remove that delusive blind, the most just and only true name which can be given the action, is that of perfidy and treason. It is true the Lacedæmonians, making the glorious and the good consist principally in the service of that country which they idolized, knew no other justice than what tended to the augmentation of the grandeur of Sparta, and the extending of its dominions. I am surprized so judicious an author as Xenophon should endeavour to palliate a conduct of this kind, by saying only that Agesilaus attached himself to that of the two kings who seemed the best affected to Greece.

At the same time, a third prince of the city of Mendes set up for himself to dispute the crown with Nectanebis. This new competitor had an army of 100,000 men to support his pretensions. Agesilaus gave his advice to attack them before they were exercised and disciplined. Had that counsel been followed, it had been easy to have defeated a body of people, raised in haste, and without any experience in war. But Nectanebis imagined that Agesilaus only gave him this advice to betray him in consequence, as he had done Tachos. He therefore gave his enemy time to discipline his troops, who soon after reduced him to retire into a city, fortified with good walls, and of very great extent. Agesilaus was obliged to follow him thither, where the Mendesian prince besieged them. Nectanebis would then have attacked the enemy before the works he had begun were far advanced, and pressed Agesilaus to that purpose; but he refused his compliance at first, which extremely augmented the suspicions conceived of him. At length, when he saw the work in a sufficient forwardness, and that there remained only as much ground between the two ends of the line as the troops within the city might occupy, drawn up in a battle, he told Nectanebis that it was time to attack the enemy, that their own line would prevent their surrounding him, and that the interval between them was exactly the space he wanted, for ranging his troops in such a manner as they might all act together effectively. The attack was executed according to Agesilaus' expectation; the besiegers were beaten, and from henceforth Agesilaus conducted all the operations of the war with so much success, that the enemy prince was always overcome, and at last taken prisoner.

The following winter,* after having well established Nectanebis, he embarked to return to Lacedæmon, and was driven by contrary winds upon the coast of Africa, into a place called the port of Menelaus, where he fell sick and died at the age of 84 years. He had reigned 41 of them at Sparta, and of those 41, he had passed 30 with the reputation of the greatest and most powerful of all the Greeks, and had been looked upon as the leader and king of almost all Greece, till the battle of Leuctra. His latter years did not entirely support the reputation he had acquired; and Xenophon in his eulogium of this prince, wherein he gives him the preference to all other captains, has been found to exaggerate his virtues, and extenuate his faults too much.

The body of Agesilaus was carried to Sparta. Those who were about him not having honey, with which it was the Spartan custom to cover the bodies they would embalm, made use of wax in its stead. His son Arch-

* A. M. 5643. Ant. J. C. 361.

Towards the end of the Egyptian war, the greatest part of the provinces in subjection to Persia revolted.

Artaxerxes Mnemon had been the involuntary occasion of this defection. That prince, of himself was good, equitable, and benevolent. He loved his people, and was beloved by them. He had abundance of mildness and sweetness of temper in his character ; but that easiness degenerated into sloth and luxury, and particularly in the latter years of his life, in which he discovered a dislike for all business and application, from whence the good qualities which he otherwise possessed, as well as his beneficent intentions, became useless and without effect. The nobility and governours of provinces, abusing his favour and the infirmities of his great age, oppressed the people, treated them with insolence and cruelty, loaded them with taxes, and did every thing in their power to render the Persian yoke insupportable.

The discontent became general, and broke out after long suffering, almost at the same time on all sides. Asia Minor, Syria, Phœnicia, and many other provinces declared themselves openly, and took up arms. The principal leaders of the conspiracy were Ariobarzanes, prince of Phrygia, Mausolus, king of Caria, Orontes governour of Mysia, and Autophradates governour of Lydia. Datames, of whom mention has been made before, and who commanded in Cappadocia, was also engaged in it. By this means half the revenues of the crown were on a sudden diverted into different channels, and the remainder did not suffice for the expences of the war against the revolters, had they acted in concert. But their union was of no long continuance ; and those who had been the first and most zealous in shaking off the yoke, were also the foremost in resuming it, and in betraying the interests of the others to make their peace with the king.

The provinces of Asia Minor, on withdrawing from their obedience, had entered into a confederacy for their mutual defence, and had chosen Orontes, governour of Mysia, for their general. They had also resolved to add 20,000 foreign troops to those of the country, and had charged the same Orontes with the care of raising them. But when he had got the money for that service into his hands, with the addition of a year's pay, he kept it for himself, and delivered to the king the persons who had brought it from the revolted provinces.

Reomithras, another of the chiefs of Asia Minor, being sent into * Egypt to negociate succours, committed a treachery of a like nature. Having brought from that country 500 talents and 50 ships of war, he assembled the principal revolters at Leucas, a city of Asia Minor, under pretence of giving them an account of his negotiation, seized them all, delivered them to the king to make his peace, and kept the money he had received in Egypt for the confederacy. Thus this formidable revolt, which had brought the Persian empire to the very brink of ruin, dissolved of itself, or, to speak more properly, was suspended for some time.

* Diodorus says he was sent to Tachos, but it is more likely that it was Nectanebis.

THE end of Artaxerxes' reign abounded with cabals.* The whole court were divided into factions in favour of one or other of his sons, who pretended to the succession. He had 150 by his concubines, who were in number 360, and 3 by his lawful wife Atossa; Darius, Ariaspes, and Ochus. To put a stop to these practices, he declared Darius the eldest, his successor; and to remove all cause of disputing that prince's right after his death, he permitted him to assume from thenceforth the title of a king, and to wear the royal tiara. But the young prince was for having something more real; besides which, the refusal of Artaxerxes to give him one of his concubines, whom he had demanded, had extremely incensed him, and he formed a conspiracy against his father's life, wherein he engaged 50 of his brothers.

It was Tiribasus, of whom mention has been made already, who contributed the most to his taking so unnatural a resolution, from a like subject of discontent against the king; who, having promised to give him first one of his daughters in marriage, and then another, broke his word both times and married them himself: such abominable incests being permitted at that time in Persia, the religion of the nation not prohibiting them.

The number of the conspirators was already very great, and the day fixed for the execution, when an eunuch, well informed of the whole plot, discovered it to the king. Upon that information, Artaxerxes thought it would be highly imprudent to despise so great a danger by neglecting a strict enquiry into it; but that it would be much more so, to give credit to it without certain and unquestionable proof. He assured himself of it with his own eyes. The conspirators were suffered to enter the king's apartment, and then seized. Darius and all his accomplices were punished as they deserved.

After the death of Darius, the cabals began again. Three of his brothers were competitors, Ariaspes, Ochus, and Arsames. The two first pretended to the throne in right of birth, being the sons of the queen. The third had the king's favour, who tenderly loved him, though only the son of a concubine. Ochus prompted by his restless ambition, studied perpetually the means to rid himself of both his rivals. As he was equally cunning and cruel, he employed his craft and artifice against Ariaspes, and his cruelty against Arsames. Knowing the former to be extremely simple and credulous, he made the eunuchs of the palace, whom he had found means to corrupt; threaten him so terribly in the name of the king his father, that expecting every moment to be treated as Darius had been, he poisoned himself to avoid it. After this there remained only Arsames to give him umbrage, because his father and all the world considered that prince as the most worthy of the throne, from his ability and other excellent qualities. Him he caused to be assassinated by Harpates, son of Tiribasus.

This loss, which followed close upon the other, and the exceeding wickedness with which both were attended, gave the old king a grief that prov-

* Plut. in Artax. p. 1024—1027. Diod. l. xv. p. 400. Justin l. x. c. 1, 2.

† This tiara was a turban, or kind of head dress, with the plume of feathers standing upright upon it. The seven counsellors had also plumes of feathers, which they wore aslant, and before. All others wore them aslant and behind:

interrupted by many revolts. That of his successor will be no less disturbed with them.

SECTION XII.

CAUSES OF THE FREQUENT INSURRECTIONS AND REVOLTS IN THE PERSIAN EMPIRE.

I HAVE taken care, in relating the seditions that happened in the Persian empire, to observe from time to time the abuses which occasioned them. But as these revolts were more frequent than ever in the latter years, and will be more so, especially in the succeeding reign, I thought it would be proper to unite here, under the same point of view, the different causes of such insurrections, which foretel the approaching decline of the Persian empire.

I. After the reign of Artaxerxes Longimanus, the kings of Persia abandoned themselves more and more to the charms of voluptuousness and luxury, and the delights of an indolent and inactive life. Shut up generally in their palaces amongst women, and a crowd of flatterers, they contented themselves with enjoying, in soft effeminate ease and idleness, the pleasure of universal command, and made their grandeur consist in the splendid glare of riches, and an expensive magnificence.

II. They were besides princes of no great talents for the conduct of affairs, of small capacity to govern, and void of taste for glory. Not having a sufficient extent of mind to animate all the parts of so vast an empire, nor ability to support the weight of it, they transferred to their officers the cares of public business, the fatigues of commanding armies, and the dangers which attend the execution of great enterprises: confining their ambition to bearing alone the lofty title of the great king, and the king of kings.

III. The great officers of the crown, the government of the provinces, the command of armies, were generally bestowed upon people without either service or merit. It was the credit of the favourites, the secret intrigues of the court, the solicitation of the women of the palace, which determined the choice of the persons who were to fill the most important posts of the empire; and appropriated the rewards due to the officers who had done the state real service to their own creatures.

IV. These courtiers, often out of a base mean jealousy of the merit that gave them umbrage, and reproached their small abilities, removed their rivals from public employments, and rendered their talents useless to the state. † Sometimes they would even cause their fidelity to be suspected by false informations, bring them to trial as criminals against the state, and force the king's most faithful servants, for their defence against their calumniators, to seek their safety in revolting, and in turning those arms against their prince, which they had so often made triumph for his glory, and the service of the empire.

V. The ministers to hold the generals in dependance, restrained them under such limited orders, as obliged them to let slip the occasions of

* A. M. 3643. Ant. J. C. 361.

† Pharnabazus, Tiribazus, Datames, &c.

success, after having let them want every thing necessary. VI. The kings of Persia had extremely degenerated from the example of Cyrus, and the ancient Persians, who contented themselves with bread and sallads for their food, and water for their drink. The Persians had been infected with the contagion of this example, and the single meal of their ancestors, they made it last part of the day, and prolonged it far into the night by drinking and far from being ashamed of drunkenness, they made it a necessary part of their life, as we have seen in the example of young Cyrus.

VII. The extreme remoteness of the provinces, which lay from the Caspian and Euxine to the Red Sea, and Æthiopia, and from the Ganges and Indus to the Ægean sea, was a great obstacle to the affection of the people, who never had the satisfaction of the presence of their masters; who knew them only by the severity of their taxations, and by the pride and avarice of their satraps, and who, in transporting themselves to the court, to make their petitions and complaints there, could not hope to find access to the king, and it contributed to the majesty of their persons to make them inaccessible and invisible.

VIII. The multitude of the provinces in subjection did not compose a uniform empire, nor the regular body of a state. The provinces were united by the common ties of interest, manners, and religion, and animated with the same spirit of government, and the guidance of the same laws. It was rather a confused, dissimilar, and even forced assemblage of different nations, free and independent, of whom some who were torn from their native country, and the sepulchres of their forefathers, saw themselves winced into unknown regions, or among enemies, where they were obliged to retain their own laws and customs, and a form of government different from themselves. These different nations, who not only lived without any common tie or relation among them, but with a diversity of manners, worship, and often with antipathy of characters and inclinations, cared nothing so ardently as their liberty, and re-establishment of their native countries. All these people therefore were unconcerned about the union of an empire, which was the sole obstacle to their desires, and could not affect a government that treated them as strangers and subjected nations, and never gave them any security or privileges.

IX. The extent of the empire, and its remoteness from the centre, it necessary to give the viceroys of the frontier provinces a great authority in every branch of government; to raise and pay tribute; to adjudge the differences of cities, provinces, and kingdoms; and to make treaties with the neighbouring states. The provinces were extensive and almost independent, in which they continued to be without being changed, and without colleagues or council to assist upon the affairs of their provinces, accustomed them to be independent and commanding absolutely, and of reigning. In consequence of this, when they was with great repugnance they submitted to be removed from their governments, and often endeavoured to support themselves in their independence of arms.

X. The governours of provinces, the generals of armies, and other officers and ministers, thought it for their honour to

pride, and to furnish out expences so much above the fortunes of private persons, they were reduced to oppress the subjects under their jurisdiction, with exorbitant taxes, flagrant extortions, and the shameful traffic of a public venality, that set those offices to sale for money, which ought to have been granted only to merit. All that vanity lavished, or luxury exhausted, was made good by mean arts, and the violent rapaciousness of an insatiable avarice.

These gross irregularities, and abundance of others, which remained without remedy, and which were daily augmented by impunity, tired the people's patience, and occasioned a general discontent amongst them, the usual forerunner of the ruin of states. Their just complaints, long time despised, were followed by an open rebellion of several nations, who endeavoured to do themselves that justice by force, which was refused to their remonstrances. In such a conduct, they failed in the submission and fidelity which subjects owe to their sovereigns; but paganism did not carry its lights so far, and was not capable of so sublime a perfection, which was reserved for a religion that teaches, that no pretext, no injustice, no vexation, can ever authorize the rebellion of a people against their prince.

BOOK XIII.
THE
HISTORY
OF THE
PERSIANS AND GRECIANS.

SECTION I.

OCHUS ASCENDS THE THRONE OF PERSIA.—HIS CRUELTY.—REVOLT OF SEVERAL NATIONS.

THE more the memory of Artaxerxes Mnemon was honoured and revered throughout the whole empire, the more Ochus believed he had reason to fear for himself; convinced, that in succeeding to him, he should not find the same favourable dispositions in the people and nobility, of whom he had made himself the horror by the murder of his two brothers. * To prevent that aversion from occasioning his exclusion, he prevailed upon the eunuchs, and others about the king's person, to conceal his death from the public. He began by taking upon himself the administration of affairs, giving orders, and sealing decrees in the name of Artaxerxes, as if he had been still alive; and by one of those decrees, he caused himself to be proclaimed king throughout the whole empire, always by the order of Artaxerxes. After having governed in this manner almost ten months, believing himself sufficiently established, he at length declared the death of his father, and ascended the throne, † taking upon himself the name of Artaxerxes. Authors, however, most frequently gave him that of Ochus, by which name I shall generally call him in the sequel of this history.

Ochus was the most cruel and wicked of all the princes of his race, as his actions soon explained. In a very short time the palace and the whole empire were filled with his murders. To ‡ remove from the revolted provinces all means of setting some other of the royal family upon the throne, and to rid himself at once of all trouble that the princes and princesses of the blood might occasion him, he put them all to death, without regard to sex, age, or proximity of blood. He caused his own sister Ocha, whose daughter he had married, to be buried alive; § and having shut up one of his uncles, with 100 of his sons and grandsons, in a court of the palace, he ordered them all to be shot to death with arrows, on-

* Polyæn. Stratag. vii.
† Justin. l. x. c. 3.

‡ A. M. 3644. Ant. J. C. 360.
§ Val. Max. l. ix. c. 2.

Ochus had caused 80 of her brothers with her father to be massacred in one day. He treated with the same barbarity, throughout the whole empire, all those who gave him any umbrage, sparing none of the nobility whom he suspected of the least discontent whatsoever.

† The cruelties exercised by Ochus did not deliver him from inquietude. Artabasis, governour of one of the Asiatic provinces, engaged Chares the Athenian, who commanded a fleet and a body of troops in those parts, to assist him, and with his aid defeated an army of 70,000 men, sent by the king to reduce him. Artabasis, in reward of so great a service, made Chares a present of money to defray the whole expences of his armament. The king of Persia resented exceedingly this conduct of the Athenians in regard to him. They were at that time employed in the war of the allies. The king's menace to join their enemies with a numerous army obliged them to recal Chares.

‡ Artabasis, being abandoned by them, had recourse to the Thebans, of whom he obtained 5000 men, whom he took into his pay, with Pamenes to command them. This reinforcement put him into a condition to acquire two other victories over the king's troops. Those two actions did the Theban troops and their commander great honour. Thebes must have been extremely incensed against the king of Persia, to send so powerful a succour to his enemies, at a time when that republic was engaged in a war with the Phocæans. It was perhaps an effect of their policy, to render themselves more formidable, and to enhance the price of their alliance. ¶ It is certain that soon after they made their peace with the king, who paid them 300 talents, that is to say, 300,000 crowns. Artabasis, destitute of all support, was overcome at last, and obliged to take refuge with Philip of Macedon.

Ochus being delivered at length from so dangerous an enemy, turned all his thoughts on the side of Egypt, which had revolted long before. About the same time, several considerable events happened in Greece, which have little or no relation with the affairs of Persia. I shall insert them here, after which I shall return to the reign of Ochus, not to interrupt the series of this history.

SECTION II.

WAR OF THE ALLIES AGAINST THE ATHENIANS.

SOME few years after the revolt of Asia Minor, † of which I have been speaking, in the third year of the 150th Olympiad, Chio, Cos, Rhodes, and Bysantium, took up arms against Athens, upon which till then they had depended. To reduce them they employed both great forces and great captains, Chabrias, Iphicrates, and Timotheus. ¶ They were the

* Quint. Curt. l. x. c. 5.

† A. M. 3648. Ant. J. C. 356. Diod. l. xvi. p. 433, 434.

‡ A. M. 3651. Ant. J. C. 353. ¶ Diod. l. xvi. p. 438.

§ A. M. 3646. Ant. J. C. 353.

¶ Hæc extrema fuit ætas imperatorum Atheniensium, Iphicrates, Chabriæ, Timothei : neque post illorum obitum quisquam dux in illa urbe fuit dignus memoria. Cor Nep. in Timoth. c. 4.

Chabrias had already acquired a great name, when having been sent against the Spartans to the aid of the Thebans, and seeing himself abandoned in the battle by the allies, who had taken flight, he sustained alone the charge of the enemy; his soldiers, by his order, having closed their files with one knee upon the ground covered with their bucklers, and presented their pikes in front, in such a manner, that they could not be broke, and Agesilaus, though victorious, was obliged to retire. The Athenians erected a statue to Chabrias in the attitude he had fought.

Iphicrates was of a very mean extraction, his father having been a shoemaker: but in a free city like Athens, merit was the sole nobility. This person may be truly said to be the son of his actions. Having signalized himself in a naval combat, wherein he was only a private soldier, he was soon after employed with distinction, and honoured with a command. In a prosecution carried on against him before the judges, his accuser, who was one of the descendants of Harmodius, and made very great use of his ancestor's name, having reproached him with the baseness of his birth, "Yes," replied he, "the nobility of my family begins in me: that of yours ends in you." He married the daughter of Cotys, king of Thrace.

† He is † ranked with the greatest men of Greece, especially in what regards the knowledge of war and military discipline. He made several useful alterations in the soldiers' armour. Before him, the bucklers were very long and heavy, and for that reason were too great a burden, and extremely troublesome; he had them made shorter and lighter, so that without exposing the body, they added to its force and agility. On the contrary, he lengthened the pikes and swords, to make them capable of reaching the enemy at a greater distance. He also changed the cuirasses, and instead of iron and brass, of which they were made before, he caused them to be made of flax. It is not easy to conceive how such armour could defend the soldiers, or be any security against wounds. But that flax being soaked in vinegar mingled with salt, was prepared in such a manner that it grew hard, and became impenetrable either to fire or sword. The use of it was common among several nations.

No troops were ever better exercised or disciplined than those of Iphicrates. He kept them always in action, and in times of peace and tranquillity made them perform all the necessary evolutions, either in attacking the enemy, or defending themselves; in laying ambuscades, or avoiding them; in keeping their ranks even in the pursuit of the enemy, without abandoning themselves to an ardour which often becomes pernicious; or to rally with success, after having begun to break and give way: so that when the battle was to be given, all was in motion with admirable promptitude and order. The officers and soldiers drew themselves up without any trouble, and even in the heat of action performed their parts, as the most able general would have directed them: a merit very rare, as I have been informed, but very estimable; as it contributes more than

* Cor. Nep. in Chab. c. l.

† Diod. l. xv. p. 360. Cor. Nep. in Iphic. c. i.

‡ Iphicrates Atheniensis non tam magnitudine rerum gestarum, quam disciplina militari nobilitatus est. Fuit enim talis dux, ut non solum ætatis suæ cum primis compararetur; sed ne de majoribus natu quidem quisquam antepremeretur. Cor. Nep.

Timotheus the son of Conon, so much celebrated for his great actions, and the important services he had rendered his country. * He did not degenerate from his father's reputation, either for his merit in the field, or his ability in the government of the state; but he added to those excellencies the glory which results from the talents of the mind, having distinguished himself particularly by the gift of eloquence and a taste for the sciences.

† No captain at first ever experienced less than himself the inconstancy of the fortune of war. He had only to undertake an enterprise to accomplish it. Success perpetually attended his views and desires. Such uncommon prosperity did not fail to excite jealousy. Those who envied him, as I have already observed, caused him to be painted asleep, with Fortune by him, taking cities for him in nets. Timotheus retorted coldly, "If I take places in my sleep, what shall I do when I am awake?" He took the thing afterwards more seriously, and, angry with those who pretended to lessen the glory of his actions, declared in public, that he did not owe his success to fortune, but to himself. That goddess, says Plutarch, offended at his pride and arrogance, abandoned him entirely, and he was never afterwards successful. Such were the chiefs employed in the war of the allies.

‡ The war and the campaign opened with the siege of Chio. Chares commanded the land, and Chabrias the sea forces. All the allies exerted themselves in sending aid to that island. Chabrias having forced the passage, entered the port, notwithstanding all the endeavours of the enemy. The other galleys were afraid to follow, and abandoned him. He was immediately surrounded on all sides, and his vessel exceedingly damaged by the assaults of the enemy. He might have saved himself by swimming to the Athenian fleet, as his soldiers did; but from a mistaken principle of glory, he thought it inconsistent with the duty of a general to abandon his vessel in such a manner, and preferred a death, glorious in his sense, to a shameful flight.

This first attempt having miscarried, both sides applied themselves vigorously to making new preparations. The Athenians fitted out a fleet of 60 galleys, and appointed Chares to command it, and armed 60 more under Iphicrates and Timotheus. The fleet of the allies consisted of 100 sail. After having ravaged several islands belonging to the Athenians, where they made a great booty, they sat down before Samos. The Athenians on their side, having united all their forces, besieged Byzantium. The allies made all possible haste to its relief. The two fleets being in view of each other, prepared to fight, when suddenly a violent storm arose, notwithstanding which Chares resolved to advance against the enemy. The two other captains, who had more prudence and experience than him, thought it improper to hazard a battle in such a conjuncture. Chares, enraged at their not following his advice, called the soldiers to

* Hic a patre acceptam gloriam multis auxit virtutibus. Fuit enim disertus, impiger, laboriosus, rei militaris peritus, neque minus civitatis regendæ. Cor. Nep. c. i.

† Timotheus Cononis filius, cum belli laude non inferior fulset quam pater, ad eam laudem doctrinæ et ingenii gloriam adjecit. Cic. l. i. de offic. n. 118.

‡ Plut. in Sylla, p. 454.

‡ Diod. l. xvi. p. 412. Cor. Nep. in Chab. c. iv.

own services, depreciated those of others, and arrogated to himself the whole glory of successes. He wrote to Athens against his two colleagues, and accused them of cowardice and treason. Upon his complaint, the people, * capricious, warm, suspicious, and naturally jealous of such as were distinguished by their extraordinary merit or authority, recalled those two generals, and brought them to a trial.

The faction of Chares, which was very powerful, at Athens, having declared against Timotheus, he was sentenced to pay a fine of 100 talents, † a worthy reward for the noble disinterestedness he had shown upon another occasion, in bringing home to his country 1200 talents ‡ of booty taken from the enemy, without the least deduction for himself. He could bear no longer the sight of an ungrateful city, and being too poor to pay so great a fine, retired to Chalcis. After his death, the people, touched with repentance, mitigated the fine to ten talents, which they made his son Conon pay, to rebuild a certain part of the walls. Thus, by an event sufficiently odd, those very walls, which his grandfather had rebuilt with the spoils of the enemy, the grandson, to the shame of Athens, repaired in part at his own expence.

|| Iphicrates was also obliged to answer for himself before the judges. It was upon this occasion that Aristophon, another Athenian captain, accused him of having betrayed and sold the fleet under his command. Iphicrates, with the confidence an established reputation inspires, asked him, "Would you have committed a treason of this nature?" "No," replied Aristophon, "I am a man of too much honour for such an action!" "How!" replied Iphicrates, "could Iphicrates do what Aristophon would not do?"

‡ He did not only employ the force of arguments in his defence, but called in also the assistance of arms. Instructed by his colleague's ill success, he saw plainly that it was more necessary to intimidate than convince his judges. He posted round the place where they assembled a number of young persons, armed with poniards which they took care to show from time to time. They could not resist so forcible and triumphant a kind of eloquence, and dismissed him acquitted of the charge. When he was afterwards reproached with so violent a proceeding, "I had been a fool indeed," said he, "if, having made war successfully for the Athenians, I had neglected doing so for myself."

Chares, by the recal of his two colleagues, was left sole general of the whole army, and was in a condition to have advanced the Athenian affairs very much in the Hellespont, if he had known how to resist the magnificent offers of Artabasus. That viceroy, who had revolted in Asia Minor against the king of Persia his master, besieged by an army of 70,000 men, and just upon the point of being ruined from the inequality of his forces, corrupted Chares. That general, who had no thoughts but of enriching himself, marched directly to the assistance of Artabasus, effectually relieved him, and received a reward suitable to the service. This action of Chares was treated as a capital crime. He had not only abandoned the service of the republic for a foreign war, but offended the king of

* *Populus acer, suspicax, mobilis, adversarius, invidus etiam potentiae, domum revocat.* Cor. Nep.

† 100,000 crowns.

|| Arist. Rhet. l. ii. c. 23.

‡ 1,200,000 crowns.

§ Polyæn. Stratag. l. iii.

ed him again upon this, as it had done several times before on like occasions. The Athenians, intimidated by the king's menaces, applied themselves seriously to prevent their effects by a general peace.

Prior to these menaces, Isocrates had earnestly recommended this treaty to them in a fine discourse, * which is still extant, wherein he gives them excellent advice. He reproaches them with great liberty, as does Demosthenes in almost all his orations, of abandoning themselves blindly to the insinuations of orators, who flatter their passions, whilst they treat those with contempt who give them the most salutary counsels. He applied himself particularly to correct in them their violent passion for the augmentation of their power, and dominion over the people of Greece, which had been the source of all their misfortunes. He recalls to their remembrance those happy days, so glorious for Athens, in which their ancestors, out of a noble and generous disinterestedness, sacrificed every thing for the support of the common liberty, and the preservation of Greece, and compares them with the present sad times, wherein the ambition of Sparta, and afterwards that of Athens, had successively plunged both states into the greatest misfortunes. He represents to them, that the real and lasting greatness of a state does not consist in augmenting its dominions, or extending its conquests to the utmost, which cannot be effected without violence and injustice, but in the wise government of the people, in rendering them happy, and protecting their allies, in being beloved and esteemed by their neighbours, and feared by their enemies. "A state," says he, "cannot fail of becoming the arbiter of all its neighbours, when "it knows how to unite in its measures the two great qualities, justice "and power, which mutually support each other, and ought to be inseparable. For as power, not regulated by the motives of reason and "justice, has recourse to the most violent methods to crush and subvert "whatever opposes it; so justice, when unarmed and without power, is "exposed to injury, and neither in a condition to defend itself, nor protect "others." The conclusion drawn by Isocrates from this reasoning, is, that Athens, if it would be happy and in tranquility, ought not to affect the empire of the sea for the sake of lording it over all other states; but should conclude a peace, whereby every city and people should be left to the full enjoyment of their liberty; and declare themselves irreconcilable enemies of those who should presume to disturb that peace, or contravene such measures.

† The peace was concluded accordingly under such conditions, and it was stipulated, that Rhodes, Byzantium, Chio, and Cos, should enjoy entire liberty. The war of the allies ended in this manner, after having continued three years.

SECTION III.

DEMOSTHENES EXCITES THE ATHENIANS FOR WAR.—DEATH OF MAUSOLUS.—GRIEF OF ARTEMISA HIS WIFE.

THIS peace did not entirely remove the apprehensions of the Athenians with regard to the king of Persia.‡ The great preparations he was

* De pace, seu socialis.
t. J. C. 356.

† A. M. 3648. Ant. J. C. 356.

‡ A. M. 3649.

pretext with which the king covered his real design.

Athens took the alarm upon this rumour. The orators increased the fears of the people by their discourses, and exhorted them to have an immediate recourse to their arms, to prevent the king of Persia by a previous declaration of war, and to make a league with all the people of Greece against the common enemy. Demosthenes made his first appearance in public at this time, and mounted the tribunal for harangues to give his opinion. He was 28 years of age. I shall speak more extensively of him hereafter. Upon the present occasion, more wise than those precipitate orators, and having undoubtedly in view the importance to the republic of the aid of the Persians against Philip, he dared not indeed oppose in a direct manner their advice, lest he should render himself suspected : but admitting as a principle from the first, that it was necessary to consider the king of Persia as the eternal enemy of Greece, he represented that it was not consistent with prudence, in an affair of such great consequence, to precipitate any thing ; that it was very improper, by a resolution taken upon light and uncertain reports, and by a too early declaration of war, to furnish so powerful a prince with a just reason to turn his arms against Greece ; that all which was necessary at present, was to fit out a fleet of 300 sail, (in what manner, he proposed a scheme*) and to hold the troops in a readiness and condition to make an effectual and vigorous defence, in case of being attacked ; that by so doing, all the people of Greece, without further invitation, would be sufficiently apprised of the common danger to join them ; and that the report alone of such an armament would be enough to induce the king of Persia to change his measures, admitting he should have formed any designs against Greece.

For the rest, he was not of opinion that it was necessary to levy any immediate tax upon the estates of private persons for the expence of this war, which would not amount to a great sum, nor suffice for the occasion. " It is better," said he, to rely upon the zeal and generosity of the citizens. " Our city may be said to be almost as rich as all the other cities of Greece together." [He had before observed that the estimate of the lands of Attica amounted to 8000 talents, about 850,000l. sterling.] " When we shall see the reality and approach of the danger, every body will be ready to contribute to the expences of the war ; as no body can be so void of reason as to prefer the hazard of losing their whole estate with their liberty, to sacrificing a small part of it to their own and their country's preservation."

" And we ought not to fear, as some people would insinuate, that the great riches of the king of Persia will enable him to raise a great body of auxiliaries, and render his army formidable against us. Our Greeks, when they are to march against Egypt, or Orontes, and the other barbarians, serve willingly under the Persians ; but not one of them, I dare be assured, not a single man of them will ever resolve to bear arms against Greece."

This discourse had all its effect. The refined and delicate address of the orator in advising the imposition of a tax to be deferred, and artfully explaining at the same time, that it would fall only upon the rich, was highly proper to render abortive an affair which had no other foundation than in the overheated imagination of some orators, who were perhaps interested in the war they advised.

* I reserve this scheme for the seventh section, being curious, and very pro-

ise his zeal, and display his eloquence. That city, which had been lately established by the Arcadians, who had settled a numerous colony there from different cities, and which might serve as a fortress and bulwark against Sparta, gave the Lacedæmonians great uneasiness, and alarmed them extremely. They resolved therefore to attack and make themselves masters of it. The Megalopolitans, who without doubt had renounced their alliance with Thebes, had recourse to Athens, and implored its protection. The other people concerned sent also their deputies thither, and the affair was debated before the people.

‡ Demosthenes founded his discourse from the beginning of it upon this principle : That it was of the last importance to prevent either Sparta or Thebes from growing too powerful, and from being in a condition to give law to the rest of Greece. Now it is evident, that if we abandon Megalopolis to the Lacedæmonians, they will soon make themselves masters of Messene also, two strong neighbouring cities which are a check upon Sparta, and keep it within due bounds. The alliance we shall make with the Arcadians, in declaring for Megalopolis, is therefore the certain means to preserve so necessary a balance between Sparta and Thebes ; because whatever happens, neither the one nor the other will be able to hurt us whilst the Arcadians are our allies, whose forces in conjunction with ours, will always be superior to those of either of them.

A weighty objection to this advice of Demosthenes, was the alliance actually subsisting between Athens and Sparta : for, in fine, said the orators who opposed Demosthenes, what idea will the world have of Athens, if we change in such a manner with the times ? or is it consistent with justice to pay no regard to the faith of treaties ? “ We ought,” † replied Demosthenes, whose very words I shall repeat in this place, “ we ought indeed always to have justice in view, and to make it the rule of our conduct ; but, at the same time, our conformity to it should consist with the public good and the interest of the state. It has been a perpetual maxim with us to assist the oppressed.” He cites the Lacedæmonians themselves, the Thebans, and Eubœans as examples. “ We have never varied from this principle. The reproach of changing therefore ought not to fall upon us, but upon those whose injustice and usurpation oblige us to declare against them.”

I admire the language of politicians. To hear them talk, it is always reason and the strictest justice that determine them ; but to see them act, makes it evident that interest and ambition are the sole rule and guide of their conduct. Their discourse is an effect of that regard for justice which nature has implanted in the mind of man, and which they cannot entirely shake off. There are few who venture to declare against that internal principle in their expressions, or to contradict it openly. But there are also few who observe it with fidelity and constancy in their actions. Greece never was known to have more treaties of alliance than at the time we are now speaking of, nor were they ever less regarded. This contempt of the religion of oaths in states, is a proof of their decline, and often denotes and occasions their approaching ruin.

per to explain in what manner the Athenians fitted out and subsisted their fleets.

* A. M. 3651. Ant. J. C. 353. Dioid. l. xv. p. 401.

† Demost. Orat. pro. Megalop.

‡ Δει σφοδρῶς μὲν αὖ καὶ πρῶτ' εἰν τα δίκαια συμπαραίηξι δὲ, ὅπως ἀμὲ καὶ σοὺς φείζονται ἐφ' ταῦτα.

command of †Pammenes. Megalopolis was reinstated in its former condition, and its inhabitants, who had retired into their own countries, were obliged to return.

The peace which had put an end to the war of the allies, did not procure for all of them the tranquility they had reason to expect from it. The people of Rhodes and Cos, who had been declared free by that treaty, only changed their master. Mausolus, king of Caria, who had assisted them in throwing off the Athenian yoke, imposed his own upon them. Having publicly declared himself for the rich and powerful, he enslaved the people, and made them suffer exceedingly. He died the second year after the treaty of peace, having reigned 24 years. † Artemisa his wife succeeded him; and as she was supported with all the influence of the king of Persia, she retained her power in the isles lately subjected.

In speaking here of Artemisa, it is proper to observe that she must not be confounded with another Artemisa who lived above 100 years before, in the time of Xerxes, and who distinguished her resolution and prudence so much in the naval battle of Salamin. Several celebrated writers have fallen into this error through inadvertency.

‡ This princess immortalized herself by the honours she rendered to the memory of Mausolus her husband. She caused a magnificent monument to be erected for him in Halicarnassus, which was called the Mausoleum, and for its beauty was esteemed one of the wonders of the world, and gave the name of mausoleum to all future great and magnificent structures of the same kind.

§ She endeavoured also to eternise the name of Mausolus by other monuments, which she believed more durable than those of brass or marble, but are often no better proof against the injuries of time; I mean works of wit. She caused excellent panegyrics to be made in honour of her husband, and proposed a prize of great value for the person whose performance should be the best. Amongst many others the celebrated Isocrates and Theopompus his disciple, were competitors for it.

Theopompus carried it from them all, and had the weakness and vanity to boast in public of having gained the prize against his master; preferring, as is too common, the fame of fine parts to the glory of a good heart. He had represented Mausolus in his history as a prince most sordidly avaricious, to whom all means of amassing treasure were good and eligible. He painted him without doubt in very different colours in his panegyric, or else he would never have pleased the princess.

¶ That illustrious widow prepared a different tomb for Mausolus than what I have been speaking of. Having gathered his ashes, and had the bones beaten in a mortar, she mingled some of the powder every day in her drink, till she had drank it all off; desiring by that means to make her own body the sepulchre of her husband. She survived him only two years, and her grief did not end but with her life.

Instead of tears, in which most writers plunge Artemisa during her wid-

* Diod. l. xv. p. 402.

† This is not the Pammenes of Thebes, of whom mention has been made before.

‡ A. M. 3650. Ant. J. C. 354. Diod. l. xvi. p. 435.

§ Plin. l. xxxvi. c. v.

¶ Aul. Gel. l. x. c. 18. Plut. in Isocrat. p. 338.

¶ Cic. Tusc. Quest. l. iii. n. 75. Val. Max. l. iv. c. 6.

at Athens as a forlorn relict, who neglected the affairs of her kingdom. But we have something more decisive upon this head. † Vitruvius tells us that after the death of Mausolus, the Rhodians, offended that a woman should reign in Caria, undertook to dethrone her. They left Rhodes for that purpose with their fleet, and entered the great port of Halicarnassus. The queen being informed of their design, gave the inhabitants orders to keep within the walls, and when the enemy should arrive, to express by shouts and clapping of hands a readiness to surrender the city to them. The Rhodians quitted their ships, and went in all haste to the public place, leaving their fleet without any to guard it. In the mean time, Artemisa came out with her galleys from the little port through a small canal, which she caused to be cut on purpose, entered the great port, seized the enemy's fleet without resistance, and having put her soldiers and mariners on board of it, she set sail. The Rhodians having no means of escaping, were all put to the sword. The queen all the while advanced towards Rhodes. When the inhabitants saw their vessels approach, adorned with wreaths of laurel, they raised great shouts, and received their victorious and triumphant fleet with extraordinary marks of joy. It was so in effect, but in another sense than they imagined. Artemisa having met with no resistance, took possession of the city, and put the principal inhabitants to death. She caused a trophy of her victory to be erected in it, and set up two statues of brass, one of which represented the city of Rhodes, and the other Artemisa, branding it with a hot iron. Vitruvius adds, that the Rhodians dared never demolish that trophy, their religion forbidding it; but they surrounded it with a building, which prevented it entirely from being seen.

All this, as Monsieur Bayle observes in his Dictionary, does not express a forlorn and inconsolable widow, that passed her whole time in grief and lamentation: which makes it reasonable to suspect, that whatever is reported of excessive in the mourning of Artemisa, has no other foundation but its being advanced at a venture by some writer, and afterwards copied by all the rest.

I should be better pleased, for the honour of Artemisa, if it had been said as there is nothing incredible in it, that by a fortitude and greatness of mind, of which her sex has many examples, she had known how to unite the severe affliction of the widow with the active courage of the queen, and made the affairs of her government serve her instead of consolation. † *Negotia pro solatiis accipiens.*

‡ The Rhodians being treated by Artemisa in the manner we have related, and unable to support any longer so severe and shameful a servitude, they had recourse to the Athenians, and implored their protection. Though they had rendered themselves entirely unworthy of it by their revolt, Demosthenes took upon himself to speak to the people in their behalf. He began by setting forth their crime in its full light; he enlarged upon their injustice and perfidy; he seemed to enter into the people's just sentiments of resentment and indignation, and it might have been thought was going to declare himself in the strongest terms against the Rhodians: but all this was only the art of the orator, to insinuate himself into his auditors' opin-

* Demost. de Libert. Rhod. p. 145.

† Vitruv. de Architect. l. ii. c. 8.

‡ Tacit.

‡ A. M. 5853. Ant. J. C. 351. Dem. de Libert. Rhod.

their unworthiness, and who nevertheless came to improve the republic's protection. He sets before them the great maxims which in all ages had constituted the glory of Athens, the forgiving of injuries, the pardoning of rebels, and the taking upon them the defence of the unfortunate. To the motives of glory he annexes those of interest, in showing the importance of declaring for a city that favoured the democratic form of government, and of not abandoning an island so powerful as that of Rhodes: which is the substance of Demosthenes' discourse entitled, "For the liberty of the Rhodians."

* The death of Artemisa, which happened the same year, it is very likely re-established the Rhodians in their liberty. She was succeeded by her brother Idræus, who espoused his own sister Ada, as Mausolus had done Artemisa. It was the custom in Caria for the kings to marry their sisters in this manner, and for the widows to succeed their husbands in the throne in preference to the brothers, and even the children of the defunct.

SECTION IV.

EXPEDITION OF OCHUS AGAINST PHŒNICIA, CYPRUS, AND EGYPT.

OCHUS † meditated in earnest the reduction of Egypt to his obedience, which had long pretended to maintain itself in independence. Whilst he was making great preparations for this important expedition, he received advice of the revolt of Phœnicia. † That people oppressed by the Persian governours, resolved to throw off so heavy a yoke, and made a league with Nectanebis king of Egypt, against whom Persia was marching its armies. As there was no other passage for that invasion but through Phœnicia, this revolt was very seasonable for Nectanebis, who therefore sent Mentor the Rhodian to support the rebels with 4000 Grecian troops. He intended by that means to make Phœnicia his barrier, and to stop the Persians there. The Phœnicians took the field with that reinforcement, beat the governours of Syria and Cilicia that had been sent against them, and drove the Persians entirely out of Phœnicia.

‡ The Cyprians who were not better treated than the Phœnicians, seeing the good success which had attended this revolt, followed their example and joined in their league with Egypt. Ochus sent orders to Idræus king of Caria to make war against them, who soon after fitted out a fleet, and sent 8000 Greeks along with it, under the command of Phocion the Athenian, and Evagoras who was believed to have been the son of Nicocles. It is probable that he had been expelled by his uncle Protagoras, and that he had embraced with pleasure this opportunity of re-ascending the throne. His knowledge of the country, and the party he had there, made the king of Persia choose him very wisely to command in this expedition. They made a descent in the island, where their army increased to double its number by the reinforcements which came from Syria and Cilicia. The hopes of enriching themselves by the spoils of this island, which was very rich, drew thither abundance of troops, and they formed the siege of Salamin by sea and land. The island of Cyprus had at that time nine cities, considerable enough to have each of them a petty king. But all those

* Strab. l. xiv. p. 656.

† Diod. l. xvi. p. 439.

‡ A. M. 3658. Ant. J. C. 351.

‡ Diod. l. xvi. p. 440, 441.

cent.

Ochus, having observed that the Egyptian war was always unsuccessful from the ill conduct of the generals sent thither, resolved to take the care of it upon himself. But before he set out, he signified his desire to the states of Greece, that they would put an end to their divisions, and cease to make war upon one another.

It is a just matter of surprise, that the court of Persia should insist so earnestly and so often that the people of Greece should live in tranquility with each other, and observe inviolably the articles of the treaty of Antalcides, the principal end of which was the establishment of a lasting union amongst them. It had formerly employed a quite different policy.

From the miscarriage of the enterprise against Greece under Xerxes, judging gold and silver a more proper means for subjecting it than that of the sword, the Persians did not attack it with open force, but by the method of secret intrigues. They conveyed considerable sums into it privately, to corrupt the persons of credit and authority in the great cities, and were perpetually watching occasions to arm them against each other, and to deprive them of the leisure and means to invade themselves. They were particularly careful to declare sometimes for one, sometimes for another, in order to support a kind of balance amongst them, which put it out of the power of any of those republics to aggrandize itself too much, and by that means to become formidable to Persia.

That nation employed a quite different conduct at this time, in prohibiting all wars to the people of Greece, and commanding them to observe an universal peace, upon pain of incurring their displeasure and arms to such as should disobey. Persia, without doubt, did not take that resolution at a venture, and had its reasons to behave in such a manner with regard to Greece.

Its design might be to soften their spirit by degrees, in disarming their hands; to blunt the edge of that valour which spurred them on perpetually by noble emulation; to extinguish in them their passion for glory and victory; to render languid by long inertion and forced ease, the activity natural to them; and in fine to bring them into the number of those people whom a quiet and effeminate life enervates, and who lose in sloth and peace that martial ardour which combats and even dangers are apt to inspire.

The king of Persia who then reigned, had a personal interest as well as his predecessor, in imposing these terms upon the Greeks. Egypt had long thrown off the yoke, and given the empire just cause of inquietude. Ochus had resolved to go in person to reduce the rebels. He had the expedition extremely at heart, and neglected nothing that could promote its success. The famous retreat of the ten thousand, without enumerating many other actions of a like nature, had left a great idea in Persia of the Grecian valour. That prince relied more upon a small body of Greeks in his pay, than upon the whole army of the Persians, as numerous as it was; and he well knew that the intestine divisions of Greece would render the cities incapable of supplying the number of soldiers he had occasion for.

In fine, as a good politician, he could not enter upon action in Egypt till he had pacified all behind him, Ionia especially, and its neighbouring provinces. Now, the most certain means to hold them in obedience, was to deprive them of all hope of aid from the Greeks, to whom they had al-

When Ochus had taken all his measures, and made the necessary preparations, he repaired to the frontiers of Phœnicia, where he had an army of 300,000 foot, and 30,000 horse, and put himself at the head of it. Mentor was at Sidon with the Grecian troops. The approach of so great an army staggered him, and he sent secretly to Ochus, to make him offers, not only of surrendering Sidon to him, but of serving him in Egypt, where he was well acquainted with the country, and might be very useful to him. Ochus agreed entirely to the proposal, upon which he engaged Tennes, king of Sidon, in the same treason, and they surrendered the place in concert to Ochus.

The Sidonians had set fire to their ships upon the approach of the king's troops, in order to lay the people under the necessity of making a good defence, by removing all hope of any other security. When they saw themselves betrayed, that the enemy were masters of the city, and that there was no possibility of escaping either by sea or land, in the despair of their condition, they shut themselves up in their houses, and set them on fire. 40,000 men, without reckoning women and children, perished in this manner. The fate of Tennes, their king was no better. Ochus seeing himself master of Sidon, and having no further occasion for him, caused him to be put to death, a just reward for his treason, and an evident proof that Ochus did not yield to him in perfidy. At the time this misfortune happened, Sidon was immensely rich. The fire having melted the gold and silver, Ochus sold the cinders for a considerable sum of money.

The dreadful ruin of this city cast so great a terror into the rest of Phœnicia, that it submitted and obtained conditions reasonable enough from the king. Ochus made no great difficulty in complying with their demands, because he would not lose the time there he had so much occasion for in the execution of his projects against Egypt.

Before he began his march to enter it, he was joined by a body of 10,000 Greeks. From the beginning of this expedition, he had demanded troops in Greece. The Athenians and Lacedæmonians had excused themselves from furnishing him any at that time; it being impossible for them to do it, whatever desire they might have, as they said, to cultivate a good correspondence with the king. The Thebans sent him 1000 men under the command of Dachares: the Argives 3000 under Nicostratus. The rest came from the cities of Asia. All these troops joined him immediately after the taking of Sidon.

† The Jews must have had some share in this war of the Phœnicians against Persia; for Sidon was no sooner taken, than Ochus entered Judea, and besieged the city of Jericho which he took. Besides which, it appears that he carried a great number of Jewish captives into Egypt, and sent many others into Hyrcania, where he settled them along the coast of the Caspian sea.

‡ Ochus also put an end to the war with Cyprus at the same time. That of Egypt so entirely engrossed his attention, that in order to have nothing to divert him from it, he was satisfied to come to an accommodation with the nine kings of Cyprus, who submitted to him upon certain conditions, and were all continued in their little states. Evagoras demanded to be reinstated in the kingdom of Salamin. It was evidently proved,

* Diod. l. xvi. p. 441—443.

† Solin. c. xxxv. Euseb. in Chron. &c. ‡ Diod. l. xvi. p. 443.

ed in the kingdom of Salamin, and the king gave Evagoras a remote government. He behaved no better in that, and was again expelled. He afterwards returned to Salamin, and was seized and put to death. Surprising difference between Nicocles and his son Evagoras !

* After the reduction of the isle of Cyprus, and the province of Phœnicia, Ochus advanced at length towards Egypt.

Upon his arrival, he encamped before Pelusium, from whence he detached three bodies of his troops, each of them commanded by a Greek and a Persian with equal authority. The first was under Lachares the Theban, and Rosaces, governour of Lydia and Ionia. The second was given to Nicostratus the Argive, and Aristazanes, one of the great officers of the crown. The third had Mentor the Rhodian, and Bagoas, one of Ochus' eunuchs at the head of it. Each detachment had its particular orders. The king remained with the main body of the army in the camp he had made choice of at first, to wait events and to be ready to support those troops in case of ill success; or to improve the advantages they might have.

Nectanebis had long expected this invasion, the preparations for which had made so much noise. He had 100,000 men on foot, 20,000 of whom were Greeks, 20,000 Lybians, and the rest were Egyptian troops. Part of them he bestowed in the places upon the frontiers, and posted himself with the rest in the passes, to dispute the enemy's entrance into Egypt. Ochus' first detachment was sent against Pelusium, where there was a garrison of 5000 Greeks. Lachares besieged the place. That under Nicostratus, on board of 24 ships of the Persian fleet, entered one of the mouths of the Nile at the same time, and sailed into the heart of Egypt, where they landed and fortified themselves well in a camp, of which the situation was very advantageous. All the Egyptian troops in these parts were immediately drawn together under Clinias, a Greek of the isle of Cos, and prepared to repel the enemy. A very warm action ensued, in which Clinias, with 5000 of his troops were killed, and the rest entirely broke and dispersed.

This action decided the success of the war. Nectanebis apprehending that Nicostratus after this victory would embark again upon the Nile, and take Memphis, the capital of the kingdom, made all the haste he could to defend it, and abandoned the passes, which it was of the last importance to secure, to prevent the entrance of the enemy. When the Greeks that defended Pelusium, were apprised of this precipitate retreat, they believed all lost, and capitulated with Lachares upon condition of being sent back into Greece with all that belonged to them, and without suffering any injury in their persons or effects.

Mentor who commanded the third detachment, finding the passes clear and unguarded, entered the country and made himself master of it without any opposition : for, after having caused a report to be spread throughout his camp, that Ochus had ordered all those who would submit, to be treated with favour, and that such as made resistance should be destroyed as the Sidonians had been ; he let all his prisoners escape, that they might carry the news into the country round about. Those poor people reported in their towns and villages what they had heard in the enemy's camp. The brutality of Ochus seemed to confirm it ; and the terror was so great

* Diqd. l. xvi. p. 444 et 450.

* Nectanebis, having lost all hope of being able to defend himself, escaped with his treasures and best effects into Æthiopia, from whence he never returned. He was the last king of Egypt of the Egyptian race, since whom it has always continued under a foreign yoke, according to the prediction of Ezekiel.†

Ochus, having entirely conquered Egypt in this manner, dismantled the cities, pillaged the temples, and returned in triumph to Babylon, laden with spoils, and especially with gold and silver, of which he carried away immense sums. He left the government of it to Pherendates, a Persian of the first quality.

‡ Here Manethon finishes his commentaries, or history of Egypt. He was a priest of Heliopolis in that country, and had written the history of its different dynasties from the commencement of the nation to the times we now treat of. His book is often cited by Josephus, Eusebius, Plutarch, Porphyry, and several others. This historian lived in the reign of Ptolemaeus Philadelphus, king of Egypt, to whom he dedicates his work, of which § Syncellus has preserved us the abridgment.

Nectanebis lost the crown by his too good opinion of himself. He had been placed upon the throne by Agesilaus, and afterwards supported in it by the valour and counsels of Diophantes the Athenian, and Lamius the Lacedæmonian, who, whilst they had the command of his troops, and the direction of the war, had rendered his arms victorious over the Persians in all the enterprises they had formed against him. It is a pity we have no account of them, and that Diodorus is silent upon this head. That prince, vain from so many successes, imagined, in consequence, that he was become sufficiently capable of conducting his own affairs in person, and dismissed them to whom he was indebted for all those advantages. He had time enough to repent his error, and to discover that the power does not confer the merit of a king.

§ Ochus rewarded very liberally the service which Mentor the Rhodian had rendered him in the reduction of Phœnicia, and the conquest of Egypt. Before he left that kingdom, he dismissed the other Greeks laden with his presents. As for Mentor, to whom the whole success of the expedition was principally owing, he not only made him a present of 100‡ talents in money, besides many jewels of great value, but gave him the government of all the coast of Asia, with the direction of the war against some provinces, which had revolted in the beginning of his reign, and declared him generalissimo of all his armies on that side.

Mentor made use of his interest to reconcile the king with his brother Mnemon, and Artabasis, who had married their sister. Both of them had been in arms against Ochus. We have already related the revolt of Artabasis, and the victories he obtained over the king's troops. He was, however, overpowered at last, and reduced to take refuge with Philip, king of Macedon; and Mnemon, who had borne a part in his wars, had also a share in his banishment. After this reconciliation, they rendered Ochus

* A. M. 3854. Ant. J. C. 350.

† Ezek. xxix. 14, 15.

‡ Syncel. p. 256. Voss. de hist. Græc. l. i. c. 14.

§ George, a monk of Constantinople, so called from his being Syncellus, or vicar to the Patriarch Tarasus, towards the end of the ninth century.

‡ A. M. 3655. Ant. J. C. 349.

¶ 100,000 crowns.

Neither did Mentor want his great merits, nor deceive the king in the confidence he had reposed in him; for he had scarce taken possession of his government, when he re-established every where the king's authority, and reduced those who had revolted in his neighbourhood to return to their obedience; some he brought over by his address and stratagems, and others by force of arms. In a word, he knew so well how to take his advantages, that at length he subjected them all to the yoke, and reinstated the king's affairs in those provinces.

* In the first year of the 108th Olympiad died Plato, the famous Athenian philosopher. I shall defer speaking of him at present, that I may not interrupt the chain of the history.

SECTION V.

DEATH OF OCHUS.—ARSES SUCCEEDS HIM.

OCHUS, † after the conquest of Egypt, and reduction of the revolted provinces of his empire, abandoned himself to pleasure and luxurious ease during the rest of his life, and left the care of affairs entirely to his ministers. The two principal of them were the eunuch Bagoas, and Mentor the Rhodian, who divided all power between them, so that the first had all the provinces of the Upper, and the latter, all those of the Lower Asia under him.

‡ After having reigned 23 years, Ochus died of poison given him by Bagoas. That eunuch, who was by birth an Egyptian, had always retained a love for his country, and a zeal for its religion. When his master conquered it, he flattered himself, that it would have been in his power to have softened the destiny of the one, and protected the other from insult. But he could not restrain the brutality of his prince, who acted a thousand things in regard to both, which the eunuch saw with extreme sorrow, and always violently resented in his heart.

Ochus, not contented with having dismantled the cities, and pillaged the houses and temples, as has been said, had besides taken away all the archives of the kingdom, which were deposited and kept with religious care in the temples of the Egyptians; and in || derision of their worship, he had caused the god Apis to be killed, that is, the sacred bull which they adored under that name. What gave occasion for this last action was, § that Ochus being as lazy and heavy as he was cruel, the Egyptians, from the first of those qualities, had given him the shocking surname of the stupid animal they found he resembled. Violently enraged at this affront, Ochus said that he would make them sensible that he was not an ass, but a lion, and that the ass whom they despised so much should eat their ox. Accordingly he ordered Apis to be dragged out of his temple, and sacrificed to an ass. After which he made his cooks dress, and serve him up to the officers of his household. This piece of wit incensed Bagoas. As for the archives, he redeemed them afterwards, and sent them back to the places where it was the custom to keep them: but the af-

* A. M. 3656. Ant. J. C. 343.

† Diod. l. xvi. p. 490.

‡ A. M. 3666. Ant. J. C. 338.

§ Plut. de Isid. et Osir. p. 363.

|| Ælian. l. iv. c. 2.

red instead of the king's, and to avenge his having made the officers of the house eat the god Apis, he made cats eat his dead body, which he gave them cut in small pieces; and for his bones, those he turned into handles for knives and swords, the natural symbols of his cruelty. It is very probable, that some new cause had awakened in the heart of this monster his ancient resentment; without which, it is not to be conceived, that he could carry his barbarity so far in regard to his master and benefactor.

After the death of Ochus, Bagoas, in whose hands all power was at that time, placed Arses upon the throne, the youngest of all the late king's sons, and put the rest to death, in order to possess with better security, and without a rival, the authority he had usurped. He gave Arses only the name of king, whilst he reserved to himself the whole power of the sovereignty. But perceiving that the young prince began to discover his wickedness, and took measures to punish it, he prevented him by having him assassinated, and destroyed his whole family with him.

Bagoas, after having rendered the throne vacant by the murder of Arses, placed Darius upon it, the third of that name who reigned in Persia. His true name was Codomanus, of whom much will be said hereafter.

We see here in a full light the sad effect of the ill policy of the kings of Persia, who, to ease themselves of the weight of public business, abandoned their whole authority to an eunuch. Bagoas might have more address and understanding than the rest, and thereby merit some distinction. It is the duty of a wise prince to distinguish merit; but it is as consistent for him to continue always the entire master, judge, and arbiter of his affairs. A prince like Ochus, who had made the greatest crimes his steps for ascending the throne, and who had supported himself in it by the same measures, deserved to have such a minister as Bagoas, who vied with his master in perfidy and cruelty. Ochus experienced their first effects. Had he desired to have nothing to fear from him, he should not have been so imprudent as to render him formidable, by giving him an unlimited power.

SECTION VI.

ABRIDGMENT OF THE LIFE OF DEMOSTHENES.

AS Demosthenes will have a great part in the history of Philip and Alexander, which will be the subject of the ensuing volume, it is necessary to give the reader some previous idea of him, and to let him know by what means he cultivated, and to what a degree of perfection he carried his talent of eloquence; which made him more awful to Philip and Alexander, and enabled him to render greater services to his country, than the highest military virtue could have done.

† That orator, born † two years before Philip, and 280 before Cicero, was not the son of a dirty smoaky blacksmith, as || Juvenal would seem

* Ælian. l. vi. c. 8.

† A. M. 3623. Ant. J. C. 381. Plut. in Demost. p. 347—439.

‡ The fourth year of the 99th Olympiad.

|| Quem pater ardentis massæ fuligine lippus,

A carbone et forcipibus, gladiosque parente

Incude, et luteo vulcano ad rhetora misit.

Juv. l. iv. sat. 10.

his reputation, whose works are an higher title of nobility than the most splendid the world affords. * Demosthenes tells us himself, that his father employed 30 slaves at his forges, each of them valued at three minæ, or 50 crowns: two excepted, who were without doubt the most expert in the business, and directed the work, and those were each of them worth 100 crowns. It is well known that part of the wealth of the ancients consisted in slaves. Those forges, all charges paid, cleared annually 30 minæ, that is, 1500 crowns. To this first manufactory, appropriated to the forging of swords and such kind of arms, he added another, wherein beds and tables of fine wood and ivory were made, which brought him in yearly 12 minæ. In this only 20 slaves were employed, each of them valued at two minæ, or 100 livres.†

Demosthenes' father died possessed of an estate of 1½ talents.‡ He had the misfortune to fall into the hands of sordid and avaricious guardians, who had no views but of making the most out of his fortune. They carried that base spirit so far as to refuse their pupil's masters the reward due to them; so that he was not educated with the care which so excellent a genius as his required; besides which, the weakness of his constitution, and the delicacy of his health, with the excessive fondness of a mother that doated upon him, prevented his masters from obliging him to apply much to his studies.

The school of Isocrates, || in which so many great men had been educated, was at that time the most famous at Athens. But whether the avarice of Demosthenes' guardians prevented him from improving under a master, whose price was very high, § or that the soft and peaceful eloquence of Isocrates was not to his taste, at that time he studied under Isæus, whose character was strength and vehemence. He found means however to get the principles of rhetoric taught by the former: but ¶ Plato, in reality, contributed the most in forming Demosthenes; he read his works with great application, and received lessons from him also; and it is easy to distinguish in the writings of the disciple the noble and sublime air of the master.

** But he soon quitted the schools of Isæus and Plato for another, under a different kind of direction; I mean, to frequent the bar, of which this was the occasion. The orator Callistratus was appointed to plead the cause of the city Oropus, situated between Bœotia and Attica. Chabrias having disposed the Athenians to march to the aid of the Thebans, who were in great distress, they hastened thither, and delivered them from the enemy. The Thebans, forgetting so great a service, took the town of Oropus, which was upon their frontier, from the Athenians. †† Chabrias was suspected, and charged with treason upon this occasion. Callistratus was chosen to plead against him. The reputation of that orator, and the importance of the cause, excited curiosity, and made a great noise in

* In Orat. i. cont. Aphob. p. 896.

† About 4l. 10s.

‡ 14,000 crowns.

|| Isocrates—cujus e ludo, tanquam ex equo Trojano, innumeri principes exierunt. De orat. n. 94.

§ About 22l. 10s.

¶ Lectitavisse Platonem studiose audivisse etiam, Demosthenes dicitur: idque apparet ex genere et granditate sermonis. Cic. in Brut. n. 121.

|| Illud jusjurandum, per cæsos in Marathone ac Salamine propugnatores reip. satis manifesto docet, præceptorem ejus Platonem fuisse. Quint. l. xii. c. 10.

** Aul. Gel. l. iii. c. 13.

†† Demost. in Midi. p. 613.

having had extraordinary success, was attended home by a crowd of illustrious citizens, who seemed to vie with each other in praising and admiring him. The young man was extremely affected with the honours which he saw paid to the orator, and still more with the supreme power of eloquence over the minds of men, over which it exercises a kind of absolute power. He was himself sensible of its effects, and not being able to resist its charms, he gave himself wholly up to it, from thenceforth renounced all other studies and pleasures, and during the continuance of Callistratus at Athens, he never quitted him, but made all the improvement he could from his precepts.

The first essay of his eloquence was against his guardians, whom he obliged to refund a part of his fortune. Encouraged by this success, he ventured to speak before the people, but with very ill success. He had a weak voice, a thick way of speaking, and a very short breath; notwithstanding which his periods were so long, that he was often obliged to stop in the midst of them for respiration. This occasioned his being hissed by the whole audience; from whence he retired entirely discouraged, and determined to renounce for ever a function of which he believed himself incapable. One of his auditors, who had observed an excellent fund of genius in him, and a kind of eloquence which came very near that of Pericles, gave him new spirit from the grateful idea of so glorious a resemblance, and the good advice which he added to it.

He ventured therefore to appear a second time before the people, and was no better received than before. As he withdrew, hanging down his head, and in the utmost confusion, Satyrus, one of the most excellent actors of those times, who was his friend, met him, and having learned from him the cause of his being so much dejected, he assured him that the evil was not without remedy, and that the case was not so desperate as he imagined. He desired him only to repeat some of Sophocles' or Euripides' verses to him, which he accordingly did. Satyrus spoke them after him, and gave them such graces by the tone, gesture, and spirit with which he pronounced them, that Demosthenes himself found them quite different from what they were in his own manner of speaking. He perceived plainly what he wanted, and applied himself to the acquiring of it.

His efforts to correct his natural defect of utterance, and to perfect himself in pronunciation, of which his friend had made him understand the value, seemed almost incredible, and prove that an industrious perseverance can surmount all things. † He stammered to such a degree, that he could not pronounce some letters; amongst others, that with which the name of the art ‡ he studied begins; and he was so short breathed, that he could not utter a whole period without stopping. He overcame these obstacles at length by putting small pebbles into his mouth, and pronouncing several verses in that manner without interruption; and then walking and going up steep and difficult places, so that at last no letter made him hesitate, and his breath held out through the longest periods.

¶ He went also to the sea side, and whilst the waves were in the most violent agitation, he pronounced harangues, to accustom himself, by the

* A. M. 3639. Ant. J. C. 365.

† Rhetoric.

‡ Cic. l. i. de orat. n. 260, 261.

¶ Quintil. l. xi. c. 3.

* Demosthenes took no less care of his action than of his voice. He had a large looking-glass in his house, which served to teach him gesture, and at which he used to declaim, before he spoke in public. To correct a fault, which he had contracted by an ill habit of continually shrugging his shoulders, he practised standing upright in a kind of a very narrow pulpit or rostrum, over which hung a halbert in such a manner, that if in the heat of action that motion escaped him, the point of the weapon might serve at the same time to admonish and correct him.

His pains were well bestowed; for it was by this means that he carried the art of declaiming to the highest degree of perfection of which it was capable; whence, it is plain, he well knew its value and importance. When he was asked three several times, which quality he thought most necessary in an orator, he gave no other answer than pronunciation; insinuating by making that reply † three times successively, that qualification to be the only one, of which the want could be least concealed, and which was the most capable of concealing other defects; and that pronunciation alone could give considerable weight even to an indifferent orator; when, without it, the most excellent could not hope the least success. He must have had a very high opinion of it, as to attain a perfection in it, and for the instruction of Neoptolemus, the most excellent comedian then in being, he devoted so considerable a sum as 10,000 drachms, ‡ though he was not very rich.

His application to study was no less surprising. To be the more removed from noise, and less subject to distraction, he caused a small chamber to be made for him under ground, in which he sometimes shut himself up for whole months, shaving on purpose half his head and face, that he might not be in a condition to go abroad. It was there, by the light of a small lamp, he composed the admirable orations, which were said by those who envied him, to smell of the oil; to imply that they were too elaborate. "It is plain," replied he, "yours did not cost you so much trouble." ¶ He rose very early in the morning, and used to say that he was sorry when any workman was at his business before him. § We may judge of his extraordinary efforts to acquire an excellence of every kind, from the pains he took in copying Thucydides' history eight times with his own hand, in order to render the style of that great man familiar to him.

Demosthenes, after having exercised his talent of eloquence in several private causes, made his appearance in full light, and mounted the tribunal of harangues, to treat there upon public affairs; with what success we shall see hereafter. Cicero ¶ tells us, that his success was so great, that all Greece came in crowds to Athens to hear Demosthenes speak;

* Quintil. l. xi. c. 3.

† Actio in dicendo una dominatur. Sine hac summus orator esse in numero nullo potest: mediocris hac instructus summos sæpe superare. Huic primas dedit Demosthenes dicitur, cum rogaretur quid in dicendo esset primum; huic secundas, huic tertias. Cic. de orat. l. iii. n. 215. ‡ About 240l. sterling.

¶ Cui non sunt auditæ Demosthenis vigilæ; qui dolere se aiebat si quando opificum antelucana victus esset industria. Tusc. Quæst. l. iv. n. 44.

§ Lucian. Advers. Indoc. p. 639.

¶ Ne illud quidem intelligunt, non modo ita memoriæ præditum esse, sed ita necesse fuisse cum Demosthenes dicturus esset, ut concursus, audiendi causa, ex tota Græcia fierent. In Brut. n. 239.

enlarged sufficiently upon that elsewhere ; * I only consider its wonderful effects.

If we may believe Philip upon this head, of which he is certainly an evidence of unquestionable authority, † the eloquence of Demosthenes alone did him more hurt than all the armies and fleets of the Athenians. His harangues, he said, were like machines of war, and batteries raised at a distance against him ; by which he overthrew all his projects, and ruined his enterprises, without its being possible to prevent their effect. " For " I myself," says Philip of him, " had I been present, and heard that vehement orator declaim, should have concluded the first, that it was " indispensably necessary to declare war against me." No city seemed impregnable to that prince, provided he could introduce a mule laden with gold into it : but he confessed that, to his sorrow, Demosthenes was invincible in that respect, and that he always found him inaccessible to his presents. After the battle of Chœronea, Philip, though victor, was struck with extreme dread at the prospect of the great danger, to which that orator, by the powerful league he had been the sole cause of forming against him, exposed himself and his kingdom.

‡ Antipater spoke to the same effect of him, " I value not," said he, " the Piræus, the galleys, and armies of the Athenians : for what have we " to fear from a people continually employed in games, feasts, and Bacchanals ? Demosthenes alone gives me pain. Without him the Athenians differ in nothing from the meanest people of Greece. He alone excites and animates them. It is he that rouses them from their lethargy " and stupefaction, and puts their arms and oars into their hands almost " against their will : incessantly representing to them the famous battles " of Marathon and Salamin, he transforms them into new men by the ardour of his discourses, and inspires them with incredible valour and fortitude. Nothing escapes his penetrating eyes, nor his consummate prudence. He foresees all our designs, he countermines all our projects, " and disconcerts us in every thing ; and did Athens entirely confide in " him, and wholly follow his advice, we were undone without remedy. " Nothing can tempt him, nor diminish his love for his country. All the " gold of Philip finds no more access to him, than that of Persia did formerly to Aristides."

He was reduced by necessity to give this glorious testimony for himself in his just defence against Æschines his accuser and declared enemy. " Whilst all the orators have suffered themselves to be corrupted by the " presents of Philip and Alexander, it is well known," says he, " that " neither delicate conjunctures, engaging expressions, magnificent promises, hope, fear, favour, any thing in the world, have ever been able " to induce me to give up the least right or interest of my country." He adds, that instead of acting like those mercenary persons, who, in all they proposed, declared for such as paid them best (like scales, that always incline to the side from whence they receive most,) he, in all the counsels he had given, had solely in view the interest and glory of his country, and that he had always continued inflexible and incorruptible to the Macedonian gold. The sequel will show how well he supported that character to the end.

* Art of studying the Belles Lettres, Vol. II.

† Lucian in Encom. Demost. p. 940, 941.

‡ Ibid. p. 931—936.

airs, and to be the principle and soul of all the great enterprises of Athens against Philip of Macedon.

SECTION VII.

DIGRESSION OF THE MANNER OF FITTING OUT FLEETS BY THE ATHENIANS.

THE subject of this digression ought properly to have had place in the fourth section of the tenth book, where I have treated of the government and maritime affairs of the Athenians. But at that time, I had not the orations of Demosthenes, which speak of them, in my thoughts. It is a deviation from the chain of the history, which the reader may easily turn over, if he thinks fit.

The word trierarchs * signifies no more in itself than commanders of galleys. But those citizens were also called trierarchs, who were appointed to fit out the galleys in time of war, and to furnish them with all things necessary, or at least with part of them.

They were chosen out of the richest of the people, and there was no fixed number of them. Sometimes two, sometimes three, and even ten trierarchs, were appointed to equip one vessel.

† At length the number of trierarchs was established at 1200, in this manner. Athens was divided into ten tribes: 120 of the richest citizens of each tribe were nominated to furnish the expences of these armaments; and thus each tribe furnishing 120, the number of the trierarchs amounted to 1200.

Those 1200 men were again divided into two parts, of 600 each; and those 600 subdivided into two more, each of 300. The first 300 were chosen from amongst such as were richest. Upon pressing occasions they advanced the necessary expences, and were reimbursed by the other 300, who paid their proportion, as the state of their affairs would admit.

A law was afterwards made, whereby those 1200 were divided into different companies, each consisting of 16 men, who joined in the equipment of a galley. That law was very heavy upon the poorer citizens, and equally unjust at bottom; as it decreed that this number of 16 should be chosen by their age, and not their estates. It ordained that all citizens, from 25 to 40, should be included in one of these companies, and contribute one-sixteenth; so that by this law the poorer citizens were to contribute as much as the most opulent, and often found it impossible to supply an expence so much above their power. From whence it happened, that the fleet was either not armed in time, or very ill fitted out; by which means Athens lost the most favourable opportunities for action.

‡ Demosthenes, always intent upon the public good, to remedy those inconveniences, proposed the abrogation of this law by another. By the latter, the trierarchs were to be chosen, not by the number of their years, but by the value of their fortunes. Each citizen, whose estate amounted to 10 talents, § was obliged to fit out one galley, and if to 20 talents, two; and so in proportion. Such as were not worth ten talents, were to join

* *Τριηραρχος.*

† Ulpian in Olynth. ii. p. 33.

‡ 10,000 crowns.

‡ Demost. in Orat. de Classib.

Nothing could be wiser than this law of Demosthenes, which reformed all the abuses of the other. By these means the fleet was fitted out in time, and provided with all things necessary; the poor were considerably relieved, and none but the rich displeased with it; for instead of contributing only a sixteenth as by the first law, they were sometimes obliged by the second to equip a galley, and sometimes two or more, according to the amount of their estates.

The rich were in consequence very much offended at Demosthenes upon this regulation; and it was without doubt an instance of no small courage in him to disregard their complaints, and to hazard the making himself as many enemies as there were powerful citizens in Athens. Let us hear himself. " * Seeing," says he, speaking to the Athenians, " your maritime affairs are in the greatest decline, the rich possessed of an immunity purchased at a very low rate, the citizens of middle and small fortunes ate up with taxes, and the republic itself, in consequence of these inconveniences, never attempting any thing till too late for its service, I had the courage to establish a law, whereby the rich are restrained to their duty, the poor relieved from oppression, and what was of the highest importance, the republic enabled to make the necessary preparations for war in due time." He adds, that there was nothing the rich would not have given him to forbear the proposing of this law, or at least to have suspended its execution; but he did not suffer himself to be swayed either by their threats or promises, and continued firm to the public good.

Not having been able to make him change his resolution, they contrived a stratagem to render it ineffectual; for it was without doubt at their instigation, that a certain person named Patroclus, cited Demosthenes before the judges, and prosecuted him juridically as an infringer of the laws of his country. The accuser having only the fifth part of the voices on his side, was according to custom fined 500 drachms;† and Demosthenes acquitted of the charge; who relates this circumstance himself.

It is doubtful, whether at Rome, especially in the latter times, the affair would have taken this turn; for we see that whatever attempts were made by the tribunes of the people, and to whatever extremity the quarrel arose, it never was possible to induce the rich, who were far more powerful and enterprising than those of Athens, to renounce the possession of the lands which they had usurped in manifest contravention of the institutions of the state. The law of Demosthenes was approved and confirmed by the senate and the people.

We find, from what has been said, that the trierarchs fitted out the galleys and their equipage at their own expence. The state paid the mariners and soldiers generally at the rate of three oboli, or five pence a day, as has been observed elsewhere. The officers had greater pay.

The trierarchs commanded the vessel, and gave all orders on board. When there were two of them to a ship, each commanded six months.

When they quitted their office, they were obliged to give an account of their administration, and deliver a state of the vessel's equipage to their successor, or the republic. The successor was obliged to go immediately and fill up the vacant place; and if he failed to be at his post by a time assigned him, he was fined for his neglect.

As the charge of trierarch was very expensive, those who were nomina-

* Demost. pro Ctesip. p. 419.

† About 12l. 5s.

they were ready to change estates with such person, and to act in the function of trierarch after such exchange. This law was instituted by Solon, and was called the law of exchanges.

Besides the equipment of galleys which must have amounted to very great sums, the rich had another charge to support in the time of war; that was the extraordinary taxes and imposts laid on their estates; upon which sometimes the hundredth, sometimes a fiftieth, and even a twelfth were levied, according to the different occasions of the state.

* Nobody at Athens upon any pretence whatsoever, could be exempted from these two charges, except the novemviri, or nine archontes, who were not obliged to fit out galleys. So that we see, without ships or money, the republic was not in a condition either to support wars or defend itself.

There were other immunities and exemptions, which were granted to such as had rendered great services to the republic, and sometimes even to all their descendants: such as maintaining public places of exercise, with all things necessary for such as frequented them; instituting a public feast for one of the ten tribes; and defraying the expences of games and shows; all which amount to great sums.

These immunities, as has already been said, were marks of honour, and rewards of services rendered the state; as well as statues which were erected to great men, the freedom of the city, and the privilege of being maintained in the Prytaneum at the public expence. The view of Athens in these honorable distinctions, was to express their high sense of gratitude, and to kindle at the same time in the hearts of their citizens a noble thirst of glory, and an ardent love for their country.

Besides the statues erected to Harmodius and Aristogiton, the deliverers of Athens, their descendants were for ever exempted from all public employments, and enjoyed that honourable privilege many ages after.

† As Aristides died without any estate, and left his son Lysimachus no other patrimony but his glory and poverty, the republic gave him 100 acres of wood, and as much arable land in Eubœa, besides 100 minæ† at one payment, and four drachms, or 40 pence a day.

‡ Athens, in these services which were done it, regarded more the good will than the action itself. A certain person of Cyrene, named Epicerdus, being at Syracuse when the Athenians were defeated, touched with compassion for the unfortunate prisoners dispersed in Sicily, whom he saw ready to expire for want of food, distributed 100 minæ amongst them, that is, 240l. Athens adopted him into the number of her citizens, and granted him all the immunities before mentioned. Some time after in the war against the thirty tyrants, the same Epicerdus gave the city a talent.§ These were but small matters on either occasion with regard to the grandeur and power of Athens; but they were infinitely affected with the good heart of a stranger, who without any view of interest, in a time of public calamity, exhausted himself in some measure for the relief of those with whom he had no affinity, and from whom he had nothing to expect.

¶ The same freedom of the city of Athens granted an exemption from customs to Leucon, who reigned in the Bosphorus, and his children, because they yearly imported from the lands of that prince, a considerable

* Demost. advers. Lept. p. 545.

† Demost. in orat. ad Lept. p. 558.

‡ 22l. 10s sterling.

§ Demost. in orat. ad Lept. p. 757.

¶ 1000 crowns.

¶ Demost. in orat. ad Lept. p. 545, 546.

outdone by generosity, exempted the Athenian merchants from the duty of a 30th upon all grain exported from his dominions, and granted them the privilege of supplying themselves with corn in his country, in preference to all other people. That exemption amounted to a considerable sum, for they brought only from thence 2,000,000 of quarters of corn, of which the 30th part amounted to almost 70,000.

The children of Conon and Chabrias were also granted an immunity from public offices. The names only of those illustrious generals sufficiently justify that liberality of the Athenian people. A person, however, called Leptinus, out of a mistaken zeal for the public good, proposed the abrogation by a new law of all the grants of that kind, which had been made from immemorial time; except those which regarded the posterity of Harmodius and Aristogiton; and to enact that for the future the people should not be capable of granting such privileges.

Demosthenes strongly opposed this law, though with great complacency to the person who proposed it; praising his good intentions, and not speaking of him but with esteem; a much more efficacious manner of refuting, than those violent invectives, and that eager and passionate style, which serve only to alienate the people, and to render an orator suspected who decries his cause himself, and shows its weak side, by substituting injurious terms for reasons, which are alone capable of convincing.

After having shown that so odious a reduction would prove of little or no advantage to the republic, from the inconsiderable number of the exempted persons, he goes on to explain its conveniences, and set them in a full light.

“ It is first,” says he, “ doing injury to the memory of those great men, whose merit the state intended to acknowledge and reward by such immunities; it is in some manner calling in question the services they have done their country; it is throwing a suspicion upon their great actions, injurious to, if not destructive of their glory. And were they now alive and present in this assembly, which of us all would presume to offer them such an affront? Should not the respect we owe their memories make us consider them as always alive and present?”

“ But if we are little affected with what concerns them, can we be insensible to our own interest? Besides that cancelling so ancient a law is to condemn the conduct of our ancestors, what shame shall we bring upon ourselves, and what an injury shall we do our reputation? The glory of Athens, and of every well governed state, is to value itself upon its gratitude, to keep its word religiously, and to be true to all its engagements. A private person who fails in these respects, is hated and abhorred; and who is not afraid of being reproached with ingratitude? And shall the commonwealth, in cancelling a law that has received the sanction of public authority, and been in a manner consecrated by the usage of so many ages, be guilty of so notorious a prevarication? We prohibit lying in the very markets under heavy penalties, and require truth and faith to be observed in them, and shall we renounce them ourselves by the revocation of grants, passed in all their forms, and upon which every private man has a right to insist?”

“ To act in such a manner, would be to extinguish in the hearts of our citizens all emulation for glory, all desire to distinguish themselves by great exploits, all zeal for the honour and welfare of their country; which

“ny things? And is there any wisdom in proposing their defects, and not
“their virtues for our imitation?”

Demosthenes concludes with demanding the law of exemptions to be retained in all its extent, with this exception, that all persons should be deprived of the benefits of it, but those who had a just title to them; and that a strict enquiry should be made for that purpose.

It is plain that I have only made a very slight extract in this place of an exceeding long discourse, and that I designed to express only the spirit and sense, without confining myself to the method and expressions of it.

There was a meanness of spirit in Leptinus' desiring to obtain a trivial advantage for the republic, by retrenching the moderate expences that were an honour to it, and no charge to himself, whilst there were other abuses of far greater importance to reform.

Such marks of public gratitude, perpetuated in a family, perpetuate also in a state an ardent zeal for its happiness, and a warm desire to distinguish that passion by glorious actions. It is not without pain I find amongst ourselves, that part of the privileges granted to the family of the maid of Orleans have been retrenched.* Charles VII. had ennobled her, her father, three brothers, and all their descendants, even by the female line. In 1614, at the request of the attorney general, the article of nobility by the women was retrenched.

* Mezerai.

END OF VOL. II.



